

RELIGIOUS DEMOCRATS:
DEMOCRATIC CULTURE AND MUSLIM POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION IN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
at The Ohio State University

by

Saiful Mujani, MA

The Ohio State University
2003

Dissertation Committee:

Professor R. William Liddle, Adviser

Professor Bradley M. Richardson

Professor Goldie Shabad

Approved by

Adviser
Department of Political Science

ABSTRACT

Most theories about the negative relationship between Islam and democracy rely on an interpretation of the Islamic political tradition. More positive accounts are also anchored in the same tradition, interpreted in a different way. While some scholarship relies on more empirical observation and analysis, there is no single work which systematically demonstrates the relationship between Islam and democracy.

This study is an attempt to fill this gap by defining Islam empirically in terms of several components and democracy in terms of the components of democratic culture—social capital, political tolerance, political engagement, political trust, and support for the democratic system—and political participation. The theories which assert that Islam is inimical to democracy are tested by examining the extent to which the Islamic and democratic components are negatively associated.

Indonesia was selected for this research as it is the most populous Muslim country in the world, with considerable variation among Muslims in belief and practice. Two national mass surveys were conducted in 2001 and 2002.

This study found that Islam defined by two sets of rituals, the networks of Islamic civic engagement, Islamic social identity, and Islamist political orientations (Islamism) does not have a negative association with the components of democracy. The only negative relationship is found between Islamism and tolerance toward Christians.

However, intolerant Islamism is not a real threat to democratic stability because intolerant Islamists tends to be passive, not active, political participants. There is no association between intolerant Islamism and protest activity that might have the potential to destabilize the democratic system.

On the contrary, almost all components of Islam have a positive and significant relationship with secular civic engagement, with political engagement, and with political participation. These three components of democracy reinforce support for the democratic system as whole. Therefore, Islam helps Muslim citizens to be active in politics and this activity is congruent with the democratic system as a whole. What emerges is not religious Muslims who are against democracy, nor non-religious democrats, but rather religious Muslims who contribute to strengthening democracy. They are religious democrats.

Dedicated to
Ikun, Putri, Berlian, and Jagad

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work is written to fulfill the requirements for my Ph.D. degree in political science in the Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University. There are many people and institutions which help me to complete my graduate studies and this dissertation. Without their help, it would have been impossible for me to finish. I cannot mention all of them here, but I must single out a few.

First, Professor R. William Liddle, chair of my dissertation committee and academic adviser during my graduate studies here at Ohio State. He is instrumental to my academic career not only because of his intellectual stimulation, advice, and encouragement, but also because of his effort to bring me to Ohio State since the beginning. He is my *kiai* and friend. As a friend, he and his family have made me feel at home during the years that my family and I have lived in Columbus.

Professor Bradley M. Richardson has inspired my research on mass attitudes and behavior, a *rara avis* in the study of Indonesian politics. He convinced me that survey research of mass opinion, while complex and difficult, is an important way of understanding society and politics, especially in our democratic era.

Professor Goldie Shabad gave valuable comments and suggestions on the draft. She stimulated me to think more deeply about the relevance of the comparative political

science theories that I have applied to the study of Indonesian Islamic politics. Perhaps most important, she helped me to stay on track with the main theme of this project and to avoid getting lost in the jungle of findings.

Professor Azyumardi Azra, my senior colleague at the Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM), Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah, at Jakarta, strongly encouraged me to pursue my doctoral study.

Dr. Jamhari, director of the PPIM, played the essential role in the implementation of my dissertation idea. He appointed me to head the two mass survey teams, on the basis of my proposal, and allowed me to use the data for this dissertation. Without his invitation and the help of other PPIM colleagues, field coordinators and interviewers spread throughout a very large country, this dissertation would have been impossible.

In addition, I need to mention my PPIM colleagues for their extremely helpful cooperation during the surveys: Fu'ad Jabali, Ismatu Ropi, Dadi Darmadi, Oman Faturahman, Jajang Jahroni, Din Wahid, Murodi, Mahyuddin, Arief Subhan, Muhammad Dahlan, Burhanuddin, Tasman, Andy Syafrani, Tasman, and Heni Nuroni.

Here in Columbus, santri of Kiai Liddle are very helpful and encouraging: Rizal Mallarangeng, Denny J.A., Eep Saefulloh Fatah, Kuskridho Ambardi, Yohanes Sulaiman, Dinna Wisnu, Takeshi Kohno, Blair King, and Kathleen Woodward.

Some institutions provided funds for my graduate studies, dissertation research and writing: the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University, the Presidential Fellowship program of the Graduate School, The Ohio State University, Fulbright and AMINEF, USINDO, the National Science Foundation, the Asia Foundation, and the Freedom Institute.

To all of the individuals and institutions mentioned above I would like to express my gratitude. They are, of course, not responsible for any mistake in this work. All errors are mine.

Finally, my graduate studies and this dissertation would have never been completed without the support of my wife, Ikun Baikuniyah, and my children, Putri Matahari, Berlian Khatulistiwa, and Jagad Alit. They make this life beautiful.

VITA

August 8, 1962 Born – Serang, Indonesia

1998 M.A. Political Science, The Ohio State University

1989 B. A. Islamic Studies,
Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN), Jakarta

1989 – present Lecturer at the Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN),
Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta

PUBLICATIONS

Mujani, Saiful. 2002. “Civil Islam atau Negara.” *Studia Islamika* 10: 151-163.

Liddle, R. William, and Saiful Mujani. 2000. “Islam dan Kultur Demokrasi.” *Jurnal Demokrasi dan HAM* 1: 112-132.

Mujani, Saiful. 1994. “Mu‘tazilla Theology and Modernization: Intellectual Portrait of Harun Nasution.” *Studia Islamika* 1: 177-199.

FIELD OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|---|------|
| Abstract | ii |
| Dedication | iv |
| Acknowledgment | v |
| Vita | viii |
| List of Tables | xii |
| List of Figures | xvi |
| Chapters: | |
| 1. Introduction | 1 |
| 1.1. Civic Culture Perspective | 1 |
| 1.2. Religion and Democratic Culture | 6 |
| 1.3. Islam and Democracy | 13 |
| 1.4. Indonesian Muslims | 32 |
| 1.5. Hypotheses | 35 |
| 1.6. Measures of Democratic Culture, Political Participation, and Islam | 37 |
| 1.7. Method and Data | 50 |
| 1.8. Overview of Dissertation | 52 |
| 2. Islam and Democracy: Intellectual Origins and Macro-Context | 55 |
| 2.1. <i>Shari'a</i> and Politics | 56 |
| 2.2. Democracy and Indonesian Muslims | 93 |
| 2.3. Conclusion | 95 |
| 3. Dimensions and Measures of Islam | 101 |
| 3.1. Faith | 102 |
| 3.2. Mandatory Rituals | 104 |
| 3.3. Suggested Rituals | 105 |
| 3.4. Nahdliyin Rituals | 109 |
| 3.5. Islamic Social Capital | 110 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 3.6. Islamist political orientations (Islamism) | 119 |
| 3.7. Patterns of relationship among Islamic components | 123 |
| 3.8. Correlates of Islamic components and socio-Economic and demographic factors | 126 |
| 3.9. Conclusion | 128 |
| 4. Social capital | 129 |
| 4.1. Interpersonal trust | 142 |
| 4.2. Networks of civic engagement | 152 |
| 4.3. Islam and social capital | 160 |
| 4.4. Conclusion | 163 |
| 5. Political Tolerance | 163 |
| 5.1. Tolerance and Democracy | 168 |
| 5.2. Islam and Tolerance | 180 |
| 5.3. Islam, Democratic Values, and Tolerance | 190 |
| 5.4. Political Tolerance and Communism | 198 |
| 5.5. Conclusion | 200 |
| 6. Political Engagement and Trust in Political Institutions | 200 |
| 6.1. Political engagement | 212 |
| 6.2. Trust in Political Institutions | 212 |
| 6.3. Political Engagement and Trust in Political Institutions | 217 |
| 6.4. Islam, Political Engagement, and Trust in Political Institutions | 221 |
| 6.5. Conclusion | 232 |
| 7. Support for Democratic System | 234 |
| 7.1. Islam, Democratic Satisfaction, and Democratic Principles | 234 |
| 7.2. Islam and Political Community | 255 |
| 7.3. Conclusion | 266 |
| 8. Political Participation | 268 |
| 8.1. Political Participation: Meaning, Measures, and Dimensions | 269 |
| 8.2. Multidimensionality of Political Participation | 285 |
| 8.3. Islam and Political Participation | 288 |
| 8.4. Conclusion | 313 |
| 9. The Congruence between Islam and Democracy | 315 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 9.1. Congruence between the Components of Democracy | 315 |
| 9.4. Islam, Political Alienation, and Political Protest | 320 |
| 9.3. Islam, Political Tolerance, and Political Participation | 328 |
| 9.4. Conclusion | 332 |
| 10. Conclusion | 334 |
| Appendix A | 351 |
| Appendix B | 356 |
| Bibliography | 371 |

LIST OF TABLES

Tables:

| | | |
|-----|---|-----|
| 3.1 | Factor analysis of Islamic rituals (varimax rotation) | 108 |
| 3.2 | Inter-component correlations (Pearson's r) of Islam | 121 |
| 3.3 | Correlations (Pearson's r) between Islam and socio-economic and demographic factors 2002 (2001) | 125 |
| 4.1 | Interpersonal trust ("most people can be trusted") among Indonesian Muslims and some other nations according to religious tradition | 138 |
| 4.2 | Active membership in several civic associations in a number of nations | 151 |
| 4.3 | Correlations (Pearson's r) between Islam, demographic and socio-economic factors, and social capital. 2002 (2001) | 155 |
| 4.4 | Multivariate analysis of secular civic engagement (standardized regression coefficients - beta) | 159 |
| 5.1 | Intolerance: object to having neighbors of different religious group in a number of nations | 174 |
| 5.2 | Some indicators of tolerance toward the least liked group in several nations | 179 |
| 5.3 | Correlations (Pearson's r) of Islam and tolerance | 186 |
| 5.4 | Multivariate analysis of political tolerance (standardized regression coefficients) | 188 |
| 6.1 | Inter-correlations of feeling close to the seven largest parties | 207 |
| 6.2 | Some indicators of political engagement in a number of nations | 211 |
| 6.3 | Some indicators of confidence in political institutions in several nations | 216 |

| | | |
|-----|---|-----|
| 6.4 | Inter-item correlation of political information 2002 (2001) | 218 |
| 6.5 | Correlation between components of political engagement 2002 (2001) | 219 |
| 6.6 | Correlations between components of political engagement and trust in political institutions | 220 |
| 6.7 | Correlations between Islamic components, political engagement components, and trust in political institutions | 224 |
| 6.8 | Multivariate analysis of political engagement (<i>Standardized Regression Coefficients</i>) | 230 |
| 6.9 | Multivariate analysis of trust in political institutions (<i>Standardized regression coefficients</i>) | 232 |
| 7.1 | Correlations (Pearson's <i>r</i>) of the components of democratic political culture | 250 |
| 7.2 | Correlations (Pearson's <i>r</i>) between Islam, other factors, and support for the democratic system | 251 |
| 7.3 | Strong support for political communities in several religions and nations | 262 |
| 7.4 | Multivariate analysis of support for democratic system (standardized regression coefficients) | 265 |
| 8.1 | Components and items of political activity | 276 |
| 8.2 | Some political activities: Indonesia in the world | 284 |
| 8.3 | Dimensionality of political participation | 287 |
| 8.4 | Correlations of (<i>r</i>) Islamic components, demographic variables, socio- economic status, political engagement, and political activities | 304 |
| 8.5 | Multivariate analysis of campaign activity (standardized regression coefficients) | 305 |
| 8.6 | Multivariate analysis of community Activity(standardized regression coefficients) | 306 |
| 8.7 | Multivariate analysis of petition activity (standardized regression coefficients)..... | 307 |

| | | |
|------|---|-----|
| 8.8 | Multivariate analysis of protest activity (standardized regression coefficients) | 308 |
| 8.9 | Multivariate analysis of overall political participation (standardized regression coefficients) | 310 |
| 9.1 | Correlations (Pearson's r) of the components of democratic political culture | 318 |
| 9.2 | Correlations between participation and support for democratic system | 319 |
| 9.3 | Typology of citizens according to the combination of political efficacy and trust in political institutions | 324 |
| 9.4 | Typology of citizens according to the combination of political efficacy and political trust | 325 |
| 9.5 | Typology of citizens according to the combination of interest in politics and political trust | 325 |
| 9.6 | Typology of citizens according to the combination of political efficacy and political trust | 325 |
| 9.7 | Typology of citizens according to the combination of political efficacy and political trust | 326 |
| 9.8 | Correlation (Pearson's r) between citizen type and forms of political participation | 326 |
| 9.9 | Correlations (tau-b) between Islamic components and apathetic and allegiant citizens according to the combination of trust and the components of political engagement | 327 |
| 9.10 | Association between Islamists and tolerance toward Christians 2002 | 329 |
| 9.11 | Correlations (tau-b) between intolerant Islamists and political Participation | 331 |
| 9.12 | Tolerance and political participation | 331 |
| 10.1 | Summary of the relationships between Islam and the components of democracy | 347 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| Figure: | Page |
|---------|---|
| 3.1 | Performance of mandatory rituals (very or quite frequently) 103 |
| 3.2 | Intensity (very or quite frequently) of performance of various suggested and Nahdliyin rituals 107 |
| 3.3 | Islamic social capital: networks of Islamic engagement and Islamic social identity 109 |
| 3.4 | Support for Islamism 116 |
| 4.1 | Most people can be trusted or can't be too careful 137 |
| 4.2 | Trust in fellow citizens in general 141 |
| 4.3 | Trust in fellow citizens who belong to another religion 141 |
| 4.4 | Proportions of active membership in various civic associations among Indonesians 149 |
| 4.5 | Number of civic associations in which a citizen is engaged 150 |
| 5.1 | Respondents who object to having various groups as neighbors 173 |
| 5.2 | Socio-political tolerance of Muslims toward Christians/Catholics 177 |
| 5.3 | The least liked group in society 177 |
| 5.4 | Some indicators of political tolerance toward the least liked groups 178 |
| 6.1 | Interest in Politics 202 |
| 6.2 | Partisanship: feeling close to a political party 206 |
| 6.3 | Exposure to political news everyday or most days of the week according to various mass media 209 |

| | | |
|-----|--|-----|
| 6.4 | Some indicators of political efficacy | 211 |
| 6.5 | Some indicators of political and social trust | 215 |
| 7.1 | Some indicators of support for democratic values | 242 |
| 7.2 | Some indicators of Indonesian citizens' evaluation of democratic Performance | 244 |
| 7.3 | Some indicators of support for the Indonesian political community | 260 |
| 7.4 | Strength in attachment to national political community according to the population of Java/Non-Java and Javanese/non-Javanese ethnic groups ... | 261 |
| 8.1 | Forms of political activity | 281 |
| 8.2 | Quantity of political activity without voting | 282 |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Civic Culture Perspective

A global tendency in the post-cold war period is the increase in the number of democratic or democratizing regimes. However, this tendency does not occur in most predominantly Muslim states (Freedom House 2002, Lipset 1994, Huntington 1997, 1991). On the basis of Freedom House's Index of Political Rights and Civil Liberty in the last three decades, Muslim states have generally failed to establish democratic politics. In that period, only one Muslim country has established a full democracy for more than five years, i.e. Mali in Africa. There are twelve semi-democratic countries, defined as partly free. The rest (35 states) are authoritarian (fully not free). Moreover, eight of the fifteen most repressive regimes in the world in the last decade are found in Muslim states.

This is a significant finding. In virtually every region of the world—Asia, Africa, Latin America, the former USSR, and Eastern Europe—the democratic tendency is strong. Authoritarian politics has been declining in non-Muslim states, while in Muslim states it has been relatively constant.

Moreover, the collapse of the USSR was followed by the rise of new nation-states, six of which have Muslim majorities: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgistan,

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Within these Muslim countries, based on the Freedom House index, authoritarian regimes have emerged, while within their non-Muslim counterparts in the former USSR democratic regimes have been the norm. Cyprus is also an interesting case. The country is divided into Greek and Turkish Cyprus, and their democraticness varies. The Greek side is more democratic.

One aspect of the third wave of democratization, to quote Huntington (1991), is the rise of democratic regimes in Eastern Europe. However, two predominantly Muslim countries, Albania and Bosnia, have been the least democratic in the region.

Students of Islam commonly acknowledge that the Arab World or the Middle East is the heart of Islamic culture and civilization. Islam has been almost identical with the Arab world. Muslim elites, activists, or intellectuals from this region, compared to other regions, are the most willing to articulate their Islamic identity, solidarity, and brotherhood as reactions against non-Muslim culture and politics. Unfortunately, most regimes of the region are authoritarian.

The question is: why is democracy rare in Muslim states, even in the current period of global democratization? If democracy is introduced to a Muslim state, why is it likely to be unstable or unconsolidated? Is this phenomenon associated with Islam?

Some students of Muslim society and of political science believe that Islam is responsible for the absence of democracy in the Muslim world (Huntington 1997 1991, 1984; Kedourie 1994, 1992, Lipset 1994, Lewis 2002, 1993, Gellner 1994, Mardin 1995). However, this claim has rarely been tested through systematic observation on the basis of

measures of the two critical concepts, i.e. Islam and democracy, and how the two may be systematically associated. This study intends to fill this gap through elaboration and testing of the arguments of the scholars who have preceded me.

The claim that Islam is responsible for the lack of democracy or for unstable democracy in predominantly Muslim states must be evaluated as a problem of political culture in which political behavior, institutions, and performance are shaped by culture. The political culture approach is necessary to assess the core arguments and the logic underlying the analysis of Huntington and other critics of Islamic democracy.

At the same time, Huntington and the others are not systematic in the way in which they construct their argument, nor do they provide satisfactory evidence to support their claim. This study is designed to approach the issue more systematically by deploying the civic culture perspective laid out initially by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963). In its focus on attitudes, beliefs, and orientations, this perspective is the closest to Huntington, while being scientifically more persuasive.

Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture* is the first work which addresses systematically the problem of democracy from the political culture perspective. They define political culture as psychological orientation toward social objects, or as attitudes toward the political system and toward the self as a political actor (Almond and Verba 1963). This orientation includes individual knowledge or belief, feelings or affection, and evaluation or judgment of the political system in general, political inputs and outputs, and one's own role within the political system. Variation in these orientations and attitudes are believed to shape political participation and to effect democratic stability.

Almond and Verba believe that variation in political orientations produces three types of political culture: parochial, subject, and participant. In parochial political culture structural differentiation, for example between the religious and the political, is absent. People are unable to orient themselves towards structurally differentiated political systems. Individuals who adhere to this political culture tend to be apathetic or alienated from the political system.

Unlike parochial culture, subject political culture tends to make people active towards structurally differentiated political systems in general and towards the output side of the system, but passive towards the political input side. As with the parochial, the subject is characterized by an absence of orientation towards the self as a participant in the input side of the political process.

Finally, the participant is characterized by the presence of orientations not only toward the structurally differentiated political system in general and the output side of the system but also toward the input side and the self as an active participant. The participant, however, does not eliminate either the parochial or the subject. The participant orientation is an addition. Therefore, participants do not necessarily leave their primordial orientation. For example, a devoutly religious individual can be an active participant, supporting specific government policies and articulating his or her views as to what the government should do.

This mixed political culture is believed to have a positive impact on democratic stability. Almond and Verba's civic culture is in fact not merely participant political culture, but participant political culture *plus something else, i.e.* activism plus passivism,

when viewed as a whole. The result is moderate, rather than radical, political behavior. The orientation is not toward revolutionary but rather toward gradual change in the society and polity.

The civic culture syndrome has been strongly criticized (Barry 1970, Pateman 1971, Muller and Seligson 1994, Tarrow 1996) but remains resilient, at least in the scholarship of democracy in the developed nations.¹ The increase in the number of democracies in the world has raised the question of the extent to which the new democracies can become stable or consolidated. In attempting to answer this question, a significant number of studies have turned back substantively to the civic culture syndrome. Inglehart even proclaimed "the renaissance of political culture" in which political culture is believed to be a crucial factor to explain democratic stability (1988). Or, as a counter to Skocpol's idea of "bringing the state back in," he suggested the idea of "bringing the people back in" to explain political phenomena, especially democratic stability (1997). Regardless of their conclusions, Norris' *Critical Citizens* (1999) or her *Democratic Phoenix* (2002), for example, are studies about global support for democracy and political participation among people which are theoretically guided by the civic culture syndrome. Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* (1993) is probably the most cited recent work which revives the idea of civic culture to explain democratic performance. It has brought back not only Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture* but also Tocqueville's

¹ See for example *Belief in Government's* series: Klingemann and Fuchs (eds.) (1995), van Deth and Scarbrough (eds.) (1995), Kaase and Newton (1995).

Democracy in America which emphasized the importance of political culture, and specifically civic association, for American democracy. All of these works argue that political culture cannot be ignored in democratic studies.

Accordingly, I will discuss the issue of the relationship between Islam and democracy in this introduction according to the logic of the civic culture research tradition. Democratic culture and behavior are understood as composed of several components: secular civic engagement, interpersonal trust, tolerance, political engagement, support for democratic system, and political participation. The claim that Islam is inimical to democracy can therefore be evaluated by exploring the extent to which Islam has a negative relationship with support for secular civic engagement, interpersonal trust, tolerance, political engagement, and political participation in addition to support for the democratic system. Before discussing these issues, I will offer a brief overview of how religion and democratic culture have generally been addressed in social science.

1.2. Religion and Democratic Culture

All important works on the association between political culture and democracy recognize the role of the religious factor. Tocqueville revealed how religion (values and association) positively influenced American democracy, while Putnam found that Catholicism in Italy has a negative relationship with democratic performance. Inglehart

(1999, 1997, 1988) in a multi-national study found that difference in religious tradition produces difference in interpersonal trust as a crucial component of democratic culture, which in turn affects democratic stability.

Why and how does religion shape political culture? The influence of religion on culture depends on the importance of religion in a society. If religion is important to a person, it may influence his or her way of viewing and evaluating other aspects of human life. The more important a person considers religion in his or her life the more likely he or she is to view other aspects of life from a religious perspective.

This likely impact of religion on politics lies in the nature of religion itself, i.e. “a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of the general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” (Geertz 1973, 30). The religious and the political interact because the latter also deals with individual moods, motivations, and interests.

Religion acts to establish long lasting moods and motivations because it is a system of values. Value change does not occur easily since it is rooted in metaphysical beliefs (Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1995, 76). This does not mean that values cannot change, or are presumed to be changeless essences. They are not changeless essences but rather patterns of belief that are relatively stable in time and place, and therefore may have a relatively independent impact on human attitudes and behavior (cf. van Deth and Scarbrough 1995, 37).

Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere (1995, 77) argue that “value change may be better understood as a complex process of reinterpreting old, highly abstract value concepts.

...conceptualizing value change as a process of changing interpretations in the process of value change.” In addition, value change may occur without corresponding social change. To change a value system requires among other things a reinterpretation of old concepts. Conflict frequently occurs, in which conservative interpreters may prevail, stabilizing and legitimating old values in the process. There is no essentialism in this understanding of value, but rather a stabilization of particular values through the maintenance of dominant interpretations (cf. van Deth and Scarbrough 1995, 37). Which interpretation is dominant in a community is a matter of empirical observation rather than speculation.

Social scientists are split into three camps regarding the relationship between religion and politics.² The first camp claims that religion is a conservative force that constrains social and political change, i.e. political modernization. The second claims that the significance of religion in politics declines as modernization succeeds. The third believes that religion, at least indirectly, contributes to political modernization.

Social scientists have traditionally treated religion as a source of political stability.³ It is believed to provide supernatural justification or legitimacy for inequality in society. In the Marxian perspective, for example, religion is "the opium of the people" in the sense that it makes us unaware of real problems faced in daily life by redirecting attention from our current condition to something else, to the elusive other world. Religion is believed to alienate people from this world. This characteristic of religion in

² For the state of the art on religion and politics in the last ten years, see Moaddel (2002), Gill (2001), Chaves and Gorski (2001), Sherkat and Ellison (1999), and Billings and Scott (1994).

³ For discussion of this issue see for example Billings and Scott (1994).

a community of unequals tends to make religion pro status quo because the inequality is metaphysically justified.⁴ It discourages citizens from participating in politics. This Marxian perspective is similar to the modernization or political development theory in the 1960s, in which religion is likely to discourage people from orienting themselves to politics. Religion is believed to be an element in a traditional parochial political culture (Almond and Verba 1963).

Modernization theorists argued that modernization, characterized by social differentiation or division of labor and by rationalization in society, makes the role of religion in society, and especially in the polity, decline (Billings and Scott, 1994). However, structural differentiation does not necessarily make religion insignificant in politics. The compensatory characteristics of religion may also be transformed into “a politically activating religion when infused with a community, rather than an individual, spirit.” (Leege 1993, 15). Religion is believed to have power to create social solidarity, produce a sense of community. This sense of community may in turn function to mediate collective action, which is crucial in democracy.

Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* is the *locus classicus* for the argument of the indirect role of religion in democracy. Among Americans, as Tocqueville witnessed them, religion helped resolve the existential problem, i.e. fear of nothingness, because religion brought the idea of eternity and hope (2000, 284). Religion also justifies equality and freedom, which cannot be realized if religion mixes directly with political affairs. In his words, “When religion seeks to found its empire only on the desire of immortality

⁴ For discussion of this issue see for example Leege (1993).

that torments the hearts of all men equally, it can aim at universality; but when it comes to be united with a government, it must adopt maxims that are applicable only to certain people. So, therefore, in allying itself with political power, religion increases its power over some and loses the hope of reigning over all” (284). That is how Americans, according to Tocqueville, perceived religion. In this sense, religion is crucial to politics, but the two are not mixed. Religion itself inspires or even constitutes the separation of church and state. “In so far as a nation takes on a democratic social state,” according to Tocqueville’s interpretation of the Americans’ mores, “it becomes more and more dangerous for religion to unite with authority; for the time approaches when power is going to pass from hand to hand ... when men, laws, and constitutions themselves will disappear or be modified daily ... Agitation and instability are due to the nature of democratic republics” (285).

Those were the mores underpinning the absence of priests’ direct involvement in politics. They did not fill public posts. They were specifically concerned with the interests of all rather than of a particular group, and therefore they concentrate more on societal affairs such as church and school. In a democracy, citizens are involved in matters of state. They are oriented toward the state. However, they are relatively still autonomous from state influence. They are critical, and even shape the state. This autonomy of the citizenry is helped by religion, by religious associations such as churches, and therefore religion becomes a cultural foundation of a democratic republic. In the church, citizens “derive essential skills from active citizenship such as social skills in listening, mediating, and leading; awareness of public issues from a moral perspective; encouragement to join other civic and community betterment activities; a conviction that

there is a sacred character to social obligations that transcends self interest; and the self-esteem that derives from practice with public assignments” (Wald 1992; cf. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). In this sense, religion is a form of culture, and culture “structures individual worldviews, helps to generate foundational beliefs, delineate appropriate behavior, and define personal identity” (Wildavsky 1987).

In the case of America as observed by Tocqueville, religious identity, generated from particular mores, is positive for democracy. This positive impact of religion on democracy, and more specifically political participation, has been reemphasized by students of social science (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Wuthnow 1999). Religion (church) helps generate civic skills, and citizens who are involved in church activities are in fact encouraged to be involved in non-religious or secular civic activity, which in turn encourages political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

The logic underlying the relationship between religion and political participation is clearly stated by Wuthnow (1999, 334): “Active church members are likely to be exposed to religious teachings about loving their neighbor and being responsible citizens, they are more likely to have social capital in the form of ties to fellow congregants that can be used to mobilize their energies, and they are more likely to be aware of needs and opportunities in their communities as a result of attending services in their congregations.”

This pattern of relationship between religion and political participation is probably unique to American society. However, many other cases indicate that religion positively contributes to democracy. In Brazil and South Korea, for example, religion is believed to contribute positively to political participation (McDonough, Shin, and Moises

1998). In these countries, according to McDonough, Shin, and Moises (1998, 938) “religion became a mobilizing force with democratization, not only encouraging but forming one of the main vehicles of collective action.” The authors have even made a larger claim that the secularization thesis does not work in the third wave of democratization.

In line with this proposition, a significant number of social scientists argue that the emergence of religious fundamentalism falsifies the secular thesis of modernization theory (Billing and Scott 1994). However, Marty and Appleby (1993, 2) argue that religious fundamentalism is a “reaction to aspects of the global process of modernization and secularization in the twentieth century.” They claim that religious fundamentalism is “a tendency and a habit of mind ... [that] manifests itself as a strategy or set of strategies by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group.” (Ibid, 3). “Reaction to ... modernization and secularization” and “to preserve” religion as a distinctive identity of a group are words from the modernization theory of secularization which clearly indicates that fundamentalism is a negative phenomenon in modern politics.

I argue, however, that our experience with fundamentalism, whether it is a reaction against secular politics or not, shows that religion can encourage its followers to act politically rather than to be absent from politics. It is not a parochial political behavior characterized by the absence of an orientation towards the existing political system (Almond and Verba 1963). In Iran, fundamentalism has successfully changed the non-democratic regime.

Nonetheless, I tend to believe that some elements of modernization theory, especially the concept of “alienation,” or religion-based negative reactions to secular politics is, as I will discuss shortly, still useful especially to explain “Islamic fundamentalist political behavior.” Marty and Appleby’s proposition about religious fundamentalism as a reaction to secularization and democratization is likely quite accurate at least in the case of Islamic fundamentalism.

The case of liberation theology in Latin America which indicates that religion not only contributes to the fall of authoritarian regimes, but also to the founding of democracy (Billing and Scott 1994), should be differentiated from “religious fundamentalism.” The two religious movements are quite different in their substance and orientation. I tend to argue that liberation theology is different from fundamentalism, at least Islamic fundamentalism. The former is a Catholicism-based popular movement that demands a democratic polity combined with a socialist spirit of social justice (Sigmund 1994). In Islamic society, fundamentalism is a reaction against the democratic polity, and for an Islam-based political system (cf. Moussali 1999).

On the other hand, sweeping generalizations about the constructive contribution of religion to democracy are likely to be wrong. The cases of religion in North America and current Latin America, which positively contribute to democracy, are quite different from Catholicism in Italy (Putnam 1993). In his study of Italian democratic performance Putnam found that Catholic religiosity (clericalism) has a strongly negative association with civic culture, or more specifically civic community. He believes that organized religion in Catholic Italy is an alternative to, not a part of, civic community. In Italian history, he argues more specifically,

Despite the reforms of the Second Vatican Council and the flowering of many divergent ideological tendencies among the faithful, the Italian Church retains much of the heritage of the Counter-Reformation, including an emphasis on the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the traditional virtues of obedience and acceptance of one's station in life. ... Vertical bonds of authority are more characteristic of the Italian Church than horizontal bonds of fellows.

Unlike in the United States, in Italy democracy is more associated with the secular civic community rather than with the church. Putnam believes that pious Catholics are more concerned with the city of God than the city of man. This claim of the negative impact of Catholicism on democracy in Italy is probably comparable to the claims made by many students of social science and historians of Muslim society, as will be discussed shortly. I will address this issue from the most diffuse claims about the relationship between Islam and democracy, i.e. how Islam as a set of political values constrains Muslim support for democracy.

1.3. Islam and Democracy

Elie Kedourie (1992, 1), a student of Muslim politics, has made a sweeping generalization about the uniqueness of Islam and its relation to society and politics. He argues that Islamic beliefs, norms, attitudes, and experience have shaped a distinctive and non-modern Muslim view of politics. Muslim civilization is unique; Muslims are proud of their heritage and closed to the outside world. This civilization, Kedourie believes, constrains Muslims from learning about and appreciating the social and political progress achieved by others (Ibid).

The self-sufficiency and exclusivity of Islam lie in the fact that religion, according to Bernard Lewis (2002, 100), regulates all aspects of Muslim life. It is unthinkable for

Muslims to belong to any social group, enjoy any activities, or develop any aspect of life outside religious regulation and jurisdiction. There is no distinction in Muslim society between the law of religion and the law of the state, which is basic to modern politics. All aspects of Muslim life, including the political, are regulated by a single divine law (*shari'a*) (Ibid). Secularism, as a crucial element of modern society and polity, Lewis continues, cannot be expected to emerge from within the society. Secularism might be imported from the West, but the attempt has sparked widespread rejection from Muslims, reflecting the belief that Islam is a self-sufficient religion which encompasses all aspects of human life.

Muslims are not likely to learn from other political systems about the merits and demerits of democracy. According to Huntington (1997) if they attempt to introduce democracy to their societies they are likely to be unsuccessful since their religion, which is pervasive in their life, is inimical to democracy. Huntington argues that the failure of democracy in Muslim societies is at least partly due to the nature of Islamic culture and society, inhospitable to Western liberal concepts (112).

Muslims view their culture as basically different from Western culture (Ibid, 114). This difference produces clashes rather than cooperation, mutual-understandings, and awareness of interdependence. This sense of difference does not exist in Islamic fundamentalism as a variant of Muslim society, but in Islam itself: "The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture" (Ibid).

Huntington makes no qualification about Islam. He believes that even liberal Muslim groups remain hostile to Western political culture (1997, 214). In addition, he

found that Islamic resurgence is a general phenomenon. It makes Islam more salient in people's lives. Islamic resurgence is not connected to Islamic fundamentalism, but to Islam itself. It is the mainstream rather than the periphery, and is pervasive. Islamic resurgence refers not only to the reassertion of the importance of Islam for personal piety but also, and more importantly, to the mainstream belief that Islam is the only solution to any problem faced by Muslims anywhere (Ibid, 109-111). Again, the slogan that Islam is the solution exists not only among Islamic fundamentalists but also among Muslims everywhere regardless of their social and political tendencies. Muslims world-wide have become more Islamic and Islamist in their cultural, social, and political life (Ibid).

Huntington, Kedourie, and Lewis's central points about the relationship between Islam and politics are: (1) Islam is a total way of life set by shari'a which regulates all individual and collective aspects of Muslim life, and therefore there is no distinction between religion and politics; (2) this way of life is not extremist but mainstream and pervasive; (3) it is antagonistic to democracy, and therefore democracy in Muslim community is unlikely. Support for a democratic regime with institutions which are differentiated from religious institutions is not likely. Muslims are also likely to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works not because of bad democratic performance but because of the contradiction with Islamic political culture. Muslims are likely to be alienated from the democratic regime and institutions. This alienation has the potential to destabilize democracy.

Having stated their general claim about the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy, Huntington and Kedourie more specifically emphasize the contradictions between the idea of *umma* (community of Islamic believers) and the

nation-state as a basic element of modern politics on which democracy is founded. In democratic studies, a democracy is understood in the context of the nation-state. There will be no democracy without the nation-state (Linz and Stephan, 1996). The crucial relationship between democracy and the nation-state lies in the necessity of any regime, including democracy, to enforce law and order, and to control its territory. The state is the only institution that can legitimately use coercion, without which democracy is unthinkable. This relationship is especially crucial for the consolidation of democracy.

The idea of the nation-state was introduced to Muslim societies in the early twentieth century, when the Ottoman caliphate fell apart. Muslim societies became small nation-states in which nation (ethnicity, language, tribe, etc.) became the cultural basis for the political community. Therefore, the nation-state understood in modern political language is a relatively new concept to Muslim communities. Does this new concept necessarily alienate Muslims from their *umma* as another political community, or vice versa?

Kedourie, Lewis, and Huntington believe that the concept of nation-state is alien to Muslims and cannot be institutionalized in the Muslim community because it is antagonistic to the pervasive concept of *umma*. The *umma* is a community or solidarity group which is built on the basis of Islamic faith and overarches ethnic or national solidarity.

Kedourie argues that Muslims everywhere have a single community, the *umma*, in which the temporal and the spiritual are together codified in the shari'a as revealed in the Qur'an and Sunna (1992, 1-2). The *umma* is the object of God's plan of salvation. A distinctive characteristic of the *umma* is its division of the world into two domains, i.e.

the *dar al-Islam* (the abode of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (the abode of war). The dar al-Islam is under Islamic rule, while the dar al-harb is under infidel rule. The dar al-Islam recognizes no permanent territorial frontier as Muslims may live in various societies and nations with different territories (Ibid). Kedourie believes that this understanding of umma exists and a part of Islamic political culture which shapes the way Muslims interact with other religions and other nations. The idea of a fixed territory of a nation is unthinkable. The umma can be expansive as it is “dedicated to the service of God according to His commandments, and to spreading the true faith” (Ibid).

Lewis (2002, 102) makes almost the same point regarding the nature of the umma and its relationship to the nation-state. He believes that the notion of umma is reviving among Muslims. It is pervasive and potentially destabilizes the nation-state building process, as it preaches supra-national Muslim solidarity (Bendix, 1978, 594).

The idea of the nation-state has been widely adopted in Muslim societies. However, the idea of umma is so strong in the minds of Muslims that any actual regime in Muslim society, at least in the Middle East, merges the idea of Arab nationalism and the concept of umma. The outcome of this merger is nationalism with a strong romantic appeal (Ibid). This merger, Bendix believes, is not a synthesis between nationalism and religious sentiment, but a dilemma for Muslim leaders because they are torn between the popular sentiment of the umma and the need for economic development which undermines that sentiment (Ibid).

Huntington (1997, 174-5) believes that the synthesis between Islamic sentiment and the idea of the nation-state is unlikely. Muslims’ loyalty to the umma is so strong that it defeats their solidarity to the nation-state. This destabilizing effect lies in the

nature of the umma itself. Muslims are unsuccessful in transforming their political loyalty from the umma to the nation-state. The pervasiveness of the idea of umma makes unlikely the emergence of loyalty to the nation-state. Huntington believes that umma and nation-state are antithetical. Muslims' loyalty to umma and other primordial entities such as family and tribe are stronger than to the nation-state.

This structure of loyalty differentiates Muslim from Western society. In the latter political loyalty to nation-state is stronger than to religion and other primordial backgrounds. Loyalty to religion is subordinated to loyalty to the nation-state. In Western societies, the structure of nation-state loyalty relative to religion tend to peak in the middle, forming an inverse U. While in Muslim societies the structure of loyalty, according to Huntington, is almost exactly the inverse (Ibid). "The small group and the great faith, the tribe and the umma, have been the principal foci of loyalty and commitment, and the nation state has been less significant" (Ibid). If Huntington is correct that Muslims tend to have weak nation-state loyalty, then democratic stability is unlikely. Loyalty to the nation-state is a cultural precondition to state stability, which is necessary for democratic consolidation.

Another problem for the relationship between Islam and democracy is the absence of civil society, believed to be important for democratic consolidation (Schmitter 1997). However, "Islamic civil society" is likely in a Muslim community as Islam has social norms and institutions which may be conducive to the emergence of civil society such as *waqf* or pious endowment and *sedekah* or charity (Lewis 2002, 110). The *waqf* and *sedekah* are Islamic social welfare institutions. They may help to give rise to an "Islamic civil society" in which norms and regulations are rooted in religion.

Secular civil society, i.e. civil society which is established beyond Islamic norms and regulations, is alien to Islamic tradition. Lewis believes that there is no Muslim social organization independent from religious norms. Civil society independent from the religious domain emerged in Muslim societies as the result of Western, especially French, influence (Lewis 2002, 110). The idea was transmitted from the West to the Muslim world through Muslims educated in the West. It is quite new and probably has no root in Muslim communities. It was an alien concept to Muslims. Lewis asserts that in the Muslim mind those who lacked religious guidance “were pagans and idolaters, and their society or polity was evil. Any Muslim who sought to join them or imitate them was an apostate.” (2002, 113).

This tradition, which is not conducive to the emergence and strengthening of secular civil society, may be still pervasive in Muslim communities if the claim that there is no social organization beyond religious regulation and the idea that there is no distinction between politics and religion in Muslim communities are correct. This may be the logic underpinning the absence or weakness of civil society in the Middle East which results in the absence of political liberalization in the region. John Waterbury, a political economist, recognizes this problem.

Despite economic improvement in the Middle East, Waterbury observes, the middle class is weak, dependent on or absorbed by the state, and therefore civil society relatively independent from state cannot emerge. The dependence on the state is partly shaped by the claim that the state functions according to religious norms and for a religious mission. Therefore the state demands that people stand behind it (Waterbury 1996, 33). Islamist groups react against the state with a similar claim that their reaction is

part of a religious mission. The influence of religion in shaping the behavior of the state and Islamist groups has closed the space for the creation and strengthening of civil society in the region. Religion has therefore become a part of the problem. It must be altered to open more space for civil society and democracy. Waterbury believes that “political Islam must enter the equation as a unique force” (Ibid, 44-5).

The absence of significant civil society in Muslim world, in Ernest Gellner's observation, lies in the characteristics of Muslim society in which social solidarity is built on the basis of a combination between Islamic and tribal or kin solidarities. This combination is unfavorable to the growth of civil society (Gellner 1994). Gellner believed that religion and clientelism together are pervasive in Muslim societies. This combination legitimizes and strengthens the state. Secular civil society, because of lack of religious legitimacy, cannot grow (Ibid, 28). Gellner contrasted Islam and civil society as the former “exemplifies a social order which seems to lack much capacity to provide political countervailing institutions or associations, which is atomized without much individualism, and operates effectively without intellectual pluralism” (Ibid, 29-30).

If Lewis', Waterbury's, and Gellner's observations of the relationship between Islam and civil society in Muslim communities are correct, then I expect that the set of Islamic rituals, which is more fundamental in Islamic orthodoxy, is likely to have a positive relationship with “Islamic civil society,” but a negative relationship with “secular civil society,” and that Islamic civil society is inimical to secular civil society. A religion-based civic community syndrome which helps religious citizens to be engaged in the secular civic community, which in turn encourages engagement in politics, is expected not to happen in Muslim communities.

The significance of civil society for democracy is its function as social capital. Citizens are coordinated to be engaged in and to participate in politics, crucial democratic activities. Civil society helps encourage political interest, partisanship, political discussion, being well-informed in politics, and political efficacy (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Almond and Verba 1963).

In his *Making Democracy Work* (1993, 167), Putnam refers to trust, norms of reciprocity, and networks of civic engagement as features of social organization that "can improve efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions." The importance of social capital to democracy mainly lies in the fact that democracy requires the collective support of citizens. This collective support is likely if the people can cooperate to achieve their collective goals, or if the people are accustomed to cooperation in society (Putnam 2002, 6).

In addition, civil society is believed to contribute to democratic consolidation as it helps to bridge democratic government and citizens through several mechanisms. Civil society stabilizes expectations, and this helps communication between society and government; channels self-expression, and therefore helps citizens not to be alienated from the system; helps to govern behavior of citizens, and therefore reduces the burden of government; functions as a reservoir for resistance to arbitrary or tyrannical action by rulers; and inculcates norms of behavior that are civic. (Schmitter 1997, 247)

Civil society as a network of civic engagement is only one component of social capital, however. Two other components are norms of reciprocity and interpersonal trust (Putnam, 1993, 170). Inglehart (1999) states that interpersonal trust is very important to democratic consolidation. It helps reduce uncertainty in the interactions among the

people and reduce transaction costs. In a democracy, elite attitudes and behavior reflect the society. Distrust among political elites that may constrain democratic performance is embedded in society. Democracy is unlikely to be stable and effective if interpersonal trust among political elites is absent. Trust among the elites that their opponents will not put them in the jail after the election but keep open the opportunity for contestation helps to create loyal opposition conducive to democratic stability (Inglehart 1999, 98).

Democracy requires collective action and coordination, which are helped by interpersonal trust (Warren 1999, 4). Democracy is built on a complex and differentiated society. In such a society cooperation is difficult if it is solely based on precise knowledge, information, and rational calculation. People in such complex societies have limited information and knowledge to make collective decisions. Interpersonal trust helps people resolve this problem, and collective action is therefore likely (Warren 1999, 3).

If interpersonal trust is crucial to democratic stability and performance, one may question where it comes from. There is no simple answer to this question. Putnam (1993) and Inglehart (1999, 1997) tend to argue that interpersonal trust was produced in the long history of a society. It "reflects the entire historical heritage of a given people, including economic, political, religious, and other factors" (Inglehart 1999, 88).

Inglehart specifically relates interpersonal trust to religious tradition. Differences in religious tradition affect interpersonal trust (1999, 90-92). In his cross-national analysis Inglehart found that interpersonal trust is strongly linked to particular religious traditions or civilizations. He found that "Protestant and Confucian-influenced societies

consistently show higher levels of interpersonal trust than do historically Roman Catholic or Islamic societies. ..." (92). Why do Catholicism and Islam not produce interpersonal trust?

Inglehart argues that a religious tradition which emphasizes hierarchical or vertical relationships between the center of religious authority and its members is likely to produce interpersonal distrust as happens in authoritarian or communist regimes (93). This characteristic, according to Inglehart, is found in Catholicism. In Protestant tradition, on the contrary, "horizontal locally-controlled organizations conducive to interpersonal trust" are strong. How about Islamic tradition? Does Islam have the same characteristic as Catholicism in terms of the relationship between the center of religious authority and its fellow Muslims? Inglehart does not reveal how the Islamic tradition produces distrust. To be sure, religious hierarchy as found in Catholicism has no parallel in Islam. However, the structure of the Protestant church also does not have an Islamic parallel. There is no such thing as a church in Islam.

In Muslim societies interpersonal trust may be defined by the object of trust itself. Islam is likely to produce distrust if the object of trust is non-Muslims. There are some scriptural sources which could shape how Muslims trust non-Muslims. For example, "A party of the followers of the Book [Christians and Jews] desire that they should lead you astray..." (Qur'an 3: 69); "And do not believe but in him who follows your religion," (Qur'an 3: 73); or, "O you who believe! do not take for intimate friends from among others than your own people; they do not fall short of inflicting loss upon you; they love

what distresses you; vehement hatred has already appeared from out of their mouths, and what their breasts conceal is greater still; ...” (Qur’an 3: 118). These norms may shape Muslim distrust of non-Muslims.

Interpersonal trust is one side of a coin. The other side is trust in political institutions. It is believed that interpersonal trust can strengthen trust in political institutions, which in turn contributes to democratic stability.⁵ Therefore, it is expected that Islamic tradition which has a negative impact on interpersonal trust may in turn have a negative relationship on political trust, and finally on democratic stability.

Democratic stability is a complex phenomenon, and political culture is believed to be crucial to democratic stability. Dahl (1997, 36, 38) argues that one of the most crucial components of political culture for democratic stability is political tolerance. In the early 1970s Dahl had doubted the extent to which a deeply divided society could establish a stable democracy or polyarchy. Dahl argues that polyarchy is more frequently found in relatively homogenous societies than in subculturally pluralistic societies (Dahl 1971, 108). In a primordially pluralistic society, tolerance is a difficult problem, and therefore open, and often bloody, conflict between the different groups frequently occurs. This intense conflict as the result of ethnic or religious differences in a society occurs because ethnic or religious identity “is incorporated so early and so deeply into one's personality.” In this conflict opponents are often transformed into an “inhuman they, whose menace stimulates and justifies the violence and savagery” (Ibid).

⁵ For discussion about this issue, see for example Newton (1999).

This argument is very relevant to the issue of the relationship between Islam and democracy, the extent to which Islam has a negative impact on political tolerance, and more specifically to non-Muslim citizens. Bernard Lewis (1985) argues that Muslim tolerance towards non-Muslims, i.e. Jews and Christian, has historically fluctuated. The sources of intolerance are not very clear. Bernard Lewis (1985) suggests that they are partly religious doctrines and partly historical and socio-political experience. The doctrinal sources of intolerance can be found in the Qur'an, for example a verse which says "O you who believe, do not take the Jews and Christians as friends ... they are friends of one another, and whoever among you takes them as friends will become one of them" (Qur'an 5: 51).

However, Lewis (1985, 14) argues that this doctrinal source should be understood historically. It reflects conflict and tension between Muslims and non-Muslims (Jews and Christians) in the early period of Islam. This need of a historically specific context of understanding the doctrine lies in the fact that there are other doctrines which indicate tolerance towards non-Muslims. The Qur'an for example says, "Those who believe [i.e., the Muslims], and those who profess Judaism, and the Christians and the Sabians, those who believe in God and in the Last Day and act righteously, shall have their reward with their Lord; there shall be no fear in them, neither shall they grieve" (Qur'an 2: 62). This verse and many others indicate that Islam is open to religious pluralism; it may be a doctrinal source for religious tolerance.

Regardless of this problem, Lewis argue that Muslims in predominantly Muslim societies or in Muslim polities were historically tolerant towards non-Muslims. Intolerance toward non-Muslims emerged after Islam was defeated by the Western powers. Many Muslims today perceive that the West is a threat to them. This is a part of the source of Muslim intolerance toward non-Muslims (Lewis 2002, 131).

In short, Muslim tolerance or intolerance is historical. However, once history has constructed a collective memory, which has been reinforced by bitter experience in daily life, religious intolerance is likely to be persistent. This may lead to a perception that religion is by nature intolerant, which leads to religious conflict, or clash of civilizations in a religiously divided society (cf. Huntington 1997). Huntington specifically believes that both Islam and Christianity are intolerant religions by nature. Their interaction may produce religious conflict that destabilizes society and polity.

Huntington further argues that Islam and Christianity are missionary religions, and each claims to be the only religion that can save humanity. Muslims perceives non-Muslims to be a target, and Christians so perceive non-Christians as well. Clashes are inevitable. “So long as Islam remains Islam (which it will) and the West remains the West (which is more dubious), this fundamental conflict between two great civilizations and ways of life will continue to define their relations in the future” (Huntington 1997, 211-2).

Lewis's proposition about Islamic intolerance is more conditional, more restricted to proponents of Islamic fundamentalism, while Huntington's is more general, viewing Islam and Christianity as by nature intolerant religions. When they meet they may well

conflict. If this claim is true, the more Islamic a Muslim is in a predominantly Muslim society the more likely he or she is to be intolerant toward Christians. This may contribute to the problem of social and political stability and to democratic consolidation.

In a consolidated democracy, almost all components of the polity support democratic rules and norms and act accordingly. This action defines democracy in a more concrete sense. Democracy is behavior as well as attitude. The extent to which a democracy is consolidated is defined at the behavioral level by the presence of regular democratic action, or of regular political participation.

Political participation is a central concept in democracy. Verba, Scholzman, and Brady (1995, 1) state that “Citizen participation is at the heart of democracy. Indeed, democracy is unthinkable without the ability of citizens to participate freely in the governing process” (cf. Kaase and Marsh 1979, 28).

If the claim that Islam is inimical to democracy is true, then this claim should be proved not only at the attitudinal level but also at the behavioral level. There is a specific claim that political participation is an alien concept in the Muslim community (Huntington 1984, Pipes 1980). If there is political participation in a Muslim community, Huntington believes, it is linked to religious affiliation because in Islam there is no distinction between religious community and political society (Huntington 1993, 307). This proposition implies that political participation in Muslim communities is likely to be restricted to Islamic purposes only, or to “Islamic political objects.” Political participation that is beyond religious purposes is not likely as Islam is believed to encompass and to regulate the behavior of all Muslims (cf. Lewis 2002, 100).

Huntington (1993) argues that the link of political participation to religion is unique to the Muslim community. In the third wave of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s, popular protests against authoritarian regimes and demands for democracy emerged in many non-democratic societies. This phenomenon, however, was rare in predominantly Muslim societies. When popular protests against the authoritarian regime emerged they are mostly dominated by Islamic fundamentalists. They demand not democracy but Islamic governance (Ibid, 308).

If Huntington et al are correct, I expect to find that Islam has a negative and significant impact on political participation unconnected to Islamic concerns. Having described how students of Muslim society and social science contrasted Islam and various components of democracy, I now need to state more explicitly the negative propositions about the relationships between Islam and various components of democratic culture and behavior.

First, social capital is crucial for political participation and for democratic consolidation. Civic engagement or civil society and interpersonal trust are two components of social capital. Islam is believed to have negative relationships with both civil society and interpersonal trust.

Second, political tolerance is crucial for democratic consolidation, and Islam is believed to be by nature an intolerant religion. Islam is believed to encourage Muslims to be intolerant, especially toward Christians.

Third, because Islam has a negative relationship with civic engagement, while civic engagement is crucial to political engagement, Islam is likely to have a negative relationship with political engagement.

Fourth, because Islam is believed to have a negative relationship with democratic consolidation, while trust in political institutions within the system is important for democratic consolidation, Islam is likely to have a negative relationship with trust in political institutions within the democratic system.

Fifth, another component of democratic culture which is crucial to democratic consolidation is satisfaction with democratic performance. The claim that Islam is likely to have a negative relationship with democratic consolidation implies that Islam has a negative relationship with satisfaction with democratic performance.

Sixth, in democratic studies, support for democratic values or principles is crucial to help consolidate a democracy. The claim that Islam has a negative relationship with democratic consolidation implies that Islam has a negative relationship with support for democratic values.

Seventh, support for the nation-state is crucial for the consolidation of any type of regime. There is no democracy without the nation-state. Islam is believed to have a negative relationship with support for the nation-state as the idea of umma, relative to nation-state, is stronger among Muslims. The umma and nation-state are two antagonistic concepts, and therefore support for the umma decreases loyalty to the nation state.

Eighth, at the behavioral level, political participation is a core concept in democracy. This concept is believed to be alien to Muslims. Political participation in Muslim societies, if any, is linked to religious matters because there is no distinction between religion and politics in Islam.

Having surveyed the critics, I must now point out that there are a number of studies about Islam and Muslim societies which lead to the opposite conclusions about

Islam and democracy. There are two main schools of thought. First, the absence of democracy in most predominantly Muslim states is not associated with Islam, but with non-Islamic factors: social and political economy, geopolitics and international factors (Entelis 1997, Anderson 1995, Halliday 1996, Gerges 1999, Tessler 2003, 2002; Al-Braizat 2002; Rose 2002). Second, Islam as a political culture is believed to have positive values for democracy (Mousalli 2001, Esposito and Voll 1996).

Mousalli (2001) attempts to demonstrate that the concepts of *shura* and *ikhtilaf* are substantively democratic norms and values. Esposito and Voll (1996) refer to *ijtihad* and *ijma'* as Islamic norms which substantively reflect democratic culture. They also believe that political participation, as a core concept in democracy, is not an alien concept to Muslims.

Norris and Inglehart (2003; Inglehart and Norris 2003) found that there is no significant difference in support for democratic values among Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims, like non-Muslims throughout the world, positively support democratic institutions. The difference between the two is gender-related. Muslims, relative to non-Muslims, are likely not to support the idea and practice of gender equality. While interesting, this idea has not yet been developed far enough to enable us to evaluate it (Fish 2002).

Tessler (2002a, 2002b) offers a more extensive operationalization of Islam, tested for its impact on support for democratic values. He found that Islam as a set of personal religious practices and political values does not have a significant impact on support for democratic values. In terms of both the quality of the data and the sophistication of the

measures of Islam and democracy at the individual level, Tessler's study is probably the best thus far. His area is the Middle East, and empirical tests of his finding elsewhere are necessary for stronger conclusions. Moreover, democracy is not only about support for democratic values but concerns as well other components of democratic culture and action as outlined above.

In order to assess more realistically the claims about the negative relationship between Islam and democracy, the two concepts should be better operationalized. The specific context, how Islam is understood and practiced by Muslims in a particular Muslim society, is also critical. Sensitivity to context may help to reveal patterns that would otherwise escape our attention.

1.4. Indonesian Muslims

I have selected Indonesian Muslims for this study as I am more familiar with the society and appropriate data collection methods and also with previous studies of Islam and democracy there.

Students of Indonesian politics are concerned with the failure of parliamentary democracy and the persistence of authoritarianism. The two main scholarly perspectives which are usually deployed to explain these problems are elite leadership and political culture. Herbert Feith and Harry Benda represent these two tendencies.

Feith (1982) believed that the failure of Indonesian democracy in the 1950s to sustain itself was mainly due to the weakness or absence of competent administrators,

and more broadly to the lack of a problem-solving mentality among politicians. Instead, charismatic solidarity makers like first President Sukarno dominated the political stage at the time.

Conversely, Benda (1982) argued that the root of the failure is the alienness of the concept of democracy in Indonesian political culture. Indonesia has a long political tradition in which personal rulership or kingship and sultanism have been pervasive. He believed that this tradition continues in post-colonial Indonesia. The absence of a competent problem-solving elite in the new Indonesia should be explained in these terms.

Several studies have tended to confirm Benda. To explain the authoritarian Indonesian New Order, Anderson's anthropological style work (1972) stresses the importance of Javanese political culture as a factor behind authoritarianism. To understand elite behavior in the authoritarian New Order, Emmerson (1976) applied the concepts of *santri* and *abangan*, pious and syncretic Muslims, as the main variants of Indonesian political culture. In the relationship between the masses and the local elite, Jackson (1980), using survey techniques in a study of West Java, found a patron-client rather than horizontal relationship. Samson (1973) argues that among modernist Islamic elites the spirit to fight for Islamization of the state was strong, making moderate politics more difficult.

All of these findings in different ways confirm Benda's thesis that Indonesian history and tradition are alien to modern political culture and institutions and are persistent, having a major negative impact on independent Indonesia. However, they are not conclusive as they are mostly based on descriptions of events and the interpretation of limited survey evidence.

The 1980s-1990s generation of Indonesianists did not resolve this issue. Ramage (1995) describes the interplay between Islam and the state ideology of Pancasila as perceived by the elites, in which traditionalist Muslims are claimed to have a genuine and strong commitment to democracy and to tolerance. Bush (2002, 2000) takes the opposite view, claiming that Islam-oriented political attitudes among traditionalist *ulama* persist. Abdillah (1999), Effendy (1998), and Hefner (2000) believe that Muslim elites mostly have positive perceptions about and attitudes toward democracy.

The more recent literature on Islam and democracy is basically descriptive. Most scholars have not clearly defined what is to be explained. Hefner made a good start, attempting to construct an explanation of Indonesian democratization by introducing the concept of "civil Islam." However, it is not clear whether it is "civil Islam" or the characteristics of the authoritarian New Order government that ruled the country for more than three decades that best explains Indonesian democratization. Hefner blames the New Order for the manipulation of "civil Islam" which in turn constrains democratic politics in the country, but does not systematically examine civil Islam as a set of attitudes held by Muslim Indonesian citizens.

In sum, scholarship about Islam and democracy among Indonesians has reached no solid conclusions. This study is an attempt to contribute to this scholarship through a systematic evaluation of the main propositions about the negative relationship between Islam and democracy. I begin by formulating these propositions into a number of specific hypotheses.

1.5. Hypotheses

1.5.1. Islam and democratic culture.

a. Islam and social capital. Democracy requires collective action and coordination, which are helped by social capital, i.e. interpersonal trust and networks of civic engagement. This cultural component of democracy is believed to be absent in Muslim societies, and Islam is held responsible for this problem. If this is true, then I expect to find my first hypothesis to be true, *that the more Islamic a Muslim, the more likely to distrust other people*. Moreover, there are some religious norms which indicate that non-Muslims cannot be trusted. The second hypothesis is: *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more likely to distrust non-Muslims*. Social capital also requires “networks of secular civic engagement.” Therefore, the third hypothesis: *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more likely to be less engaged in secular civic community*.

b. Islam and socio-political tolerance. Political tolerance is crucial to democratic consolidation. Islam and Christianity are asserted to be missionary religions whose adherents have an obligation to convert non-believers, a likely source of intolerance in Muslim societies. If this proposition is true, I expect to find that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more unlikely to be tolerant toward Christians*. Further, political tolerance is understood as tolerance toward the least liked group. Therefore, I expect to find that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more likely to be intolerant toward the least liked group*.

c. Islam and political engagement. Political engagement or participant political culture is believed to be crucial in democracy. It is claimed that political participation is alien to Islam. If true, I expect to find that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more likely he or she is not to be engaged in politics*.

d. Islam and trust in democratic institutions. In the civic culture literature, trust in political institutions is related to interpersonal trust. The claim that Islam is inimical to democracy can partly be evaluated by the extent to which Islam has a negative relationship with trust in political institutions. If the claim is true I expect to find that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more likely not to trust political institutions.*

e. Islam and democratic principles. The claim that Islam is inimical to democracy is particularly related to support for democratic principles such as a belief that democracy is the best system of governance, the value of liberty and minority rights, and competitive elections. Muslims are believed to be more accustomed to Islamic culture inimical to these principles. If this claim is true I expect to find *that the more Islamic a Muslim, the more unlikely to support democratic principles.*

f. Islam and support for nation-state. In the Islamic political tradition, the idea of the nation-state is alien. Therefore *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more likely he or she is not to support the nation-state as a political community.*

g. Islam and political participation. Political participation is believed to be an alien concept in the Muslim community. Political participation is linked to Islamic affiliation because Islam regulates all aspects of Muslim behavior. I expect, therefore, that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more likely not to participate in politics unless defined by Islamic concerns.*

h. Islam, political engagement, trust in political institutions, and political participation. Studies of democracy suggest that various combinations of political engagement and trust in political institutions will produce various type of citizens: allegiant, alienated, apathetic and naïve (cf. Seligson 1980). Allegiant citizens are politically engaged and

trust in political institutions. Alienated citizens are politically engaged but distrust political institutions, and may destabilize democracy. Naïve citizens are not politically engaged but trust in political institutions. Apathetic citizens are not engaged but distrust political institutions. The claim that Islam has a negative relationship with democracy can be evaluated in terms of these four types of citizens. If the claim is true, then I expect to find that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the less likely to be an allegiant citizen relative to alienated, naïve, and apathetic types of citizens.*

i. Intolerant Islam and political participation. If Islam has a negative relationship with tolerance, and tolerance has a negative relationship with political participation, then *the intolerant Muslim is likely to be active in politics.* This pattern is important to democratic stability, which requires tolerant rather than intolerant activists.

1.6. Measures of Democratic Culture, Political Participation, and Islam

1.6.1. Democratic culture. Democratic culture comprises several elements: interpersonal trust, networks of civic engagement, tolerance, political engagement, trust in political institutions, satisfaction with democratic performance, support for democratic values, support for nation-state (political community), allegiant citizen, and tolerant activist.

These components of democratic culture are measured as follows.⁶

a. Interpersonal trust. To replicate the World Value Survey (WVS), interpersonal trust is measured by a single item, whether a person says that "people in general can be

⁶ For detailed wording of democratic culture items, see Appendix B.

- trusted," or "cannot be too careful in dealing with other people." In addition, I specifically gauge a Muslim's trust in non-Muslims by the extent to which he or she trusts in citizens who belong to another religion.
- b. Networks of secular civic engagement. Networks of civic engagement typically include informal as well as formal organizations, not only civic associations but also informal social engagements such as dinner with friends, gathering in a café, etc. (cf. Putnam 2002, 10). In this study the networks of secular civic engagement are restricted to the formal ones: rotating credit associations (*arisan*), community councils (*majlis* or *dewan desa/kelurahan*, or *karang taruna*), cooperatives, agricultural or industrial unions (*perhimpunan tani*, *perhimpunan nelayan*, or *sarekat pekerja*), sports clubs, cultural clubs, environmentalist associations (*perhimpunan pencinta lingkungan*), animal lover associations (*perhimpunan pencinta binatang piaraan*), boy or girl scout or Red Cross (*Pramuka* or *Palang Merah*), professional associations such as teachers' associations (*Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia*), and doctors' associations (*Ikatan Dokter Indonesia*), new social movement associations (*lembaga swadaya masyarakat*), and others. Scores for membership in the association are added to constitute a scale of networks of secular civic engagement.
- c. Political tolerance. Tolerance is defined as "willingness to 'put up with' those things one rejects or opposes" (Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982, 2). There are two different strategies to measure political tolerance. Stouffer's *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberty* (1955) treats communism as the target of political tolerance, measuring the extent to which Americans tolerated Communist political

activity. More recent studies of political tolerance do not focus on a specific group but rather any group that a respondent selects as the least liked group (Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1979). This is "a content-controlled measure strategy" rather than a specific group target strategy. In this study, both strategies are used. The specific group target is Christians. It is measured by four items: the extent to which a Muslim allows Christians to (1) have religious services in a predominantly Muslim community, (2) to build a church in a predominantly Muslim community, (3) to be a teacher at a public school, and (4) to be the president of Indonesia. These four items are added to constitute a three-point scale of tolerance toward Christians (intolerant, neutral, or tolerant). The controlled content measure strategy of political tolerance is, first, respondents' selection of their least liked group from the list. If there is none on the list that respondents like the least, they are asked to mention any group in the society that they like the least (Sullivan et al 1983, 60-1). The least liked groups on the list are: Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, Buddhist, Jews, Darul Islam (Islamic state movement), Islamic Defense Front (FPI), Jihadi Militia (Laskar Jihad), Chinese and Communists. Their tolerance towards the least liked group is gauged by the extent to which they agree if the least liked group (1) is outlawed, (2) has a public meeting, (3) has demonstrations, and (4) is allowed to be a public official. These four items constitute a five-point scale of general political tolerance: very intolerant (1) to very tolerant (5).

- d. Political engagement. This concept includes interest in politics, political information, political discussion, partisanship, and political efficacy (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). Interest in politics is a four-point

- scale of interest in politics or governmental issues. Political information is a four-point scale constructed from the intensity of following political news via TV, radio, newspaper, magazine, and the internet. Political discussion is a four-point scale of intensity in discussion about politics or governmental issues with family members, neighbors, colleagues and co-workers. Partisanship is a four-point scale of feeling close to a political party. Political efficacy is a four-point scale constructed from three items of internal and external efficacy: can influence government decision, government cares what people think, and the influence of central government on the daily life of people.
- e. Trust in political institutions. Trust in political institutions is a five point-scale about the intensity of trust in political institution. It is constructed from seven items (cf. Listhaug and Wiberg 1995, Citrin and Muste 1999): the extent to which a person trusts that these institutions can function as expected: president, People's Consultative Assembly (*Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*), People's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*), courts, armed forces, police, and political parties. Each of these items is a five-point scale.
- f. Satisfaction with democratic performance. This concept is measured by three items: the extent to which the people are satisfied with the way democracy works in the polity, people's evaluation of the direction of the government (in the right or wrong direction), people's assessment of the performance of the current democratic government compared to that of the previous non-democratic regime. These three items constitute a three-point scale of democratic satisfaction (very satisfied, satisfied, and unsatisfied).

- g. Support for democratic principles. In democratic studies, support for democratic principles is understood as positive attitudes both toward a set of components of democratic values and procedures and toward democracy in general. Measures include first of all popular positive attitudes toward the idea that democracy is the best form of government (Klingemann 1999, 35-6). This item, in the World Value Survey, has been asked as part of a four-item battery. Democratic principles have also been measured more specifically as the values of liberty (two items of support for minority rights, one item of support for equality before the law, one item of support for political rights), support for competitive elections (two items), support for free enterprise (one item), and support for independent media (one item) (cf. Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992). These twelve items are added to construct a five-point scale of support for democratic principles: strongly disagree with democratic principles (1) to strongly agree with democratic principles (5).
- h. Support for political community. Support for political community is the extent to which a citizen is positively oriented toward the nation-state as a political community. In the WVS, it is gauged by two items: national pride and willingness to fight for the country (Klingemann 1999, 38). A feeling of belonging to the nation-state rather than to the local community is also used. These three items are added to constitute a four-point scale, no support at all (0) to strong support (3).
- i. Four types of citizens: allegiant, alienated, naïve, and apathetic. This item is constructed as several combinations of political engagement and trust in political institutions.

- j. Islamist intolerance. A combination of support for Islamism and an intolerant attitude compared to non-Islamist tolerance which is a combination of disagreement with Islamism and a tolerant attitude. About Islamism see below.

1. 6.2. Political Participation

Verba and Nie (1972) define political participation as “activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take” (cf. Kaase and Marsh 1979, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Brady 1999, Conway 2000). All definitions of political participation include four basic concepts: activities or actions, ordinary citizens, politics, and influence (Brady 1999). “Action” or “activity” in political participation is something that a man or woman does. It is not just thoughts, attitudes, or tendencies (Brady 1999).

Political participation is not only action, but also action by ordinary citizens, not government elites. Action by the government elite is political, but not political participation (Brady 1999). Action is also political, meaning that it should be directed at a government policy or activity (Brady 1999). In addition, political participation is a voluntary act, meaning that the participants are not forced to do an activity and are not paid for that activity (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 38-9).

Early studies of political participation in the 1950s and 1960s (Lane 1959, Milbrath 1965; cf. Kaase and Marsh 1979) attempted to demonstrate that political participation was one-dimensional. Later studies (Verba and Nie 1972; Milbrath and Goel 1977) criticized this one-dimensional scale. Verba and Nie (1972), for example, argue that political participation consists of many dimensions. Kaase and Marsh (1979)

also suggest that political participation consists of two different forms, i.e. conventional and unconventional. Conventional includes any activity by ordinary citizen to influence political outcomes according to relatively settled procedures or laws, such as voting, running for a particular public office, campaigning, etc. Unconventional is any activity by ordinary citizens to influence political outcomes “that does not correspond to the norms of law and custom that regulate political participation under a particular regime” (p. 41) such as demonstration, strikes and boycotts.

There is no consensus on measures of political participation in the literature. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 68-72), however, state that there are some benchmarks, i.e. political activity that includes at least voting, campaign work, contacting public officials, and community work. To this list I add political protests. My measures of political participation are therefore very similar to Kaase and Marsh’s and to Perry, Moyser, and Day’s (1992). The measures include conventional and unconventional political activity from voting to damaging public facility. All these items described in Chapter 8.⁷

1.6.3. Islam

Social scientists approach religion as a system of values through one of two strategies. In the first, religion is defined as a "mental phenomenon," and in the second as a "social phenomenon." (Wald and Smidt 1993, 32). The former is about *believing*, the latter about *belonging*. As a mental phenomenon, "religion encompasses the

⁷ See appendix B for detailed wordings of the items.

fundamental beliefs, ideas, ethical codes, and symbols associated with religious tradition, including what others call theology or belief system" (Wald 1992, 27). This research strategy basically emphasizes the importance of religious teachings and values and their impact on social and political behavior.

As a *social phenomenon*, religion is defined as a social group "whose members may exhibit a common identity, a regular pattern of social interaction, or similar expectations (group norms) concerning belief and behavior" (Wald and Smidt 1993, 33). Membership in or belonging to a particular religious group and particular behavior that reflects the group norms are crucial to this strategy in the study of religion.

Interaction of the two is also possible. Belief may constitute particular attitudes and behaviors. Through a process of institutionalization the attitudes and behaviors are shared in a collectivity, and individuals in the collectivity feel that they belong to it. This belonging, in turn, may affect the belief.

To be more systematic, social scientists commonly define religion at least into two components: a body of ideas and ritual obligations, and a social collectivity with a routine pattern of interaction, or organization with prescribed rules, norms, and infrastructure (Wald, Kellstedt, and Legee 1993, 123). Gerhard Lenski's *The Religious Factor* (1963) suggests multidimensionality of religion—orientation, communalism, and associationalism—which corresponds to theological, social, and organizational dimensions. Orientation encompasses agreement with religious doctrines and frequency of private communication with the divine. Communalism refers to the commonality of religious identification among family and friends. Associationalism has to do with

membership in corporate religious organizations and attendance at collective worship and other activities conducted under the aegis of churches. These dimensions have different impacts on various political variables such as voting, democratic values, and partisan choice.

To a large extent these components of religion constitute Islam. To put it more broadly, Islam, as a religion, consists of belief and belonging, and the two in practice interact. Islam, at least as commonly understood, is inconceivable without faith or *iman*. At the most elementary level, Muslims commonly perceive Islam as a unity between belief and belonging, at least a belief that there is no god but God, and that Muhammad is the messenger of God. Believing that Muhammad is His messenger means that God revealed the Qur'an. The content of the Qur'an is believed to be the teachings, values, norms, and law of God.

Traditionally, Muslims are familiar with the Five Pillars of Islam. In addition to the confession of faith, a Muslim is obliged to say the daily five prayers, to pay alms (*zakat*), to fast in the month of Ramadan, and to make the pilgrimage to Mecca if he or she is able. These pillars basically reflect the unity between belief and belonging even though the two are conceptually distinct.

In this study, Islam is first defined by a statement of faith and mandatory rituals (*ibadah wajib*). The statement of faith is the confession that there is no god but Allah (God), and Muhammad is His messenger. The obligatory rituals are restricted to the intensity of the performances of the daily five prayers and of the Ramadan fasting. These items are added to constitute a four-point scale of obligatory rituals, from never (1) to very frequently (4).

In addition to the obligatory rituals, Islam can be defined as a set of suggested rituals (*ibadah sunnah*). Because these rituals are not obligatory, they are likely to be more varied. This large variation is important for analytical purposes. In this study, the suggested rituals are intensities of prayer performance prior to work (*berdo'a sebelum bekerja*), of reciting the Qur'anic verses (*membaca ayat-ayat al-Qur'an* or *mengaji*), of performing collective prayers (*salat berjama'ah*), of attending religious classes (*pengajian*, or *majlis taklim*), of giving charity (*sadakah*), of performing suggested fasting (*puasa sunnah*), and of performing suggested prayer (*salat sunnah*). Each of these items is a four-point scale, from never (1) to very frequently (4). The seven items are added to constitute a four-point scale of suggested rituals, from never (1) to very frequently (4).

The mandatory and suggested rituals are recognized in Muslim communities. However, particular Muslim communities have a uniquely additional set of rituals which locally define Muslim piety. In the context of my case, Indonesian Muslims, as will subsequently be discussed, there is a set of rituals practiced by a particular community, i.e. the Nahdlatul Ulama community. I call this set of rituals the *Nahdliyin rituals*. They include the annually commemoration of the dead (*khaul*), the seven day commemoration of the dead (*tujuh harian*), *tahlilan* (collective recitation that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His messenger), requests a prayer to Islamic spiritual figures (*mohon do'a dari kiai*), and visits to Islamic spiritual burial or shrine (*ziarah ke kuburan kiai atau wali*). These items are added to constitute a four-point Nahdliyin ritual scale, from never (1) to very frequently (4).

As a social phenomenon, Islam is institutionalized in various Islamic social organizations. Involvement in Islamic organizations defines socially a Muslim's religiosity. They constitute the networks of Islamic civic engagement. Involvement also defines Islamic social identity. Involvement and civic engagement are measured by intensity (active member, non-active member, and non-member) and quantity of membership, i.e. membership in national Islamic organizations and in local Islamic community groups. These two items are added to constitute a three-point scale of the network of Islamic civic engagement.

In Muslim societies, there are a significant number of national Islamic organizations. These organizations may define Islamic social identity, which may in turn affect engagement in the secular civic community, politics, and in democracy in general. In this study, Islamic social identity is the extent to which a Muslim feels close to a particular Islamic organization. In the context of Indonesian society, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah are known as the two largest Islamic organizations. Feeling close to these two organizations defines Nahdlatul Ulama or Muhammadiyah identity.

Historically, NU and Muhammadiyah used to support the idea that religion and state are one. Today, NU is known as a preeminent foundation of democratic politics. Muhammadiyah, on the other hand, is often identified with the modernist group of Muslims which tends to support Islamism or fundamentalism (to be discussed below). As large and influential mass organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah may well shape the way in which Indonesian Muslims support Islamism or democracy. NU identity is

gauged by the extent to which a Muslim feels close to the organization. Muhammadiyah identity is similarly measured by the extent to which a respondent feels close to Muhammadiyah. Each is a four-point scale.

The claim that Islam is inimical to democracy lies in a particular understanding of Islam, i.e. Islam as a total system of life in which politics is subordinated to religion. Islam is perceived as a set of laws (shari‘a) which stipulates the social and political life of Muslims. This understanding of Islam is today usually called Islamism (Ruedy 1994, Kramer 1997, Roy 1993; Guazzone 1995, Monshipouri 1998).

Measuring Islamism is not easy. Tessler’s (2002) seminal study suggests that the Islamist political orientation can be gauged through four items—support for the idea that Islam and politics are not separated, support for Islamist organization movements, support for the political leadership of religious authority, and support for the implementation of Islam in society and polity by government. In this study, I disaggregate these measures into fourteen items. In democratic studies, one important item used to measure general support for democracy is support for the idea that democracy, relative to other forms of governance, is the best. I replace democracy in the item with Islam to gauge general support for Islamic governance.

Islamism is theocratic in the sense that sovereignty belongs to God rather than to man. The extent to which Muslims support this idea is a second item of support for Islamism. In Islamic governance, government must implement Islamic law (shari‘a) in society and polity, and the extent to which Muslims support this idea is the third measure of support for Islamism.

In democracies, Islamist movements and parties participate in elections. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, Islamism requires that parties and candidate participate in election to fight for the implementation of shari‘a in society and polity. Support for the idea that elections should be restricted to parties which fight for the implementation of the Islamic law is used as a measure of support for Islamism. Another item is restriction of the election to candidates who fight for Islamic law.

Shari‘a is a contested concept in Muslim societies. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Islamists believe that it is the divine law, and has specifically legislative power as prescribed in the Qur’an and Sunna. Support for Islamism may be interpreted to mean support for particular laws. In Muslim societies, a significant number of Islamic laws are well known such as amputation of the hand of a thief and an inheritance law in which the son’s right to inherit is twice that of a daughter. Support for these two Islamic laws indicates support for Islamism.

In Islamism, man and woman are treated unequally. In this study, the concept of unequal rights is measured with four items: support for the idea that man is woman’s superior, support for the idea that woman cannot make a long trip without being accompanied by her kin (*muhrim*), support for the idea that priority for education should be given to sons, and support for the idea that a woman cannot become a judge in court because she is weak.

The fourteen items are added to be a five-point scale of support for Islamism. Theological and intellectual arguments underpinning the items will be discussed in the

next chapter. For clarity, however, I will note here that the phrase “more Islamic” in the hypotheses refers to the intensity of Islamic religiosity in terms of faith in God, various ritual activities, Islamic civic engagement, Islamic social identity, and/or Islamism.

In order to be more realistic in assessing the relationships between the Islamic variables and democratic culture components and political participation, I will also include theoretically relevant non-religious variables in this study, i.e. demographic factors (gender, age, and rural-urban cleavage), and socio-economic factor (education, occupation, and income). In addition, a political economy factor will be included for the relevant analysis. This factor includes *egotropic-sociotropic* and *retrospective-prospective* evaluations of economic conditions. The theoretical significance of these non-religious factors will be discussed in the relevant chapters.

1.7. Method and Data

Survey data will be used to test the hypotheses. The ideal cases to test my hypotheses are the Arab nation-states, especially Saudi Arabia as it is perceived to be the heart of Islam. I am, however, not familiar with these cases, especially in terms of organizing and carrying out a survey. The case that I am familiar with is Indonesian Islam as I am an Indonesian and have worked in the community.

Moreover, the relative rarity of democracy in the Muslim world is a constraint to assess the claim that Islam may or may not produce democratic political attitudes and behavior. It is difficult to generate realistic data showing evidence of democratic participation within the context of a non-democratic regime. Fortunately, post-Suharto Indonesia has been relatively democratic, and therefore provides a natural laboratory for

this research. In this new democracy, democracy may not yet be institutionalized. The learning process from democratic practice that may shape mass political culture has just begun. Therefore, the main independent factor (Islam) is independent enough from the influence of democracy (the dependent variable).

I am employed by the Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (Center for the Study of Islam and Society), Universitas Islam Negeri (State Islamic University) of Syarif Hidayatullah, at Jakarta. I was asked to lead two mass surveys about Islam and democracy and have been permitted to use the data for this dissertation. We did two mass surveys in 2001 and 2002. The 2001 survey covers about 87% of the national population, while the 2002 survey covers the entire national population minus Maluku's provinces (about 1% of the whole). Data analyzed in this study is restricted to the Muslim sample (about 90%). For further discussion of the surveys, see Appendix A.

In addition, Indonesia, the largest Muslim nation in the world, is an interesting case as it has some characteristics that are significant for hypotheses-testing. Muslims in the country are believed to have more internal variation than Muslims in the Middle East. In addition to the orthodox (*santri*) tendencies, a significant number of Indonesian Muslims tend to heterodoxy (*abangan*) (Geertz 1960). Among the orthodox, Indonesian Muslims are believed to vary between traditionalists and modernists. The first orthodox variant is associated with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the second with the Muhammadiyah social and educational organizations as described above.

Geertz's *Islam Observed* (1968) compares two Muslim communities, Morocco and Indonesia. He found that Islam in Morocco is more inclined to fundamentalism, while Indonesian Muslims are more inclusive or pluralistic. He believes that these

tendencies of Indonesian Islam are associated with a strong heterodoxy, rather than orthodoxy, in the community. Indonesian Islam is likely to have more variation, and this variation is crucial for analytical purposes.

1.8. Overview of Dissertation

The theoretical foundation of the claim that Islam is inimical to democracy is complex at both the macro and elite levels. Muslim political orientations and behavior cannot be restricted to a single variant of Islam. This issue will be discussed in Chapter 2 with more attention to the intellectual and macro context, where there are at least two variants of Islam relevant to this study, i.e. Liberal Islam and Islamism.

Dimensions and measures of Islam will be discussed further in Chapter 3. How religious are Indonesian Muslims judged from the measures I have chosen? How are the components of Islam correlated? Does Islamism correlate strongly with other types of Islam? How is Islam correlated with socio-economic and demographic factors?

Chapter 4 explores the possession of social capital by Indonesian Muslims. It is about how Indonesian Muslims trust other people in general and non-Muslims in particular, and about their networks of secular civic engagement. Relationships between the components of Islam and the three components of social capital are also assessed. Does Islam have a negative and significant relationship with social capital as some studies suggest? In the analysis, non-Islamic factors are included to make sure that the impact of Islam, negative or positive, on social capital is independent.

Chapter 5 examines tolerance among Indonesian Muslims. Tolerance is defined as tolerance towards Christians and toward the least liked group. This analysis also includes non-Islamic factors which are theoretically relevant such as education and democratic values to make sure that the impact of Islam on tolerance is persuasive.

In Chapter 6 I will discuss how Islam likely affects political engagement and trust in political institutions. Chapter 7 will address the extent to which Indonesian Muslims support the democratic system at a diffuse level: satisfaction with democratic performance, democratic principles, and support for the nation-state. How are these three components correlated? Does Islam have a negative relationship with them?

Chapter 8 examines democracy as behavior, i.e. political participation. I will describe how much Indonesian Muslims participate in politics, and in what forms, from voting to direct political protests such as demonstrations and damaging public facilities. Is it correct to conclude that Islam is likely to have a negative relationship with political participation that is not defined Islamically?

Chapter 9 evaluates the extent to which political participation is congruent with the democratic system as a whole. This evaluation is crucial to estimate how political participation strengthens or weakens the democratic system as a whole and how political participation may destabilize the democratic system. In addition, I will address the likely negative impacts of alienated activism and intolerant Islam on democratic stability.

In Chapter 10 I will summarize more explicitly the overall findings of this study. I will return to each hypothesis developed in the introduction and demonstrate the extent of Islam's negative and significant relationship with the components of democratic

culture and with political participation. Finally I will state the core finding of this study and discuss some practical implications of the finding which may help to strengthen democracy, in Indonesia and in other predominantly Muslim societies.

CHAPTER 2

ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS AND MACRO-CONTEXT

Many leading scholars of democracy and Muslim society speculate that Islam is inimical to democracy. This claim is mostly based on the observation of Islamic history, from the early period of about 1500 years ago to the present. In the long history of Islam, relative to other religions, democracy has been absent. Islam is a crucial cause of this problem, it is argued, as Islam has a unique political philosophy inimical to democracy.

Political secularization, the separation between religious and political domains, or between religion and state, which is an essential part of modern democracy, is not characteristic of Muslim societies. Islam is therefore not likely to contribute to political secularization and democracy.

This chapter addresses this question through a brief consideration of contemporary Islamic political thought and action among Muslim intellectuals. It focuses on contemporary Indonesian Muslim elites, parties, and movements. It lays a foundation of intellectual origins and a macro context of individual attitudes and behavior.

If observation of Muslim societies is restricted to contemporary Muslim political thoughts, parties, and movements, it can be shown that the negative evaluations of Islam

and democracy are accurate only regarding one variant of Islam. However, as mentioned above, critical analysis is mainly based on their observation of the past, not the present.

It is true that the past shapes contemporary Muslim societies and politics, but it is not the whole story.

As discussed in the introduction, the way the past shapes today's Muslims' views about politics may be influenced by the way cultural agents or interpreters interpret the past, the tradition. Their view of the past may be different from that of their predecessors without becoming less Islamic. They may even feel that their "new Islam" is more Islamic than "old Islam" placed in a new society. This does not mean that "old Islam in a new society" has disappeared. It still exists, and is probably dominant in Muslim societies as Samuel Huntington and other pessimists believe. But it is not alone. It is competing with "new Islam in a new society." Today's Muslims are struggling to define the meaning of Islam in a new world.

2.1. *Shari'a* and Politics

Islam, as religion, consists of belief and belonging, and the two in practice interact. In this interaction the social and political life of Muslims is defined differentially among Muslims themselves. The interpretation of the concept of *shari'a* is crucial. It means "the path or road leading to water, i.e. a way to the very source of life." (Rahman, 1979, 100). The very source of life in this context is God Himself. Rahman (1979, 100-01) speaks more technically about *shari'a* as "religious values, expressed

functionally and in concrete terms, to direct man's life.... The Way, ordained by God, wherein man is to conduct his life in order to realize the Divine Will. ... It includes all behavior – spiritual, mental, and physical. Thus it comprehends both faith and practice.”

This definition of *shari'a* fits the approach to religion as the interaction between belief and belonging. There is, however, severe disagreement among Muslim scholars about the meaning and scope of *shari'a*. Muslims commonly believe that the first source of the *shari'a* is the Qur'an. A question immediately arises as to the extent to which the Qur'an covers all legal issues related to Muslim behavior in a changing society. Rahman (1979, 68) argues that “the strictly legislative portion of the Qur'an is relatively quite small,” and therefore not sufficient to direct Muslim behavior. Muhammad Sa'id al-`Ashmawi, a Chief Judge of Egypt, more specifically states about *shari'a* as follows: “The term *Shari'a* appears as such only once in the Qur'an ... (Sura 45, Verse 18), but one finds there three other terms from the same root (Sura 42, Verse 13; Sura 5, Verse 48; Sura 42, Verse 41). In all these places *Shari'a* signifies not judicial norms but the route or the way.” (Al-`Ashmawi, 1998, 50).

This limitation of the Qur'an is resolved through the inclusion of the *Sunna* as preserved in the *Hadith*, which is the record of the Prophet's life in his community. The *Hadith* is believed to be the second source of the *shari'a*. It encompasses a broader range of social and political interaction in the Muslim community. The absolute importance of *Sunna* as the second source of the *shari'a*, according to Rahman (1979, 69), has been legitimated since the Prophet passed away by a doctrine of infallibility or sinlessness of the Prophet.

After the Prophet passed away, and the Muslim community had grown much larger, beyond Arabia, the *Sunna* itself was felt insufficient to direct Muslim behavior. A controversy emerged, in which one group of scholars, called the *ahl al-hadith*, claimed that the true Islam or *shar‘a* manifested in a community should imitate “the Sunna community,” i.e. the community of Muslims under the authority of the Prophet in Medina. Any influence from the non-*Sunna* community is claimed to deviate from the model and is supposedly intolerable.⁸

Another group of the ‘ulama’ argued that it is true that the *Sunna* was never wrong in its historical context, but when this context changed, as normally happens in any community, the *Sunna* in fact became insufficient to direct Muslim behavior. This change strengthened the personal role of the ‘ulama’ on the basis of his understanding of the Qur’an and *Hadith*. This personal opinion (*fiqh*), is opened to falsification. The *ahl al-hadith* cannot accept this argument, and always imagines the *Sunna* community as the true model for the Muslim community regardless of historical change.

The two different beliefs about the nature of *shari‘a* shaped the way contemporary ‘ulama’ or activists imagine the Muslim community, including their perceptions about the relationship between religion and politics. To simplify, I will sketch the debates about the relationship between Islam and politics among some leading

⁸ *Ahl al-Hadith* is actually not a school of thought in Islam, but rather a general attitude of the ‘ulama’ that tends to reject reasoning (*ra‘y*) in the understanding of Islamic doctrines as prescribed in the Qur’an and *Hadith*. They especially rejected the Muslim theologians and philosophers, influenced especially by scholasticism, who tended to be rationalistic in the understanding of Islam and tended to undermine the literal understanding of the Qur’an and *Hadith*. In the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence, the *ahl al-hadith* was represented among others by ‘ulama’ such as Malik ibn Anas, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, and Daud Khalaf, while the rationalists were represented by Abu Hanifah (see Rahman 1979, 81-83).

contemporary Muslim intellectuals or 'ulama', and place the Muslim masses' attitude and behavior in the context of this debate. Their antagonistic views about *shari'a*, and its relations with politics, may shape the attitude and behavior of the Muslim masses.

Broadly speaking, the 'ulama' or Muslim intellectuals are split into two tendencies: Liberal and Islamist. The liberal intellectuals or 'ulama' produced Liberal Islam (Kurtzman, 1998; Binder, 1988) and the Islamists produced Islamism (Ruedy, 1994; Roy, 1993; Guazzone, 1995; Kramer, 1997; Monshipouri, 1998). I will highlight their antagonistic views on the issue.

The intellectual source of liberal political views in contemporary Muslim society can be traced at least to Muhammad 'Abduh of Egypt, the leading Muslim thinker who contributed to the heart of Islamic renewal or modernism (see Adam 1933). Inspired by Western social thought and the rational school of Islamic theology, the Mu'tazilla, Abduh argued that the Qur'an emphasizes the importance of reason (*aql*). He believed that rational calculation to make decisions for the sake of human well-being in a changing society is basically Qur'anic (Adam 1933). Therefore, in addition to the Qur'an and *Sunna*, reason is crucial to the proper development of Islamic law. He further argued that if a specific norm or law in the Qur'an and the *Sunna* contradicts reason, then reason should prevail (Adam 1933, 77).

This rational tendency is a foundation for Islamic modernism under 'Abduh's intellectual leadership. 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, one of 'Abduh's students, explored further this liberal tendency in the understanding of the relationship between Islam and politics. His criticism is mainly directed to the idea that the Prophet Muhammad is the role model

of the Islamic political leader, with Medina as the Islamic political community under his leadership in which religion and politics are believed to be inseparable. ‘Abd al-Raziq argued,

“The authority [of the Message] is sent by Heaven, from God, to him [Muhammad] whose divine revelation is delivered by Heaven’s angels. This sacred power ... does not hold within it the meaning of kingship, nor does it resemble the power of kings, nor can [the authority of the] sultan of all sultans approximate it. It is a message and a religion; it is a prophetic government not a government of sultans. ... Once again we warn the reader not to confuse the two kinds of governments, and not to conflate the two kinds of trusteeships—the trusteeship of the messenger, on account of his being a messenger, and the trusteeship of powerful kings. The Messenger’s trusteeship over his people is a spiritual trusteeship whose origin is faith from the heart, ... On the other hand, the trusteeship of the ruler is a material one. It depends on subduing bodies without any connection to the heart. While the former is a trusteeship leading to God, the latter is one for managing life’s concern and populating the earth. While the former is religion, the latter is the world. The former is divine, the latter is human. The former is a religious leadership, the latter a political one – and there is much distance between politics and religion.” (‘Abd al-Raziq, 1998, 31)

Khalaf-Allah (1998), another Egyptian Muslim thinker, claims that Islam not only supports but also requires democracy. Having stressed that Islam requires the separation between religion and worldly affairs, he argues that worldly affairs should be decided by men, not by revelation, through the *shura* or consultation. Quoting a Qur’anic verse saying “And seek their counsel in all affairs,” he argues that the Qur’an requires the establishment of legislative authority to decide any worldly affair. He argues that

The bounteous Qur’an obliged the Prophet to seek the counsel of his Companions, to decide with them how to achieve the general interest, and to execute that decision without awaiting revelation. And in this vein, God’s statement, ‘And when you have come to a decision, place your trust in God alone,’ means: execute this decision without waiting for divine opinion. (39)

According to Khalaf-Allah, however, the institutionalization of *shura* in more specific rules that can regulate behavior is historical, in the sense that it depends on specific time and place. If the rules had been established specifically in the Qur'an and *Sunna*, they would have been believed to be divine, or to be religious matters. The fact is that they are not divine. He justifies this proposition by quoting the Prophet's words (*Hadith*): "You are more knowledgeable of your concerns," and "That which deals with your religion, [refer it] to me, and that which deals with your worldly concerns, you are more knowledgeable of that" (41). In modern politics, constitutionalism, on which the parliamentary system, elections, majority rule, etc., are based, is in fact a good system of governance, i.e. instrumental to achieve a public interest. Therefore, Khalaf-Allah argues, Muslims have no choice but to establish the system. It is in accordance with Islamic values and spirit (43).

The secular understanding of the relationship between Islam and politics is reflected in Al- 'Ashmawi's interpretation of *shari'a*. He argues that "Shari'a signifies not judicial norms but the route or the way." (50) He continues,

Of some 6000 Qur'anic verses, only 200 have a legal aspect, that is, approximately one thirtieth of the Qur'an, including the verses which were abrogated by subsequent ones. This shows that the principal object of the Qur'an is moral in nature. It is concerned to inscribe the fault in the soul of the believer, to elevate his conscience and morality in order that it might be its own proper *shari'a* in the sense of the way leading to God. Also, even when a Qur'anic law is applicable, this should be in the context of faith and justice, beyond any judicial partiality or deviation. On the other hand, judicial norms being by nature local and temporary, God more often left expressly to humans the work of regulating the details and the freedom to review them with a view to possibly substituting others in response to the needs of each country and epoch. (51)

In this view, *shari'a* could not be prescribed as a legislative outcome prepared to be implemented in Muslim polities, but rather as moral and religious values which may inspire the legislative process and outcomes in specific historical contexts. Unlike this liberal interpretation of the relationship between Islam and state, and of the concept of *shari'a*, Islamist intellectuals claim that religion and state, or religion and politics, are inseparable in Islam. Influenced by the concept of “nation-state” of modern political thought, Rashid Rida introduced the idea of “Islamic state” (*al-hukumat al-Islamiyyah*) as an alternative to the *khilafah* (caliphate) which had ended with the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate and the establishment of the secular republic of Turkey (Enayat, 1982).

In his seminal concept of the Islamic state, *shari'a* is very central, and the authority for its interpretation is *ahl al-hall wa'l-'aqd* (“the people who loosen and bind”), i.e. religious authorities or ‘ulama’ (*Ibid*, 72). However, Rida distinguishes *shari'a* into two domains: *'ibadah* (ritual acts) and *mu'amalah* (social relations or mundane transactions). The latter is subject to consultation (*shura*) of the legislators, and therefore the outcomes are man-made laws (*Ibid*, 79).

Who are the legislators? In the Islamic state, Rida suggests that the legislators are the ‘ulama.’ He argues that the ‘ulama’ are “ideally placed to act as the natural and genuine representative of Muslims” (*Ibid*, 77). The representatives have the authority to elect the national leader (*khalifah*). Who elects the representatives? Rida is not clear on this crucial issue even though he argues that “the ummah (community) is the locus of national sovereignty” (*Ibid*, 80).

Rida's idea of the Islamic state, which includes a separation between religious matters (*'ibadah*) and mundane matters (*mu'amalah*), or in Enayat's phrase "the parallel existence of religion and politics," has been interpreted by the Islamists in such a way that politics is ultimately subordinated into religion (*Ibid*, 83).

This more theocratic interpretation of politics can be found for example in *Ihwan al-Muslimun* (Muslim Brothers) of Egypt. The Ihwan has been well-known for its claim of the totality of Islam, meaning that Islam encompasses all aspects of human life, including politics (85).⁹ More specifically, the Ihwan defined its ideology that "(a) Islam is a comprehensive, self-evolving (*mutakamil bi-dhatihi*) system; it is the ultimate path of life, in all its spheres; (b) Islam emanates from and is based on two fundamental sources, the Qur'an, and the Prophetic Tradition; (c) Islam is applicable to all times and places" (*Ibid*, 85). The Islamic state is based on this set of beliefs, and Muslims must fight to establish the Islamic state. Otherwise "the Muslims are all of them guilty before God Almighty" (*Ibid*, 85). The *shari'a*, i.e. the Qur'an and the *Sunna*, encompasses all aspects of human life, including political matters. The Ihwan believes that God is the sole lawgiver (*Ibid*, 89).

Known as a moderate leader of the Ihwan, Hasan al-Bana's contribution to the unity between Islam and politics is very explicit (Moussalli 1999). He believed that the confession that there is no god but God means the obligation of Muslims to rely on God's law in all aspect of Muslim life. In politics, it means the necessity to establish divine

⁹ There are many "fundamentalist movements" in Egypt, and the Ihwan is known nowadays as a "moderate fundamentalist movement" relative to others such as al-Takfir w'al Hijrah, al-Jihad, and al Jama`a al-Islamiyya, which are more radical not only in their ideology but also in their actions. See for example, Ramadan (1993).

governance on earth (Moussalli 1999, 108). However, unlike the radical Islamists, al-Banna believed that an evolutionary way to achieve the main goals is acceptable. He argued that an Islamic state cannot be established if a majority of the umma do not support the idea (Ibid). Long-term education and community development are therefore critical. In practice, al-Banna accepted constitutionalism and the multiparty system as practiced in Egypt in the 1930s (Ibid; Mitchell 1964).

Al-Banna's acceptance of constitutionalism, according to Moussalli (1999), was based on his understanding of the Qur'anic concept of *shura* (consultation) and his realistic view of different understandings of Islamic teachings among individual Muslims. In politics, *shura* is a means for resolving differences. Democracy is accepted as a realization of *shura* (Moussalli, 1999, 121). Al-Banna argued that it should be socialized among the umma. An Islamic state or "Islamic democracy" cannot be established without an allegiance of Muslims to the system.

In practice, the socialization of the idea of Islamic state turned out to be difficult. The battlefield, where secularism was supported by the government in power, was not conducive to the idea of Islamic state. The Ihwan turned to revolution, and Sayyed Qutb became the ideologue of this phase in the development of the Ihwan.

In his political thought, Qutb relied on the concept of *tawhid* which he interprets not only as faith in the oneness of God (monotheism) but also, and more importantly, as the unity of the umma and human beings under divine law (Moussalli 1999, 134). He believed that there is no ruler and legislator but God, and therefore God is the ultimate organizer of life on earth. Qutb ignored the complexity of humankind, and reduced it to two categories: Islamic or non-Islamic (*jahili*), the followers of God (*hizb al-Allah*) or the

followers of Satan (*hizb al-Shaytan*). (Ibid) The two are in opposition, and therefore establishing *tawhid* means to strengthen the followers of God and eliminate the followers of Satan (Ibid, 149). The confession that there is no god but God, in Qutb's view, is a revolution against any worldly authority, against un-Islamic rule, against any government ruled by humans (Ibid). Any society or polity under human rule is *dar al-harb* (the abode of war), the legitimate object of Islamic revolution. The Islamic state, Qutb continues, is a state based on *shari'a* regardless of the population, whether the population is predominantly Muslims or non-Muslims. The main criterion is not population but law (Ibid, 150-51). The Islamic state, in Qutb's conception, recognizes no territory. Its basic unit is Islamic law (Ibid).

The ideology of the Ihwan is similar to the *wilayah al-faqih* introduced by Imam Khomeini for the Islamic Republic of Iran, or to the concept of "theo-democracy" introduced by Abd 'Ala Mawdudi of Pakistan. In his "The Pillars of an Islamic State," Khomeini argues,

If the nomenclature of state could be labeled, it would be known as the 'government of Law' and that law is neither made by a man nor by a group of men, but it is made by their creator, Almighty Allah. This law is equally applicable to the Head of State; members of parliament, the executive branch, the judiciary branch; and the people. ... The Law of Allah has been revealed in the language of the Holy Qur'an. (248)

In his "The Necessity of Islamic Government," Khomeini explicitly states that:

the law of the Shari'a embraces a diverse body of laws and regulations, which amounts to a complete social system. In this system of laws, all the needs of man have been met: his dealing with neighbors, fellow citizens, and clan, as well as children and relatives; the concerns of private and material life; regulations concerning war and peace and intercourse with other nations; penal and

commercial laws; and regulations pertaining to trade and agriculture. ... It is obvious, then, how much care Islam devotes to government and the political and economic relations of society, with the goal of creating conditions conducive to the production of morally upright and virtuous human beings. ... The glorious Qur'an and the Sunna contain all the laws and ordinances man needs in order to attain happiness and the perfection of his state. (253-54)

Khomeini argued that the head of an Islamic state must know the law thoroughly. The extent to which any person knows the law is a matter of degree. In the case of Islamic *Shi'ism* to which the majority of Iranians belong, the leader of the *umma* is supposed to be the imam. Unfortunately, the imam, in Shi'ism, is in occultation, and therefore a person who masters the law should take the leadership while waiting for the emergence of the *imam*, and this person is an 'ulama'. His idea of *wilayah al-faqih* (mandate of the jurists) is developed from this proposition (Arjomand, 1993). Jurists (*faqih*) must rule the state following the shari'ah.

The mandate of the jurists is also found in Mawdudi's (1976) concept of *theodemocracy*. Mawdudi, the founder of Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan, in his "The Political Theory of Islam," specified three principles:

1. No Person, class, or group, not even the entire population of the state as a whole, can lay a claim to sovereignty. God alone is the real sovereign; all others are merely His subject;
2. God is the real law-giver and the authority of absolute legislation vests in Him. The believers cannot resort to totally independent legislation nor can they modify any law that God has laid down, even if the desire to effect such legislation or change in Divine laws is unanimous; ...
3. An Islamic state must in all respects, be founded upon the law laid down by God through His Prophet. The government that runs such a state will be entitled to obedience in its capacity as a political agency set up to enforce the law of God and only insofar as it acts in that capacity. If it disregards the law revealed by God, its commands will not be binding on the believers. (271)

Mawdudi argued that 'ulama' are the most knowledgeable about the law of God, and therefore the 'ulama' must be legislative agents. There are many ulamas. Which are more knowledgeable? Mawdudi argues that the Muslim people should select among the 'ulama' those who they deem to be most knowledgeable. This inclusion of the Muslim people in the selection of the ulama makes the concept of theocracy "democratic" (88). In this *theo-democracy*, the legislators are restricted to the 'ulama', and the Muslim people vote for legislator candidates from among the 'ulama' (89).

This perception of Islam as a comprehensive political ideology can be found among Muslim intellectuals in many Muslim countries. Nonetheless, it is only one of many variants, including more liberal interpretations. The struggle among Muslim elites for the meaning of Islam in its relation to politics is likely to shape Muslim perceptions in general about the issue, and there is no systematic evidence to argue that one variant is dominant over the other. What appears on the surface is a rainbow-like pluralistic range of interpretations. Huntington and other critics of Muslim politics are not concerned with this pluralism, however. Their Islam is Islamism, and liberal Islam has been excluded, even dismissed as "not Islam."

2.2. Democracy and Indonesian Muslims

Liberals and Islamists are also found among Indonesian Muslim intellectuals or 'ulama'.¹⁰ At the beginning of the Indonesian Republic, Muslim intellectuals who

¹⁰ For extensive discussion of the perception of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals about the relationship between Islam and politics, Islam and state, and more specifically about Islam and democracy, see for example Abdillah (1999), Effendy (1998), Maarif (1987), and Noor (1987, 1973).

claimed that they represented Islam tended to assert that Islam and politics cannot be differentiated (Maarif 1985; Noor 1973). Muslim Intellectuals who claimed to represent Islam, such as Tjokroaminoto (Syarikat Islam), Ahmad Dahlan (Muhammadiyah), Agus Salam (Syarikat Islam), Hasyim Asy`ari (NU), Wahid Hasyim (NU), M. Natsir (Masyumi), A. Hasan (Persis), Hamka (Muhammadiyah and Masyumi), and many others, were proponents of the “Islamic state” or the idea that Islam must be the foundation of the Indonesian Constitution (Maarif 1985; Noor 1980). This idea could also be found among Islamic political parties such as the Mayumi, NU, PSII, and Perti, among Islamic organizations and movements such as the Syarikat Islam, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Persatuan Islam (Persis), and Darul Islam (DI).

Prior to independence (1945), the Islamic state idea was debated in the Japanese - era Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI). A decision was made that the temporary foundation of the Republic was Pancasila (Five Principles, of which the first was Belief in God, without specifying any special relationship to Islam), and it was understood that the debate would be reopened in the future, when independence had been won. In 1955 the first democratic elections were held, creating a Constituent Assembly (*Madjlis Konstituante*) charged with designing a permanent constitution. The members were representatives of political parties. In this Assembly, the issue of the foundation of the state reemerged. The Islamic representatives, from Masyumi, NU, PSII, and Perti, argued that the Republic should be based on Islam rather than Pancasila (Maarif 1985; Noor 1988). The nationalists and non-Muslims were not convinced. The deadlock was only resolved when President Sukarno dissolved the Assembly in 1959.

Political Islam in the 1950s was apparently homogeneous. It was almost unthinkable to claim that separation between Islam and state was acceptable as an Islamic idea. No Muslim intellectual representing a large percentage of the Muslim community said that Islam and politics, or Islam and Pancasila, were two different animals, dealt with different areas of life, and therefore could not be compared. President Soekarno and Vice President Mohammad Hatta attempted to convince the Islamic party leaders that Pancasila itself was Islamic.¹¹ Sukarno and Hatta, however, were regarded as nationalist or secular, not Muslim intellectuals. They were also not recognized authorities in Islamic teachings.

The consensual opinion among Muslim elites was strong and became a cultural as well as political constraint on the ability of national politicians to promote a secular state. This can be seen for example in President Sukarno's public speech:

Islam has ideals. It has constitutional ideals... there are still a lot of misunderstandings, especially among the intellectuals, about this issue. We have often heard the words, 'don't bring religious matters into state matters, don't bring religious matters into political matters.' This [idea] does not fit Islam. Islam is not what is a so called *privaate zaak* [private matter]. Islam recognizes no distinction between what is commonly called 'religion' and social life or polity [kehidupan kenegaraan]... Islam has constitutional ideals even though Islam does not want theocracy. Although in Islamic terms *scheiding tussen kerk en staat* [separation between church and state] is not accepted, Islam has social ideals, but the term is different from ours. We use the term 'state.' (Bung Karno 1990, 7).

In other words, the consensus among Islamic politicians was so strong that President Sukarno, though opposed to the idea of an Islamic state, had to find ways to accommodate it.

¹¹ Sukarno and Hatta's understanding of Islam, see for example Soekarno (1990) and Fauzie (2002).

Only in the 1970s did a critique against the idea of an Islamic state emerge from within the Muslim community itself. Nurcholish Madjid, a former chairman of the largest Islamic university student organization, HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic University Student Association), formally trained in Islamic studies and known for his authority in Islamic teachings, was the first Muslim intellectual who publicly introduced the idea that political secularization is Islamically legitimate.¹²

Madjid, in the spirit of modern political thought, argues that in so far as Muslims cannot differentiate the sacred from the profane, Islam from worldly political affairs, Muslims will not be able to achieve either the essence of Islam, as the sacred, or the establishment of a modern form of politics. Because the sacred is only God, then *desacralization* of the profane is a religious necessity. In the struggle against supporters of a Muslim state, Madjid has attempted to reinterpret Islamic history to save the Muslim community from what he regards as malaise or decadence in their political life. He derived his ideas of equality, tolerance, pluralism, consensus, opposition, and popular sovereignty from Islamic doctrines and tradition. Any belief of Muslims that contradicts those modern socio-political ideas was subjected to historical criticism. The net outcome of this approach to Islam is that Islam is essentially modern (Madjid 1984).

As might be expected, there were many reactions against this stance, especially from more senior Muslim leaders. They assert that Madjid's idea of secularization both deviates from and is dangerous to Islam.¹³ Nonetheless, Madjid, an authority in Islamic

¹² On Madjid political thoughts see for example Effendy (1998) and Liddle (1996).

¹³ One of the most extensive assessments of Madjid's secularization ideas by a senior figure is H. M. Rasjidi. (1974).

teachings, has become an agent for Islamic cultural change among his contemporaries (cf. Liddle 1996). Since the early 1970s he has continued to construct a “modern Islamic political culture” through his reinterpretation of Islamic doctrines and traditions.¹⁴

Abdurrahman Wahid is another agent for the modernization of Muslim political culture. Wahid’s agency is probably more decisive than Madjid’s due to his social status. Wahid belongs to the Nahdlatul Ulama subculture and is also a member of the NU elite. A grandson of the founder of NU and a son of the long-term NU chair, Wahid Hasyim, Wahid was himself elected chair of the organization for three terms. For many years, even before becoming NU chair, he wrote extensively on Islam and modern political thought. His ideas were backed by some senior NU elites such as Kiai Ahmad Siddiq and Kiai Sahal Mahfud.¹⁵

Wahid is a more independent thinker than Madjid, less inclined to anchor his ideas in the Qur’an and *Sunna*. Nonetheless, his ideas are widely accepted as genuinely Islamic, probably because of his privileged status in NU circles and even in the Muslim community as a whole. His deepest concern is with pluralism, political tolerance, and religious equality in the context of the Indonesian nation-state. He argues that in order to build a modern nation, and for the sake of the public interest, one religion can not be regarded as superior to another. It is intolerable to treat someone as a second-class citizen simply because he or she is non-Muslim. Indonesia is comprised of many religions, and each is only one component of the nation. Islam and other religions are

¹⁴ On the importance of agency in Indonesian politics, see Liddle (1996).

¹⁵ About Kiai Ahmad Siddiq’s Islamic thought, see Noeh and Mastuki (2001); on Mahfudh’s Islamic thought see Qomar (2002).

complementary, not antagonistic (Wahid 1984). This position of Islam, as one among many religions in the nation, is necessary for the sake of the public interest (*maslahat*) which is the core of Islam itself in the context of worldly life.

Wahid's religious inclusivity leads him to support Pancasila as the sole foundation of the Republic. Under his leadership, NU was the first major Islamic organization that accepted Pancasila as the final and the sole ideology of the Republic (Effendy 1998).¹⁶ Moreover, NU declared that Pancasila is its own organizational foundation, a decision that had a powerful effect on NU's role in national politics.¹⁷

Finally, NU under Wahid's leadership withdrew from partisan politics. Throughout most of Suharto's New Order, NU supported an Islamic political party, the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party). In 1984, NU returned to the *1926 khittah* ("1926 guidelines"), meaning that it became again a purely socio-religious, rather than political, organization. Members of NU were freed to participate in any political party, regardless of its religious orientation. Since then, NU members can be found in many parties, Islamic and secular.

¹⁶ The idea that Pancasila must become the only foundation (*asas*) for social and political organization was introduced by President Suharto. It was unthinkable at the time that there would be a group from within the Muslim community which publicly opposed the idea. However, the PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic High School Student), and a faction of the HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic University Student Association) did oppose the idea. In consequence, they became underground organizations until the fall of Suharto.

¹⁷ In the last congress of the NU in Kediri, eastern Java, the delegates re-evaluated NU's Pancasila foundation. A significant number proposed a change back to Islam. However, the final outcome of the debate was that NU remains with Pancasila as its foundation. See Bush (2002).

Wahid is not alone within the NU community. He may represent the so-called "liberal NU" (Qomar 2002), but he has relied very much on his seniors within NU. Among the seniors, Kiai Ahmad Siddiq is probably the most articulate on the issue of the relationship between Islam and nation-state.

As mentioned above, Indonesian Muslim leaders used to believe in the supremacy of Islam over the nation-state. The social basis of the Islamic state is the umma (Islamic community) rather than a religiously plural community. The umma is not only a community of believers but also reflects Islamic solidarity or fraternity (*ukhuwwah Islamiyyah*). For this reason, *ukhuwwah Islamiyyah* used to be counterposed to national solidarity, with the argument that the latter should be subordinated to the former. A non-Islamic nation-state of Indonesia could not be accepted because there is no notion of a non-Islamic political community.

Kiai Siddiq proposed a new interpretation of *ukhuwwah Islamiyyah*. He argued that there are other fraternities, i.e. *ukhuwwah wathaniyyah* (national fraternity) and *ukhuwwah bassyariyyah* (human fraternity). The three should relate harmoniously. They must be balanced; one should not be confronted with the others since only through the three dimensions of the *ukhuwwah* can *rahmatan lil 'alamîn* (welfare of the universe) be realized. *Ukhuwwah Islamiyyah* and *ukhuwwah wathaniyyah* are foundations for the *ukhuwwah basyariyyah* (Qomar 2002, 163). Kiai Siddiq emphasizes the inclusiveness of *ukhuwwah Islamiyyah* as a sense of fraternity of Muslims not only toward Muslims themselves but also toward non-Muslims or unbelievers (Ibid). On the basis of this fraternity, Indonesian Muslims are obliged to accept Indonesia as a nation-state which comprises different religious groups.

Kiai Siddiq was also the Islamic leader who proposed the idea that Pancasila as the sole foundation of the nation-state is a final decision for Indonesian Muslims (Noeh and Mastuki 2002, 126). At the time, this opinion was unprecedented. Pancasila, at least formally, is not a secular doctrine. It states explicitly that all Indonesians believe in God, thereby excluding atheists. It is, however, a constitutional guarantee for a religiously inclusive and pluralistic community and therefore a constraint on the embodiment of the idea of an Islamic state. It is a formal compromise between the idea of the secular nation-state and the Islamic state.

Another senior NU figure who has played a crucial role in building a new political culture within the NU community is Kiai Sahal Mahfudh, currently the chair of the legislative body (*Syuriah*) within NU. His ideas about *maslahhah 'ammah* (public interest) and pluralism have been crucial for political culture reform (Qomar 2001, 242). He argues that in the social and political life of Muslims collective decisions must reflect the public interest. In the context of Indonesia, the public interest must include all components of the nation regardless of religious background.

An Islamic state in Indonesia is not legitimate if it does not reflect the religiously plural interests of the people. Kiai Sahal argues further that in Islam government has the responsibility to establish justice and welfare for people of all religions (Ibid, 244). Using Islamic symbols in politics only produces Islamic fanaticism which lacks a deep understanding and awareness of Islam itself (Ibid).

This inclusive view is also popular among younger elites within the NU such as Said Agil Siradj and Masdar Farid Mas'udi. Religious pluralism in Indonesia has become a main concern of many NU leaders. Siradj, like Wahid, is troubled by the issue of the

relationship between Muslims, Christians and Jews. The Qur'an states that Jews and Christians will not be pleased with Muslims if Muslims do not follow their religion (Q 2: 120). This verse encourages Muslims to distrust and be intolerant of Jews and Christians. Siradj comments that the verse indicates that just as Jews and Christians will never believe in Islam, so Muslims will never believe in their faiths. The three faiths or theologies are different, and accepting this fact of difference may help to build a religious tolerance among them (Qomar 2001, 195).

This religious difference, according to Siradj, should not be confused with social and political life. Theological differences should be irrelevant in social and political life in the sense that social and political actions should not be judged according to religious affiliation. Along with this proposition, he argues that non-Muslims have rights to be leaders of the country. A non-muslim can become president (Siradj 1997, 79). Women also have the right to lead (Ibid). Political intolerance toward women is based on a refutable interpretation of Islamic doctrines.

The idea that women do not have the right to be a leader is based among others on an interpretation of the Qur'anic verse *al-rijal qawwamun 'ala nissa*. An established translation of this verse is that "man is the leader of woman." The key word in this verse is *qawwam* which has various meanings: leader, supporter, or complement. Mas'udi, the most articulate young NU leader, argues that the interpretation of the verse should be undertaken in terms of an understanding of the hierarchy of moral spirit within the Qur'an. The Qur'an explicitly states that God's judgment is based solely on one's submission (*taqwa*) to Him regardless of gender. This doctrine should be placed in the

top of the moral hierarchy of Islam, and therefore the word *qawwam* is supposed to be understood as "complement" or "supporter," and therefore the verse is supposed to say that men are a complement to, rather than leaders, of women (Qomar 2002, 207-8). Mas'udi's main concern is social justice. He attempts to reevaluate and remake Islamic doctrines that reflect social justice, including gender equality.

The emergence of the new political culture within NU may not (yet) reflect the whole NU community. However it has strategic significance as it occurs among the top leaders. In the NU tradition, loyalty to leaders is persistent (Dhofier 1984) and therefore cultural change at the elite level may have a rapid and significant impact on the rank and file. Moreover, the return to the *1926 khittah* provides a valuable structural context, in which NU now acts indirectly as an agent for political culture change rather than as a direct political participant. NU members themselves become more pluralistic as they choose from a wide array of parties.

Since Indonesia's democratic opening in 1998, hundreds of new political parties have been formed.¹⁸ Social cleavages seem to play a major role in partisan choice.¹⁹ NU did not officially form a political party, but its elites established several. They competed for NU voters in the 1999 election. Wahid himself established the PKB (Partai

¹⁸ About the parties, see Almanak Parpol Indonesia (ND).

¹⁹ For the evaluation of the impact of social cleavages on partisanship among the masses in the 1999 national election, see Liddle and Mujani (2002).

Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party), hoping that NU members would support it.²⁰ He even stated—contradictory to his earlier position when NU left PPP—that it was mandatory for the NU members to support the party (Abdillah 1999, 20).

Regardless of its close relationship to NU, PKB is formally a religiously inclusive party. The platform of the party is Pancasila. This platform and Wahid's reputation as a liberal Muslim leader may encourage non-Muslims to join the party. A coalition with PKB proposed by the leader of a small Christian Party, PDKB (Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa, Love of the People Democracy Party) probably positively reflects non-Muslim sentiment toward the religiously inclusive PKB (Kompas, July 5, 2002).

Muhammadiyah, the second largest Muslim organization in the country, has also reversed its earlier pro-Islamic state position. During the authoritarian New Order, the Muhammadiyah, like NU, was forced to change its foundation from Islam to Pancasila. In the post-Suharto democratic era, the Muhammadiyah switched back to Islam.²¹ However, it still accepts Pancasila as the ideology of the Republic. This represents a reversal of its position in the 1950s, when Muhammadiyah was an important constituent of the leading Islamic party, Masyumi, and the early 1970s, when it was informally affiliated with Masyumi's successor Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia).

Muhammadiyah's new political orientation reflects the internal dynamics of the modernist Muslim community in recent years. Amien Rais, a Gadjah Mada University

²⁰ Other parties that emerged from within the NU community were Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (PNU), Partai Nahdlatul Umat, and Partai Sunni.

²¹ This decision was made in the last Congress in Yogyakarta in 1999.

professor of international relations,²² was elected chair of Muhammadiyah in 1995, and subsequently played a central role in the articulation of Muhammadiyah's new political orientation.²³

For many years, Rais was considered to be close to the fundamentalists or Islamists in his political orientation, but he later became a moderate. He believes that democracy, relative to other forms of governance, is best for Muslims. The democratic system is the highest stage of political development that mankind has achieved historically, and it is the best available political system for Muslims to resolve their differences. Democracy is the most consistent with the spirit and substance of the Qur'an and *Sunna* (Abdillah 1999, 80-2). Humankind have received a mandate from God to resolve their own problems through political participation. This idea leads to the necessity of free election for public office by the people according to the principle of people's sovereignty (*Ibid*). Related to this, Rais believes that equality before the law for all citizens regardless of their ethnic or religious background, basic rights such as freedom of thought, of speech, of assembly, of religion, etc., and religious tolerance are at the heart of Islamic socio-political values (*Ibid*, 115,140, 153).

Rais' democratic commitment was affirmed in the post-Suharto period when he decided to establish a non-Islamic political party, PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party) in 1998. The party platform was religiously inclusive even

²² Rais' Islamic political thought described here is mainly based on Abdillah (1999).

²³ The election of Amien Rais, and the reelection of Wahid as chair of NU in 1996, were crucial indications of the emergence of more independent Islamic organizations vis-à-vis the state. Suharto rejected both of their candidacies, but the organizations themselves refused to accept Suharto's decision.

though Muhammadiyah members are believed to be the main constituents of the party.²⁴

As chair of the People's Consultative Assembly, the highest political institution according to the Indonesian constitution, Rais successfully led the process of amendment of the constitution by the Assembly. The amended constitution is a modern document.

In the amendments, one of the most controversial issues was whether the state should be responsible for the implementation of Islamic law (*shari'a*) for all Muslims. The original text of the draft amendment, Article 29, was "The state is based on the belief in God with the obligation of all adherents of Islam to practice the *shari'a*." This represented an attempt to revive the Jakarta Charter, the brief moment in 1945 when the nationalist politicians had agreed to incorporate the *shari'a* into the constitution.

Rais and his party in the Assembly rejected the *shari'a* amendment for the sake of Indonesian unity.²⁵ Rais himself heavily lobbied the Islamic parties in the Assembly, i.e. the PPP, PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, Crescent Moon and Star Party), and PK (Partai Keadilan, Justice Party), not to vote for the amendment. He referred to the opinions of the leaders of large religious organizations (NU, Muhammadiyah, and non-Islamic organizations) which demanded that the amendment be rejected for the unity of the

²⁴ Close to Masjumi elites and supporters, Rais was once expected to revive the Masyumi Party. However, he believed that an Islamically based political party is like clothing that is too small to wear, meaning an Islamic party cannot incorporate all elements of Indonesia, and would constrain him as a national political leader (Kompas, June 14, 1998).

²⁵ The coalition between PAN and PK (Justice Party) in the MPR, i.e. the Fraksi Reformasi (Reform Fraction) offered an alternative about religion. Their draft says, "The state is based on Pancasila with the obligation for all citizens to practice their respective religion." This version was made to accommodate the Justice Party's preference for the state enforcement for the practice of *shari'a*. The PK is known as an Islamist party. In the final decision the coalition split along party lines. The PAN decided to accept the majority vote, meaning that the state is not responsible for the enforcement of the *shari'a* in society, while the PK stated that it was not responsible for the decision.

nation. He was unable to persuade them, but since they have only about 15% of the vote the amendment could not be passed. Each of the Islamic parties made statements explaining their decision not to participate in the final decision.

Sjafriansyah, representing the PPP, stated, “As an Islamic platform based party, PPP continues to fight for *shari‘a* through democratic procedures, i.e. through the MPR [People's Consultative Assembly] as a constitutional institution. The PPP will continue to convince other fractions to understand the *shari‘a*” (Kompas, August 11, 2002). The PPP believes that other parties refuse to incorporate the *shari‘a* into the constitution because they do not understand the importance of *shari‘a* to Indonesian society and politics. Because a majority in the MPR rejected the amendment, the PPP was forced to state that “PPP will understand and appreciate all decisions made by the MPR. We must apologize for being unsuccessful to aggregate the aspiration and demand of the Islamic community [for the inclusion of the *shari‘a* into the constitution].” (Ibid)

A stronger will to fight for state implementation of the *shari‘a* was voiced by the PBB, another Islamic party. Nadjih Ahjad, speaker of the party at the final session of the Assembly, stated that the PBB fraction will never relent on its determination to include the seven words of the Jakarta Charter into Article 29 of the constitution. But the party recognized that for the moment they could not win. Therefore, he continued, "it has to be noted that the PBB fraction did not participate in the decision making about Article 29 [of the constitution].”

An interesting moment occurred when the Reform faction, a coalition between the PAN and PK, an Islamic party, made a concluding remark about the proposed Article 29. A. M. Fatwa, the fraction spokesperson, stated that "we do not want to constrain the

democratic decision making process. Therefore, return to the original text ... is the consensus" (Ibid). Having stated this, Mutamimul`ula, vice chair of the Reform fraction and representative of the PK, interrupted:

We, seven members of the Justice Party in the Assembly who are in the Reform fraction, realize that our struggle [for the state responsibility for the implementation of religious teachings in society and polity] is quite difficult to be accepted, and we do not want to constrain the decision making process. Therefore, it has to be noted that we do not participate in the decision making. (Ibid)

In addition to PPP, PBB, and PK, the Daulatul Umma (Authority of the Umma) fraction through its' speaker, Asnawi Latief, made a final remark: "the constitution is inspired by the Jakarta Charter. Therefore, it is very unfortunate that the seven words of the Jakarta Charter cannot be included into the constitution" (Ibid). Hartono Mardjono of this fraction personally said that it has to be noted that he did not participate in the decision making about Article 29 (Ibid).

The success of the non-Islamist group to block the Islamists probably cannot be separated from the extra-Assembly pressure exerted by the leaders of NU, Muhammadiyah and other mass religious organizations. In lobbying his Islamist colleagues not to amend Article 29, Rais frequently referred to the mass organizations which he believes (accurately) represent a majority of Indonesian Muslims.

Three Muslim figures outside the Assembly that Rais referred to were Nurcholish Madjid, Syafii Maarif, and Hasyim Muzadi. Maarif is chair of Muhammadiyah, Muzadi

of the NU. Their collective action, together with representatives of non-Islamic organizations, has no precedent in modern Indonesian political history. They were, in fact, re-making that history.

Maarif has been very critical of the Islamists. In some ways, he is the most progressive among the current Muhammadiyah elite on the issue of the relationship between Islam and politics. He argues that the idea that Islam is *dîn wa dawlah* (religion and state) blurs the essence of Muhammad's Prophecy (Abdillah 1999, 65). The idea of the Islamic state is based on a belief that sovereignty belongs to God only, and this sovereignty is compared to people's sovereignty. This interpretation, according to Maarif, devalues God sovereignty, because the two sovereignties cannot be compared. Politics in this world is a human affair as, according to him, God has given him or her a "political responsibility" to elect or to be elected to political office (Maarif 1985, 169)

Maarif more specifically and proudly refers to his organization, Muhammadiyah, in which democracy has been practiced at the societal level. He states,

One of the sociological phenomena which is interesting in Muhammadiyah is its commitment to democratic culture. The tradition of consultation from the lowest level through the national congress is a historical fact about the strength of the commitment. The democracy that we mean is democracy as the implementation of the shura (consultation) principle as prescribed in the Qur'an to achieve an egalitarian life. In the long history of Muhammadiyah, we have rarely heard about leaders dropped from above. ... a leader with a command style will certainly not survive in Muhammadiyah. ... There is a positive sign about the emergence of democracy in our political culture. Muhammadiyah, I think, will contribute significantly to accelerate democratization in our country. ...For the Muslim community which is a majority in Indonesia, democracy is the best instrument to achieve human goals and Islamic social ideals. Muhammadiyah as a part of the majority has no choice but to show its strong commitment to democratic ideals. (Maarif 2000, 104, 105, 106)

Muhammadiyah's commitment to democracy was demonstrated in a hearing with the ad hoc committee of the Assembly responsible for the *shari'a* amendment. On behalf of Muhammadiyah, Maarif stated, "Muhammadiyah rejects the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the amendment of Article 29 ... which has been demanded so far by many groups" (Kompas, February 7, 2002).

A similar statement was made jointly by NU and Muhammadiyah. On behalf of NU, Kiai Hasyim Muzadi, NU chair, demanded that Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution not be amended because the constitution is a big umbrella, and because the formalization of religion through its inclusion into the constitution will directly or indirectly spark national disintegration (Kompas, August 8, 2002). The HMI Diponegoro, the largest Islamic university student organization in the country, also participated in a hearing in the Assembly to express their interest in maintaining Article 29 in its present form.²⁶ (Kompas, August 5, 2002).

These important Islamic organizations have all passed the crucial test of commitment to a religiously pluralistic Indonesian nation-state as a necessary foundation for democracy. They probably represent the political orientation of a majority of Muslims in the country. Moreover, their interpretation of the relationship between Islam and politics probably accounts for the fact that major political forces such as the PDI-P, Golkar, PKB and PAN reject the subordination of politics to religion.

²⁶ The HMI Diponegoro refers to the largest faction of the organization whose headquarters is on Diponegoro Street in Jakarta. Another faction of the organization is the HMI-MPO. MPO stands for "Majlis Penyelamat Organisasi" (Assembly for the Preservation of the Organization), meaning preservation from the New Order's demand that Pancasila be the foundation of the organization. This faction rejected this demand and struggled to maintain Islam as the foundation of the organization. The HMI Diponegoro has nowadays returned to Islam as its foundation, but the two factions are not reconciled yet.

However, this commitment to the nation-state, and more specifically to the idea that Islam conceived in societal rather than state terms is necessary to guarantee the equal treatment of different religious groups, is still being challenged by the Islamist parties, social organizations and movements. In politics, the Islamist political orientation is still strong at least in PPP, PBB, and PK.

PPP in its platforms states that the party's goal is to achieve a just and prosperous society according to God's will, in the form of a nation-state of the Republic of Indonesia which is based on Pancasila, to make a democratic political order on the basis of an Islamic ethic (*ahklaqul karimah*), and to develop an Islamic life. (Almanak Parpol Indonesia 443). Strictly speaking, the "Islamic agenda" in this platform does not necessarily contradict with democracy.

This stance is basically similar to those of PBB and PK. In its platforms, the PBB states that the goals of the party are to realize the life of Indonesian society according to the declaration of independence of August 17, 1945, i.e. a society that has faith in and obedience to God, has an ethic, is spiritually and physically committed to the welfare of all its members, and makes responsible progress for the people. (Ibid, 167)

The PK platform states similarly that the goal of the party is to realize a just and prosperous Indonesian society in accordance with God's will (Ibid, 265). This party formally states that its foundation is Pancasila rather than Islam. However, Pancasila is a loose principle, and, according to the party, it is open to interpretation (267). The formal acceptance of Pancasila as the foundation of the party does not create confusion as to whether it is an Islamist party or not. Relative to other large parties, PK is the only party that formally has a *Shari'a* Council (Dewan Shari'a) in its structure, which functions to

guide any political decision according to the shari'a. In the Assembly session in which the *shari'a* amendment was debated, as discussed above, the PK clearly showed its Islamist identity.

The three Islamist parties have accepted the fact that the majority vote in the Assembly rejected state responsibility for the enforcement of the *shari'a* in the society. The majority's rejection is not only due to the fact that Indonesia is religiously pluralistic but is also because the concept of *shari'a* itself has not been successfully elaborated by the three parties in a such a way that it does not contradict with the principles of a democratic state and a pluralistic society.

As mentioned earlier, the vote in the Assembly that supported *shari'a* enforcement was only about 15%, which is much smaller relative to that in the Constitutional Assembly (about 46%) in the 1950s. This difference indicates a major shift in political orientation among Indonesian Muslims.

In addition, the three Islamist parties have been more moderate than their predecessors in the 1950s as they do not oppose Islam to Pancasila. The demand for the *shari'a* has been claimed to be consistent with Pancasila. They even claim that the decree by President Sukarno that returned the country to the Constitution of 1945 in 1959 after the failure of the Constitutional Assembly has meant the return to "the original text" of the 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945) in which the seven words of the Jakarta Charter, "with the obligation of the adherents of Islam to practice the *shari'a*," are included (*Republika*, August 5, 2002). Of course, liberals and Islamists continue to have a very different view of the relationship between Pancasila and Islam.

Regardless of this difference, the struggle for the enforcement of the *shari'a* in post-Suharto Indonesia is much milder today than in the 1950s. At that time, the struggle occurred not only in Parliament but also in society through various Islamic movements. In post Suharto Indonesia, pro-*shari'a* Islamic movements have emerged, but none has taken a "radical form," i.e. armed movements engaged in violent acts against the state as characterized the Darul Islam from the 1940s through the early 1960s.²⁷

Post-Suharto Islamist movements such as KISDI (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Muslim World), FPI (Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defender Front), Laskar Ahlussunah Wal Jama'ah (Ahlussunah Waljama'ah militia), Laskar Mujahidin (Mujahidin Militia), Majelis Mujahidin (Mujahidin Council), NII (Negara Islam Indonesia, Islamic State of Indonesia), Hizb ut-Tahrir, Laskar Jundullah, and many others, have fought for the enforcement of *shari'a* in peaceful or relatively peaceful ways.²⁸

Of the movements, Hizb ut-Tahrir (Hizb al-Tahrir) is probably the most Islamist in terms of political orientation. This movement is international in scope, and the Hizb ut-Tahrir of Indonesia (HTI) is just a branch of the Hizb ut-Tahrir centered in Palestine. This Islamist movement organization has fought for the revival of *khilafah* (caliphate), i.e. a concept of polity which is claimed to be based on the Qur'an and *Sunna* and had been

²⁷ About the Darul Islam, see Van Dijk (1978) and Jackson (1980).

²⁸ Armed force has been used by some of them in the context of religious conflicts in Maluku and Central Sulawesi. Their involvement came later after the local conflicts occurred in which armed violence has been used by both sides, Muslims and Christians. However, some of the movements, especially the FPI, engaged in "sweeping" of particular amusement centers, bars, and cafes which were claimed to violate the *shari'a* such as prostitution, alcohol and gambling.

realized in a long history of Islamic empires, from the Prophet Muhammad through the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The movement rejects not only democracy but also the idea of the nation-state because Islam is beyond national and ethnic identity.²⁹ This political orientation fits the claim of critics like Huntington, described in the Introduction, that in Islam the idea of the nation-state is alien.

In the constitution of Hizb ut-Tahrir the terms *khilafah* and state are used interchangeably. The nation in the concept of “nation-state” is “Islam” whose scope is defined as “the Islamic domain” (*dar al-Islam*) and “the disbelief domain” (*dar al-kufr*). In the former, the *shari‘a* applies, and in the latter the rules of disbelief apply (www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/constitution.htm). Under the khilafah or Islamic state the *shari‘a* applies to all citizens regardless of their religion, except in matters of worship in which non-Muslims are allowed to perform their own religious obligations.

The constitution states that the khilafah

is founded upon four principles. They are: 1. Sovereignty belongs to the divine law (*shara‘*) and not to the people. 2) Authority belongs to the people, i.e. the *umma*. 3) The appointment of the khalifah into the office is an obligation upon all Muslims. 4) Only khalifah has the right to adopt the *ahkam shari‘yyah* and thus he passes ... the constitution and the various canons. (Ibid)

In addition, the constitution states that “No one is permitted to take charge of ruling, ... except a male who is free (*hurr*), i.e. not a slave, mature (*baligh*), sane (*‘aqil*),

²⁹ Majlis Mujahidin is likely to share this idea judged from the opinion of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, chair of the Majlis. See Burhanuddin (2003).

trustworthy ('adl), competent; and he must not be save a Muslim.” (Ibid). In the khilafah, "Muslims are entitled to established parties ... on condition that the parties are based on shari'a. ... Any party not established on the basis of Islam is prohibited.” (Ibid).

The khalifah is elected by male and female Muslims. Non-Muslims have no right to participate in elections. The procedure to elect the khalifah is as follows: Muslim citizens elect members of the Majlis al-Ummah (Assembly of Islamic Community). This Majlis short-lists the candidates for that post. The names are subsequently announced and the Muslims are asked to elect one of them. The person who attains the majority of the votes is pronounced the khalifah (Ibid). This khalifah is identical with the state (khilafah) in the sense that there is no institution that can control his power except the *shari'a* (Ibid).

The HTI is quite recent in Indonesia. It emerged in the 1990s, and is very active in propagating and socializing its ideals and to pressuring the government to implement the *shari'a*. The HTI claims that the source of Indonesia' current crisis is the absence of the *shari'a* in the life of Indonesian Muslims. The spokesman of HTI, Ismail Yusanto, addresses this issue as follows:

The crisis is 'fasad' (corruption) caused by human actions ... 'by the mistakes and sins of man.' ... Disobedience (ma'siyat) is any action against Allah's law., i.e. doing the prohibited action or ignoring the command. Any kind of disobedience causes sin. ... Any kind of sin causes corruption.... So it is clear that all misery comes from one root: there does not exist any Islamic country in which all the Islamic law (shari'a) is implemented in all of life's affairs. Therefore the struggle to resume the Islamic way of life by re-establishing the Islamic khilafah state (*sic*) is the main problem of the Islamic Ummah ... everywhere... The heart of the matter is: how to re-implement the law of Allah... completely. It is believed that only in this way all current problems of the Ummah will be solved by a clear method, and the honor of Islam and the Islamic ummah ... could be reached again. So, the struggle to resume the Islamic Shari'a in Indonesia is very

important. This struggle is the manifestation of Aqeeda [faith]. Factually, which other system could be hoped to solve the multidimensional crisis in Indonesia, if not Islamic shari'a, after the failure of socialism and the disabling of capitalism? ... The implementation of shari'a by state is a well-known command in Islam ... like the command for salat (prayer), zakat (charity), hajj (pilgrimage), etc. In reality, the setting up of a state with its structures and authorities is the Islamic view for the implementation of law (shari'a), as it is the practical realization in social and state life of obedience to the Creator (Allah). So *the struggle to implement the Islamic sharia for Muslims is a necessary. It is a conviction borne from certainty that there is no honor without Islam, and there is no Islam without shari'a, and there is no shari'a without state.* It is a manifest fact that the Islamic shari'a is the only solution for all of life's problems whether in the field of economy, politics, social life, culture and education. ... The implementation of shari'a will bring the Indonesian society with its Moslem majority nearer to the religiosity of Islam, as a realization of the mission of life: obedience to Allah. (www.khilafah.com/home/lographics/category.php?Document...). (italics mine)

A specific example of an Islamic state or khilafah in which the shari'a is implemented is the rejection of female leadership especially for strategic posts such as the presidency. On Megawati, the HTI asks

is Megawati's assuming of the presidency a correct action? Indeed, it is not. ... She is a woman and the Islamic Shari'a does not allow a woman to assume the affairs of ruling. ... How can members of the parliament, who gave her the pledge for the presidency, defend their position, when it contradicts the saying of the Messenger (saw): 'No people will succeed if they appoint a woman as ruler over their affairs' (Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, July 31, 2001; www.mindspring.eu.com/indonesiadilemma.htm).

The Hizb ut-Tahrir of Indonesia has frequently demonstrated its concern with the necessity to implement the shari'a in Indonesian society and polity through collective actions such as demonstrations or hearings with Parliament or the Assembly. During the

process of amendment of the 1945 Constitution in August 2002, for example, thousands of members and supporters of HTI put pressure on the Assembly to implement the *shari'a*. (Kompas, August 3, 2002).

In addition to HTI, the Majelis Mujahidin is another important Islamist movement organization and network which organizes Islamist potential at the national level to fight for the *shari'a*. In its first congress in Yogyakarta, August 2000, the Majelis created the structures which reflect the legacy of Islamic political institutions such as *ahl al-hall wa'l-'aqd* ("Islamic legislative body") and khalifah (Kompas, August 6 and 8, 2000). In the congress Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was selected as chair of the *ahl al-hall wa'l-'aqd*, and Irfan Suryahadi Awwas as chair of the executive body of the Majelis Mujahidin.

These two figures were virtually unknown in the history of Indonesian Muslim politics compared to other figures who participated in the congress such as Deliar Noer, the chair of the Indonesian Islamic Party and a well-known professor of Indonesian Muslim politics, Ali Yafie who is well-known as one of the NU elites, or Alawy Muhammad who is known as a charismatic 'ulama'.

Ba'asyir's political orientation and activity were not known until the mass media exposed him as a suspect in several church bombings linked to the Jama'ah Islamiyya, an alleged international terrorist group. In addition, he was suspected of attempting to assassinate Vice-President Megawati in 2000 and as the master-mind of the Bali bombing blast.

Ba'asyir's Islamic political orientation is not very different from Hizb ut-Tharir. He agrees with Tahrir's struggle to establish the khilafah. He argues that khilafah is the ultimate goal of his struggle. To reach this goal the implementation of *shari'a* in society

and polity is necessary through education and political struggle. The inclusion of the shari'a into the constitution is a step to establish an Islamic state and finally the khilafah (Burhanuddin 2002).

This Islamist political orientation is also reflected in Awwas, the executive chair of the Majlis Mujahidin. In his column, "Islam Radikal di Mata Kaum Sekuler" (Radical Islam in the Secularist View), Awwas summarized his Islamist political orientation as he defended the violent actions in the name of Islam by several Islamist activists in the last two years:

In the Qur'anic perspective, to choose a way of life that violates God's instructions and the Messenger's guidance is infidelity... In the thoughts of secular figures, radical Islam is characterized as: 1) his or her religion is the only true religion; 2) Islam is the perfect religion to regulate all aspects of life; 3) the necessity of taking the Prophet as the role model; 4) making no distinction between religion and the state; 5) believing in jihad as a means to struggle against the infidel that threatens Islam; 6) dividing the human race into two groups, i.e. the group of believers, and the group of disbelievers; 7) demanding that the shari'a be implemented in individual, social, and political lives ...Is it wrong for a Muslim to follow the Prophet as his or her excellent role model...? Is it wrong for a Muslim to take the shari'a as a system of life? Is it not true that there is no religion without shari'a? Not to take Islam as the only true religion violates the divine revelation. The radicals subordinate their wills and wants into the will of God. ... [radical actions] are the outcomes of their ijtihad [understanding of Islam]. We do not have any right to judge negatively their ijtihad.... To place Islam only as a personal matter without any relation with social and political life and state means to think that religion does not have any goal and orientation. Is it possible to adopt an un-Islamic system of life to resolve various social illness? How can it be possible that a Muslim is obedient to the infidel instructions while disobedient to Allah, the God of the universe? (Tempo, January 12, 2003).

The column was written in the context of growing criticism of some Islamist activists who claim that *jihad* requires violence, i.e. an Islamic war against the

threatening infidels. The association between this Islamic orientation and violence is quite clear if judged from verbal confessions by such activists as Imam Samudra, one of the Bali bombers.

Imam Samudra or Abdul Aziz, now in police custody, has claimed that he is responsible for the Bali bombing blast that killed more than hundred innocents. According to his confession, the necessity of implementing the shari'a in society and polity encouraged him to learn about jihad in Afghanistan, southern Philippines, and Malaysia (Tempo, November 25-December 1, 2002). He believes that martyrdom is his ultimate goal (Ibid).

The Islamic orientation of Abdul Aziz and his group is a variant of Islamism, probably the most extreme form. There are many other variants whose adherents believe in democratic procedures to achieve their goals such as elections, demonstrations, and hearings with public officials. The Islamic Defender Front, Brotherhood of Indonesian Muslim Workers, Islamic Youth Movement, and Mujahidin Militia already mentioned represent this variant. In his rhetoric during the amendment demonstration, Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, the leader of the Islamic Defender Front, urged that the Assembly pass the amendment of article 29. He stated that there are only two parties in the world, i.e. the Allah party and the Satan party: "The party of Allah is that which implements the shari'a. While the Satan party is the reverse" (Kompas, August 3, 2002). If the parties in the Assembly passed the amendment, they would be parties of God. "Otherwise," he continued, "they are Satanic parties. The PDIP, PBB, PAN, PPP, and the fraction of the

armed forces and police are Satanic parties if they reject the shari'a [into the constitution]. [If they are so] the Islamic ummah is in no need to participate in the 2004 general election" (Ibid).

Many Islamist movements accept "democracy" in their own interpretation. One of the characteristics of their understanding of democracy is *majoritarianism*, a democracy which ignores civil liberty. They argue that democracy as rule by majority is instrumental to achieving Islamic goals. They claim that their demand for the implementation of shari'a by the state represents the interest of a majority of Muslims. Syihab for example argues that the outcome of the amendment process does not accommodate the interest of the majority (ibid).

This claim ignores the fact of Islamic pluralism. The challenge to shari'a has come not only from traditionally secular political forces such as the PDI-P, but also from within the Muslim community itself as is acknowledged by Yusanto of the HTI. He complained that "the main constraint for the implementation of shari'a in Indonesia has in fact come from Islamic figures themselves rather than from non-Muslims." (Tempo Interactive, August 3, 2002). The Islamist inclination to majoritarianism in their understanding of democracy ignores the concept of the equality of citizens regardless of religious background. It raises fears among democrats since the Islamists' democracy may mean "one man, one vote, one time."

2.3. Conclusion

This brief discussion reveals that perceptions and attitude concerning the relationship between Islam and politics varies among Indonesian Muslims, from the

liberals on the left to the radical Islamists on the far right of the spectrum. This variation is present in Islamic social organizations and movements and in political parties. Without systematic evidence, we cannot claim that the Islamist political orientation is large or small, significant or insignificant, among Indonesian Muslims. Nor can we claim that the liberal political orientation is large and important, and therefore Indonesian democracy is likely to be consolidated. The broad sketch offered above of the various political orientations provides only a macro-context for the systematic analysis of the following chapters.

CHAPTER 3

DIMENSIONS AND MEASURES OF ISLAM

Testing the extent to which Islam is inimical to democracy depends on how the two concepts are defined and measured. This chapter is an attempt to define and measure Islam as a religion. As discussed in Chapter 1, social scientists define religion as a system of belief in the sacred. This system is approached through one of two strategies. Religion is defined as a "mental phenomenon" or as a "social phenomenon." (Wald and Smidt 1993, 32). The former is about *believing*, while the latter is about *belonging*. As a mental phenomenon, "religion encompasses the fundamental beliefs, ideas, ethical codes, and symbols associated with religious tradition, including what others call theology or belief system" (Wald 1992, 27). This research strategy emphasizes the importance of religious teachings and values and their impact on social and political behavior.

As a social phenomenon, religion is defined as a social group "whose members may exhibit a common identity, a regular pattern of social interaction, or similar expectations (group norms) concerning belief and behavior" (Wald and Smidt 1993, 33). Membership of or belonging to a particular religious group and particular behaviors that reflect the group norms are crucial to this strategy in the study of religion.

Of course, the two interact. Belief in particular religious values and ideas produced by interpretation may shape particular attitudes and behaviors. Through a process of institutionalization the attitudes and behaviors are shared in a collectivity to which individuals belong. Their belonging, in turn, may affect their beliefs.³⁰

Gerhard Lenski's *The Religious Factor* (1963) suggests that religion is multidimensional. Lenski's concepts of orientation, communalism, and associationalism broadly correspond to the more common terms of theological, social, and organizational dimensions. Orientation encompasses agreement with religious doctrines and frequency of private communication with the divine. Communalism refers to the commonality of religious identification among family and friends; and associationalism to corporate religious organizations, as measured by attendance at collective worship and other activities conducted under the aegis of religion. In Lenski's model, these dimensions have different impacts on political variables such as voting, democratic values, and partisan choice. As will be discussed shortly, this multidimensionality of religion can also be found in Islam.

Islam, as religion, consists of belief and belonging, and the two in practice interact. Islam, at least as commonly understood, is inconceivable without faith, belief, or *iman* (Denny 1994). On the elementary level, Muslims commonly perceive Islam as a unity between belief and belonging. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the core belief is that there is no god but God, and that Muhammad is the messenger of God. Believing that Muhammad is His messenger means that God has revealed the Qur'an. The content of

³⁰ A similar dialectic of interpretation and institution in sociological processes is proposed by Berger and Luckmann (1967).

the Qur'an is believed to be the teachings, values, norms, and law of God. Traditionally, Muslims are familiar with the five pillars of Islam. In addition to the confession, a Muslim is obliged to perform the daily five prayers, to pay alms (*zakat*), to fast in the month of Ramadan, and to go to the pilgrimage to Mecca if he or she is able. These pillars basically reflect the unity between belief and belonging even though the two are conceptually distinct.

In addition, Islam, as described in Chapter 2, materializes in various social organizations and networks. Involvement in Islamic organizations may give rise to self-identification with a particular Islamic organization. I will label this self-identification "Islamic social identity."

As discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, some Muslims and students of Muslim society argue that Islam is not only about rituals, organizational engagement, or social identity, but also about politics. It reflects a belief in the unity between religion and politics. Islam in this view is a total way of life, a system which comprises interdependent parts. In this study, this belief is called Islamism.

The characteristic of Islamism relevant to this study is the belief in the unity of religion and politics. More precisely, the subordination of politics to religion. Politics is ordered according to Islamic norms and laws. As discussed in Chapter 2, Islamism is only one variant of Islam. Another variant, which is called liberal Islam in this study, does not link religion and politics so tightly. In this perspective, religion is conceived in personal and social terms. It exists in ritual or worship and social activity, which in turn

may affect politics. This study examines both the Islamist and the liberal variants by focusing on faith, ritual, social activity, and belief in the unity between religion and politics.

As faith, Islam is defined by the extent to which a Muslim believes in God and in Muhammad as His messenger. This is the core belief. For most Muslims, it is strongly associated with worship or ritual. Islam is not only an *orthodoxy* (“right faith”) as in Christianity, but also *orthopraxy* (“right practice”) as in Judaism (Denny 1994, 113). Islamic ritual in this study comprises three components: mandatory rituals (*ibadah wajib*), suggested rituals (*ibadah sunnah*), and the Nahdliyin rituals (see Chapter 1).

There is no comparable concept in Christianity for “mandatory ritual” or “mandatory worship.” A form of worship is mandatory because, according to Islamic orthodoxy, it has a reward or punishment effect. If a Muslim performs it he or she will be rewarded. Conversely, failure to perform it will bring punishment in the hereafter. Ignoring this form of worship is a sin. Moreover, it is highly regulated. A Muslim cannot do it in his or her own way.

Suggested worship has the reward but not the punishment effect. It is not a sin for a Muslim if he or she does not perform this ritual. However, it is recommended as it is believed to have a positive effect on Muslim life. Because it is not mandatory, a Muslim usually does not perform it as intensively. However, it does describe intensity of religiosity. The more suggested worship performed, the more pious is the person who performs it.

Among Indonesian Muslims, there is a particular set of rituals which are quite controversial. One group of Muslims, many of whom are associated with the mass

organization of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), believe that such rituals (called *Nadhliyin* in this study) are suggested or recommended and have positive effects. Another group argues that the rituals are heresy (*bid'ah*) as the Prophet Muhammad did not perform the rituals, or are even categorized as *shirk* (idolatry) as they imply belief in another sacred power besides God.

This set of rituals include the seven day commemoration of the dead (*tujuh harian*), the annual commemoration of the dead (*khaul*), and the collective ceremony (*tahlilan*) in which the phrase “there is no god but God” is uttered repeatedly for specific purposes such as to help the dead be accepted by God or to help a family be protected by God. The rituals particularly associated with *shirk* are *ziarah*, visiting shrines to beg for help from the dead for various purposes, and asking for prayers from a religious authority (*kiai* or *wali*) for various personal reasons.³¹

Controversy about the rituals occurs especially between members of NU and adherents of “puritanical Islam,” often identified with the modernist organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam (Persis) and Al-Irsjad.³² Indeed, the birth of NU was in part a reaction against the growing influence of a puritanical variant of Islam, Wahabism, from Arabia which was intolerant and was hostile to sufism (*tasawuf*) and other religious practices believed to be associated with *shirk*. Wahabism claims that Islam is restricted

³¹ About *ziarah* see Jamhari (2001).

³² About the emergence of the NU and its relation to the controversy, see Noer (1973) and Haidar (1994). An interesting description of the conflict between these two groups regarding the rituals is Bowen (1993).

to the Qur'an and Sunna. Its way of understanding the sources of Islam is also literal, so that philosophical and mystical approaches are claimed to be heretical and should be avoided by Muslims for the sake of *tawhid* or monotheism understood literally.

In Indonesia, this puritanical movement has been represented among others by Muhammadiyah. Conflict between NU and Muhammadiyah is often associated with their different stances on puritanism. The NU community is familiar with “sufi way” (*tariqa*) and this *tariqa* is an important part of their religious life.³³ Most Muslims believe that the dead are dead only physically. They are spiritually still alive. According to some, the dead can communicate with the living, which makes possible asking for help from the dead. An especially holy Muslim who has died is believed to have the power to help the living. In addition, in the *tariqa* community or Sufi order, a *wali* (“Muslim saint”) has spiritual power which can connect ordinary Muslims to God. Praising a *wali* is a way to receive his or her assistance. This belief is of course considered *shirk* (polytheism) by puritanical Muslims.

Islam is also defined in this study as “Islamic social capital.” As such, it is one of the outcomes of the institutionalization of Islamic beliefs and rituals in social groups and organizations. Put differently, it is the networks of Islamic civic engagement which comprise membership in local and national Islamic organizations. At the individual level, Islamic social capital means the intensity and quantity of activity in any Islamic organization or group. The concept also includes Islamic social identity which is the

³³ About the *tariqa* among the NU community see for example van Bruinessen (1995) and Sujuthi (2001).

intensity of self-identification with a particular Islamic organization. In this study, the measurement of social identity is restricted to self-identification with the largest two Islamic organizations, NU (NU identity) and Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah identity).

The last component of Islam in this study is belief in the unity between Islam and politics or Islamism. It is defined by the extent to which Muslims are oriented toward Islamic political values gauged by a number of items. The central concept is *shari'a*. For Islamists, *shari'a* and its derivatives regulate all aspects of Muslim life including the political. Several questionnaire items have been developed to gauge the degree of Islamism among Indonesian Muslims. Detailed description of these items is presented below.

3.1. Faith

Faith or *iman* is about belief in God. This is not a simple yes or no proposition. A person may sometimes believe in God, and sometimes not. For many, perhaps most, individuals, belief is not a constant condition. Therefore, I measure belief in God by the extent to which a person believes in God: always, often, sometimes, or never.

In the surveys, almost all Indonesian Muslims reported that they absolutely believe, or never doubt, in God (97.2%). Those who sometimes doubt are about 2%. Only about 1% reported that they frequently doubt or never believe in God. Judging

from this, almost all Indonesian Muslims are believers. Because of its low variation, this is not a good measure of Islam for analytical purpose at the individual level. It may be useful as an aggregate measure of faith for a cross-nation analysis.³⁴

3.2. Mandatory Rituals

In addition to faith in God, Muslims are required to perform a number of rituals. Two of these rituals are the five daily prayers (*salat lima waktu*) and fasting in the month of Ramadan. The five prayers are arranged by time: *salat al-fajr* (early morning), *salat al-duhr* (noon), *salat al-'asr* (mid-afternoon), *salat al-maghrib* (sunset), and *salat al-'isha* (evening).³⁵ These practices are highly regulated. The intensity of performing them constitute a prime definition of Muslim piety.

About 88% of the Muslim respondents reported that they very or quite frequently perform the daily five prayers, and 94% reported that they very or quite often perform the Ramadhan fasting.³⁶ Judging from these percentages, Indonesian Muslims are almost homogenously religious.

³⁴ In a pre-test of the 2001 survey, a substantial number of items of faith, constructed according to the pillar of faith (*rukun iman*), were included. I found almost homogenous answers to the items. More than 95% of the respondents reported that they believe in God, the prophecy of Muhammad and other messengers of God, in the Qur'an as the word of God, in angels, and in the final judgment. Because of this low variation, these items were dropped. In the 2002 survey, one item of faith, i.e. belief in God, is included, to provide minimal and basic indicator of Indonesian Muslim religiosity.

³⁵ A good description of these prayers is Denny (1994).

³⁶ These proportions are the average from both surveys.

Some studies of Indonesian society in the 1960s and 1970s claimed that many Indonesian Muslims, or at least the Javanese, were only religious nominally. They did not follow the Islamic orthopraxy, or rarely practiced their ritual obligations such as the prayers or the Ramadan fasting (Geertz 1960, Kuntjaraningrat 1985).

Geertz (1960) in particular claims that the Javanese are *abangan* rather than pious Muslims. Abanganism is a Javanese variant of Islam, mixed with pre-Islamic animism and Hinduism, that has long been believed to be widespread among the population (Geertz 1960, Kuntjaraningrat 1985). Because these pre-Islamic religions were persistent, Islam in Indonesia continued to be a mixture of old and new. For this reason, abanganism is sometimes called a syncretism of the Javanese. The core is a mix between Hinduism and animism, and only the surface is Islamic. The abangan are said not to perform their Islamic obligatory rituals, and are therefore often labeled nominal Muslims or *Islam KTP* ("identity-card Muslims").




Figure 3.1. Performance of mandatory rituals (very or quite frequently) (%)

The 2001 and 2002 survey outcomes, however, tend to reject Geertz's claim (Figure 3.1). Instead, they reflect the conclusion of more recent studies by anthropologists (Hefner 1987, Pranowo 1993) and by a previous mass survey (Liddle and Mujani, 2002). The abangan population is very small judging from the intensity of performance of abangan rituals. Only about 2% of the respondents very or quite often go to a spiritual adviser (*dukun*) to resolve their problems; only about 13% very or quite often have a *ruwatan*³⁷ for peace and harmony with the spirits; only about 6% who very or quite often burn incense (*kemenyan*) in service to the spirits; only about 5% who very or quite often visit a sacred grave (*ziarah ke kuburan orang sakti*) to ask for specific help; and only about 7% reported that they very or quite often give offerings to the spirits (*sesajen*). In general, the percentage of performance of abangan rituals is much smaller than the figures for the suggested rituals of Islam described below.³⁸

3.3. Suggested Rituals

In addition to the mandatory rituals, Muslims may perform other ritual activities. These activities are only suggested or highly suggested (*sunnah*). In this study, these activities are called suggested rituals. They comprise reciting the Qur'an, collective

³⁷ "Ruwatan" is a ritual to start something new in order to receive blessing from spiritual powers and to be successful in overcoming future difficulties. This ritual is offered for example when a person starts to build a house, to start a new work project, to restore harmony with spirits of the ocean for fishermen, etc.

³⁸ The proportion of abangan rituals is about the same controlling for provincial variables. In Central Java, for example, the ostensible heart of abangan country, the proportion of abangan in the population is almost the same as those of other provinces. Because of this small proportion, the abangan ritual questions were not included in the 2002 survey.

prayers (*salat berjamaan*), suggested prayers (*salat sunnah*), prayer prior to starting daily work (*berdoa sebelum bekerja*), suggested fasting (*puasa sunnah*), religious classes (*pengajian*), and giving charity (*sedekah*).

As expected, Muslim religiosity is not homogenous in the suggested rituals. The proportion of Indonesian Muslims who perform the suggested rituals varies markedly: about 59% very or quite frequently recite the Qur'an, about 83% very or quite frequently pray outside the daily five prayers before they work, about 59% very or quite frequently pray together with others or engage in collective prayer, about 47% very or quite frequently perform the suggested prayers, about 33% very or quite frequently perform the suggested fasting, and about 61% very or quite frequently go to religious classes. Giving charity, a voluntary gift of goods or money to the needy in the name of God, is also a suggested practice (Figure 3.2). Regardless of the amount, about 74% of Muslims reported that they very or quite often give charitable contributions.

3.4. Nahdliyin Rituals

Particular Muslim communities, especially Nahdlatul Ulama members as described above, do other suggested rituals such as asking for prayers from a religious authority (*kiai*) in order to achieve individual goals.³⁹ About 37% reported that they very or quite often go to a *kiai* to ask for his blessing for a particular purpose (Figure 3.2).

³⁹ About *kiai* see for example Dhofier (1982); about Tarekat and Nahdliyin community in Indonesia, see for example Bruinessen (1995) and Sujuthi (2001).

The *kiai* is a popular religious authority in the Indonesian Muslim community. A *kiai* is not only a religious scholar, but also an informal Muslim community leader, often believed to have charisma and such spiritual power that he has a closer relation with God than ordinary Muslims.

In Indonesia, visiting a burial shrine (*makam wali*) is another kind of ritual in the community. It is believed that the dead can spiritually communicate with and assist people who try to come to him or her.⁴⁰ About 26% of the survey respondents stated that they very or quite often visit burial shrines.

Tahlilan, a collective ritual in which the greatness of God is praised repeatedly, is also found, most commonly among NU members.⁴¹ About 60% reported that they very or quite often participate in the *tahlilan* ritual.⁴² A *tahlilan* is usually held by a community member who has a particular purpose, a prayer for the well-being of a family member who has passed away, for example. It is led by a religious authority. Participants are members of the community or neighborhood, and food and beverages are served.

A more specific ritual associated with the *tahlilan* is the annual commemoration of the death of a family member called *khaul* (see Fanani and Sabardila 2001, Bruinessen, 1995). Family members of the dead commonly invite *kiai* and community members to

⁴⁰ About *ziarah* among Indonesians see Jamhari (2001), Bruinessen (1996, 1995), and Sujuthi (2001).

⁴¹ About *tahlilan* see Fanani and Sabardila (2001).

⁴² Geertz (1960) started his description of *The Religion of Java* with an analysis of the *slametan*. For Javanese, the *tahlilan* is a part of the *slametan*.

pray for the well-being of the deceased in the hereafter. About 55% of respondents reported that they very or quite often perform a khaul. The seven day ritual (*tujuh harian*) for the death of a family member is also found among Indonesian Muslims, and like the *khaul* is commonly associated with NU. About 66% reported that they very or quite often perform the seven day ritual.




Figure 3.2. Intensity (very or quite frequently) of performance of various suggested and Nahdliyin rituals (%): 1 = Reciting the Qur'an, 2 = Praying outside mandatory rituals, 3 = Collective prayer, 4 = Suggested prayer, 5 = Suggested fasting, 6 = Go to religious classes, 7 = Ask for *kia'si* prayer, 8 = Tahlilan, 9 = Khaul, 10 = Seven Day ceremony for the dead, 11 = Charity, 12 = Going to burial shrine

In Islamic orthodoxy or orthopraxy, as mentioned above, the mandatory and suggested rituals are distinct. Those who perform the mandatory do not necessarily perform the suggested as well. In Indonesia, the Nahdliyin rituals are performed mainly by NU members. Most Muhammadiyah members do not perform these rituals. For this

reason, I differentiate the Nahdliyin rituals from the other two types. According to a confirmatory factor analysis, these three distinct dimensions of Islamic rituals are valid.

The analysis also suggests that the measures of Islamic rituals are consistent.⁴³

| | Factor | | |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | Suggested | Nahdliyin | Mandatory |
| Mandatory prayers | .331 | .046 | .660 |
| Ramadan fasting | .164 | .033 | .731 |
| Recite the Qur'an | .536 | .062 | .356 |
| Collective prayer (salat berjamaah) | .610 | .204 | .240 |
| Suggested prayer (salat sunnah) | .748 | .116 | .211 |
| Suggested fasting (puasa sunnah) | .651 | .110 | .165 |
| Pray before work | .378 | .195 | .335 |
| Religious class (pengajian) | .527 | .253 | .212 |
| Ask prayer from religious authority (kiai) | .411 | .362 | .086 |
| Praising God (Tahlilan) | .334 | .520 | .063 |
| Annual commemoration of the dead (khaul) | .083 | .816 | .021 |
| Seven day commemoration of the dead (tujuh harian) | .048 | .775 | .047 |
| Give charity | .323 | .306 | .173 |
| Visit the shrine (ziarah ke kuburan wali) | .366 | .412 | .070 |

Table 3.1. Factor analysis of Islamic rituals (varimax rotation)
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

⁴³ All factor analyses throughout this work are guided by Zeller and Carmines (1980), Affifi and Clark (1990), and Kim and Meuller (1978).

3.5. Islamic Social Capital

As stated earlier, Islam is not measured by ritual intensity alone but also by involvement in community life and by attachment to particular Islamic organizations. The former is networks of Islamic civic engagement, the latter is Islamic social identity. In Indonesia, Muslims are involved in many social organizations. In the surveys, two items were constructed to measure involvement in Islamic social organizations or the networks of Islamic civic engagement.




Figure 3.3. Islamic social capital: networks of Islamic engagement and Islamic social identity (%): 1 = Active member in national Islamic organization, 2 = Active member in local Islamic organization, 3 = Feeling very or quite close to NU (NU identity), 4 = Feeling very or quite close to Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah identity)

First, respondents were asked about voluntary membership in religious organizations at the national level such as NU, Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, and others. About 21% of Muslim respondents reported that they were active members of an

organization (Figure 3.3). A larger proportion (about 47%) reported that they are active members in smaller religious groups in their local community such as religious study groups (*majlis taklim*) or the mosque youth association (*remaja masjid*).

NU and Muhammadiyah are well known as the first and second largest Muslim organizations in the country. A significant proportion of respondents (about 48%) reported that they felt very or quite close to NU, and a smaller proportion (about 18%) reported that they felt very or quite close to Muhammadiyah.

3.6. Islamist Political Orientation (Islamism)

An Islamist political orientation is believed to be crucial to define the extent to which a Muslim is Islamist. Students of Muslim societies such as Lewis and Gellner and of political science such as Huntington and Kedourie have even claimed without qualification that an Islamist political orientation is universal among Muslims. How accurate this claim is will be discussed shortly.

How can we measure the Islamist political orientation? One way to do it is to first specify how Islamist ideologues define Islam as a socio-political ideology. We can then verify their definition empirically by seeing the extent to which ordinary Muslims replicate their interpretation. For example, Islamist ideologues such as Mawdudi, Qutb and Khomeini claim that Islam recognizes divine sovereignty rather than popular sovereignty. Liberal Muslims on the contrary claim that God has given mankind autonomy and sovereignty for worldly political matters.

In the surveys, a ten-point scale question explored the extent to which a respondent agrees with the Islamist claim of divine versus popular sovereignty. The responses vary greatly. The mean is about 6 out of 10, meaning that most people are neutral on the issue, or lean slightly in the direction of popular sovereignty.

The Islamist tendency is much larger (about 63%) when the concept is measured by whether the respondent agrees or not with the idea that Islamic governance, governance based on the *shari'a* and under the leadership of an Islamic authority, is the best for a nation like Indonesia (Figure 3.4). Related to this measure is an attitude toward state involvement in *shari'a* enforcement. A still larger proportion (about 66%) agree with the idea of state enforcement.

This large Islamist proportion significantly decreases (to about 50%) when the concept is measured by support for Islamist movements such as the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), the Jihadi Militia and Darul Islam, which fight for the implementation of *shari'a* in the society. These Islamist movement organizations are known to be very active in demanding implementation of the *shari'a*. Support for Islamism declines further when it is gauged by agreement with the idea that Muslim voters should elect Islamic authorities to represent them (46%). A still smaller proportion supports the idea that the party system should include Islamic parties only (about 22%).

As described in Chapter 2, Islamist theoreticians interpret the concept of *shura* or consultation as a procedure for decision-making. They also understand implementation of *shura* to include the party system through which Muslims channel their political interests. However, they argue that in an Islamic polity the party system should prohibit non-Islamic parties.

All of the evidence indicates that the general idea of Islamic governance and the shari'a are problematic when they touch solid empirical ground. The majority of Indonesian Muslims agree with the idea of Islamic governance, based on shari'a and under the leadership of Islamic authorities, and with state enforcement of the shari'a. However, when these ideas are linked to implementation, the old Islamist majority opinion disappears. A new moderate majority (about 62%) even disagrees with the idea of limiting the party system to Islamic parties.

This inconsistency between the general or abstract and the specific or implementational is also found when the concept of *shari'a* is made more concrete. Islamism is unique in its view of women's social and political rights. Women are often the primary targets of Islamist regimes in power. In the surveys, some questions related to women's rights were asked to gauge Islamist orientations.

A significant minority of respondents (about 40%) agree with the idea that the state should enforce the obligation for Muslim woman to wear a veil (*jilbab*). Verses in the Qur'an (33: 59; 24: 31) indicating that women must wear a veil have often been referred to by Islamist preachers and activists as important norms.

Among Indonesian Muslims, the form of veiling has changed substantially. Women used to wear veil that only covered their hair or was draped about their shoulders. Since about the late 1970s, the most common veil has more tightly covered the head. The term *jilbab* has also been redefined to mean a cloth that covers completely a woman's body. Nonetheless, many Indonesian Muslim women do not wear a veil.

When their failure to do so is condemned as un-Islamic by the Islamists, they struggle to find Islamic norms to support their behavior. The Islamist claim is criticized

as inaccurate historically and even in terms of the Qur'an. The works of Fatima Mernissi, Riffat Hasan, and other internationally-known Muslim scholars have helped Indonesian Muslim gender equality activists to defend their behavior against the Islamist challenge.⁴⁴

Muslim gender equality activists believe that the veil is only a medieval tradition that does not need to be followed by modern women. The Qur'anic verses, examined historically and sociologically, also reveal a holistic moral spirit or ethos in which man and woman are equal before God.⁴⁵

An interesting example of this struggle for Islamically-based gender equality is a volume entitled *Ulama Perempuan Indonesia* (Female Ulama of Indonesia) (Burhanudin, 2002). The word 'ulama' commonly refers to "male Islamic scholars." Female 'ulama' do not have a significant presence in Islamic intellectual history. However, gender equality activists reinvented the history, creating female 'ulama' to counter the dominant image in Muslim society, including intellectual circles, that the female is inferior to the male.

Apart from the struggle for gender equality, wearing the veil is a growing public issue in Indonesia. It has become a part of the *shari'a* enforcement movement which has been taken up by local governments in some districts and municipalities such as Cianjur,

⁴⁴ Fatima Mernissi, a Moroccan sociologist, has written several books on women in Muslim society. *The Veil and the Male Elite* and *Islam and Democracy* have been translated into Indonesian.

⁴⁵ See for example Umar (2002) and a volume edited by Munhanif (2002).

Tasikmalaya, Garut, and Serang. The provincial government of Aceh is also responsible for the implementation of *shari'a*. In each of these areas one of the first *shari'a* enacted required veiling.

It is not an exaggeration to argue that in Islamist polities, women are often the first object of concern of the *shari'a*-minded. Indeed, a simple way to figure out whether a polity is Islamist or not is through observing women's behavior. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan under the Taliban, for example, one can sense easily what an Islamist polity is through women's behavior in public spaces. In the most extreme form as practiced by the Taliban, women were not allowed to have a career or a modern education, not to mention to be active politically (Gohari 2000).

A literal reading of the Qur'an uncovers several verses referring to female behavior. The most-cited is Q 4: 34, "man is superior over woman." An Islamist is expected to have an attitude toward women's activity in public service reflective of these passages. In order to explore these attitudes, a set of women's issue items were asked in the surveys.

First, respondents were asked about their attitude toward the perception that "man is superior over woman in most things." The percentage of positive responses is about 49%. Related to the issue of gender based leadership, Islamists are expected to oppose careers for women, such as member of Parliament or judge. The proportions between the pros and the cons toward these issues should be similar to the general proposition that men are superior to women. However, according to the surveys, the percentage of Islamist attitudes is relatively small. Only about 5% of the people opposed a woman's right to be a member of Parliament, much smaller than the proportion of those who agree

that she may (about 88%). When asked whether they agree with an Islamist belief that a woman cannot be a judge because she is weak, about 21% agreed. This proportion is larger, but still much smaller than that of support for Islamic government, as mentioned above (63%).

There are other measures of Islamist attitudes toward women. A Qur'anic verse (4: 11) states that the right of daughters to inheritance is half that of sons. Islamists commonly accept the verse literally, ignoring the socio-historical context. In Indonesian society this is a persistent issue. Munawir Sjadzali, a former minister of Religious Affairs, once suggested that the verse should be understood within the socio-historical context of Arabia in which it was very progressive for its time (Sjadzali 1988).

In that society, having a female baby was often thought to be a disaster. A story is told that in pre-Islamic Arabia to bury alive a female baby was a common tradition (Mernissi 1991, 12). In the modern era, Sjadzali said that it is unjust to apply the verse literally. He suggested that the spirit of the whole Qur'an—justice—should be applied to understanding the verse. This idea raised a huge controversy among Muslims in the 1980s. Many Muslim authorities condemned the minister, claiming that the idea was dangerous to Islam (Saimima 1988).

In the surveys, respondents' opinions on the issue were split. About 50% agreed with the idea that sons are superior over daughters in the inheritance matter. The controversy between Sjadzali and other liberal Islamic scholars, on the one hand and the Islamists on the other, probably reflected mass opinion at the time.

The surveys included another item which was expected to reveal the Islamist orientation on gender. Respondents were asked if sons should be given priority in

education, in a situation in which a family is able financially to support only one of the children. Responses to this issue were similar to those on the inheritance issue: about 44% of the people agreed that educational priority of education should given to a son.

The Islamist orientation toward woman can also be seen in more specific attitudes that are found in many Muslim societies, for example the prohibition for a woman to make a long trip unaccompanied by a close kin member (*muhrim*).⁴⁶ About 48% of the Indonesian Muslim respondents still accept this norm.




Figure 3.4. Support for Islamism (%): 1 = Islam is the best political system; 2 = The state must enforce Islamic law (shari'a); 3 = Hand amputation penalty; 4 = Support for Islamic authorities; 5 = Support for Islamist party; 6 = Support for Islamist movement; 7 = Woman's travel without her kin (*muhrim*); 8 = Police enforcement of the Ramadan fasting; 9 = Superiority of male over female; 10 = Woman's right to become a member of Parliament; 11 = Unequal right for education between son and daughter; 12 = Woman is weak to be a judge; 13 = Unequal inheritance rights between son and daughter; 14 = God's sovereignty

⁴⁶ *Muhrim* is a person who is related by blood and to whom the woman may not be married, such as parents, brother, sister, child, etc.

The Qur'an (21: 3) also stipulates hand amputation for thievery. Islamists understand the verse literally and demand its implementation. However, many Muslim scholars, again through historical criticism, argue that the spirit underlying the verse is to create order and security in society. In medieval Muslim society, hand amputation was probably an effective and acceptable instrument to create social order. In modern society, other instruments like prisons are believed to be more humane and educative and therefore an appropriate Islamic substitute for amputation (An-Na'im 1996, 208).

Indonesian Muslim authorities also debate this issue, probably reflecting a range of mass opinions. The surveys indicate that about 31% of Indonesian Muslims agreed and 52% disagreed that amputation should be carried out by the Indonesian state.

The Islamist tendency to involve government in religious affairs can be measured by many items, include obligations specifically prescribed in the Qur'an and Sunna. Most Muslims everywhere would agree that they are obliged to implement the five pillars of the faith. The daily five prayers and the Ramadan fasting are two of the pillars. The Islamist idea is that government must be responsible for enforcement of the pillars. In the 2001 survey, the respondents were asked if they agreed that the police should arrest a Muslim who does not perform the daily five prayers or the Ramadan fasting.⁴⁷ Only about 10% agreed. In the 2002 survey, the respondents were asked if they agreed that

⁴⁷ Indonesian Islamists often demand that the government close restaurants or public entertainment in Ramadan to respect the fasting month. In the 2002 survey the prayer item was dropped, while the fasting item stayed. However, the wording was different from that of the 2001 survey. The results are also different. See the appendix for detailed wording of the items.

police must keep watch over (*mengawasi*) whether Muslims perform the Ramadan fasting. About 30% agreed. In other words, a majority of the people disagree with state enforcement or supervision of their ritual obligations.

I would now like to summarize the many items described individually above into the larger components of mandatory rituals, suggested rituals, Nahdlyin rituals, networks of Islamic civic engagement, NU identity, Muhammadiyah identity, and Islamism. On the basis of the first component, mandatory rituals, a large majority of Indonesian Muslims, above 80%, are religious.

A significant proportion not only perform the mandatory but the suggested rituals as well. If the scores of the seven suggested ritual items are added to constitute a 4-point scale, the mean for these items is 3.15, indicating substantial performance.⁴⁸ A large number of Indonesian Muslims are also active in Islamic associations and identify themselves with NU or Muhammadiyah. However, they are neutral—neither strongly anti- or pro-Islamist—on Islamist political orientation.⁴⁹

These findings lead me to conclude that Indonesian Muslims are pious judged by their performance of their mandatory and suggested ritual performance. A significant proportion are active as well in Islamic social organizations. However, their attitude toward Islamism is neutral. There is no indication that they reject or support the idea.

⁴⁸ The 4-point scale is constructed from the seven items of the intensity of suggested rituals in which 1 = never, 2 = rare, 3 = quite frequently, and 4 = very frequently. Reliability of the scale (alpha) is .81.

⁴⁹ The Islamist items were added to constitute a 5-point scale of Islamist political orientation, in which 1 = non-Islamist at all, 3 = neutral, and 5 = very strong Islamist. The mean of this scale is 3.0, meaning that the people are about neutral on the issue. The veil and women's right to become member of Parliament were not included in the scale construction as they have negative correlations with some of other items. The reliability coefficient (alpha) of the scale is .75.

3.7. Patterns of Relationship Among Islamic Components

In social science, religion is often claimed to be a significant source of conservative or “fundamentalist” political orientation. The more pious, the more conservative. Huntington, Lewis and other scholars, like Islamists, believe that Islam is a total way of life, and therefore each component of Islam must be highly correlated with the others. This implies that those who perform Islamic rituals are likely to be active in Islamic social organization, and in turn to support Islamism.

In the case of Indonesia, some studies suggest that there is a religious cleavage between traditionalists and modernists which complexifies the general picture. NU represents the traditionalists and Muhammadiyah the modernists (Geertz, 1960). Modernists are asserted to have a tendency to scripturalism, meaning a more direct connection between belief and practice on the one hand and the Qur’an and Hadith on the other. More recent interpretations of these religious and political orientations would suggest similarities to what I have called Islamism.

The cleavage between modernists and traditionalists, or organizationally between Muhammadiyah and NU, is widely believed to have raised the level of conflict within the Muslim community (Fanani and Sabadila 2001), even though another study suggests that the difference in religious orientation has been overstated (Mulkhan 1998). From his anthropological observation, Mulkhan found that the Nahdlyin rituals identified with the NU are in fact practiced also within the Muhammadiyah community. Both of these competing claims relied on a limited observation of the Muslim community in Java.

The surveys which provide the data for this study reveal several relationship patterns among the Islamic dimensions.⁵⁰ First, the mandatory rituals, as expected, have a significant and direct relationship with the suggested rituals, with the networks of Islamic civic engagement, and with NU identity. However, they do not have a direct and significant relationship with the Nahdliyin ritual, the Muhammadiyah identity, and with Islamism. Second, the suggested rituals have a direct and significant relationship with all components of Islam, including Islamism.

Third, the Nahdliyin ritual, as expected, has a direct and significant relationship with NU identity and the networks of Islamic engagement. The Nahdliyin ritual also, again as expected, has a direct, negative, and significant relationship with Muhammadiyah identity. However, it does not have a significant relationship with Islamism. Fourth, the networks of Islamic civic engagement have the strongest relationship with NU identity and inconsistent relationships with Muhammadiyah identity and with Islamism. Fifth, NU identity does not have a consistent and significant relationship with Islamism, while Muhammadiyah identity does not have significant relationship with Islamism.

⁵⁰ Univariate, bivariate, and multivariate statistical analyses throughout this work are guided by Lewis-Beck (1995), Afifi and Clark (1990), Schroeder, Sjoquist, and Stephan (1986), and Weisberg (1992). In this analysis, mandatory rituals are a four-point scale constructed by adding the two items and dividing by two: never perform the rituals (1) to very frequently perform the rituals (4). Suggested rituals is a four-point scale from never perform (1) to very frequently perform (4). This scale is constructed from the seven items by adding them and dividing by seven. The Nahdliyin ritual is a four-point scale, also from never perform (1) to very frequently perform (4). It is constructed from the five items by adding them and dividing by five. Islamic civic engagement is a three-point scale constructed from the two items: disengaged (1), some engaged (2), and very engaged (3). It is constructed from the two items. NU identity is feeling close to NU: not close at all (1) to very close (4). Muhammadiyah identity is also a scale constructed the same way. On the Islamism scale see footnote no. 20 in this chapter.

These patterns indicate that the mandatory rituals, as the basic element of Islam, in the Indonesian case, are not responsible for Islamism. The strongest impact of the mandatory rituals is on the suggested rituals, while the strongest impact of the suggested rituals is on the networks of Islamic civic engagement.

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Mandatory rituals | - | | | | | |
| Suggested rituals | .14** (.21**) | - | | | | |
| Nahdliyin rituals | .00 (.00) | .08** (.09**) | - | | | |
| NU identity | .09** (.01) | .18** (.28**) | .22** (.25**) | - | | |
| Muhammadiyah identity | .02 (.03) | .14** (.16**) | -.15** (-.16**) | .16** (.21**) | - | |
| Islamic civic engagement | .15** (.15**) | .30** (.28**) | .17** (.16**) | .43** (.37**) | .12** (.16**) | - |
| Islamism | .00 (.01) | .08** (.22**) | .06* (.02) | .02 (.08**) | -.05 (-.02) | .06* (.14**) |

Table 3.2. Inter-Component Correlations (Pearson's r) of Islam in 2001 (2002)

** and *Correlations are significant at .01 and .05 level (pairwise deletion).

It is also interesting to note here that NU identity and Muhammadiyah identity are not mutually exclusive. They in fact have a positive relationship even though the Nahdliyin rituals have a negative relationship with Muhammadiyah identity. This indicates that Muhammadiyah members are unlikely to share the Nahdliyin rituals, which is indeed the conventional wisdom. NU and Muhammadiyah are antagonistic when seen through the prism of the Nahdliyin rituals, but otherwise the relationship is positive and significant. This indicates that not all NU identifiers perform the Nahdliyin rituals. One may question how this can be, since the Nahdliyin rituals are traditionally a principal

identifier of NU membership. The answer may be that religio-cultural change has occurred within the NU community so that not all NU identifiers today still perform the Nahdliyin rituals.

These findings have four important implications for understanding Indonesian Islam at the individual level. First, inter-correlations among the various Islamic components exist, but the correlations between Islamism and the other components of Islam are the weakest. Second, there is no indication that the mandatory rituals, the most basic measures of Muslim religiosity, are associated with Islamism. In terms of Islamic orthodoxy or orthopraxy, a Muslim is said to be religious if he or she performs the mandatory rituals. The absence of a relationship between the rituals and Islamism reveals at the very least that Indonesian Islam is not monolithic in the sense in which Huntington, Lewis, and others have portrayed it.

Third, Muhammadiyah identity do not have a significant relationship with Islamism. Indonesian observers have often argued that there are Islamist tendencies in Muhammadiyah, but the survey data do not show this to be true. Fourth, Islamism does correlate with suggested rituals and Islamic civic engagement. This perhaps indicates that Islamists want to imitate the Prophet Muhammad, who was a political as well as religious leader. Islamists are also likely to be more active in Islamic social activity outside NU and Muhammadiyah, perhaps because these two mainstream organizations are not ideologically friendly to them.

3.8. Correlates of Islamic Components and Socio-Economic and Demographic Factors

Some versions of modernization theory claim that religion is a phenomenon of traditional society that tends to disappear with the creation of a modern industrialized society. Religion's roots are in rural areas and in lower social classes. In the case of Indonesian Muslims, particular religious attitudes and behaviors are often related to social class. Geertz (1960), for example, believed that traditionalists or NU members came from rural and lower classes, while modernists such as Muhammadiyah members were urban and middle class.

Studies of Islamist movements in particular have often claimed that these movements are urban and middle class phenomena (Aziz, Tolkhah, and Sutarman 1989), and therefore that the Islamist political orientation is likely to be rooted in these classes. Indonesian Islamists, too, are generally believed to come from an urban and middle class background. They are quite visible in the large secular state universities, where they often control campus mosques. Islamism has been growing on the campuses since the 1980s, and are today strategic constituents of an Islamist political party, the PK (Partai Keadilan) (Damanik 2003).

Bivariate statistical analysis (Table 3.3) reveals the patterns of correlation between the components of Islam and socio-economic factors.⁵¹ First, Islam, defined as mandatory rituals, is in fact an urban and middle class phenomenon. These rituals have a

⁵¹ Socio-economic and demographic variables are scales and coded as follows: gender: male = 1, female = 0; rural = 1, urban = 0; age: from the youngest to the oldest; education: never go to school = 0, some college or higher = 7; occupation: salaried = 1, otherwise = 0; income : $1 \leq \text{Rp } 200,000.00$, $8 \geq \text{Rp } 1,600,000.00$.

positive and significant correlation with the urban, not rural population, with more educated and higher income citizens, and with the salaried class. Put another way, a Muslim who lives in a city, has more education, earns a salary, and has a higher income, is more likely to practice the mandatory rituals.

Islam is also a rural phenomenon if it is defined in terms of the Nahdliyin rituals and NU identity. A Muslim who lives in a village, has little education, lower class and lower income, is more likely to practice Nahdliyin rituals. This pattern is also found in the correlation between socio-economic background and NU identity. Conversely, Muhammadiyah identity has middle class roots. A better educated, higher income Muslim is more likely to identify himself or herself with Muhammadiyah. The rural-urban cleavage, however, does not correlate with Muhammadiyah identity. Muhammadiyah identifiers are more or less as likely to live in villages as in cities.

These findings tend to disconfirm the larger claims of modernization theory, since they show that most Indonesian Muslims are pious and that it is precisely among the better educated, higher income, urban population that performance of the mandatory rituals is strongest. On the other hand, they tend to confirm the narrower claims of Geertz and other students of Indonesian Muslim society that traditionalism is rural and lower class while modernism is a middle class, if not specifically urban phenomenon.

The claim that Islamism is an urban and middle class phenomenon, however, is disconfirmed or at least misstated. Evidence from the surveys indicates that Islamists are more likely to come from rural, rather than urban, backgrounds. He or she is also likely to be less educated, non-salaried, and lower income. The claim that Islamists are middle class and urban probably originated in the Indonesian mass media, and is based on

specific non-generalizable cases. The journalistic observers probably did not take the time to compare the more visible urban with the more hidden rural cases, and therefore came up with misleading conclusions.

Putting together the survey and media reports, perhaps it is more accurate to characterize Indonesian Islamists as split-personality “rural citizens living in metropolitan areas.” They are likely to be alienated from their metropolitan life, fail to become urbanites, and imagine the primordial social and political order in which they grew up (or nostalgically remember growing up) as a preferred alternative to what they perceive to be urban and secular disorder.

| | Male | Age | Rural residence | Education | Salaried | Income |
|--------------------------|--------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Mandatory rituals | -.10** (-.14**) | .02 (.00) | -.05* (.00) | .17** (.11**) | .11** (.10**) | .13** (.07**) |
| Suggested rituals | .07** (.07**) | .12** (.19**) | .03 (.09**) | .05* (-15**) | .05* (.08**) | .03 (-.08**) |
| Nahdlyin rituals | .07** (.12**) | .08** (.10**) | .12** (.07**) | -.15** (-15**) | -.10** (.08**) | -.09** (-.08**) |
| NU identity | .02 (.05*) | .01 (.04) | .18** (.13**) | -.09* (-.04) | -.13** (.07**) | -.12** (-.04) |
| Muhammadiyah identity | .00 (.05*) | .04 (.05*) | .02 (.5*) | .15** (.16**) | .10** (.12**) | .06** (.10**) |
| Islamic civic engagement | .01 (.03) | .04 (.10**) | .11** (.14**) | -.04* (-.06*) | .04* (.04*) | -.06** (-.06**) |
| Islamism | .04 (.00) | .02 (.02) | .22** (.12**) | -.26** (-27**) | -.16** (-19**) | -.18** (-17**) |

Table 3.3. Correlations (Pearson's *r*) between Islam and socio-economic and demographic factors 2002 (2001)

** and *correlations are significant at .01 and .05 respectively

The split-personality Islamists oppose secularization of politics and democracy as urban phenomena (Mujani and Liddle 2003; cf. Marty and Appleby 1993). They attempt to ruralize urban politics. They imagine a “village of God” as a model for their government and social order in modern cities (Mujani and Liddle 2003). They establish movement organizations and political parties, which are modern institutions, but they use them for parochial and exclusive purposes out of tune with the needs of a religiously pluralistic society.

3.9. Conclusion

To conclude, I will state more explicitly some important findings of this exploration of dimensions and measures of Islam.

First, defined by belief in God and by intensity of performing the mandatory rituals, Indonesian Muslims in general are pious. This confirms more recent anthropological conclusions about the religiosity of Indonesian Muslims. The older abangan thesis of 1950s anthropology is not verified by the results of today’s surveys.

Second, a substantial proportion of Muslims perform regularly the suggested rituals. Unlike the case of the mandatory rituals, variation in the performance of the suggested rituals is large. This makes possible further analysis of the relationship between Islam and democracy among Indonesian Muslims.

Third, many Indonesian Muslims are engaged in Islamic group or organization activity at the local or national level. Many also identify with NU or Muhammadiyah. The conventional wisdom that NU and Muhammadiyah are the first and second largest Muslim organizations in the country is reflected in the survey outcomes.

Fourth, Islamism is not identical with Islam. Many Indonesian Muslims, but less than a majority, are Islamist. Overall Indonesian Muslims are neutral, neither for nor against Islamism.

Fifth, Islamism correlates with rural residence, lower education, and lower socio-economic status. Islamist activists and movements are found in cities, but their roots and followers are in rural areas.

Sixth, although Islamism is a rural phenomenon, it is not found among rural Muslims who frequently perform the Nahdliyin rituals. Islamism also only weakly correlates with NU identity. Surprisingly, it is uncorrelated with Muhammadiyah identity. Performance of suggested rituals is the only dimension of Islamic rituals which has a stable relationship with Islamism. Overall, Islamism has weak and insignificant relationships with the other components of Islam. The tendency to identify Islam with Islamism, as is done by so many scholars, is misleading if not wrong. Islam is not Islamism. Islam is not identical with the idea that there is no distinction between religion and politics.

Throughout the rest of this work the claim that Islam is inimical to democracy relies on the definition and measurement of Islam in the seven dimensions laid out in this chapter. These definitions and measurements are far from perfect, but instead represent a preliminary attempt to make more realistic claims about the impact of Islam on democracy.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL CAPITAL

The claim that Islam is inimical to democracy is partly based on the proposition that civil society is alien to Islam. This chapter evaluates this claim. Civil society is defined as social capital, which comprises two components: interpersonal trust and networks of civic engagement. After describing the characteristics of the two components of social capital among Indonesian Muslims, I will analyze the extent to which Islam has a negative impact on them.

Students of democracy have recently been attracted to the idea of social capital. Putnam (2002, 5), for example, found that use of the concept in the international social science literature had grown exponentially, with about twenty articles on social capital prior to 1981 and 1,003 between 1996 and 1999. The importance of social capital to democracy lies in the assumption that democracy requires citizen involvement in social activity.

The concept of social capital was originally used in the early twentieth century by Hanifan to refer to "good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families that make up a social unit" (In Putnam, 2002, 4). In his *Making Democracy Work* (1993, 167), Putnam refers to trust, norms of reciprocity and networks

of civic engagement as features of social organization that "can improve efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions." The importance of social capital to democracy mainly lies in the fact that democracy requires the collective support of citizens. This support is likely if people can cooperate to achieve their collective goals, or if people are accustomed to cooperation in society (Putnam, 2002, 6). In this study, data on social capital are restricted to interpersonal trust and networks of civic engagement only, since data on norms of reciprocity are not available.

4.1. Interpersonal trust

Interpersonal trust is an essential component of social capital (Putnam 1993, 170). It is true that citizen distrust in authority or government is crucial in a democracy, to put pressure on government and to make democracy work. Distrust in authority is even more crucial in the process of political transformation from authoritarianism to democracy (Inglehart 1999).

Distrust in government is also a characteristic of the critical citizen in consolidated democracies, which does not weaken democracy itself. However, once a democracy is installed it requires support from citizens, and this support is helped by citizens who can resolve problems of collective action. Interpersonal trust contributes to this resolution. In other words, democracy requires collective action and coordination, which are helped by interpersonal trust (Warren 1999, 4).

Democracy is built in societies in which social interaction is complex. Cooperation and coordination in such societies is almost impossible if it is solely based on knowledge and rational calculation by members of society as individuals have limited

information and knowledge to make decisions. Trust helps people resolve this problem, and therefore collective action or cooperation is made possible regardless of knowledge insufficiency. In Warren's words,

As societies become more complex, more differentiated, and more independent, individuals increasingly confront a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, these developments can, and often do, generate extended life-choices—choices resulting from greater efficiencies, pluralization, and mobility. On the other hand, increasing independence extends the vulnerabilities to which they are subject. ... Individuals do bridge the gap, however. In most cases, they do so not by knowing their vulnerabilities but by *trusting* others, institutions, and systems with their fortunes. ... extensions of trust, especially to strangers embedded in institutions, enable coordination of actions over large domains of space and time, which in turn permits the benefits of more complex, differentiated, and diverse society. (Warren, 1999, 3. Italics in the original)

In his cross-national studies of democracy, Inglehart (1999, 1997, 1988; cf. Norris 2002; Putnam 1993; Almond and Verba 1963) claims that interpersonal trust, as a form of political culture, has been a major factor in democratic stability. Interpersonal trust is crucial to reduce uncertainty in interactions among people and to reduce transaction costs. In democracies, political processes, political outcomes, and elite political behavior are reflections of society. Distrust among political elites that may produce unstable and ineffective government has roots in society. Elites must trust that their opponents will not put them in jail after losing an election but rather will still give them opportunities to be reelected (Inglehart 1999, 98).

It is plausible to assume that interpersonal trust is produced by democratic institutions rather than the other way around (Skocpol 1982; Tarrow 1996). People trust each other in a democracy because a democratic polity is conducive to that attitude. Or, government policy may have historically contributed to the emergence of social capital

such as interpersonal trust or networks of civic engagement (cf. Skocpol 1999). Once social capital emerges it becomes relatively autonomous from political institutions, and may in turn affect those institutions. This conception of the relative autonomy of social capital from political institutions is justified by the fact that kinds of social capital like interpersonal trust vary regardless of the stability or instability of political institutions.

Putnam (1993), for example, argues that if democratic institutions had been the whole story of democratic performance then we would have found that democratic performance in southern and northern Italy would have been the same. In fact, democratic performance in the north is superior to that of the south. What explains this variation is variation in social capital, in which interpersonal trust is the essential component. Moreover, if democratic institutions produced interpersonal trust which materialized in civic engagement, interpersonal trust in southern and northern Italy would be more alike. In fact, civic engagement is stronger in northern than in southern Italy.

A similar argument is made by Inglehart (1999, 88). If democratic institutions produced interpersonal trust, the case of American democracy would be characterized by stable interpersonal trust, as the democratic institutions have been relatively the same over time. But interpersonal trust among Americans has declined in the last four decades even though her democratic institutions have been relatively stable. There would have been no phenomenon of *Bowling Alone* in America (Putnam 1995) if social capital such as interpersonal trust had been produced by democratic institutions.

If interpersonal trust is crucial to democratic stability and performance, one may question the sources or origins of interpersonal trust. There is no simple answer to this

question. Putnam (1993) and Inglehart (1999, 1997) argue that interpersonal trust "reflects the entire historical heritage of a given people, including economic, political, religious, and other factors" (Inglehart 1999, 88).

The importance of religious tradition is emphasized by Inglehart, who argues that differences in religious traditions are responsible for the difference in interpersonal trust among societies (1999, 90-92). Based on his cross-national analysis, Inglehart argues that "interpersonal trust shows remarkably strong linkages with the religious tradition of the given society ... Protestant and Confucian-influenced societies consistently show higher levels of interpersonal trust than do historically Roman Catholic or Islamic societies. ..." (92).

Inglehart does not elaborate sufficiently why religious traditions produce variation in interpersonal trust, but briefly argues that a religious tradition which emphasizes homogeneously hierarchical or vertical relationships between the center of religious authority and its fellows is likely to produce interpersonal distrust as happens in authoritarian or communist regimes (93). These different traditions are found in Protestantism and Catholicism. Protestantism is characterized by

horizontal locally-controlled organizations conducive to interpersonal trust, while remote hierarchical organizations tend to undermine it. The Roman Catholic Church is the very prototype of a hierarchical, centrally controlled institution; Protestant Churches were smaller, relatively decentralized and more open to local control. Though these factors may not count for much today, historically the respective churches played immensely influential roles in shaping their societies. The contrast between local control and domination by a remote hierarchy seem to have important long-term consequences for interpersonal trust. (1999, 92-93)

Inglehart does not say much about Islam other than noting that interpersonal trust is weak in some predominantly Muslim nations such as Turkey, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, and Nigeria. Does Islam have the same characteristics as Catholicism in terms of the relationship between the center of religious authority and its adherents?

Even a casual observer of Muslim society should quickly conclude that there is not a remote hierarchy in Islam as in Catholicism (Lewis 2002). To be sure, there are *'ulama'* or Islamic scholars who are trained in Islamic scholarship and therefore more literate in Islamic teachings relative to ordinary Muslims, but unlike Catholicism, the *'ulama'* have no authority to forgive a sinner. In addition, there is no a central ulama in World Muslim community.

This does not mean that the religious structure in Islam is similar to that of Protestantism. To be sure, Muslims and Protestants are individually responsible for their own salvation, and each has access to religious sources, the Bible or the Qur'an, and freedom to interpret religious teachings. But the *'ulama'* is not similar to the minister in Protestantism who is a religious authority in a church that belongs to a community, where his economic life is mainly dependent on his church that is supported by the community.

This pattern has no parallel in Islam. Put another way, the idea that the mosque belongs to a particular Muslim community does not exist in Islam. It is the house of God that belongs to anybody who believes in Him, a building in which to pray, personally or collectively, or to study Islamic teachings. There is an idea of *jama'ah masjid* ("mosque community"), but it only refers to Muslims who frequently go to the mosque. Preaching

in the mosque is not dominated by anyone. A preacher is any Muslim who is believed literate in religious teachings. The prayer leader (*imam*) is any Muslim who is fluent in reciting the Qur'anic verses.

Compared to Catholicism, Islam is more egalitarian in terms of the relationship between the scripture and the adherents. However, the Muslim community does not establish the mosque as a relatively exclusive community as is generally the case in Christianity. A Muslim who goes to the mosque has no obligation to support it financially. An *imam* (prayer leader) of a mosque usually works outside the mosque for his livelihood. If he is a religious scholar, he can make money through his preaching (*ceramah agama*) in any Muslim community, in any mosque. Therefore, there is no parallel between the church in Christianity and the mosque in Islam (Lewis 2002, 98).

Mosques are inclusive. They are not built as the result of religious disputes. Sects exist, but fewer than in Protestantism. Two Muslim groups involved in a dispute can go to the same mosque. However, a mosque, like a church, can to some extent function as an intermediary institution, in which individual Muslims can communicate and share information about community or public issues. Because the mosque is inclusive and non-hierarchical, it may contribute to more contact and therefore more interpersonal trust. There is no inherent structure in the mosque which can be expected to contribute to the emergence of interpersonal distrust among Muslims.

Interpersonal distrust may be more likely to emerge among Muslims if the object of trust is non-Muslim. The low proportion of trustworthiness among Muslims revealed by Inglehart should probably be understood in the context of religious pluralism rather than interpersonal trust *per se*. Distrust among Muslims toward non-Muslims, especially

Christians and Jews, most likely emerged due to their long history of conflict. This conflict may have been institutionalized in the form of religious norms prescribed in the Qur'an.

There are significant verses in scripture which suggest that Muslims do not trust non-Muslims. The Qur'an says for example, "A party of the followers of the Book [Christians and Jews] desire that they should lead you astray..." (3:3: 69); "And do not believe but in him who follows your religion," (3: 73); or, "O you who believe! do not take for intimate friends from among others than your own people; they do not fall short of inflicting loss upon you; they love what distresses you; vehement hatred has already appeared from out of their mouths, and what their breasts conceal is greater still; ..." (3: 118). These norms may shape how Muslims distrust non-Muslims.

Religion understood as "religious tradition," as in Inglehart and Putnam, is probably not a good foundation for analyzing the impact of religion on contemporary politics. Their understanding is essentialist, in the sense that religious tradition does not change. Genuine religious change in a society is therefore difficult to analyze.

To be more rigorous, we have to be able to observe if religious traditions have or have not changed. At the national level, if we cannot define the extent to which a religious tradition is strong or weak we cannot convincingly claim that religious tradition is an important factor to explain interpersonal trust and democratic stability. Inglehart (1999, 96) fails to confront this problem when he claims that religious tradition defined through a survey of the mass religiosity of a nation has no impact on interpersonal trust. Moreover, he obscures his main argument when he states that religious heritage should be

understood as a part of a larger historical tradition shaped by the economic, political, and social experience of a given people. His true independent variable then becomes not religious tradition but the forces shaping the larger historical tradition.

Consistent with the behavioral approach in democratic studies, I define religious tradition as perceived, felt, and lived by its adherents today. If I find no significant impact of religiosity on interpersonal trust I will not speculate that the underlying cause lies in a long religious tradition. Explanation of interpersonal trust should be looked for in factors that are analytically more convincing than the ambiguous idea of a historical tradition. Moreover, if religious tradition is static over a long period of time, and affects current religious adherents regardless of their current religiosity, then this analytical explanation will be useless as we cannot manipulate the past.

The study of interpersonal trust is observed at the individual level through this measure: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" In Inglehart's World Value Survey, responses that people in general can be trusted vary according to their religious tradition at the national level. In four predominantly Muslim nations—Turkey, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, and Nigeria—the proportion of people who reported that they trust other people is on average below 20%. In other words, fewer than two out of ten citizens in those predominantly Muslim nations trust other people in general. Interpersonal trust is low.




Figure 4.1 Most people can be trusted or can't be too careful (%)

The WVS question was replicated in the 2001 and 2002 surveys of Indonesian Muslims. The percentages are similar (Figure 4.1). Only about one out of ten Indonesian Muslims trust other people in general.

The Indonesian proportion is below the average of the other Muslim nations, and far below the average of nations reported by the World Value Survey. Indonesia seems to add to the total number of Muslim nations that have weak interpersonal trust. The percentage is close to that of Turkey and only slightly above the figure for some Catholic nations (Brazil, the Philippines, Peru, and Puerto Rico) (Inglehart 1999, 91; see Table 4.1).

The low percentage among Indonesian Muslims may be associated with Islam or it may be caused by other factors. In the post-Suharto years social and political conditions have sharply deteriorated. Disturbances, crime, violence, and terror are frequent and widely reported in the national newspapers. Personal security is threatened from many quarters. A simple accident or misinformation might cost one's life. A

person fingered on the street as a robber, for example, often brings a terrifying mass response. Vigilante punishment occurs frequently because of the general perception that the police are both incompetent and corrupt.

| Religion, Nations, and Year | % (N) | Religion, Nations, and Year | % (N) |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| <i>Islam</i> | | <i>Orthodox</i> | |
| Indonesia 2001 | 11.4 (1973) | Georgia | 23.3 (2356) |
| Indonesia 2002 | 8.3 (2268) | Ukraine | 31.0 (2612) |
| Azerbaijan | 20.5 (1895) | Russia | 30.4 (3798) |
| Bangladesh 1997 | 20.9 (1492) | <i>Hindu</i> | |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 28.3 (1141) | India | 36.5 (4132) |
| Nigeria | 20.3 (3477) | <i>Confucianism</i> | |
| Pakistan | 18.8 (727) | Mainland China | 55.6 (2430) |
| Turkey | 7.1 (2904) | Taiwan | 41.8 (1396) |
| <i>Catholicism</i> | | South Korea | 33.8 (3392) |
| Argentina | 22.1 (2926) | Japan | 41.8 (3000) |
| Brazil | 5.0 (2907) | <i>Protestantism</i> | |
| Italy | 31.9 (3234) | Sweden | 60.9 (2777) |
| Poland | 25.5 (1941) | The Netherlands | 48.9 (2037) |
| Spain | 33.8 (7211) | United Kingdom | 39.5 (3705) |
| The Philippines | 5.5 (1191) | USA | 42.7 (5552) |
| Venezuela | 13.7 (1164) | West Germany | 37.3 (3781) |

Table 4.1. Interpersonal trust ("most people can be trusted") among Indonesian Muslims and some other nations according to religious tradition
Sources: PPIM Surveys and the WVS conducted in the 1980s and 1990s.

My own observations in a village in West Java tend to confirm this sense of growing insecurity. Since the fall of the New Order bandits in the village have become more prevalent. Farmers are unable to protect their property, including crops in the fields. Their solution, absent effective police protection, was to organize their own security force among the villagers.

The villagers had become suspicious of any stranger who came to the village. At night, people could not travel freely. They feared being robbed especially as they travel by *ojeg* (motorcycle taxi). Transportation service by *ojeg* is a common phenomenon in many villages. In this village this transportation service did not work at night because of frequent robberies and even killings. To the villagers, Reformation (the post-Suharto period) is the source of their problem. Reformation means disorder, which is in turn likely to be related to socio-economic hardship since the economic crisis began in 1997. The impact of the crisis is felt not only by city dwellers but also by villagers. A middle class villager said to the author:

In the New Order, I had sixteen cars. Now I [in the reform era] only have three. For daily living I have to sell my water buffalos, which I never did before. In the New Order, my fruit was frequently rotten as there was too much; now they have to be harvested before they are ripe because of lack of food to consume and also to compete with the bandits. Now it is even difficult to sell my land for my daily needs. Nobody has money.⁵²

Crime increases because of economic hardship, and people feel even more insecure and distrustful, even of their neighbors. Recall Banfield's description in the case of Italy that "it is safer to trust others if one has a margin of economic security. Under conditions of extreme poverty, the loss incurred from misplaced trust can be fatal" (in Inglehart 1999, 89).

Social distrust may specifically occur among Muslims toward non-Muslims as is reflected in many religiously-colored social conflicts in the last three years. In the

⁵²Interview with a villager, October 15, 2002.

surveys, respondents were asked the extent to which they trust fellow citizens who belong to other religions. Responses to this question vary, but the percentages who reported that they most of the time trust others who belong to other religions are very small. The 2002 percentage was an improvement, but of course two points do not make a trend (Figure 4.2).

The proportions are quite similar to those for interpersonal trust in general.⁵³ They may reflect what has happened to interreligious relationships in Indonesia in recent years. Several religious wars have occurred, in which thousands of people have lost their lives and property. The intensity of religious conflict increased from 1999 through 2001, especially in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Maluku, producing headlines in national mass media. Muslims and non-Muslims alike may have been emotionally affected by the tragedies. All sides involved created their own para-military forces or militia, and the government was unable to control them. Fortunately, the wars have begun to abate and two important Muslim militias, the Laskar Jihad (Holy War Militia) and the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front) for example, were dissolved by their own leaders.

Distrust of Muslims toward non-Muslims may have been triggered by these local religious wars. They may have revived a "hidden transcript," distrust towards non-

⁵³ The strategy to measure trust in other fellow citizens who belong to different religious affiliations is different from that of World Value Survey. It is a five-point scale: very distrustful (1) to very trustful (5).

Muslims after a long history fraught with bitter disputes, and reflected in the Qur'an-derived doctrine that non-Muslims cannot be trusted. How this distrust toward non-Muslims correlates with Muslim religiosity will be discussed later in this chapter.




Figure 4.2. Trust in fellow citizens in general (%)




Figure 4.3. Trust in fellow citizens who belong to another religion (%)

In fact, trust toward non-Muslims has significantly increased in 2002. This increase probably reflects the fact that religiously-colored conflict declined in 2002. Government-mediated reconciliation between Muslim and Christian communities involved in the Central Sulawesi and Maluku conflicts was achieved in that year as well. Church or mosque burning disappeared from the mass media even though the tensions were not completely dissipated. Unfortunately, the Bali and Manado bombings happened just as the 2002 survey was being conducted.

In addition to replicating the World Value Survey's approach, this study also uses a five-point scale as an alternative to measure interpersonal trust. This strategy is designed to increase variation in this key variable for analytical purposes. Based on these measures, general interpersonal trust among Indonesian Muslims varies considerably, as may be seen in Figure 4.3.⁵⁴

4.2. Networks of civic engagement

Another component of social capital is networks of civic engagement, which refers to the involvement of citizens in voluntary associations or civil society. Putnam argues that "the denser such networks in a community, the more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit" (Putnam 1993, 173). This network of civic engagement includes not only formal but also informal elements, not only civic association but also informal social engagements such as dinner with friends or gathering with friends in a café (cf. Putnam 2002, 10).

⁵⁴ The five-point scale of trust is from very distrustful (1) to very trustful (5). The proportion of "very trustful" responses is compared with that of "most people can be trusted" in the World Value Survey.

The importance of civic engagement for democracy lies in the assumption that civic engagement helps individuals become informed about policies and actions which may affect public life. It helps individuals interact with others who have like interests. It also makes individuals available for mobilization by their groups or leaders, and therefore helps political participation (Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992, 85).

This mechanism of association between civic engagement and political participation implies the importance of dimensions of political engagement such as political interest and political information. Here the impact is indirect. However, some other studies suggest that civic engagement may have a more direct impact on political participation (van Deth 1997; Olsen 1972). Civic engagement is believed to bring "an individual in contact with many new and diverse people, and the resulting relationships draw him into public affairs and political activity" (Olsen 1972, 318).

In this study, networks of civic engagement are restricted to the formal. My main focus is the intensity of a citizen's engagement in a voluntary association. This intensity is measured by the extent to which a citizen is active in a voluntary association, and by how many civic associations a citizen is engaged in.

Religious civic association was defined in Chapter 3. Wuthnow (1999) argues that a citizen who is engaged in a church or religious organization tends to be engaged in non-religious voluntary association as well, which in turn encourages him or her to be engaged in politics (cf. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Engagement in civic association or civil society not only helps individuals to be encouraged to participate in politics or to be exposed to public issues (Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992) but also to contribute to democratic consolidation. Schmitter (1997, 247) argues that the contribution of civil society to democratic consolidation lies in the assumption that civil society stabilizes citizen expectations.

These stable expectations help government to communicate with citizens and in turn help citizens to channel their self-expression. Citizens are less alienated from the system. In addition, stable expectations produced by involvement in civil society help government to control the behavior of citizens at lower cost. Civil society also functions as a reservoir for resistance to arbitrary or tyrannical action by rulers.

The claim of Huntington and other critics that democratic consolidation is unlikely in Muslim societies can partly be attributed to the absence of civil society or civic associations. Gellner (1996), Lewis (2002) and many others assert that civil society is an alien concept in Muslim society. They also argue that Islam encompasses everything, and therefore there is no such thing as civil society that is autonomous from regulation by religious law (shari'a). If their view is correct, religiosity that is connected to Islamic social organizations should have a negative relationship to non-religious civic associations. Lewis (2002, 113) more specifically addresses this issue,

non-religious society as something desirable and permissible was totally alien to Islam. ... Those who lacked even this measure of religious guidance were pagans and idolaters, and their society or polity were evil. Any Muslim who sought to join them or imitate them was an apostate... in the Muslim conception, God is the true sovereign of the community, the ultimate source of authority, the sole source of legislation.

Or, in Gellner's words,

The interesting thing about Muslim societies is that this system [asabiyya] is not resented and is widely accepted as normal. What strikes observers is the combination of religious moralism and cynical clientelism.... It is as if the society's moral requirements were adequately met by the sheer fact that the state enforces, or at least does not violate, the Law; granted this condition, it is accepted that the attribution of positions and advantages should be a matter of rival networks fighting it out, and winner takes, if not all, at least the best of what is going. ... The expectation of some additional Civil Society, which could hold the state to account, ... would seem almost impious, but in any case unrealistic. The state can be called to account for violation of the divinely ordained Law ... In the end, society seems to possess no cement other than the faith on the one hand, and the loyalty, once upon a time of clan and now of clientele, on the other. ... Whether or not we like them, the persistence of these societies indicates that they are an option which we must learn to understand, and which constitutes an important variant of the current political condition. If segmentary societies are to be contrasted with Civil Society because the sub-communities on which they depend are too stifling for modern individualism, then Islam provides a further contrast. It exemplifies a social order which seems to lack much capacity to provide political countervailing institutions or associations, which is atomized without much individualism, and operates effectively without intellectual pluralism.(1994, 28,29-30)

In this sense, civil society as non-religious associations framed by non-religious norms or regulation is not likely in Muslim society. At the individual level, a Muslim is unlikely to be voluntarily engaged in non-religious associations such as unions and sports clubs. If this claim is accurate it is plausible to expect that the more religious a Muslim, the more likely he or she is not to be engaged in non-religious civil society. This issue will be examined later in this chapter.

Prior to testing of this claim, it is necessary to describe non-religious civil society at the community level. There are in fact various kinds of non-religious voluntary civic associations, at the local and national levels, in Indonesia. They include *arisan* (rotating

credit associations), village council or village youth organizations (*majlis desa* or *majlis kelurahan*, or *karang taruna*), cooperatives, cultural clubs, sports clubs, unions, farmer, or fisher associations, professional organizations, animal lover associations, Red Cross, LSM (Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat) or self help social organizations which are concerned with postmaterialist values such as democracy, human rights, social-economic equality, non-violence, environmental preservation, and gender equality.⁵⁵

The LSM may be parallel to "new social movement organizations" found in consolidated democracies. LSM activists themselves frequently refer to such early twentieth century social movement organization such as the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Traders Association) founded in 1905 and Budi Utomo founded in 1908. The ultimate goal of these movement organizations was the independence of Indonesia from foreign colonial rule.

Networks of civic engagement have quite deep roots in Indonesian social history. In the early 20th century, under the colonial authority, some well-known and large civic associations had emerged such as the Budi Utomo and Indische Partij in addition to Islam-colored civil society organizations such as the Sarekat Dagang Islam, Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association), Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. All these civil societies are conventionally believed to have contributed significantly to the struggle for independence from Dutch rule.

⁵⁵. About the identity of the LSM, see for example Mahasin (2000). On the contribution of the LSM to the emergence of democracy in Indonesia see for example Uhlin (1995).

Most Indonesians are probably familiar with the phrase *gotong royong* (voluntarily mutual cooperation) and practice it in their social life.⁵⁶ The phrase refers to any voluntary activity of community members to resolve collective problems.⁵⁷ For example, community members work together to prepare for burial services, house building, marriage parties, paddy planting, and night security patrols (*ronda*). The importance of *gotong royong* is reflected in President Sukarno's proposed ideology for newly independent Indonesia, Pancasila or Five Principles.

Sukarno argued that if the five principles are crystallized, they eventually become one, *gotong royong*. That is the heart of our nation. He, and many Indonesian elites, have believed since the founding of the nation that *gotong royong* is the basis and spirit of the Indonesian people. His daughter, now President Megawati Sukaroputri, named her cabinet the *Gotong Royong Cabinet*. Umar Kayam (1992), a well-known intellectual and sociologist, used the phrase *mangan ora mangan kumpul* (getting together is important, even without a meal) to describe the importance of being together, at least for the ethnic Javanese. The proverb implies that being together is more important for the community than economic interest.

It is sometimes claimed that *gotong royong* is close to collectivism in which individual rights and freedom are disregarded. This characteristic of society is associated with the non-democratic nature of the traditional Javanese polity (cf. Anderson 1972).

⁵⁶ There are many proverbs that refer to mutual cooperation, an indication perhaps of the existence of social capital. For example, *berat sama dipikul ringan sama dijinjing* (stick together through thick and thin, or share equally in carrying heavy and light burdens), *bersatu kita teguh bercerai kita runtuh* (being united is strength, and being separated is collapse).

⁵⁷ About *Gotong Royong* traditions from various regions of the country see a series of publications by the Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan (Department of Education and Culture) (1986).

Javanese culture has been claimed by many Indonesianists to be a source of authoritarian culture which contributed to the failure of democracy in the 1950s, and to the persistence of authoritarianism under President Sukarno and President Suharto for about 40 years.

This claim is actually not unrealistic because the nature of social capital such as interpersonal trust and cooperation among fellow citizens can be conducive to stability of both types of regime, authoritarianism and democracy. Social capital does not explain how a regime emerges, but rather how it can be stable (Inglehart 1999). Gotong royong is like a fertile soil in which one can plant any political institution, democratic or authoritarian. Since democracy by definition is anti-coercive politics, however, strong social capital is required and gotong royong may be particularly important in providing that support.

In the two surveys, respondents were asked to describe the intensity of their voluntary activities. Specifically, they were asked to report whether they were active members, non-active members, or non-members in a range of non-religious civic associations such as the arisan, sports clubs, cooperatives, etc. Figure 4.3 shows the percentages of people who reported that they are active members in various civic associations. Figure 4.4 displays the quantity of associations in which persons are active.

Figure 4.3 reveals that a significant number of respondents (39%) are engaged in arisan or rotating credit associations, an association that Putnam (1993) takes as an exemplar of civic association believed to be important for democracy.⁵⁸ Most people are engaged in at least one civic association, but those who reported that they are not engaged

⁵⁸ For discussion of the rotating credit association, see Geertz (1962); *Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Daerah* (1986).

in any association is quite significant (38%). Only about 13% of the people were active in sports clubs, which are believed to have impact on political engagement (Putnam, 1993), only 7% in cultural clubs, and only about 4% in the Red Cross or Boy Scouts. Seen from the number of associations in which a citizen is engaged, only about two out of ten citizens were active in two civic associations.




Figure 4.4. Proportions of active membership in various civic associations among Indonesians (%): 1 = arisan; 2 = village association (village council, village youth association or karang taruna); 3 = union/farm/fishery association; 4 = cooperative; 5 = sports club; 6 = cultural club; 7 = animal lover club; 8 = Red Cross or boy scout; 9 = professional association; 10 = LSM or new social movement

What is theoretically interesting about social capital for this study is the extent to which Islam constrains participation in non-religious civic associations . As described earlier, some students of Islam claim that non-religious civil society is alien to the

Muslim community. To follow this argument, it is expected that Islam will have a negative relationship with interpersonal trust and with membership in secular civic associations. This issue will be discussed shortly.




Figure 4.5. Number of civic associations in which a citizen is engaged (%)

Prior to this discussion, it is important to note that Indonesian Muslims are mostly involved in more indigenous civil society associations such as the *dewan desa* (village council) or the *arisan* rather than modern ones such as unions, hobby associations, etc.

The significant proportion (38%) of disengaged people is actually not very surprising. Active membership in several civic associations such as sports clubs, arts clubs, unions, and environmental groups indicates that Indonesians are more active than the citizens of many other nations (Table 4.2). The claim made by Gellner and others that secular civil society in Muslim societies is unlikely is not persuasive in the case of

Indonesia. However, this simple description of secular civic engagement is not sufficient to falsify the claim. Further analysis is required. To accomplish this, I will demonstrate how Islam correlates with secular civic engagement.

| Civic Association | Sports | Arts | Union | Professional |
|------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| Religion & Nation | | | | |
| <i>Islam</i> | | | | |
| Indonesia 2001 | 12.5 (1986) | 7.1 (1991) | 21.0 (1989) | 5.7 (1985) |
| Indonesia 2002 | 16.9 (2271) | 9.8 (2276) | 18.3 (2265) | 4.7 (2257) |
| Azerbaijan | 1.5 (2002) | 2.1 (2002) | 2.8 (2002) | 0.8 (2002) |
| Bangladesh | 16.5 (1525) | 17.7 (1525) | 3.7 (1525) | 9.2 (1525) |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 13.7 (1200) | 6.9 (1200) | 10.3 (1200) | 7.8 (1200) |
| Nigeria | 21.0 (2769) | 20.2 (2769) | 10.5 (2769) | 16.0 (2769) |
| Turkey | 4.1 (1876) | 3.3 (1876) | 2.6 (1876) | 5.4 (1877) |
| <i>Catholicism</i> | | | | |
| Argentina | 5.1 (2081) | 5.8 (3086) | 1.3 (3086) | 2.8 (3086) |
| Brazil | 7.4 (2931) | 6.2 (2931) | 4.9 (2931) | 5.4 (2931) |
| Italy | 6.6 (2018) | 2.9 (3366) | 3.1 (3366) | 1.2 (3366) |
| Spain | 4.1 (5358) | 3.4 (7661) | 1.6 (7661) | 1.7 (7661) |
| The Philippines | 9.5 (1200) | 5.3 (1200) | 3.1 (1200) | 4.3 (1200) |
| Venezuela | 16.8 (1200) | 10.0 (1190) | 5.2 (1193) | 8.4 (1195) |
| <i>Orthodox Christianity</i> | | | | |
| Georgia | 3.3 (2588) | 5.6 (2588) | 1.5 (2589) | 1.5 (2590) |
| Ukraine | 1.7 (2811) | 1.7 (2811) | 3.1 (2811) | 0.9 (2811) |
| Russia | 3.2 (4001) | 2.9 (4001) | 7.9 (4001) | 0.9 (28110) |
| <i>Hindu</i> | | | | |
| India | 10.2 (2040) | 11.9 (2040) | 7.4 (2040) | 6.5 (2040) |
| <i>Confucianism</i> | | | | |
| Mainland China | 8.4 (2500) | 6.8 (2500) | 3.8 (2500) | 8.2 (2500) |
| Taiwan | 5.3 (1448) | 6.5 (1449) | 11.5 (1449) | 2.8 (1449) |
| South Korea | 8.7 (2496) | 4.3 (3463) | 1.4 (3463) | 3.5 (3455) |
| Japan | 7.5 (2048) | 3.4 (3252) | 2.2 (3250) | 3.5 (3256) |
| <i>Protestantism</i> | | | | |
| Sweden | 21.9 (2037) | 6.5 (2989) | 7.3 (2991) | 4.1 (2990) |
| The Netherlands | 9.4 (1017) | 7.3 (2238) | 1.3 (2238) | 1.6 (2238) |
| USA | 15.3 (3369) | 11 (5691) | 3.6 (5689) | 9.2 (5691) |
| West Germany | 18.7 (3112) | 5.5 (4415) | 2.8 (4415) | 2.4 (4410) |

Table 4.2. Active membership in several civic associations in a Number of nations
Sources: PPIM Surveys, WVS.

4.3. Islam and social capital

As previously discussed, interpersonal trust as a component of social capital is very low in Indonesia. About 87% of the respondents reported that most people cannot be trusted. Is religion responsible for this low percentage? Engagement in secular civic engagement varies greatly. Does religion explain this variation?

In the case of Italy, Putnam (1994) found that pious Catholics tend to be absent from secular civic associations. Does this phenomenon have any parallel in the Muslim community? Bernard Lewis (2002), Mardin (1991), and Gellner (1995) would say yes. Some other students of Muslim society, however, suggest that secular civil society is growing in Muslim countries (Norton 1995; Kelsay 2002; Ibrahim 2000). These competing claims have never been analytically tested.

Bivariate statistics (Table 4.3) indicate that Islam is not a negative factor for social capital among Indonesian Muslims.⁵⁹ Islam does not encourage distrust among fellow citizens. There is no indication that Islam negatively correlates with secular civic engagement.

Interpersonal trust gauged by “most people can be trusted” does not have a significant relationship either with Islamic or non-Islamic factors such as education, rural-urban cleavage, age, and gender. Interpersonal trust is in fact not explainable with my data. One possible reason for this is that interpersonal trust measured by a single indicator lacks variation. Almost all Muslims distrust their fellow citizens. Another

⁵⁹ In the analysis, trust is a dummy variable: most people can be trusted = 1, and otherwise = 0. Secular civic engagement is a 0-10 point scale constructed by adding the ten item score of active membership in secular civic engagement. For coding and scaling for Islamic and demographic components see Chapter 3.

possible reason is that the measure is not reliable. It is probably too general. Given the centrality of the concept in democratic theory, further exploration of interpersonal trust among Indonesian Muslims is clearly required.

Interpersonal trust measured by a five-point scale (trust 2) reveals more validity when correlated with some socio-economic and demographic variables (Table 4.3). Some components of Islam also have some significant correlation with interpersonal trust. These correlations are positive. The suggested rituals, NU identity, Muhammadiyah identity and Islamic civic engagement, albeit inconsistent, correlate with the five-point scale interpersonal trust (Table 4.3). Islam does not discourage Muslims to trust other fellow citizens in general. On the contrary, there is some indication that particular components of Islam correlate with trust.

As previously discussed, Islam is likely to have a negative relationship with social trust if the target of trust is defined in terms of religious affiliation. Muslims are likely to distrust fellow citizens who belong to other religions. Some Qur'anic verses previously described suggest that Muslims do not trust non-Muslims.

Bivariate statistics reveal that all Islamic components, except Islamism, do not have negative and significant correlations with interpersonal trust defined as trust in non-Muslims. Islamism has a negative and significant correlation with the trust. The more Islamist a Muslim, the more likely he or she is to distrust non-Muslims. However, Islamism, as discussed in Chapter 3, is not identical with Islam. Therefore, it cannot be inferred from this finding that Islam in general produces distrust in non-Muslims. The question is the extent to which the effect of Islamism on trust in non-Muslims is stable

when other theoretically relevant variables are included in the analysis. Multivariate analysis reveals that the negative effect of Islamism on trust in non-Muslims is stable regardless of socio-economic and demographic factors.

A quite different picture is seen in the relationship between Islam and social capital when the latter is defined by networks of secular civic engagement (Table 4.3). No single component of Islam correlates negatively and significantly with the networks of secular civic engagement. On the contrary, almost all components of Islam correlate positively and significantly. Mandatory rituals and Islamism are the only two Islamic components which do not have significant correlations with the networks. Even Islamism does not decrease the engagement of Muslims in secular civic associations.

This finding falsifies the claim that Islam is likely to discourage Muslims from engagement in non-Islamic civic activity. A Muslim who is pious judged by his or her intensity in performing the suggested and Nahdliyin rituals is more, not less, likely to be engaged in secular civic associations. A similar pattern is found in the relationship between Islamic social identity and secular civic engagement. However, the strongest correlation is between secular civic engagement and Islamic civic engagement.

This finding contradicts the claim that Muslims want to be regulated by Islamic law and therefore will not engage in non-Islamic social group activity. The claim also implies that a Muslim who is more engaged in Islamic civic association is less likely to be engaged in secular civic engagement. On the contrary, engagement in Islamic civic activity is likely to encourage involvement in secular civic associations.

| | Trust 1 | Trust 2 | Trust 3 | Secular civic engagement |
|------------------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| A. Islam | | | | |
| Mandatory rituals | -04 (-.03) | .02 (-.03) | .01 (-.05*) | .01 (.02) |
| Suggested rituals | .02 (-.01) | .06** (.08**) | .05* (-.00) | .14** (.22**) |
| Nahdlyin Rituals | -.03 (-.06**) | .01 (-.04) | .070** (.00) | .12** (.15**) |
| Islamic civic engagement | .03 (.00) | .04 (.06*) | .01 (.02) | .31** (.20**) |
| NU-ID | .04 (.00) | .025 (.09**) | .04 (.04) | .17** (.10**) |
| Muhammadiyah-ID | .00 (.01) | -.01 (.09*) | -.01 (.07**) | .20** (.09**) |
| Islamism | .03 (-.04) | .04 (-.02) | -.10** (-.23**) | -.03 (.00) |
| B. Demography and SES | | | | |
| Gender: Male | .04 (.02) | .061** (.06*) | .05* (.05*) | .11** (.09**) |
| Age | .03 (.02) | .03 (.04) | .05* (.08**) | -.05* (-.02) |
| Rural residence | .04 (.00) | .01 (.07**) | -.04 (.01) | .03 (.00) |
| Education | -.06** (-.03) | .02 (.04) | .05* (.02) | .16** (.17**) |
| Salariate | .00 (.00) | .043 (.02) | .04 (.03) | .12** (.21**) |
| Income | .03 (.03) | .046* (.01) | .06** (.01) | .09** (.21**) |

Table 4.3. Correlations (Pearson's r) between Islam, demographic and socio-economic factors, and social capital. 2002 (2001)

** and * are correlations significant at .01 and .05 level respectively (2-tailed). Trust 1 is a dummy variable: most people can be trusted (1), and can't be too careful with other people (0); Trust 2 is a five-point scale of general trust; Trust 3 is a five-point scale of trust in non-Muslims.

The strength of the connection between most Islamic components and secular civic engagement needs further investigation. It is likely that some correlations are spurious as some non-Islamic components, for example the socio-economic factor, also correlate positively with secular civic engagement and with most Islamic components. It

is plausible to assume that it is not Islam itself which shapes the engagement in secular civic association but rather socio-economic factors. It is plausible to argue that only pious Muslims with higher socio-economic status affect positively and significantly the engagement in secular civic associations. Therefore, socio-economic variables are the underlying cause of the relationship.

Many studies indicate that socio-economic and some demographic factors are important for the growth of civic associations. In the social economic status (SES) model of political participation, socio-economic factors are believed to have a direct effect not only on political participation but also on social participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Parry, Moysen, and Day 1992; van Deth 1997). Like political participation, social participation, including active membership in a civic association, which is a component of democratic culture, requires socio-economic resources. It requires time, money, skill and knowledge to participate in a social organization.

Those who are employed are more likely to participate in social activity as the unemployed are busy finding work. Those who have better jobs, the salaried or the middle class, are likely to have more flexibility with their time, have more income, and therefore be more likely to participate in social organizations. In addition, participation in social organizations requires knowledge and skill, and therefore more educated citizens are more likely to participate. Related to the socio-economic factor, rural-urban cleavage is likely to affect social participation. An urbanite is likely to have a better education, better job, and better income, and therefore be better prepared for social participation.

Gender may be an important demographic variable that affects democratic political culture. Males are likely to be more involved in civic associations and to be

more engaged in politics. However, this claim is not verified in the case of current American society (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, 2001, 77). Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 317) argue that in American society "affiliation with non-political organizations is significantly structured by income and race or ethnicity, but not gender." This conclusion indicates the occurrence of social change. In the nineteenth century, Tocqueville (2000, 20) noted in his discussion of the importance of civil society in America that "Men have the opportunity of seeing one another."

Face to face interaction is a basic element in civic engagement. In the case of Indonesia, Tocqueville's finding is probably still relevant. Men have more opportunity to be active in the social world. The non-working housewife is still typical. However, I believe that the male's greater likelihood of participation in the social world is not because of gender difference itself but rather of other factors that intervene in the relationship between gender and social participation. Most importantly, socio-economic status factors such as level of education, income, employment, and occupation. Controlling for socio-economic factors may indeed wipe out the role of gender.

Table 4.4 displays a multivariate analysis showing how Islam and non-religious factors simultaneously affect networks of non-religious civic engagement. The impact of a number of Islamic components is in fact stable.

Suggested and Nahdliyin rituals, Muhammadiyah identity and Islamic civic engagement impact secular civic engagement regardless of socio-economic and demographic factors. The effect of NU identity disappears as it correlates with the Nahdliyin rituals. This indicates that the Nahdliyin rituals have a more independent effect on secular civic engagement.

Engagement in Islamic associations increases significantly the likelihood of being engaged in non-religious civic associations.⁶⁰ The claim made by Lewis and other scholars

that civil society outside religious regulation is an alien concept in Muslim society therefore has no empirical foundation in Indonesia. Putnam's pious Italian Catholic who tends to be absent from secular civic associations and political engagement and more oriented toward the City of God has no parallel in the Indonesian Muslim community.

Indonesian Muslims are likely to resemble American Christians in the sense that their involvement in church activity helps them to be involved in various non-religious civic associations (Wuthnow 1999; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Putnam 2001; Tocqueville 2000). Their religious civic activity spills over into non-religious civic

⁶⁰In these multivariate analyses, the independent variables have different units and therefore their impacts on the dependent variable cannot be compared except if they are standardized. Therefore, the reported outcomes are standardized regression coefficients (betas) in order to be able to compare the relative impacts of the independent variables on the dependent variable. The standardized regression coefficients should be read so that the impact of an independent variable on the dependent variable is that an increase in one unit of standard deviation of an independent variable increases one unit of standard deviation of the dependent variable holding other variables constant. The standardized coefficients (betas) tell the relative impacts of the independent variables on the dependent variable. Throughout this work, only betas are reported in all multivariate analyses for the comparative purpose of assessing the impacts of independent variables on various dependent variables. Statistical significance refers to unstandardized regression coefficients which are not reported for simplicity. However, it is displayed on the betas to indicate that the relationship is statistically significant. All multivariate analyses throughout this work are guided by Lewis-Beck (1995), Afifi and Clark (1990), and Schroeder, Sjoquist, and Stephan (1986). In the multivariate analysis, education and rural-urban cleavage were included. Other socio-economic variables, i.e. occupation and income, have strong correlations with education, and have resulted in multicollinearity when included into the equations. Therefore, the socio-economic factor is represented by education and rural-urban cleavage only throughout this work. On coding and scaling of these variables see Chapter 3. In addition, the independent variables included in the equation are only those which reveal a significant relationship in bivariate statistics. The three rituals are indexes constructed by principle component analysis to resolve the problem of multicollinearity as they are highly correlated. Each index indicates that the lowest score is the least frequently perform, and the highest score the most frequently perform the rituals. Throughout this work, these indexes are applied in each multivariate analysis.

activity. Islamic civic associations help Muslims to be more active in social activity, or to be available for further social mobilization, to be more involved in non-religious social activities.

| | 2001 | 2002 |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|
| <i>Islam</i> | | |
| Mandatory rituals | - | - |
| Suggested rituals | .14** | .05 |
| Nahdliyin Ritual | .16** | .12** |
| Islamic civic engagement | .15** | .23** |
| NU ID | -.03 | .02 |
| Muhammadiyah ID | .06* | .15** |
| <i>Socio-economy and demography</i> | | |
| Education | .21** | .16** |
| Age | - | -.03 |
| Gender: Male | .08** | .08** |
| <i>N</i> | 1511 | 1540 |
| <i>Adjusted R²</i> | .11 | .14 |

Table 4.4. Multivariate analysis of secular civic engagement (standardized regression coefficients - beta)

** $P \leq .01$, * $P \leq .05$

In addition to the networks of Islamic civic engagement, education as a socio-economic component, as expected, has a direct impact on the networks of secular civic engagement. The higher the level of education, the more likely to be involved in the networks. Rural-urban cleavage, however, has no direct impact. In the case of Indonesia, the concept of gotong royong, discussed earlier, long believed to be an important component of social capital, is likely to be more pervasive in rural areas. Meanwhile, other associations such as unions, the Red Cross and professional associations are more popular among urbanites. The rural-urban cleavage is likely to be more significant for these specifically modern forms of civic association than to secular

civic associations in general. Therefore, it is plausible if rural-urban cleavage does not matter for the networks in Indonesia as they comprise the two forms of secular civic association. Both rural and urban residents have the same opportunities to be engaged in civic associations. The difference is mainly in the form of association.

The pattern of relationship between Islam, socio-economy, and secular civic engagement can be described as follows. Islam as a set of mandatory rituals affects suggested rituals, which in turn affect Nahdliyin rituals and Muhammadiyah identity. The Nahdliyin rituals affect NU identity. The suggested rituals, NU identity and Muhammadiyah identity affect Islamic civic engagement. The Suggested rituals still have direct relationship with the secular civic engagement. Therefore, suggested rituals, Islamic civic engagement together with Muhammadiyah identity affects secular civic engagement. This pattern is quite independent of the socio-economic and demographic factors. It is an Islamic model of secular civic engagement in which, interestingly enough, Islamism does not have significant relationship with the secular civic engagement, and therefore it is excluded from the model.

4.4. Conclusion

Having explored the characteristics of social capital through interpersonal trust and secular civic engagement I should state more explicitly some important findings to conclude this chapter.

First, measured by interpersonal trust, social capital among Indonesian Muslims is weak. A majority of Indonesian Muslims feel that they cannot be too careful with other people in general. However, overall Islam is not responsible for this weak interpersonal trust among Indonesian Muslims.

Second, measured by trust in non-Muslims, social capital among Indonesian Muslims is also weak. A majority of Indonesian Muslims do not trust non-Muslims. However, almost no components of Islam are responsible for this problem. Islamism is the only component of Islam which affects the trust negatively. This pattern does not lend support to the general claim that Islam is responsible for the lack of trust because Islamism is not identical with Islam (Chapter 3).

Third, defined by secular civic engagement, social capital among Indonesian Muslims is not weak relative to other democracies in the world. Many Indonesian Muslims are engaged in secular civic associations, especially local civic associations such as the rotating credit association (*arisan*) and community organizations. In addition to the socio-economic factor, Islam in the forms of suggested rituals, Nahdliyin rituals, Muhammadiyah identity, and Islamic civic engagement have direct, positive, and significant effects on secular civic engagement. Islam increases, not decreases, the likelihood of Muslims to be engaged in secular civic engagement.

Fourth, a Muslim who is pious judged from his or her ritual intensity tends to be more involved in Islamic organizations, which in turn encourages him or her to be involved in secular civil society. If civil society, especially the secular variant, is a societal basis for democracy, then Islam has the potential to contribute to democratization through its strengthening of civil society.

Civil society is crucial to democracy because it helps build civility among fellow citizens. A crucial test of this civility is tolerance or toleration among fellow citizens. This issue will be explored in the next chapter: the extent to which secular civil society and the components of Islam shape tolerance.

CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL TOLERANCE

Bernard Lewis (2002) states that a test of civil society in Muslim countries is tolerance. Schmitter (1997) asserts that civil society contributes to democratic consolidation by helping produce tolerance among citizens. Tolerance helps to stabilize society which in turn strengthens democracy. Conversely, intolerance makes democracy difficult to sustain.

Huntington charges that Islam by nature is an intolerant religion. The clash of civilizations, especially between Islam and other religions, is rooted in this characteristic of Islam. A society characterized by deep conflict or intolerance is inimical to democracy. Accordingly, the issue of the relationship between Islam and tolerance is crucial. This chapter assesses the extent to which Islam produces intolerance in the Indonesian case. Prior to this, I will discuss further the significance of tolerance for democracy.

5.1. Tolerance and democracy

A functioning democracy requires a particular culture, "the acceptance by the citizenry and political elites of principles underlying freedom of speech, assembly, religion, ... and the like" (Lipset 1994, 3). These freedoms will be possible if citizens

tolerate different beliefs held or interests pursued by other citizens. In a democracy, each citizen is normatively supposed to have equal opportunity to achieve his or her goals regardless of cultural, social, political, or economic background and interests. These differences can become problematic in the absence of tolerance.

Democracy is built on the fact of interest conflicts among citizens. Democratic arrangements mediate the conflict peacefully without diminishing differences. These arrangements require participants to tolerate difference and to agree to disagree. Citizens are allowed to hate each other as far as this attitude does not disregard each other's rights (cf. Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982, 5-6). A Christian is allowed to hate a Muslim, for example, but he or she is only intolerant if he attempts to prevent Muslims from observing their religion, becoming a neighbor, running for public office, etc. The hate is not problematic if the hated are still allowed to pursue their rights as citizens.

Tolerance is not identical with democracy, but it is believed to be crucial to making democracy work (Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982, 5). Democratic stability is a complex phenomenon, and political culture is one important ingredient in the mixture. Dahl (1997, 36, 38) argues that an essential component of political culture for democratic stability is political tolerance. In the early 1970s he had doubted whether a deeply divided society could establish a stable democracy or polyarchy. Dahl (1971, 108) argues further,

That subcultural pluralism often places a dangerous strain on the tolerance and mutual security required for a system of public contestation seems hardly open to doubt. Polyarchy in particular is more frequently found in relatively homogenous countries than in countries with a great amount of subcultural pluralism.

Intolerance is very likely to occur especially in primordially divided societies, societies divided along religious, ethnic, or regional lines. About his concern with primordial pluralism, Dahl (1971, 108) states:

Presumably because an ethnic or religious identity is incorporated so early and so deeply into one's personality, conflicts among ethnic and religious subcultures are specifically fraught with danger, particularly if they are also tied to region. Because conflicts among ethnic and religious subcultures are so easily seen as threats to one's most fundamental self, opponents are readily transformed into malign and inhuman 'they,' whose menace stimulates and justifies the violence and savagery that have been the common response of in-group to out-group among all mankind.

In primordially divided society intolerant attitudes and behavior are likely and may threaten democratic stability. More importantly, political participation can be dangerous to democracy itself if it is not accompanied by tolerance, especially when the elites themselves are intolerant. In Dahl's words:

If an increase in political activity brings the authoritarian-minded into the political arena, the consensus on the basic norms among the politically active must certainly be declining ... In the light of all this we cannot assume that an increase in participation is always associated with an increase in (democracy). (1956, 89).

This implies that political participation should be built on the basis of relative tolerance among the participants. Tolerance may influence the extent to which participation is peaceful or violent. Together with trust, tolerance is a "passive" element of democratic culture, which should accompany the "active participant political culture" (Chapter 4 and Chapter 6) (Almond and Verba 1963).

There is no scholar who rejects the significance of tolerance in democratic stability. However, the so-called “elitist” theory of democracy is not very concerned with political intolerance as long as political elites are tolerant, because it is the elites who finally make the policy decisions (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; McClosky 1964; Prothro and Grigg 1960).⁶¹ If the mass public is intolerant, this theory suggests, they should participate as little as possible to keep the democracy stable. Fortunately, this theory asserts that elites are more tolerant than the mass public because they are carriers of the democratic creed (Stouffer 1955; Dahl 1961; McClosky 1964; Prothro and Grigg 1960; Sullivan et al 1993). In addition, the elites are more often socialized into pluralistic politics. Therefore, the impact of intolerant masses, who can be neutralized by the elite, should not be overstated (Stouffer 1955; McClosky 1964; Prothro and Grigg 1960).

The elitist theory of democracy further asserts that intolerant citizens are likely to be apathetic or absent from politics, and therefore they may not be a threat to democratic system. There is some truth to this claim. I suspect, however, that under certain conditions of severe conflict among elites, the intolerant masses can be mobilized to support different elite-led parties. This mobilization is potentially dangerous to democratic stability.

Moreover, the presence of a large intolerant mass may contribute to repressive regime behavior which in turn can weaken democracy. Mass pressure on government to discriminate against a particular group in society may get a positive response from the

⁶¹ Discussion about elitist theory of democracy and political tolerance see for example Gibson (1992a, 1989, 1988), Gibson and Duch (1991), and Gibson and Bingham (1984) and Marcus et al (1995).

government. Mass intolerance then becomes a destabilizing factor. Barnum (1982) found that mass political tolerance/intolerance matters for tolerant/intolerant public policy outcomes. In his study, an intolerant demand that a particular group not be allowed to have a public demonstration produced an intolerant policy from an elite that was itself tolerant. Elites may accommodate any demand as far as it benefits their political survival.

Some other studies suggest that level of elite, local or national, makes a difference in degree of accommodation (Gibson and Bingham 1984). National elites tend to reject intolerant demands. The difference lies partly in their political socialization to a predominantly democratic national elite subculture and in their experience with more diverse interests and demands (Ibid, 44-45; Sullivan et al 1993).

Other studies indicate that the intolerant mass does not have a significant impact on most public policy issues (Gibson 1988, 1989). Political tolerance matters more when the issues are fundamental, for example related to civil or democratic rights (Marcus et al 1995; Gibson 1992). The elitist theory's further claim that tolerant citizens are more active than intolerant citizens requires further empirical test. It is also plausible to imagine the greater probability of intolerant activists who might seriously undermine democratic stability. Marcus et al (1995) describe the pattern:

The intolerant subjects ... were significantly more likely to indicate an intention to act ...than the tolerant. The significance difference in the mean behavior intention scores between the tolerant and intolerant showed that the intolerant were definitely on the active side of the scale and the tolerant on the inactive side. The intolerant may overall be inactive, but when they are faced with a noxious group trying to exercise its civil liberties, they are more than willing to express an intention to do something to keep the group from holding its rally. Indeed, a desire to stop the group may be what motivates the intolerant to become involved

in politics. The tolerant, who may tend to be more politically involved overall, are generally unwilling to indicate an intention to do what is necessary to protect a noxious group's civil liberties. ... The results of our analysis have implications for democratic political systems. Many scholars studying opinion intensity have commented on the potentially negative effects of intense opinions. When opinions are held too strongly, people become fanatical. If many people hold intense opinions, especially when the opinions conflict, political leaders are faced with the difficult task of trying to find an acceptable solution, and democracy can be weakened by the turmoil (207-208).

The claim that the elite is more committed to democratic values and therefore more likely to be tolerant and to produce public policy which mirrors their tolerance is probably true. However, elites are also political animals whose main goal is to survive in their political career. They are opportunistic and more than willing to use any resources to achieve that goal. If a majority of the masses are intolerant and demand an intolerant public policy the elites will not behave like angels. The problem is important because it is only in democracies that elites must listen to the majority. Majorities may act tyrannously, as we learned long ago from Madison, Tocqueville, and J.S. Mill. Majority tyranny is a special concern, as Dahl cautioned, in a primordially divided nation such as Indonesia.

5.2. Islam and tolerance

In Muslim societies, “religious tolerance”, or “religio-political tolerance” is probably the central issue, rather than “political tolerance” in general. This specifically religious tolerance is historically called “toleration,” and was first discussed by John Locke (1963) in the context of the relationship between church and state in the United

Kingdom. Toleration refers to willingness not to interfere with others' beliefs, attitudes, and actions even though they are disliked. The state should not be involved in religious matters, and should not be in the hands of a particular religious group.

In Muslim society, tolerance refers to attitudes and behavior of Muslims toward non-Muslims, or vice versa. Historically, it more specifically has referred to the relationship between Muslims and adherents of other Semitic religions, Judaism and Christianity. The relationship between Muslims, Christians and Jews is complex and has fluctuated over the centuries. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Bernard Lewis (1985) has written that the sources of intolerance among Muslims toward non-Muslims such as Christians and Jews are not clear. They are partly religious doctrines and partly historical and socio-political experience. The doctrinal sources can be found in the Qur'an, for example a verse which says "O you who believe, do not take the Jews and Christians as friends ... they are friends of one another, and whoever among you takes them as friends will become one of them" (Qur'an 5: 51).

Lewis (1985, 14) argues that this doctrinal source should be understood historically. It reflects conflict and tension between Muslims and non-Muslims (Jews and Christians) in the early period of Islam. The emphasis on a historically specific context is persuasive as there are other doctrines which suggests tolerance toward non-Muslims as Lewis quoted. The Qur'an for example says, "Those who believe [i.e., the Muslims], and those who profess Judaism, and the Christians and the Sabians, those who believe in God and in the Last Day and act righteously, shall have their reward with their Lord; there shall be no fear in them, neither shall they grieve." (Qur'an 2 : 62).

This verse and many others indicate that Islam is inclusive toward Jews and Christians, and may become a doctrinal source for religious tolerance. Salvation does not exclusively belong to Islam. In a specific historical context, this tolerant doctrine of Islam may prevail while in another intolerant doctrine may be dominant. Lewis locates the problem in the long history of Islam and its encounters with other religions:

In most tests of tolerance, Islam, both in theory and in practice, compares unfavorably with Western democracies as they have developed during the last two or three centuries, but very favorably with most other Christian and post-Christian societies and regimes. There is nothing in Islamic history to compare with the emancipation, acceptance, and integration of other believers and non-believers in the West; but equally, there is nothing in Islamic history to compare with the Spanish expulsion of Jews and Muslims, the Inquisition, the *auto da fé's*, the wars of religion, not to speak of more recent crimes of commission and acquiescence. There were occasional persecutions, but they were rare, and usually of brief duration, related to local and specific circumstances. ... In modern times, Islamic tolerance has been somewhat diminished. After the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, Islam was a retreating, not an advancing force in the world, and Muslims began to feel threatened by the rise and expression of the great Christian empires of Eastern and Western Europe. ... In the present mood, a triumph of militant Islam would be unlikely to bring a return to traditional Islamic tolerance - and even that would no longer be acceptable to minority elements schooled on modern ideas of human, civil, and political rights. (2002, 114, 131)

Muslim tolerance or intolerance is historical. However, once history has constructed a collective memory, and that memory has been reinforced by bitter experiences, religious intolerance is likely to persist. There follows the perception that religion is by nature intolerant, which leads to religious conflict (cf. Huntington 1997). Huntington believes that both Islam and Christianity are intolerant religions.

The twentieth-century conflict between liberal democracy and Marxist-Leninism is only a fleeting and superficial historical phenomenon compared to the continuing

and deeply conflictual relation between Islam and Christianity. ... The causes of this ongoing pattern of conflict lie not in transitory phenomena such as twelfth-century Christian passion or twentieth-century Muslim fundamentalism. They flow from the nature of the two religions and the civilizations based on them. Conflict was, on the one hand, a product of difference, particularly the Muslim concept of Islam as a way of life transcending and uniting religion and politics versus the Western Christian concept of the separate realms of God and Caesar... [Islam and Christianity are] both universalistic, claiming to be the one true faith to which all humans can adhere. Both are missionary religions believing that their adherents have an obligation to convert nonbelievers to that one true faith. From its origin Islam expanded by conquest and when the opportunity existed Christianity did also... The causes of the renewal of conflict between Islam and the West thus lies in the fundamental questions of power and culture. *Kto? Kovo?* Who is to rule? Who is to be ruled? The central issue of politics defined by Lenin is the root of the contest between Islam and the West. There is, however, the additional conflict which Lenin would have considered meaningless, between two different versions of what is right and what is wrong and, as a consequence, who is right and who is wrong. So long as Islam remains Islam (which it will) and the West remains West (which is more dubious), this fundamental conflict between two great civilizations and ways of life will continue to define their relations in the future even as it has defined them for the past fourteenth centuries." (1997, 210, 211, 212)

Lewis's proposition about Islamic intolerance is more conditional, more historical, and more restricted to proponents of Islamic fundamentalism, while Huntington's is more general, or more essentialistic, in the sense that Islam and Christianity are *by nature* intolerant religions. Like an Islamist, Huntington believes that Islam by nature is a total way of life, which recognizes no truth and salvation in other religions. Missionary activity is a religious duty. He believes that Christianity has the same nature. When these two missionary and exclusive religions meet religious conflict and war are unavoidable.

How relevant is Huntington's proposition for Indonesian Muslims? His conclusion about the intolerant nature of Islam is not restricted to a variant of Islam, but to Islam as a whole. Huntington also explicitly views Islam as a total way of life, and therefore all components of Islam are strongly inter-correlated. This implies that the

ritual component strongly correlates with Islamic political orientation and with Islamic civic engagement. These components are believed to correlate strongly with intolerance toward Christians.

Before exploring these relationships, I will describe the characteristics of tolerance among Indonesian Muslims. Tolerance in Indonesia takes two forms: a specific religion based socio-political tolerance; and political tolerance in general.

"Tolerance" in this work is defined as "willingness to 'put up with' those things one rejects or opposes" (Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982, 2). There are two different strategies as to how political tolerance is measured. Stouffer's *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberty* (1955) treats communism as the target of political tolerance, the extent to which Americans tolerated communist political activity.

More recent studies of political tolerance do not treat a specific group such as communists or the Ku Klux Klan as the target of tolerance, but rather any group that a respondent selects as the least liked group (Sullivan et al 1983, 60-1). This is "a content-controlled measure" strategy rather than a specific group target strategy to measure political tolerance. These two strategies are applied here. Stouffer's strategy is applied with Christians as the target of tolerance and Sullivan et al's with the least liked group as the target. In addition, I also include a more general measure of tolerance, tolerance to have members of particular groups as neighbors. It is measured by a single variable: how many societal groups does a respondent reject as neighbors? This information may uncover the most basic pattern of tolerance in a society.

Figure 5.1 displays percentages of groups in the society that people object to having as their neighbors. An overwhelming majority (84%) object to having a

communist as their neighbor. In addition, there are smaller proportions who reported that they objected to having Christian or Catholic (16%), Islamist Muslim (14%), Chinese (13%), or Hindu or Buddhist (12%) as their neighbor.

In terms of the percentage of respondents who do not object to having members of other religious groups as neighbors, the intolerant among Indonesian Muslims is relatively small. This proportion is quite similar to that of many other nations. It is better than Turkey, India, Georgia, and Japan, but similar to many consolidated democracies, such as the US, UK, and West Germany (Table 5.1). On the basis of this comparison, one cannot persuasively argue that Indonesian Muslims are intolerant toward other religious groups.




Figure 5.1: Respondents who object to having various groups as neighbors (2002) (%) (1 = Communists, 2 = Christians, 3 = Islamist Muslims, 4 = Chinese, 5 = Hindu/Buddhist, 6 = Other)

Among Indonesians, there is much less intolerance toward Christians than toward communists. Nonetheless, conflict between Muslims and Christians, including church

burnings and bombings, is frequent. These incidents probably reflect tension and intolerance between the two groups, along the lines of Huntington's analysis. To explore this issue, a set of questions were asked both in the 2001 and 2002 surveys.

| Religion, Nations | % (N) | Religion, Nations | % (N) |
|--------------------|-------------|------------------------------|-------------|
| <i>Islam</i> | | <i>Orthodox Christianity</i> | |
| Indonesia 2002 | 16.0 (2268) | Georgia | 28.3 (2593) |
| Azerbaijan | 18.4 (2002) | Ukraine | 17.5 (2811) |
| Bangladesh 1997 | 12.7 (1525) | Russia | 12.4 (4001) |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 27.6 (1200) | <i>Confucianism</i> | |
| Nigeria | 21.7 (3769) | Mainland China | 12.1 (1000) |
| Turkey | 51.1 (2856) | Taiwan | 17.4 (1437) |
| <i>Catholicism</i> | | South Korea | 23.1 (2221) |
| Argentina | 6.7 (2081) | Japan | 28.8 (1011) |
| Brazil | 13.2 (1149) | <i>Protestantism</i> | |
| Italy | 14.3 (2018) | Sweden | 15.0 (2056) |
| Poland | 25.9 (1145) | The Netherlands | 14.1 (1017) |
| Spain | 11.7 (5358) | United Kingdom | 16.4 (1484) |
| The Philippines | 29.1(1200) | USA | 13.3 (3381) |
| Venezuela | 26.0 (1200) | West Germany | 16.3 (3118) |
| <i>Hindu</i> | | | |
| India | 30.4 (4540) | | |

Table 5.1. Intolerance: Object to Having Neighbors of Different Religious Group in a Number of Nations

Sources: Except for Indonesia, all nations are from the WVS conducted in the 1980s and 1990s. Some nations represent pooled survey data of WVS. The target group of tolerance for Indonesia is Protestant or Catholic, for all other nations in the WVS the target group is Muslim except for Turkey, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, and Bosnia-Herzegovina which are respectively Jews, Hindu, Christian, and Orthodox.

Respondents were asked if they would tolerate a Christian as a teacher in a public school, if they objected to a church in a predominantly Muslim community, to Christian religious services in a predominantly Muslim community, and to a Christian becoming president of the country. Figure 5.2 displays the percentage of tolerance among

Indonesian Muslims toward Christians gauged by the four items. Only about two out of ten Muslims reported that they do not object to having a Christian as president of the country.

More tolerance is expressed on the issue of religious services or of building churches by and for Christians. About three out of ten Muslims tolerate the religious services. In addition, about four out of ten Muslims did not object to a Christian teacher in a public school. Judged by these four items, a majority of Indonesian Muslims are not tolerant toward Christians. At the descriptive level, at least, Huntington's picture seems accurate.

Although intolerance toward Christians is large, it is smaller than intolerance toward communists. As described earlier, an overwhelming majority of the respondents even object to having a communist as their neighbor. This large proportion of intolerance toward communists reflects majority opinion among Muslims even when a different strategy is followed.

To follow Sullivan et al's content-controlled measure strategy of gauging political tolerance, respondents were asked to select a group that they liked the least, either from a list or from groups in society they designated. Respondents could reply that they do not have any group that they like the least. Target groups on the list were Protestants, Catholics, Hindus, Buddhists, Chinese, Jews, Communists, Darul Islam (a pro Islamic state group) and Laskar Jihad (Holy War Militia). Those who selected a target group were asked if they agree or disagree that the group be outlawed, the group be allowed to have public meetings or demonstrations in their area, and that a member of the group be allowed to run for public office (see appendix B for detailed wordings).

Figure 5.3 reveals the percentages. About 85% of the people reported that there is a group that they like least. About six of ten Indonesians selected communists as the least liked group, and only one out of ten selected Catholics or Protestants. About one out of ten also selected Jews as the least liked group. More Muslims dislike communists rather than religious groups even though conflicts between Muslims and Christians are frequent. However, conflict between communists and anti-communists in the history has been much more extensive as will be discussed in the last part of this chapter.

Figure 5.3 portrays tolerance and intolerance not only toward communists but also toward other groups in society that the respondents liked the least.⁶² As previously noted, anti-communism as an attitude is not necessarily intolerance. It becomes intolerance when followed by unwillingness to tolerate any political action by a communist. An overwhelming majority of Indonesian Muslims, according to the 2002 survey data, are not tolerant towards these groups. About 83% agree that the least liked group should be outlawed by the government. About the same proportion (86%) would not allow the group to have a public meeting or demonstration in their area. Most people (about 80%) also would not allow member of the group to be a public official.

Judging by these percentages, most Indonesian Muslims are intolerant, not only toward specific groups such as Christians, but also toward a least liked group in general, especially communists. Is this large intolerant mass public unique to Indonesia?

⁶² Other alternative answers are "uncertain" and "don't know." For detailed wording of the questions, see the appendix B.




Figure 5.2: Socio-Political Tolerance of Muslims toward Christians/Catholics (%): 1 = become president; 2 = become a teacher in public school; 3 = hold religious services; 4 = build a church




Figure 5.3: The least liked group in society (%) (2002): 1 = communists; 2 = Christians/Catholics; 3 = Jews; 4 = Islamist groups; 5 = Chinese; 6 = other groups, 7 = none




Figure 5.4: Some indicators of political tolerance toward the least liked groups (%) (1 = allowed by the government, 2 = allowed to have public meetings, 3 = allowed to have demonstrations, 4 = allowed to be a public official)

Using similar measures of tolerance, the World Value Survey reveals that the mass public in most nations in the world is indeed intolerant. A majority admit that there is a group in society that they like the least. An overwhelming majority disagree if the least liked group holds demonstrations (87%), if a member becomes a teacher at a public school (93%) or becomes a public official (93%) (World Value Survey). These proportions are slightly larger than those for Indonesia.

Indonesians are more intolerant than citizens of Bangladesh and Sweden, but less intolerant than Azerbaijanis, Filipinos, and Indians. Judging by the descriptive statistics, political tolerance among Indonesians is not too bad relative to many other nations in the world (Table 5.2)

What explains intolerance among Indonesians? Is it connected to Islam? These issues will be answered in the next section in the context of other factors believed to affect political tolerance such as education and democratic values.

| Tolerant attitudes | Demonstration | Hold public office |
|------------------------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Religion & Nation | | |
| <i>Islam</i> | | |
| Indonesia | 14% (1704) | 20% (1708) |
| Azerbaijan | 0.7 (1907) | 0.7 (1935) |
| Bangladesh | 43.8 (1320) | 36.0 (1349) |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 4.4 (1136) | 1.4 (1152) |
| <i>Catholicism</i> | | |
| Argentina | 13.8 (989) | 7.0 (996) |
| Brazil | 17.5 (1054) | 7.7 (1061) |
| Spain | (1143) | 2.7 (1167) |
| The Philippines | 4.2 (1179) | 3.6 (1190) |
| Venezuela | 5.3 (1154) | 6.0 (1153) |
| <i>Orthodox Christianity</i> | | |
| Georgia | 6.5 (2378) | 4.7 (2410) |
| Ukraine | 5.9 (2390) | 2.2 (2447) |
| Russia | 11.3 (1840) | 4.0 (1897) |
| <i>Hindu</i> | | |
| India | 9.7 (1706) | 7.7 (1727) |
| <i>Confucianism</i> | | |
| China | - | 11.0 (1373) |
| Taiwan | 13.9 (691) | 17.5 (708) |
| <i>Protestantism</i> | | |
| Sweden | 30.3 (903) | 9.4 (922) |
| Switzerland | 6.3 (1079) | 4.4 (1071) |
| USA | 24.6 (1457) | 14.4 (1467) |
| West Germany | 19.4 (963) | 6.3 (975) |

Table 5.2. Some Indicators of Tolerance toward the Least Liked Group in Several Nations

Sources: PPIM Surveys and World Value Survey

5.3. Islam, democratic values, and political tolerance

As discussed earlier, a majority of Indonesians (80%) reported that there is a group in the society that they like the least, and about 85% said that they would not tolerate the political activity of the least liked group. Most Indonesian Muslims are also intolerant toward Christians. From a political culture perspective, this intolerance is problematic for democracy.

To what extent is Islam responsible for creating intolerant citizens? It is often argued, as we have seen, that the absence of democracy or failure to consolidate democratic institutions can be attributed to high levels of socio-political intolerance among Muslims.

In a democracy, religious freedom should be allowed and protected. Democrats are expected to tolerate any citizen attending religious services and building religious institutions. Democrats are also expected to tolerate any citizen having a career in public life such as becoming a teacher in public school or becoming the national leader.

In Indonesia, dissemination of religious teachings by Christian missionaries has frequently given rise to conflict that affects political stability. The government has often intervened. In the late 1960s, for example, the government prescribed rules for proselytization. Members of particular religious groups are not supposed to be the target of missionary activity by another religious group. In particular, Muslims are not supposed to be a target of Christian missionary activity.

These regulations appear to reflect intolerance. However, Muslim missionary activists commonly claim that Christian missionaries entice Muslims with material goods

and other assistance. They help the poor and less educated Muslims in order to attract them to Christianity. Muslim activists claim that this tactic takes unfair advantage of poor Muslims.

The sources of Muslim intolerance toward non-Muslims such as Christians are not very clear. Bernard Lewis (1985) argues that they are partly religious doctrines, as found in the Qur'an, and partly historical and socio-political experience. Islam historically was intolerant toward three social groups: women, slaves, and non-Muslims. These three social groups are discriminated against as inferior to Muslim males. Lewis argues that the doctrinal sources should be understood historically as reflecting conflict and tension in the early period of Islam. His view is persuasive as there are other doctrines which indicate tolerance and suggest that Islam is in principle open to religious pluralism.

In the contemporary Muslim world, one group emphasizes the tolerant, while another emphasizes the intolerant doctrines. What makes this difference in emphasis is not the doctrines themselves, which are open to any Muslim, but rather the social and historical context in which each generation of Muslims acts in the world. Huntington, as we have seen, rejects the contextual view in favor of a more essentialist one.

Huntington's view is not much different from that of Islamist Muslims in Indonesia, who reject the idea of historical interpretation. They believe that all Qur'anic verses are universal and are never concerned with reconciling apparent contradictions. Many others, however, understand the tenets historically, and do attempt to reconcile the

apparently contradictory verses. This more liberal group believes that Islam at the most fundamental level teaches religious tolerance. The apparently intolerant doctrines should be subordinated to the tolerant ones by way of historical criticism.

Which group is predominant in Indonesian Muslim society? To what extent is Islam responsible for the intolerant attitudes? A partial answer is that the extent to which Islam is responsible for the intolerant attitudes depends on which component of Islam Indonesians adhere to.

In addition to Islam, democratic values also have potential to explain political tolerance. Students of political tolerance argue that the more committed to democratic values a person is the more likely he or she is to be tolerant (Marcus et al 1995; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982).

Identity- and interest-based competition and conflict in a society are central to democracy. Democracy itself is an institution that helps arrange and mediate conflict. However, democratic institutions may not be sufficient to handle conflict. Something else is required: tolerance among elites and masses. Tolerance is a powerful psychological force. Without it, identity and interest based conflict and competition that are legitimate in a democracy may result in destruction and violence which may lead to social and political disorder and then to democratic instability.

To be sure, some studies indicate that, depending on context, democratic values may have a negative relationship with tolerance (Duch and Gibson, 1992). In Germany, for example, the mass public who support democratic values tend to be intolerant toward fascism. This deviates from a more common finding of the positive impact of democratic values, but is clearly related to the specifics of the German experience.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, one important contribution of civil society to democratic consolidation is its capacity to provide structures in which citizens of various social backgrounds work together for a collective interest. This feature of civil society helps build mutual understanding among the participants (cf. Schmitter 1997; Lewis 2002). Therefore, the more engaged in civic associations, the more likely one is to be tolerant.

Education is believed to be an important variable to explain political tolerance. The more educated, the more likely a person is to be tolerant (Prothro and Grigg 1960; McClosky 1964; Sullivan, Piereson, Marcus 1982; Marcus et al 1995). The logic underlying this positive relationship is that feeling tolerant toward the disliked is not easy for most people. Knowledge about democratic values and pluralism is socialized through (modern) education. Education also helps to link these abstract values to concrete life (Prothro and Grigg 1960). Democratic beliefs and habits are not a state of nature, but are acquired through learning, including formal education (McClosky 1964).

In my view, the impact of education on tolerance varies with the substance of education. The impact may generally be positive, but in particular educational contexts in which intolerance is promoted, the outcome may be different. In Indonesia, anti-communism has been inculcated from elementary school through college, even though democratic values and pluralism are positively valued. Many Indonesians hold the two beliefs in their minds at the same time. This context may affect the relationship between education, support for democratic values, and tolerance.

Knowledge or information about democratic values is a crucial element which links education to tolerance. However, knowledge is not restricted to that acquired

through formal education. It may be also shaped by contemporary knowledge acquired outside school (Marcus et al 1995; McClosky and Zeller 1984). Following political news through mass media and through discussion may provide a critical information base for many people. An assessment of the information produced by the mass media becomes crucial to understanding how information shapes political tolerance.

Generational change may also affect political tolerance (Davis 1975). A generation that experiences strong hostility toward a particular target group tends to be intolerant toward the group compared to successor generations who do not have the same experience. In Indonesia, a generation that experienced bloody conflict between the communists and all others in the 1960s is likely to be intolerant toward communists compared to generation borns in the 1970s or later.

Bivariate statistics (Table 5.3) reveal correlations of Islamic components and other factors with tolerance toward Christians and tolerance toward the least liked group. Islamic components have mixed correlations.⁶³ Mandatory rituals and Islamism have negative and significant correlations with tolerance toward Christians. Suggested rituals and Islamic civic engagement also have negative and significant, albeit inconsistent, correlations with tolerance toward Christians. Nahdliyin rituals and NU identity do not correlate significantly with tolerance, while Muhammadiyah has a positive (though unstable) correlation with tolerance.

⁶³ In these analyses, tolerance toward Christians is a three-point scale constructed by adding the four items of tolerance toward Christians: from intolerant (1) to tolerant (3). Tolerance toward the least liked group is a five-point scale constructed by adding the four items.

Defined as general political tolerance, or as tolerance toward the least liked group, almost all Islamic components do not have significant correlations with tolerance.

Suggested rituals and Islamic civic engagement are the only components of Islam which correlate significantly with tolerance. However, the two have different signs. Mandatory rituals are negative while Islamic civic engagement is positive one.

Huntington's claim that Islam is by nature is an intolerant religion appears to be partly verified among Indonesian Muslims. This is particularly the case if Islam is defined as Islamism and tolerance as tolerance toward Christians. However, it is plausible to argue that it is not Islamism itself which produces the negative impact, but rather something else such as education, civic engagement or democratic values. It is possible that an Islamist who has a better education is more tolerant toward Christians than one who has a lower education, which would mean that education is the cause of the negative impact. This possibility will be addressed below.

Non-Islamic factors, on the contrary, mostly have positive and significant correlations with tolerance as defined by tolerance toward Christians. Support for democratic culture, secular civic engagement, political engagement, education, salaried class and income all correlate positively and significantly with tolerance. Only rural residence and age correlate negatively.

At the same time, almost all of the non-Islamic factors have negative and significant correlations with political tolerance or general political tolerance defined by tolerance toward the least liked group. Democratic values, political engagement, the salaried class, income and education all affect tolerance negatively. Rural residence is

the only non-Islamic factor that has a positive and significant correlation with tolerance. All these correlations deviate from most findings about the pattern of association between these factors and tolerance.

| | Socio-political tolerance 2002 (2001) | General political tolerance 2002 |
|--------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|
| A. Religion | | |
| Mandatory rituals | -.05* (-.07**) | -.11** |
| Suggested rituals | -.14** (-.01) | .00 |
| Nahdlyin Rituals | -.02 (-.02) | .05* |
| NU-ID | -.03 (.00) | .01 |
| Muhammadiyah-ID | .07** (.04) | -.01 |
| Islamism | -.34** (-.33**) | .02 |
| Islamic civic engagement | -.07* (-.03) | .09** |
| B. Non-Religion | | |
| Secular civic engagement | .10** (.08**) | .04 |
| Political engagement | .02 (.05*) | -.14** |
| Democratic values | .06** (.13**) | -.26** |
| Gender: Male | .06** (.04) | -.06** |
| Age | -.05* (.01) | .03 |
| Rural | -.13** (-.08**) | .09** |
| Education | .14** (.15**) | -.21** |
| Salariate | .07** (.06**) | -.09** |
| Income | .09** (.10**) | -.12** |

Table 5.3. Correlations (Pearson's *r*) of Islam and Tolerance
** and *correlation significant at .01 and .05 level respectively.

How stable are these associations when all of the significant independent variables are taken together in a multivariate analysis?

Table 5.4 displays how the independent variables simultaneously affect the two forms of tolerance.⁶⁴ Islamism is the only component of Islam which has a negative, significant, and stable relationship with tolerance toward Christians. Mandatory rituals

⁶⁴ About scaling and coding of the independent variables in the two equations see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.

and suggested rituals also have a negative, albeit unstable, relationship with tolerance toward Christians. Regardless of demographic, socio-economic, and democratic culture variables, Islamism decreases tolerance toward Christians. The negative impact of Islamism even decreases the impact of democratic values and education. Even Muslims with better education and support for democratic values are likely to be intolerant toward Christians if they are Islamists.

It must be stressed, however, that these findings only partly confirm Huntington's claim about the intolerant nature of Islam. If Islam is defined by other components of Islam, especially Islamic social capital, his claim is unsupported by my data. Moreover, Islamism is not identical with Islam (Chapter 3). To be more engaged in Islamic activity is not necessarily to be an Islamist. Therefore, specification of what we mean by Islam is necessary to understand more accurately the nature of its relationship to political tolerance.

Unlike Islamism, secular civic engagement has a positive and significant impact on tolerance toward Christians. Regardless of the Islamic factor, democratic values, and education, secular civic engagement increases tolerance. The hypothesis that civil society helps build tolerance is supported by the evidence of Indonesian Muslims.

When defined by general political tolerance or tolerance toward the least liked group, political tolerance does not have a significant relationship with secular civic engagement. There is also no significance in the relationship between tolerance and almost all components of Islam. Only mandatory rituals and Islamic civic engagement

have a significant relationship, but in opposed directions. The mandatory rituals have a negative relationship, while Islamic civic engagement is positive regardless of the other factors (Table 5.4).

| | Socio-political Tolerance | | General political tolerance |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| | 2001 | 2002 | 2002 |
| A. Islam | | | |
| Mandatory ritual | -.069** | -.031 | -.093** |
| Suggested ritual | - | -.074** | - |
| Nahdliyin ritual | - | - | .018 |
| Muhammadiyah identity | - | .077** | - |
| Islamic civic engagement | - | -.051 | .089** |
| Islamism | -.320** | -.281** | - |
| B. Non-religion | | | |
| Democratic culture | | | |
| Secular civic engagement | .053* | .094** | - |
| Political engagement | .008 | -.028 | -.048 |
| Democratic values | .055* | .009 | -.189** |
| SES and Demography | | | |
| Education | .040 | .017 | -.114** |
| Rural residence | -.051* | -.066* | -.010 |
| Age | - | .065* | - |
| Gender: male | - | .087** | -.049 |
| Adjusted R ² | .136 | .130 | .097 |
| N | 1417 | 1320 | 1447 |

Table 5. 4. Multivariate Analysis of Political Tolerance (standardized regression coefficients)

** $P \leq .01$, * $P \leq .05$.

A Muslim who frequently performs the rituals is likely to be intolerant toward the least liked group. The more engaged a person is in Islamic association, conversely, the more likely he or she is to be tolerant to the least liked group. Civic association perhaps functions as theories of civil society predict, to help build tolerance. This association is

the only variable in the multivariate analysis which has a positive and significant impact on tolerance. Another civil society variable, secular civil society, does not have a significant impact on general political tolerance.

A surprising piece of evidence is the negative and stable impact of support for democratic values on tolerance toward the least liked group. Another surprising finding is the negative impact of education on tolerance toward the least liked group. More educated citizens are more intolerant. This negative relationship is also found in the relationship between rural residence and tolerance toward Christians. It is not surprising, as in rural communities religious life is commonly homogenous and people are not accustomed to religious pluralism.

The negative relationship between support for democratic values and tolerance toward the least liked group requires further explanation. It is mainly communists as target group that produces this result. It is still surprising, however, because support for democratic values is believed to be a strong and positive predictor of political tolerance. Why are Indonesian democrats not tolerant toward communists?

One possible answer has to do with the reliability and validity of the measures of political tolerance applied in the survey. Future surveys with better measures may help to minimize this problem. Another possible answer is related to the nature of communism in Indonesian society and politics. Most people probably perceive communists as a more dangerous group, relative to others, that threatens the society and polity. Perceived threat is believed to be a crucial factor which affects political tolerance (Marcus et al 1995; Sullivan, Piereson, Marcus 1982). To be a democrat in Indonesia does not necessarily imply tolerance toward a group that the respondent thinks is a threat.

5.4. Political tolerance and communism

Further study to verify this hypothesis is required, since the two surveys do not provide information about threat perception of the target group. However, some description and hypothetical explanations may help to understand why the Indonesian democrats are not tolerant towards communists.

As mentioned earlier, communists have a unique place in the history of Indonesian society and politics. Communist politics in the country emerged prior to independence in the early 20th century (McVey, 1965). The international communist activists brought it to the country from Europe. They helped to found unions, whose many members were active in the largest Islamic movement organization, Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association), established in 1911. The influence of communism within the SI was strong and gave rise to white (Islamic) and red (communist) factions within the elites (Noer 1973). Their ideological conflict grew until the communists quit the SI and established the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) (McVey, 1965).

The SI under the leadership of the white faction continued, but became weaker. The colonial authorities banned the PKI in 1928 as it threatened its rule. PKI leaders were arrested and sent to the concentration camp of Boven Digul in far-off New Guinea.

At independence in 1945, the PKI revived under the leadership of Musso. In 1948 Musso's PKI rebelled against the central government in the town of Madiun in eastern Java (Van Der Kroef 1965, Hindley 1964). The government, crying treason, and anti-communist parties reacted with force against the PKI. At the time, Indonesia was facing a serious threat from the Dutch, who had not recognized Indonesian independence.

The PKI rebellion took place in this situation and was felt by many to be traitorous, a thrust from behind. Many political and especially armed forces leaders have never trusted the PKI since then (Crouch 1988; Noer 1987).

The PKI soon revived, proclaiming its commitment to the democratic process rather than rebellion. Now under the leadership of D. N. Aidit, it participated in the 1955 national election and received a significant number of votes (16%). As parliamentary democracy declined and President Sukarno took over the government in 1959, he dissolved two important political parties, the Muslim based Masjumi (Majlis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Consultative Council), which was the second largest party, and a social democratic party, the PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party). The three other large parties, the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Party), NU (at that time, unlike today, a political party as well as a social and educational organization), and the PKI, were allowed to continue to participate in national politics.

Under Sukarno's Guided Democracy (1959-1966), national politics was mainly dominated by three political forces, the army on the right, President Sukarno in the middle, and the PKI on the left (Crouch 1988). The sharpest confrontation occurred between the army and the PKI, then at the peak of its power and influence. President Sukarno was known to be sympathetic to Marxism and the idea of social revolution. The PKI seized the opportunity to ally itself with Sukarno.

At the national level, the PKI's main political opponent was the army under the leadership of General Ahmad Yani and General A. H. Nasution. At the grass roots level were local landlords, many associated with the NU (Noer 1987). A series of "one sided

actions” (*aksi sepihak*) by the PKI to implement the government’s land reform program caused extensive conflicts between PKI supporters and local landlords. Class conflict was intensified by religious sentiment, the pious Muslims of the NU against the nominal Muslims who supported the PKI.

In urban areas, conflict erupted between the PKI and its enemies, especially the army, liberal intellectuals, middle class Muslims, and Muslim university students. The communists appeared to have the upper hand. The PKI was the second largest communist political party in the world, after the Chinese Communist Party. PKI leaders and their opponents all believed that the party needed only one step forward to take over the government.

It never happened. Instead, a political tragedy occurred on October 1, 1965, in which six generals were abducted and killed. There has never been a crystal clear answer as to which political force was responsible for the killings. The army, now under the leadership of Major General Suharto, attempted to convince the public that the PKI was responsible. The PKI’s friends countered that the army under the leadership of Suharto was behind the tragedy.

Following the killings, the army under General Suharto took over the national leadership from President Sukarno through a military coup in the name of the recovery of social and political order.⁶⁵ This new leadership, supported by anti-communist elements, particularly from the devout Muslim community, eliminated the communists as a political force. Anti-PKI protests mushroomed. The PKI members and leaders were chased,

⁶⁵ About the coup, see for example Crouch (1988).

arrested, and killed. In only on year (1965-1966), several hundred thousand Communists were killed, and hundreds of thousands of others were sent to prison (Cribb 1990; Crouch 1988).⁶⁶

Anti-communism was a central pillar of Suharto's New Order government. The opinion that the PKI was dangerous and a threat to the very life of the nation was trumpeted throughout the country. The New Order government established the BP7 (Badan Pusat Pengkajian, Pendidikan, Pengamalan, Penghayatan, dan Pemurnian Pancasila, Central Body for the Study, Implementation, Internalization, and Dissemination of Pancasila Values) whose main aim was to institutionalize Pancasila values in society and polity. Civil servants, students, and voluntary association members were trained via the P4 (Pedoman, Penghayatan, dan Pengamalan Pancasila, Directives for the Internalization and Implementation of Pancasila Values). Communism was proclaimed one of the most serious threats to those values.

The extent to which this training or indoctrination gave rise to anti-communist sentiment among the people is uncertain. However, a major anti-communist effort was undertaken and billions of rupiahs were spent. It is probable that, at the very least, the massive anti-communism program of the regime heightened the existing anti-communist sentiment among the people.

Social or student movements sympathetic to Marxism periodically emerged during the New Order. Leftist activists tried to distinguish Marxist from PKI doctrines, because of the bad image of the PKI constructed by the regime and the fear of state terror

⁶⁶ There has never been an exact number of the killed Communists. Sources estimated the number with a very large margin, i.e. between 70,000 and 2,000,000. See Cribb (1990).

against the PKI. However, their activities were mostly underground. Marxist sympathizers were often sent to prison without trial. On one occasion student activists went to prison only because they read Marxist works.

The regime censored books, mass media and film, and monitored many societal groups to preserve the polity and society from communist influence. *Penghianatan G30S PKI* (Treason of G30S PKI) is a popular film that demonstrates the brutality of Indonesian communism against the army prior to the coup. Under the New Order, this film was broadcast by state television every September 30th as part of the state's anti-communism campaign (Sen 1988).

The regime developed an anti-communism curriculum for schools and universities (Bourchier 1997; Leigh 1991). Anyone who wished to work for the government or to run for public office had to be screened by the military for communist connections. Any family member or descendent of a communist was denied his or her civil rights.

The New Order has fallen, but anti-communist sentiment has probably remained pervasive. Today, anti-communist terror comes not only from the state but also from the society itself. In this post New Order era, many leftist or Marxist works have been published and are sold in public bookstores. This would have never happened in the New Order era. However, some Muslim groups have campaigned against the publications, confiscated the books from bookstores and burned them. The police could not stop this action because the works are still formally illegal. The anti-communism campaign's success may be measured by the fact that there is no significant group that can convince the government or the public of communism's right to exist. Abdurrahman Wahid, as

president in 2000, proposed that the anti-communism decree made in the late 1960s by the MPR-S (Majlis Permusjawaratan Rakyat Sementara, Interim People's Consultative Assembly), the highest state institution in the country, be dissolved. This proposal was rejected by the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative Council) or The Council, and probably by the people in general. A faction in the DPR had even reacted against the proposal by threatening to impeach President Wahid (Republika, April 4, 2000).

The Council (DPR) is currently debating a new election bill. One clause in the draft states that communists or anyone associated with communism is prohibited from running for presidential office. Leaders of the Golkar party, the state party during the New Order period, have persuaded other parties to pass the law. They argue that communism is still a threat to the nation (Koran Tempo, April 21, 2003). The PDI-Perjuangan of President Megawati, however, has attempted to convince The Council that former communist supporters, family, or sympathizers are Indonesian citizens, and therefore have the same political rights as other Indonesians (Koran Tempo, April 22, 2003).

One aspect of the current debate is that communism has become a political resource. In addition to human rights considerations, the move by some parties to rehabilitate the political rights of former communists may help to enlarge their constituency. The communists were strong on Java, and among lower class voters. The constituents of President Wahid's party, PKB, are mostly Javanese, and therefore the effort to rehabilitate the communists or anyone related to communism may be politically strategic for PKB.

This strategic reason may also drive the PDI-P to restore the political rights of the communists. PDI-P is a continuation of the old PNI, which was once close to the PKI. President Sukarno, the founder of the PNI, was quite sympathetic to the ideals of the PKI. So it is not surprising if the PDI-P attempts to rehabilitate former communists or anyone related to communism.

Nonetheless, anti-communist sentiment is probably still pervasive among the people. The New Order's anti-communist jargon that the party is a latent threat to the nation is still powerful. This sentiment is reflected in an anti-communist sentiment expressed by a religious figure in a village to the author (October 16, 2002):

I came to this village in the early 1960s when communism was strong in national politics. Communism was very strong also here, and the people here rarely go to the mosque. The mosque was empty and not cared for. I believe that communism never dies. It is in the hearts of its proponents, and can materialize at any time. So, we have to be careful with communism.

In post-Suharto Indonesia, a new leftist party, the PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokratik, Democratic People's Party), participated in the 1999 election. Its leader, Budiman Sujatmiko, had been sent to prison by the Suharto regime as a Communist suspect. In post-Suharto Indonesia, politics has been much more open, and the establishment of the party was possible. However, it could not legally state that it is ideologically communist or Marxist. The party received fewer than 100,000 votes in an electorate of more than 100 million. Its failure may to some extent reflect the pervasive anti-communism found in our surveys.

This short story about anti-communism may help explain why a majority of respondents are intolerant toward the communists regardless of democratic commitment

and level of education. If political tolerance as measured by tolerance toward the least liked groups is essential to democratic values, those Indonesians who claim to support democratic values are likely to be majoritarian democrats only, that is supporters of democracy minus political tolerance (cf. Duch and Gibson 1992). This characteristic of Indonesian democrats is probably unique, a product of a specific historical context, the long history of anti-communism in the society and polity.

Does generation matter to anti-communist sentiment? It is possible that the post 1960s generation is more tolerant toward communists as this younger generation did not directly experience the 1960s bloody political conflicts. The 2002 survey data, however, indicates that the generation difference does not matter. Instead, it is probable that the New Order regime has been extremely successful in its anti-communism campaign. Regardless of generational difference, Indonesian democrats are intolerant toward communists.

A "deviant" relationship between support for democratic values and political tolerance has been found in other cases as well such as Germany and Luxemburg (Duch and Gibson, 1992). In the case of Russia, democratic values do not have a significant relationship with political tolerance (Gibson, 1998a, 1998b). In the cases of Germany and Luxemburg democratic values have a negative and significant relationship with tolerance toward fascists (Duch and Gibson, 1992). The Indonesian case which reveals a negative relationship between democratic values and political tolerance should also be understood within its political context, especially the specific place of the PKI in the polity.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the extent to which Islam is inimical to political tolerance which is believed to be crucial for democratic consolidation. I will conclude the chapter by restating some important findings.

First, the claim made by Huntington that Islam is an intolerant religion is only true if Islam is defined as Islamism and tolerance by tolerance toward Christians. Mandatory rituals and suggested rituals indicate some negative impact on tolerance, but the findings are inconsistent. Other components of Islam—Nahdliyin ritual, Islamic civic engagement, NU identity and Muhammadiyah identity—do not have a significant relationship with intolerance. In addition, these components of Islam are not associated with Islamism. Therefore, we must narrowly define Islam as Islamism in order to support the claim that Islam produces intolerance toward Christians.

Second, almost all Islamic components do not have any association with political tolerance defined as tolerance toward the least liked group. Mandatory rituals are the only exception. Islamic civic engagement does have a positive and significant impact on tolerance, but it is safe to conclude that overall Islam does not produce intolerance toward the least liked group.

Third, Islamic civic engagement is the only variable in this study which has a positive and significant impact on political tolerance defined by tolerance toward the least liked-group. Islamic civic association in which Muslims are engaged is likely to function in accord with civil society theory to help produce tolerance.

Fourth, democratic values and secular civic engagement have positive and significant impacts on political tolerance defined by tolerance toward Christians. Rural residence conversely has a negative impact. These patterns confirm many findings about tolerance.

Fifth, democratic values and education surprisingly have negative impacts on political intolerance defined by tolerance toward the least liked group. This pattern deviates from many findings about political tolerance. This deviation should probably be understood locally. A majority of Indonesians select communists as the least liked group. Communism in Indonesian politics has a bad image produced by its opponents who have been dominant in society and polity since the fall of the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965. Communism is still today an illegal ideology and political force. The phenomenon of democrats intolerant toward communists should be understood from this specific context.

The extent to which tolerance contributes to congruence between citizens and a democratic form of government will be discussed in Chapter 9. Do the intolerant Islamist and the intolerant democrat tend to be more engaged and to participate in political protests? If they are and do, they may be a force for democratic instability.

CHAPTER 6

POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND TRUST IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Is Islam inimical to political engagement and trust in political institutions? If it is true that Islam is inimical to democracy as discussed in Chapter 1, then I expect to find in this chapter that Islam has a negative relationship with engagement and trust as the two variables are parts of democratic culture. Political engagement is important for political participation and for the integration of citizens into the democratic system as a whole. This integration can partly be observed in the pattern of the relationship between political engagement and trust in political institutions.

Political engagement and trust in political institutions may combine in ways crucial to political participation and support for the democratic system. One of the likely combinations is active engagement by distrustful citizens. This combination is likely to produce alienated citizens who then may contribute to destabilizing democratic government. Does Islam contribute to this alienation?

6.1. Political engagement

In the civic culture tradition, political engagement or participant political culture is mainly understood by the extent to which a citizen is psychologically engaged in

politics or concerned with public issues. This psychological force is believed to be critical for political participation as will be discussed in Chapter 8. The importance of the networks of civic engagement or the involvement in social organizations for political participation, as already discussed in Chapter 5, partly lies in the assumption that involvement will expose individuals to public issues and therefore help them to be more informed about their collective interest, to be more interested in and more willing to discuss politics and public issues. If this involvement in social organization does not produce the relevant psychological features, then it loses its effect on political participation.

In the literature on political attitudes, political engagement comprises political interest, partisanship, political information, and political efficacy (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). I also include political discussion as a form of political engagement, following the suggestion of several prominent scholars (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, 2001, 102; Inglehart 1981; Norris 2002). The following are descriptions of the theoretical relevance and empirical findings of the components of political engagement.

a. Interest in politics

Political interest in this study is "the degree to which politics arouses a citizen's curiosity" (Van Deth 1989, 278). It is about curiosity rather than motivation. To be interested in politics does not necessarily mean to be motivated to participate in a form of political action. In Klingemann's words, "A subjective expression of high political interest does not necessarily imply political motivation; a person may well be interested in political drama for totally unpolitical reasons" (1979, 264). However, it is believed

that this form of political engagement psychologically pushes a citizen to be involved or to vote and participate in other ways (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Political interest is believed to mediate social background and political participation. This mediation function of political interest is so evident that Lane (1959, 144) called it the "law of mediating interest."

There are also comparative studies relating political interest to other political attitudes in democratic countries (Converse 1970; Kinder 1983; Converse and Markus 1979; Inglehart 1985; Van Deth 1983). In addition, political interest is believed to be significant to understand support for political system or legitimacy on the one hand and political protest as a form of political participation on the other (Barnes, Kaase, et al 1979).




Figure 6.1: Interest in politics (%)

As in many surveys, in the two Indonesian surveys, political interest is gauged by the extent to which a citizen is interested in politics or in governmental issues in general. Or, more precisely, "How interested are you in politics or governmental issues in Figure 6.1: general? Very interested, quite interested, a little interested, or not at all interested?"

In the two surveys (Figure 6.1), only about 25% of the people reported that they are very or quite interested in politics or governmental issues. A majority are only a little or not at all interested. This proportion is quite small relative to the averages in other democracies in the 1990s (36%) (World Value Survey; Table 6.2).

b. Partisanship

Another component of political engagement is partisanship, the psychological complex that refers to self-identification with a political party. Put another way, partisanship is conceived as psychological identification with, or affective orientation toward, a group object in society (Campbell, et al 1960, 121ff). It is a psychological membership shaped by primary political socialization and the internalization of electoral experience (Converse 1969).

Modern, or representative, democracy is unthinkable without party politics, and the strength of party politics to a great extent depends on citizens' support for political parties. Political parties aggregate societal interests in the democratic political process, and therefore citizens' support for a political party is essential to representative democracy. From a political attitude point of view, partisanship is important to make a democracy work.

Political parties claim to represent public interests and fight for strategic offices. To achieve their goals, political parties mobilize people for support. This practice is likely to produce we-they relationships, patterns of like and dislike among people. Through the primary socialization process in the family and through electoral experiences such as repeated voting, party identification or we-they sentiment is transmitted and internalized (Converse 1969).

Party politics and partisanship produce political conflict, but they also produce political integration. Political parties mediate and integrate the citizens of a pluralistic society to national politics, the state, or the democratic system in general (Sartori 1976; Liddle 1971). Partisanship encourages individuals to participate in politics, to support and to trust government by their party.

Studies of political behavior assert that individuals who identify themselves with political parties are likely to participate in elections and in party campaigns. They are likely also to care about election outcomes (Campbell, et al 1960; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1979; Kaase 1989). Some other studies suggest that non-partisanship is a signal of political apathy or alienation which can lead to protest action and destabilization (Kaase and Barnes 1979; Kaase 1989). Partisanship is also believed to shape a more positive orientation towards government and the political system; non-partisanship, on the contrary, is believed to produce political cynicism (Miller and Listhaug 1990).

Strong partisans are likely to establish a party system, which in turn contributes to democratic stability. Schmitt and Holmberg (1995, 100) reveal how these three components are associated:

Most obviously, partisanship contributes to stability in individual voting behavior ... Declining partisanship, therefore, is equivalent to the dwindling of the stabilizing elements in electoral behavior. When partisanship is declining, electoral volatility is likely to increase—to the degree permitted by the structure of party competition in a given country... And, a downturn in partisanship improves the electoral prospects for new parties, contributes to the further fractionalization of party systems, and thereby tends to complicate coalition building and government formation processes. Partisanship thus contributes to mobilization of citizens in conventional political participation, ... and gives individual party choice some firm ground. Depending on the performance of party government, partisanship seems to promote beliefs about legitimacy and political trust, and thus helps to integrate citizens into a political order. Partisanship contributes directly to the stability of party systems, and indirectly to the stability of political order itself. This is what is at stake if partisanship fades away.

A positive correlation between partisanship and trust in political institutions is an indication of congruence between citizens and the democratic system. Partisanship is measured, in this study, by whether there is a political party to which a respondent feels close. In the two surveys, about 33% responded positively to this question. Respondents also reported the extent to which they feel close to a party. About 25% reported that they feel very or fairly close to a party (Figure 6.2). This proportion looks small, but is at the mean of many other contemporary democracies, such as those in Western Europe (28%) (Schmitt and Holmberg 1995, 126).

In the civic culture literature, partisanship is also related to partisan tolerance (Almond and Verba 1963). Strong partisanship accompanied by high tolerance toward other parties is believed to be healthy for democratic stability (Almond and Verba 1963). Conversely, high partisanship without tolerance may lead to political conflict that contributes to democratic instability.

In the case of Indonesia, the low percentage of partisans is also characterized by a low proportion of hostile attitudes toward other parties. Respondents were asked whether there is a political party that they dislike. About 21% answered affirmatively. In order to know the extent to which this dislike means intolerance, they were asked whether they object to the disliked party having a meeting in their area. Only about 6% reported that they object. In addition, feeling close to a party does not correlate negatively with feeling dislike for a different party, meaning that partisanship is not accompanied by intolerance.




Figure 6.2: Partisanship: Feeling Close to a Political Party (%)

In addition, the issue of intolerance among party supporters can be explored in another way, the extent to which feeling close to a party produces feelings distant to other parties. In other words, the extent to which partisanship is mutually exclusive. In the two surveys, respondents were asked the extent to which they feel close to each of the

seven largest parties: PDI-P, Partai Golkar, PPP, PKB, PAN, PBB and and PK .⁶⁷ Strong partisanship is indicated by a negative correlation between feeling close to PDI-P, for example, and the rest.

The correlations of partisan attitudes toward the seven parties indicate that their partisanships are not mutually exclusive (Table 6.1). On the contrary, they are quite inclusive, meaning that a citizen who feels close to one party also feels close to other parties. This inclusive partisanship is quite strong especially among those who feel close to "sociologically Muslim based parties," PPP, PKB, PAN, PBB, and PK. Judging by this partisanship, people are generally not strongly partisan, and those who have partisanship tend to be inclusive. In other words, partisanship among Indonesians is weak in general.

| | | | | | | | |
|--------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--|
| PDI-P | - | | | | | | |
| Golkar | .11 (.19) | - | | | | | |
| PPP | .12 (.11) | .11 (.21) | - | | | | |
| PKB | .18 (.09) | .08 (.10) | .39 (.51) | - | | | |
| PAN | .16 (.07) | .16 (.25) | .39 (.48) | .36 (.37) | - | | |
| PBB | .19 (.11) | .19 (.24) | .44 (.49) | .37 (.38) | .66 (.66) | - | |
| PK | .19 (.14) | .20 (.27) | .40 (.39) | .41 (.33) | .62 (.59) | .72 (.72) | |

Table 6.1. Inter-correlations of feeling close to the seven largest parties 2002 (2001)

All correlations are significant at the .01 level.

⁶⁷ Respondents were asked the extent to which they feel close to the relevant parties on a ten-point scale, from not close at all (1) to very close (10).

c. Political information

Political information is individuals' knowledge about politics. It is an objective, not subjective, measure of political engagement (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001, 101). Political information, political knowledge, or what Zaller calls "cognitive engagement," is believed to be a strong predictor of the connectedness of individuals to political processes (Zaller 1992).

Political information is commonly measured by the extent to which a person is knowledgeable about political issues (Zaller 1990). In this study, political information is minimally understood as individuals' exposure to mass media (Price and Zaller 1993). A citizen who is frequently exposed to political news via mass media is likely to be more informed about politics, which in turn may encourage him or her to be involved in politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 10). In addition, the more exposed to mass media the more likely a person is to have more accurate information about politics, an important quality in a democracy (Berelson, et al 1954, 252).

Mass media also functions like "connective tissue" linking officials and political issues to citizens (Gunther and Mughan 2000, 420). Mass media "affects the electoral process and the accountability of politicians to the general public, and hence the quality of democracy" (Ibid). Some studies suggest that mass media helps citizens to be "engaged not as isolated individuals pursuing their own ends but as public-spirited members who are dedicated to the common good" (Grossman 1995, 7). Mass media provides political information which is an important political resource for citizens involved in democratic politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 1).




Figure 6.3: Exposure to Political News Everyday or Most Days of the Week According to Various Mass Media (%).

In this study, political information is gauged from intensity of exposure to mass media only. It includes following political news through newspapers, television, radio, magazines, and the internet. As in many democracies, Indonesians' exposure to political news or information via television is greatest. About 55% of the respondents reported that they follow political news via television every day or most days of the week. The next most popular media are radio (25%), newspapers (16%) and magazines (5%). As expected, exposure to political news via the internet is very small (1%).

d. Political discussion

Political discussion allows people to share ideas and to find solutions relevant to the public interest (Gamson 1992; Berber 1984). As discussed previously, civic engagement is crucial to mediate individual citizens' participation in politics. It exposes them to public issues and to discussion about the issues.

In the two surveys, respondents were asked how frequently they discussed politics or governmental issues with others (family members, neighbors, coworkers and colleagues). The proportion of Indonesians who very or quite frequently discuss politics is about 16%. This figure is small, but almost the same as the average in other democracies (17%) (World Value Survey; Table 6.2). A majority of people all over the world do not frequently talk about politics.

e. Political efficacy

Political efficacy refers to "an individual's sense of personal competence in influencing the political system" (Reef and Knoke 1999, 414). Political efficacy is the inverse of political alienation or political powerlessness, which refers to "a person's perceived inability to influence governmental policy" (Ibid, 414). In the political efficacy literature, the measure of political efficacy varies (Ibid). In this work, political efficacy and political powerlessness are measured with three items: feeling able to influence government policy; the government cares what people like me think; and the central government in Jakarta affects daily life.

Figure 6.4 reveals the proportions of Indonesian citizens who are efficacious. About three out of ten opine that the government cares what people think, that they can influence government decision, and that national government decisions affect citizens' daily lives. Overall, a majority of people are not efficacious. Or, they feel powerless in their relationship to political system.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ This finding is similar to Emmerson's in the early 1970s that bureaucrats were alienated from the political process (Emmerson, 1973.)




Figure 6.4. Some Indicators of Political Efficacy:
 1 = government cares what people like me think;
 2 = can influence government decisions;
 3 = influence of the central government on the daily life of people

| Civic Association | Political Interest* | Political discussion** |
|------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| <i>Religion & Nation</i> | | |
| <i>Islam</i> | | |
| Indonesia 2001 | 26.9% (N = 1923) | 18.0 (1982) |
| Indonesia 2002 | 26.4 (2157) | 17.4 (2235) |
| Azerbaijan | 42.7 (1959) | 9.2 (1971) |
| Bangladesh | 51.0 (1513) | 11.5 (1490) |
| Bosnia-Hercegovina | 49.5 (1196) | 20.8 (1191) |
| Turkey | 57.2 (2898) | 14.5 (2916) |
| <i>Catholicism</i> | | |
| Argentina | 32.5 (3071) | 25.2 (3046) |
| Brazil | 41.0 (2918) | 17.1 (2898) |
| Italy | 28.8 (3287) | 12.4 (3356) |
| Spain | 26.9 (7584) | 12.0 (7551) |
| The Philippines | 49.5 (1199) | 6.8 (1172) |
| Venezuela | 19.5 (1142) | 11.6 (1183) |

Table 6.2. Some Indicators of Political Engagement in a Number of Nations.*Very or some interested in politics; **frequently, and Indonesian data are "very frequently" or "quite frequently."
 Sources: World Value Survey, and PPIM Survey

| <i>Civic Association</i> | Political Interest* | Political discussion** |
|------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| <i>Religion & Nation</i> | | |
| <i>Orthodox Christianity</i> | | |
| Georgia | 48.4 (2587) | 17.9 (2575) |
| Ukraine | 40.5 (2732) | 12.5 (2621) |
| Russia | 43.6 (3979) | 26.0 (3941) |
| <i>Hindu</i> | | |
| India | 43.2 (4433) | 15.8 (4349) |
| <i>Confucianism</i> | | |
| China | 67.2 (979) | 20.2 (2462) |
| Taiwan | 40.7 (1431) | 8.7 (1443) |
| South Korea | 62.0 (3454) | 13.2 (3408) |
| Japan | 56.1 (3200) | 5.0 (3185) |
| <i>Protestantism</i> | | |
| Sweden | 47.5 (3009) | 6.5 (2989) |
| The Netherlands | 51.3 (2218) | 15.3 (2215) |
| United Kingdom | 43.3 (2711) | 12.2 (3797) |
| USA | 56.5 (5626) | 13.3 (5656) |
| West Germany | 65.2 (4386) | 24.5 (4375) |

Table 6.2 (continued)

Table 6.2. Some Indicators of Political Engagement in a Number of Nations.*Very or some interested in politics; **frequently, and Indonesian data are "very frequently" or "quite frequently."
Sources: World Value Survey, and PPIM Survey.

6.2. Trust in political institutions

In the civic culture research program, the concept of political efficacy is paired with political trust. Political efficacy is an input while political trust is an output of the political system (Almond and Verba, 1963). The congruence between political efficacy and political trust is believed to produce a stable democratic system. Another likely combination is political efficacy and distrust toward political institutions. The latter combination is likely to produce alienated activists who channel their distrust in the form of "un-institutionalized political participation" such as protest against the government

(Reef and Knoke 1999, 414; Gamson 1968, 48; Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982; Muller and Jukam 1977; Seligson 1983). Conversely, low political efficacy reinforced by distrust produces apathy, a culture which is incompatible with democratic legitimacy.

The combination of trust in political institutions and political interest may produce a similar typology of citizens. Interest in politics plus trust in political institutions results in allegiant citizens supportive of democratic stability. Another combination is interest in politics with distrust in political institutions. This combination produces alienated citizens who may destabilize the democratic system.

In this study, the object of political trust is democratic institutions rather than the incumbent administration's officials (cf. Norris 1999). More specifically, it is measured by trust in various political institutions: presidency, People's Consultative Assembly, People's Representative Council, courts, police, armed forces, and political parties.

Citizens' trust in political institutions has varied in the last two years. In 2001, about six out of ten citizens trusted in the president (Figure 6.7). This proportion decreased significantly in 2002, when about five out of ten citizens trusted the president. This decrease probably reflects the failure of this institution to function properly at the time, as the president was frequently criticized in the national mass media for her inability to direct the nation, or at least to establish law and order.

Popular trust in the armed forces, on the other hand, has increased from 57% in 2001 to 67% in 2001. The people trust that the armed forces will protect the state from external threats. This increase may be related to a concern that the main democratic institutions such as president, legislatures, and political parties have not functioned as expected.

The armed forces are identified with national stability and public order. Since the fall of Suharto, the power of the armed forces has been curtailed. Civilian supremacy has begun to be realized. The police, not the armed forces, are now expected to take care of internal security. Unfortunately, they have not been able to do so effectively. The mass media and observers have been highly critical of the failings of the police, a judgment that is reflected in respondents' lack of trust. In the two surveys, a majority of people do not trust the police. Only about four out of ten citizens trust that the police can establish law and order.

Judicial institutions are critical to law and order in all modern societies. In the two surveys, people were asked the extent to which they trust that the court can function to establish justice for all citizens. In the 2001 survey, about 44% of the people trust the court. The figure improved to 48% in 2002.

Similar percentages trust the People's Consultative Council and the People's Representative Assembly, Indonesia's two national legislative bodies. Respondents were asked the extent to which they trust that the Council can make laws reflecting the popular interest. Fewer than a majority responded positively in both 2001 and 2002.

The Assembly functions like the Council but at a higher legislative level. Its main purpose is to amend or replace the constitution. A majority of the current members are Council members elected in 1999.⁶⁹ In the surveys, people were asked the extent to which the Assembly can make constitutional decisions that represent the interests of the

⁶⁹ The current Assembly has 695 members, of which 500 are Council members. The rest are regional delegates and minority group representatives.

people. Only about 47% of the people trust the Assembly. In a representative democracy, citizens do not have a direct relationship with the legislative or executive bodies. They are linked by political parties, which mediate between the people and government. Parties aggregate societal interests.




Figure 6.5. Some Indicators of Political and Social Trust (%): 1 = president; 2 = police; 3 = armed forces; 4 = courts; 5 = Council; 6 = Assembly; 7 = parties; 8 = unions; 9 = religious organizations; 10 = religious leaders

Respondents were asked the extent to which they trust that political parties function to aggregate their constituents' interests. Positive responses to this question are the lowest relative to other political institutions. Only about 36% and 39% in the two surveys reported that they trust the parties. These proportions are much lower than the 1999 voter turnout (91%). In other words, the low trust level does not reflect the high voter turnout. It may, however, reflect the low degree of partisanship which has previously been described.

| Institution | National government | Parliament | Political party | Police |
|------------------------------|---------------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|
| <i>Religion & Nation</i> | | | | |
| <i>Islam</i> | | | | |
| Indonesia 2001 | 60.8 % (N= 1988) | 44.3 (1992) | 36.6 (1985) | 41.0 (1998) |
| Indonesia 2002 | 49.7 (2266) | 45.2 (2264) | 38.6 (2261) | 42.3 (2250) |
| Azerbaijan | 92.3 (1863) | 73.9 (1802) | 9.2 (1971) | 47.5 (1971) |
| Bangladesh | 80.7 (1459) | 84.3 (1392) | 11.5 (1490) | 12.3 (1490) |
| Bosnia | 70.7 (1176) | 56.7 (1161) | 20.8 (1191) | 17.2 (1191) |
| Turkey | 47.6 (2769) | 51.7 (2826) | 14.5 (2916) | 34.4 (2916) |
| <i>Catholicism</i> | | | | |
| Argentina | 26.1 (1052) | 34.6 (3015) | 25.2 (3046) | 30.5 (3046) |
| Brazil | 48.6 (1139) | 27.3 (2916) | 17.1 (2898) | 43.3 (2898) |
| Italy | - | 30.4 (3359) | 12.4 (3356) | 43.3 (3356) |
| Spain | 26.5 (2668) | 40.5 (7466) | 12.0 (7551) | 42.1 (7551) |
| The Philippines | 58.7 (1172) | 60 (1186) | 6.8 (1172) | 23.2 (1172) |
| Venezuela | 26.6 (1186) | 23.3 (1175) | 11.6 (1183) | 46.8 (1183) |
| <i>Orthodox</i> | | | | |
| Georgia | 47.6 (2520) | 38.4 (2514) | 17.9 (2575) | 25.2 (2575) |
| Ukraine | 43.7 (2604) | 37.8 (2524) | 12.5 (2621) | 30.3 (2621) |
| Russia | 53.2 (3712) | 34.5 (3678) | 26.0 (3941) | 20.2 (3941) |
| <i>Hindu</i> | | | | |
| India | 56.5 (4093) | 66.1 (4107) | 15.8 (4349) | 29.7 (4349) |
| <i>Confucianism</i> | | | | |
| China | 80.0 (887) | 81.2 (962) | 20.2 (2462) | 21.9 (2462) |
| Taiwan | 69.7 (756) | 39.2 (1385) | 8.7 (1443) | 29.9 (1443) |
| South Korea | 44.0 (1244) | 42.5 (3430) | 13.2 (3408) | 22.4 (3408) |
| Japan | 32.2 (982) | 27.7 (3124) | 5.0 (3185) | 44.6 (3185) |
| <i>Protestantism</i> | | | | |
| Sweden | 42.3 (986) | 46.1 (2895) | 6.5 (2989) | 21.1 (2989) |
| The Netherlands | - | 48.4 (2191) | 15.3 (2215) | 25.3 (2215) |
| United Kingdom | - | 42.1 (2677) | 12.2 (3797) | 35.3 (3797) |
| USA | 44.2 (3314) | 43.9 (5463) | 13.3 (5656) | 30.9 (5656) |
| West Germany | 24.0 (995) | 46.0 (4363) | 24.5 (4375) | 15.5 (4375) |

Table 6.3. Some indicators of confidence in political institutions (great deal or quite)
Sources: World Value Survey; PPIM Surveys

Overall, trust in political institutions is about 45%. As a comparison, trust in modern social institutions such as labor unions is almost the same. However, trust in

traditional social institutions such as religious organizations and religious leaders is significantly higher. Solid majorities (about 60%) trust in religious organizations and in religious leaders (above 70%) (Figure 6.5).

Trust in political institutions is commonly low among mass publics in most democracies (Table 6.3). As will be discussed below, the claim that trust in political institutions is essential for democratic stability is questionable as long as people strongly support democratic principles.

6.3. Political engagement and trust in political institutions

The five items of exposure to political news via mass media are quite strongly correlated (Table 6.4). A similar pattern is found in the inter-correlation among items of political efficacy. The media items are added to constitute a component of political engagement, political information.⁷⁰ The three items of political efficacy constitute another component of political engagement.⁷¹

Correlations between components of political engagement vary. The strongest is among political information, political discussion and political interest. The weakest are between political efficacy and the rest of the components of political engagement (Table 6.5). Political efficacy even has no significant correlations with all other components of political engagement, except for interest in politics. Individuals who are interested in

⁷⁰ Each item comprises a five-point scale. Adding the scores of five items and dividing by five constitute a five-point scale of political information, i.e. intensity of following political news via the mass media in a week: 1 = never, 5 = Everyday.

⁷¹ Each item comprises a four-point scale. Adding the score of the three items and dividing by 3 constitutes a four-point scale of political efficacy: not efficacious at all (1) to very efficacious (4).

politics are likely to be exposed more often to political news via mass media, to discuss political issues more frequently, and to feel closer to a political party, and (albeit weakly) to be more efficacious, or vice versa.

As previously stated, political engagement and trust in political institutions may produce particular types of citizens. In the two surveys, correlations between the components of political engagement and trust in political institutions are mixed (Table 6.6). Political efficacy is the only component of political engagement which correlates positively and significantly with trust in political institutions. The more efficacious a person feels, the more likely he or she is to trust in political institutions and vice versa. Political efficacy probably produces allegiant attitudes among Indonesians. This indicates a system-stabilizing congruence between the two.

| | | | | | |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--|
| TV | | - | | | |
| Radio | .25 (.32) | | - | | |
| Newspaper | .40 (.40) | .19 (.26) | | - | |
| Magazine | .26 (.27) | .21 (.30) | .51 (.62) | | |
| Internet | .06 (.07) | .08 (.14) | .21 (.26) | .35 (.35) | |

Table 6. 4. Inter-item correlations of political information 2002 (2001)
All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level.

However, political discussion and exposure to mass media correlate negatively and significantly with trust in political institutions. The more frequently a person follows political news via media and the more frequently he or she discusses politic, the lower the

trust in political institution, and vice versa. In other words, media exposure and political discussion produce alienation among Indonesians, which may generate destabilizing protest.

| | | | | |
|-----------------------|--------------|------------|-----------|-----------|
| Political information | - | | | |
| Political efficacy | -.03* (.04*) | - | | |
| Partisanship | .12 (.04*) | .04* (.09) | - | |
| Political discussion | .38 (.30) | .01* (.07) | .25 (.15) | - |
| Interest in politics | .35 (.30) | .10 (.11) | .25 (.20) | .49 (.45) |

Table 6. 5. Correlation between components of political engagement 2002 (2001)

*Correlation is not significant at the 0.05 level.

My expectation that partisanship would have a positive and significant correlation with trust in political institution to make it congruent with the political system, as previously discussed, was not fulfilled. Partisanship does not correlate significantly with trust in political institutions. A similar pattern can be seen in the relationship between interest in politics and trust in political institutions. Neither allegiance nor alienation is produced by the combination of political engagement and trust.

The failure of the partisanship variable to produce allegiant citizens is probably due to the measures of political trust. A better measure may be trust in party government and politicians. Trust in political institutions is probably ambiguous, especially since Indonesia is governed by party coalitions.⁷²

⁷² Governments in democratic Indonesia democracy since the 1999 election have been based on party coalitions. The first was under President Wahid (PKB) with Vice-President Megawati (PDI-P). The cabinet represented all seven large political parties. The second government under President Megawati with Vice-President Hamzah Haz (PPP) also is broadly-based.

In addition, measures of partisanship in this study are not specific enough. I measure partisanship in general rather than partisanship that refers to a specific political party. This "general partisanship" may contribute to congruence between citizens and the political system if the political system is defined more diffusely, for example as support for democratic principles, satisfaction with democratic practice, or support for the political community. All these possibilities will be explored in Chapter 7.

| | Trust in political institutions |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------|
| Political efficacy | .20** (.21**) |
| Partisanship | -.03(.06*) |
| Political discussion | -.18** (-.15**) |
| Interest in politics | -.03 (-.04) |
| Political information | -.14** (-.10**) |

Table 6. 6. Correlations between components of political engagement and trust in political institutions 2002 (2001)

**and*correlations are significant at the 0.01 and .05 level respectively.

Further analysis is required to reveal the potential threat of alienation produced by exposure to mass media. One way to do this is through analysis of the relationship between exposure and political discussion on the one hand and political participation on the other. If these two components of political engagement produce protest, and protest has a negative relationship with trust in political institutions and support for the democratic system, then the two components of political engagement are likely to be destabilizing. This possibility will be explored in Chapter 9 after a full discussion of forms of political participation in Chapter 8.

6.4. Islam, political engagement, and trust in political institutions

The importance of social capital for democracy lies partly in its contribution to political engagement (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Putnam 1993). Political engagement is a psychological force that encourages political participation and contributes to a congruent relationship between citizens and the political system. Univariate statistics previously discussed indicate that political engagement in Indonesia varies greatly. Does religion matter to this variation?

In the case of Italy Putnam (1993) believes that a pious Catholic is likely to be absent from secular civic activity, and, in consequence, disengaged from politics. In America, however, religion is positive for democracy, helping citizens to be engaged in secular association and in politics.

As extensively discussed in Chapter 1, there can be no conclusive answer to the question about the relationship between Islam and secular civil society. Some scholars argue that non-Islamic norms-based civic association is unlikely and therefore political engagement is also unlikely in Muslim societies. Chapter 3 has shown that there is no empirical support for the proposition that Islam and secular civic engagement are negatively related. However, this is not the whole story. The relationship between Islam and secular civil society should be evaluated in terms of other dimensions of democratic culture, i.e. political engagement and trust in political institutions.

As previously discussed, political engagement is essential to political participation and to the integration of citizens into a stable democratic system. Therefore, an assessment of the extent to which Islam impacts political engagement and trust negatively

is important to evaluating Huntington and other critics of Islam. If they are correct, I expect to find negative relationships between Islam on the one hand and political engagement and trust in political institutions on the other.

Bivariate statistics (Table 6.7) reveal that almost all components of Islam do not correlate negatively and significantly with political engagement and trust in political institutions. Au contraire, almost all components of Islam have positive and significant correlations with all components of political engagement. Negative and significant correlations are found only between Nahdliyin rituals and political information, Islamism and political information, and Islamism and political discussion.

All these significant correlations, both positive and negative, are probably spurious. Their significance will almost certainly diminish when controlled for other theoretically relevant factors such socio-economy and demography. A pious Muslim who has a higher economic status is more exposed to political news and more interested in politics; a pious Muslim who is more disadvantaged economically will probably be less involved in politics. These relationships will be assessed subsequently through multivariate analysis. However, it is safe to state here that the Huntington-inspired claim that Islam has a negative relationship with political engagement as a component of democratic culture is in general rejected in the case of Indonesian Muslims.

The claim that Islam has a unique political culture unfavorable to democratic stability implies that the religion will generate distrust in modern political institutions, which are claimed to be alien to Islamic political tradition. Muslims know about caliphs, sultans and amirs rather than presidents, legislatures, or political parties. Therefore, the

more Islamic a Muslim is the more likely he or she is to distrust modern political institutions. This distrust may create political instability once the modern political institutions are installed in a Muslim society since the two are not congruent.

This set of arguments has no empirical foundation among Indonesian Muslims. Islamism, despite its potential to produce distrust in alien modern political institutions, is in fact positively and significantly related to trust in political institutions. Bivariate statistics indicate that some components of Islam have the potential to integrate Muslims into democratic institutions.

Most components of Islam are likely to encourage Muslims to engage in politics. The Protestant American syndrome as depicted by Tocqueville, rather than the Italian Catholic profile drawn by Putnam, is more likely to characterize Indonesian Muslims. As discussed in Chapter 4, all components of Islam have a positive and significant relationship with the networks of secular civic engagement (Chapter 4). This relationship encourages political engagement, which in turn promotes political participation. This complex relationship will be discussed further in Chapter 9.

As previously mentioned, the relationships between Islamic components and political engagement and trust in political institutions may well be spurious. Socio-economic factors and networks of civic engagement are probably the underlying factors which shape the apparently significant relationships between most components of Islam and the components of political engagement and trust in political institutions.

In the SES (Socio-Economic Status) model, SES defines the extent to which a citizen is engaged in civic associations and in politics. Related to SES is rural-urban

cleavage. Because a rural citizen is likely to be less advantaged than an urbanite in terms of the resources of political engagement (better education, occupation, income, and more engagement in secular civic associations), he or she is likely to be less engaged in politics. A Muslim, regardless of his or her religiosity, is more likely to be engaged in politics if he or she is better off in SES.

| | Partisanship | Discussion | Interest | Information | Efficacy | Trust |
|---------------------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------|------------------|
| Mandatory rituals | .04* (.03*) | .05 (.05) | .05 (.03*) | .11 (.06) | .01* (.05) | -.05 (-.04*) |
| Suggested rituals | .16 (.16) | .10 (.13) | .13 (.11) | .15 (.16) | .09 (.06) | .04* (.07) |
| Nahdlyin rituals | .04* (.18) | -.02* (.02*) | -.01* (.02*) | -.07 (-.08) | .10 (.07) | .14 (.02*) |
| Islamic civic association | .14 (.22) | .09 (.12) | .13 (.09) | .06 (.01*) | .11 (.09) | .07 (.02*) |
| Islamism | .09 (.16) | -.05 (-.11) | -.02* (-.02*) | -.15 (-.16) | .09 (.03*) | .08 (.16) |
| NU identity | .15 (.27) | .04* (.12) | .09 (.09) | -.01* (.00*) | .16 (.08) | .05 (.08) |
| Muhammadiyah identity | .15 (.05) | .11 (.15) | .17 (.16) | .14 (.16) | .08 (.04*) | -.02* (-.04*) |
| Demography | | | | | | |
| Education | .10 (.00*) | .38 (.33) | .30 (.29) | .49 (.48) | -.05 (.00) | -.21 (-.14) |
| Rural residence | .01* (.08) | -.11 (-.07) | -.08 (-.11) | -.24 (-.24) | .14 (.07) | .13 (.08) |
| Age | -.02 (.03) | -.15 (-.15) | -.12 (-.04*) | -.11 (-.08) | .02* (.05) | .06 (.06) |
| Gender: Male | .09 (.07) | .20 (.21) | .14 (.15) | .13 (.11) | .03* (.07) | .06 (-.01) |

Table 6. 7. Correlations between Islamic components, political engagement components, and trust in political institutions 2002 (2001)

*Correlation is not significant at .05 level, otherwise is significant at .05 or better.

Age is also related to specific components of political engagement. Senior citizens are more likely to have external efficacy and to identify with a political party (Abramson 1983, 185; Conway 2000, 22). However, age may correlate negatively with level of education. An older citizen is likely to have a lower level of education, which in turn is associated with disengagement from politics (Conway 2000, 22).

This influence of the socio-economic factor may also impact the relationship between gender and political engagement. A male who has a better education, job, and income is likely to be more engaged in politics than a disadvantaged female. It is not gender, but socio-economic, difference that explains variation in political engagement. Some recent studies indicate that the relationship between gender and political engagement is more complex and is not entirely mediated by the socio-economic factor. According to this argument, males are more likely than females to be engaged in politics regardless of the socio-economic factor (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997; Inglehart 1981).

In bivariate statistics, almost all components of Islam have positive and significant correlations with political engagement. However, in multivariate analysis, the impact of a significant number of Islamic components on almost all components of political engagement is decreased (Table 6.8).⁷³ Only suggested rituals and Muhammadiyah identity still have direct, positive, consistent, and significant impacts on most components of political engagement. Nahdliyin rituals, NU identity, and Islamic civic engagement do not. As discussed in Chapter 3, the way these components of Islam

⁷³ See Chapter 3 for coding and scaling of Islamic components and socio-economic and demographic variables.

affect political engagement is indirect, through secular civic engagement. This indicates that Islam in general is more accurately viewed as societal components shaping secular civic engagement which affect political engagement and political participation. This pattern fits the civic voluntary model of political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), as will be discussed in Chapter 9.

It is important to note, however, that Nahdliyin rituals and Islamism have quite stable, positive, and significant impacts on political efficacy regardless of socio-demographic factors. Political efficacy is the only component of political engagement which does not have a significant and positive relationship with education. In addition to the Nahdliyin rituals and Islamism, secular civic engagement and rural residence significantly affect political efficacy. This pattern indicates that Indonesian Muslims' feelings of political efficacy are close to a "naïve political attitude." Efficaciousness is not associated with education and political information, but with rural residence. Optimism about self-competence to influence the political process is not based on knowledge about politics as education and political information do not correlate significantly with political efficacy (Table 6.3 and Table 6.7).

I want to be clear about the relationship between Islam and political engagement as revealed in this chapter. Regardless of level of education, rural-urban cleavage, age, and gender, some Islamic components have direct, positive, and significant relationships with political engagement. An Indonesian Muslim who performs the suggested rituals more frequently, is more active in Islamic associations or community life, and who feels

close to the NU or Muhammadiyah, is more likely to be interested in politics, to identify with a political party, to follow political news via mass media and to discuss politics more frequently.

In short, Islam is not inimical to political engagement as a component of democratic culture which is believed to integrate citizens into the democratic system and to encourage them to participate in politics. On the contrary, Islam is quite supportive of political engagement. Together with the socio-economic factor, Islam as institutionalized in the Muslim civic community has considerable potential to strengthen democracy.

Compared to other factors, education, as expected, is the strongest predictor of political engagement. One can in fact construct an "Islamic socio-economic model" of participant political culture, which combines Islamic and socio-economic factors to explain participant political culture in Indonesia. Figure 6.6 reveals the mechanism of the relationship between Islam, socio-economy, the networks of secular civic engagement, and political engagement.

Islam, defined by a set of rituals, is likely to affect the networks of Islamic social capital (NU-ID, Muhammadiyah-ID, and the networks of Islamic civic engagement), which in turn impact the networks of secular civic engagement, which finally promote political engagement (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). This is an Islamic path to political engagement. Another path starts from education, which affects the networks of both Islamic and secular social capital, which in turn impact political engagement. This mechanism is similar to the civil society model of democratic culture. In Chapter 9, this model will be elaborated further as an Islamically based civil society model of political participation.

Is a similar pattern visible in the relationship between Islamic components and trust in political institutions? Do the significant correlations between Islamism, NU identity, some Islamic civic engagement and Nahdliyin rituals remain stable when some theoretically relevant factors are included into the equation in a multivariate analysis?

Previous works on democratic culture agree that the socio-economic factor has a positive and significant relationship with political trust, which in turn affects democratic consolidation.⁷⁴ Many studies indicate that education has a positive impact on political trust. Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence to support this sweeping generalization (Mishler and Rose 1997). Newton (1999, 181) has even suggested that political trust cannot be explained persuasively by socio-economic factors, including education. Political trust, he continues, will be better explained by political factors such as political economic performance under the institutions.

The author tends to believe that socio-economic factors, especially education, contribute negatively to political trust in Indonesia. The phenomenon of critical citizens (Norris 1999) is found in consolidated democracies. Critical citizens, characterized by better social economic status, strongly support democratic values, but distrust political institutions and government (Norris 1999).

One important component of critical citizenship is education. Educated citizens are likely to know better the extent to which political institutions have performed well,

⁷⁴ For a further discussion about sources of political distrust see for example Abramson (1980).

and are also likely to have higher expectations and democratic standards to evaluate institutional performance. Therefore, the higher the level of education a person has the more likely he or she is to be critical of or to distrust political institutions.

Critical citizens are likely to view political institutions as instruments to achieve their goals. They will be more likely to trust political institutions if the institutions perform as expected or help to promote economic prosperity. In other words, trust in political institutions is more affected by political and economic rather than socio-cultural problems (Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993; Weatherford 1992, 1984).

Multivariate analysis (Table 6.9) indicates that Islam is almost a non-factor in terms of political trust. However, it needs to be emphasized here that the claim that Islam is likely to make Muslims alienated from modern political institutions, since Muslims are likely to be more oriented towards Islamic political institutions, is not made by my data.

The Indonesian case indicates that education negatively contributes to political trust. Is this dangerous for democratic consolidation? In general, I believe that critical citizens are not dangerous to democratic consolidation. The sources of critical attitudes, especially education, do not have a negative relationship with support for democratic principles (Chapter 7). In addition, trust in political institutions has a positive relationship with political efficacy as mentioned above. The negative impact of political distrust on democratic stability is likely to occur if the distrustful citizen is efficacious. In other words, political efficacy plus distrust can produce alienated activists who contribute to disturbances and undermine democracy.

However, the negative impact of political information is quite consistent even though it is smaller than the positive impact of political efficacy. The negative picture portrayed by the media and the sense of political efficacy or optimism about political institutions felt by many Indonesians are competing, and may define future political dynamics. In my view, the positive and significant impact of political efficacy on trust combined with the negative and significant impact of political information and education on trust, indicate that efficacy and trust in Indonesia again reflects a "naïve political attitude" rather than an "allegiant attitude." I will discuss this further in Chapter 9.

| | Political Interest | | Partisanship | | Political information | |
|--------------------------|--------------------|---------|--------------|--------|-----------------------|---------|
| | 2001 | 2002 | 2001 | 2002 | 2001 | 2002 |
| <i>Religion</i> | | | | | | |
| Mandatory rituals | .010 | .008 | .017 | -.007 | .013 | .039 |
| Suggested rituals | -.002 | .078** | .082** | .067* | .062* | .166** |
| Nahdliyin rituals | .033 | .023 | .091** | .027 | -.046 | -.008 |
| NU identity | .034 | .064* | .206** | .060* | -.031 | -.018 |
| Muhammadiyah identity | .090** | .070* | .023 | .113** | .055* | .033 |
| Islamic civic engagement | .022 | .061* | .056 | .056 | -.008 | .011 |
| Islamism | .069* | .007 | .150** | .076** | -.062* | -.055* |
| <i>Socio-demography</i> | | | | | | |
| Secular civic engagement | .145** | .081** | .070* | .008 | .171** | .129** |
| Education | .226** | .278** | .026 | .117** | .337** | .391** |
| Rural residence | -.040 | .001 | .059* | .027 | -.105** | -.114** |
| Age | .039 | -.074** | .012 | -.010 | -.078** | -.051* |
| Gender: Male | .100** | .118** | .010 | .064* | .095** | .076** |
| Adjusted R ² | .121 | .152 | .139 | .060 | .276 | .293 |
| N | 1354 | 1355 | 1390 | 1379 | 1315 | 1339 |

Table 6.8. Multivariate analyses of political engagement (standardized regression coefficients).

. +Overall political engagement is an additive scale from four items of political engagement: interest in politics, partisanship, political information, and political discussion.

** $P \leq .01$, * $P \leq .05$

| | Political discussion | | Political efficacy | | Overall political engagement+ | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|---------|--------------------|--------|-------------------------------|---------|
| | 2001 | 2002 | 2001 | 2002 | 2001 | 2002 |
| <i>Religion</i> | | | | | | |
| Mandatory ritual | .017 | -.024 | .048 | -.010 | .024 | .001 |
| Suggested ritual | .027 | .091** | .031 | .039 | .067* | .143** |
| Nahdliyin ritual | .025 | -.015 | .062* | .079** | .029 | .010 |
| NU identity | .051 | .026 | .030 | .080** | .125** | .050 |
| Muhammadiyah identity | .053* | .003 | .084** | .036 | .078** | .081** |
| Islamic civic engagement | .083 | .062* | .006 | -.013 | .052 | .065* |
| Islamism | -.058* | -.025 | .036 | .056* | .066* | .014 |
| <i>Socio-demography</i> | | | | | | |
| Secular civic engagement | .045 | .053* | .112** | .165** | .177** | .091** |
| Education | .292** | .317** | -.001 | .044 | .301** | .391** |
| Rural residence | .012 | -.029 | .074** | .125** | -.018 | -.032 |
| Age | .048 | -.145** | -.039 | -.019 | -.054* | -.093** |
| Gender: Male | .180** | .179** | .055* | -.007 | .139** | .156** |
| Adjusted R ² | .163 | .201 | .044 | .078 | .243 | .285 |
| N | 1377 | 1366 | 1390 | 1379 | 1248 | 1313 |

Table 6.8 (continued)

Table 6.8. Multivariate analyses of political engagement (standardized regression coefficients).

+Overall political engagement is an additive scale from four items of political engagement: interest in politics, partisanship, political information, and political discussion.

** $P \leq .01$, * $P \leq .05$.

Perceptions of personal and national economic condition also help to explain political trust. This assertion is quite persuasive in the case of Indonesia, and is even the strongest predictor relative to other factors (Table 6.7). The more positively a citizen evaluates his or her personal and national economic condition under a given set of institutions the more likely he or she is to trust the institutions. If political trust is crucial to make democracy work, then the voters' evaluations of their personal and national economic condition should be taken seriously.

| | 2001 | 2002 |
|--------------------------|---------|---------|
| <i>A. Religion</i> | | |
| Suggested rituals | .045 | - |
| NU identity | .055* | -.004 |
| Islamism | .123** | .160** |
| <i>B. Non-religion</i> | | |
| Political information | -.067* | -.058* |
| Political efficacy | .173** | .148** |
| Secular civic engagement | .089** | - |
| Political economy | - | .209** |
| Education | -.086** | -.078** |
| Rural residence | .026 | .041 |
| Age | -.024 | .016 |
| Adjusted R ² | .100 | .140 |
| N | 1326 | 1482 |

Table 6.9. Multivariate Analysis of Trust in Political Institutions
(Standardized regression coefficients)

**P \leq . 01, *P \leq .05. Trust in political institutions is an additive scale of seven items of trust in political institutions.

6.5. Conclusion

This chapter has evaluated the persuasiveness of the claim that Islam is inimical to democracy. One component of democracy is democratic culture, and political engagement and trust in political institutions are important dimensions of that culture. These dimensions encourage citizens to participate in democratic politics and integrate them into the democratic system. They help to make democracy work and to become stable. For this reason the claim that Islam is unfriendly to democracy should partly be evaluated in terms of its relationship with these two components of democratic culture.

In the case of Indonesian Muslims, the claim is not persuasive. Islam is inimical neither to political engagement nor to trust in political institutions. On the contrary, there

are indications that Islam has positive and significant relationships with both of these elements of democratic culture. Of the Islamic components, suggested ritual and Muhammadiyah identity have significant, direct, consistent, and positive relationships with political engagement. Nahdliyin ritual, NU identity, and Islamic civic engagement contribute indirectly to political engagement. Their impact is mediated by secular civic engagement. However, they directly contribute to political efficacy, a component of political engagement.

Political efficacy and trust in political institutions are significantly correlated, but they have a negative or insignificant correlation with education and with political information. Because of lack of education and information, efficacious and trustful Indonesian Muslims are likely to be "naïve" rather than "alienated" citizens. Those Indonesians who are more educated and informed about politics tend to be more "critical citizens" who are characterized by distrust and skepticism concerning their ability to influence political institutions.

How different are these critical citizens from "alienated citizens?" Are they likely to support democratic principles and the nation-state regardless of their skepticism about political institutions? These issues will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM

The claim that Islam is inimical to democracy is explicitly associated with level of support for democratic regime principles and for the modern nation-state as the preferred political community. At the individual level, these supports are even indications of democratic consolidation itself. This chapter assesses this claim by defining the democratic system as support for democratic values, satisfaction with democratic performance, and support for the idea of the nation-state. If the claim that Islam is inimical to democracy is true, I expect to find negative relationships between Islam and support for democratic values, satisfaction with democratic performance, and support for the nation-state among Indonesian Muslims.

7.1. Islam, democratic satisfaction, and democratic principles

Students of democracy are concerned with how a democracy is consolidated.

According to Larry Diamond, this is

the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down. It involves behavioral and institutional changes that normalize democratic politics and narrows its uncertainty. The normalization requires the expansion of citizen access,

development of democratic citizenship and culture, broadening of leadership recruitment and training, and other functions that civil society performed. (Diamond 1996, 238)

The legitimacy of a democracy is popular acceptance that democracy as a system of government is wanted by a majority of people in a polity. Adam Przeworski offers a similar criterion:

Democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a particular system of institutions becomes *the only game in town, when no one can imagine action outside the democratic institutions*, when all the loser wants to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost. Democracy is consolidated when it becomes self-enforcing, that is, when all relevant political forces find it best to continue to submit their interests and values to the uncertain interplay of the institutions (1991, 26; italics mine).

Despite their different perspectives about how to consolidate democracy—Diamond stresses culture, while Przeworski emphasizes elite rational calculation and interests—both identify "acceptance," "justification," or "legitimacy" by a majority of citizens or strategic groups, that is, attitudinal variables, as basic criteria. The attitudinal criterion is stated explicitly by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. They argue that

Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life ... (Linz and Stepan, 1996b, 16; italics in the original).

Attitudes are only one of two criteria of democratic consolidation at the individual level. The other is behavior (Ibid). In this chapter, evidence for democratic consolidation is limited to the attitudinal criterion. Behavioral criterion, i.e. general political participation, will be discussed in the next chapter.

The importance of culture for consolidation is addressed by many students of democracy in addition to Diamond. Huntington for example argues that

Modern democracy is a product of Western Civilization. Its roots lie in the social pluralism, the class system, the civil society, the belief in the rule of law, the experience with representative bodies, the separation between the spiritual and temporal authority, and the commitment to individualism that began to develop in Western Europe a millennium ago. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these legacies generated the struggles for political participation by the aristocrats and rising middle classes that produced nineteenth-century democratic development. These characteristics may individually be found in other civilizations, but together *they have existed only in the West, and they explain why modern democracy is a child of Western civilization* (1997, 6; italic is mine).

Huntington explicitly links democracy to Western civilization and doubts if democratic consolidation can occur in non-Western civilizations (Huntington 1996, 1991). He specifically mentions attitudinal criteria, beliefs in the rule of law and the commitment to individualism, in addition to separation of church and state and the experience with representative bodies and social pluralism. The cultural criteria of democracy are believed to be produced by Western civilization, but to be absent elsewhere (cf. Fukuyama 1995).

Huntington doubts, if not rejects, the likelihood of democracy in Muslim communities because Islam has its own political culture hostile to democracy. He asserts that

The general failure of liberal democracy to take hold in Muslim societies is a continuing and repeated phenomenon for an entire century beginning in the late 1800s. This failure has its source at least in part in the inhospitable nature of Islamic culture and society to Western liberal concepts...Whatever their political or religious opinions, Muslims agree that basic differences exist between their

culture and Western culture. ... *The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture* ... (Huntington 1997, 114, 214; italic is mine).

Huntington argues further that the tendency of mainstream Islam nowadays is to return to Islam, meaning to find solutions to their social and political problems in Islam. This tendency, he continues, is not characteristic of fundamentalist or extremist variants of Islam only, but rather of mainstream Islam everywhere it is found. In his words,

Muslims in massive numbers were simultaneously turning toward Islam as a source of identity, meaning stability, legitimacy, development, power, and hope, epitomized in the slogan 'Islam is the solution.' This Islamic Resurgence in its extent and profundity is the latest phase in the adjustment of Islamic civilization to the West, an effort to find the 'solution' not in Western ideologies but in Islam... The Islamic Resurgence is the effort by Muslims to achieve this goal. It is a broad intellectual, cultural, social, and political movement prevalent throughout the Islamic world. Islamic 'fundamentalism' ... is only one component in the much more extensive revival of Islamic ideas, practices, and rhetoric and the rededication to Islam by Muslim populations. The resurgence is mainstream not extremist, pervasive not isolated. ...The Resurgence has affected Muslims in every country and most aspects of society and politics in most Muslim countries... In its political manifestations, the Islamic Resurgence bears some resemblance to Marxism, with scriptural texts, a vision of perfect society, commitment to fundamental change, rejection of the powers that be and the nation state...The Resurgence ... has touched almost every Muslim society. Beginning in the 1970s, Islamic symbols, beliefs, practices, institutions, policies, and organizations won increasing commitment and support throughout the world of 1 billion Muslims stretching from Morocco to Indonesia and from Nigeria to Kazakhstan. Islamization tended to occur first in the cultural realm and then to move on to the social and political spheres. ... In 1995 every country with a predominantly Muslim population, except Iran, was more Islamic and Islamist culturally, socially, and politically than it was fifteen years earlier (Huntington 1997, 109, 110, 111).

The improbability of democracy in Muslim communities is deeply rooted in Islamic political culture and tradition. Islam has a comprehensive political system practiced in the long history of Muslim societies. According to Bernard Lewis, this system is not democracy and has no significant democratic component.

The idea that any group of persons, any kind of activities, any part of human life is in any sense outside the scope of religious law and jurisdiction is alien to Muslim thought. There is, for example, no distinction between canon law and civil law, between the law of church and the law of the state, crucial in Christian history. There is only a single law, the shari'a, accepted by Muslims as of divine origin and regulating all aspects of human life: civil, commercial, criminal, constitutional, as well as matters more specifically concerned with religion in the limited, Christian sense of that word. ... The absence of a native secularism in Islam, and the widespread Muslim rejection of an imported secularism inspired by Christian example, may be attributed to certain profound differences of belief and experience in the two religious cultures (2002, 100).

The belief in the *shari'a*, a system of law regulating all aspects of Muslim life, is probably the core of the Islamic political system which distinguishes it from other political systems such as democracy. Shari'a is not a set of religious principles or values, diffuse and open to multiple interpretations. It is law, which in any society is rigid, external to individual wills, and coercive. Shari'a as law, or more technically speaking, as legislative decisions or judicial norms, ready to be carried out, is exclusive, unique, and closed to democratic norms.

A crucial democratic norm is the differentiation, if not separation, between church and state known as secularism. Because of the nature of the shari'a, Lewis argues that "native secularism", secularism produced by the Muslim community, is unlikely. The internal dynamic which helped the emergence of democracy is not available to Muslims.

Secularism can be imported from Western culture but will be rejected by a shari'a-dominated Islam. Like grass in the desert, democracy can not grow in Muslim countries.

Ellie Kedourie also refers to Islam as an impediment to influence from other cultures. Learning and adaptation are improbable.

Whether it is defined in geographical or cultural terms, and whatever its exact boundaries are held to be, there can be no disputing the fact that the Middle East is predominantly Muslim. The beliefs, norms, and attitudes of Islam, the experiences, triumphs, and vicissitudes that Muslims have encountered over the centuries have combined to bring about a society of a highly distinctive character, with its own unmistakable patina. Muslims ...are strongly marked by the Muslim tradition, and what may be called the Muslim civilization, the more so until very recent times, the Muslim world had little contact with, little curiosity about, and little respect for what went on outside the boundaries. Even today, when the Western world is the source of industrial techniques and military weapons, and is seen as providing intellectual and political norms, Islam as a religion is very far from being defeated or silenced. And its influence as a culture, whether acknowledged or not, obstinately persists in permeating and shaping institutions, attitudes, and mode of discourse. This is nowhere more true than in government and politics, and in the mutual responses of the ruler and the ruled ... (1992, 1).

If Islam is perfect, why should Muslims borrow political norms from other societies and civilizations? Islam is superior. Huntington, Lewis and Kedourie have a good grasp of the nature of the Islamic political tradition. To the extent to which that tradition dominates the Muslim world today, their projections about secularism are correct. They are also right about the failings of contemporary Islamic regimes such as the Islamic Republic of Iran (at least under the leadership of Imam Khomeini), the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the current Saudi Arabia government. Currently active

“Islamist groups” such as the Ithwan al-Muslimun of Egypt, the Jama‘at-i Islami of Pakistan, the FIS of Algeria, Hizb ut-Tahrir of Palestine, the Darul Islam and Majlis Mujahidin of Indonesia also fit their image.

Their argument becomes doubtful, however, when it is cast as a sweeping empirical generalization about Muslim political attitudes, Muslim groups, and Muslim majority nation-states throughout the world. They may or may not be correct that traditional Islam as religion and as political culture persists regardless of internal and external constraints and opportunities. Finding out whether this is so requires systemic observation of Muslim religiosity and political orientation and orientation toward democratic culture such as is attempted in this study.

At the individual level, democratic culture as portrayed in this chapter is a set of supportive attitudes towards democracy as a political system, defined as institutions providing for equal rights before the law, minority rights, political freedom and competition, free press and free enterprise. All these features are secular norms and values. Norris (1999) and other students of democracy call this support for democratic values or principles as support for "regime principles."

In democratic studies, support for "democratic principles" is understood not only as a positive disposition toward a set of components of democratic values and procedures, but also as a positive attitude toward democracy as a diffuse idea. Measures include positive attitudes of the mass public toward the idea that democracy is the best form of government relative to other forms of government (Klingemann 1999, 35-6). This item, in the World Value Survey, has been asked as a part of a four-item battery of democratic support. Democratic principles have also been disaggregated as the value of liberty,

norms of democracy, rights consciousness, the value of dissent, support for independent media and competitive elections (Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992). These dimensions of democratic culture are applied in this study to the Indonesian case.

A strong majority of respondents (about 70%) to the two surveys support the idea that democracy, relative to other forms of government, is best for the country (Figure 7.1). Consistent with this finding is the relatively very small proportion of the people who have positive attitudes towards negative measures of democracy, for example that democracy is bad for economic development (about 10%), that it is a source of disorder (about 5%), and that it is indecisive (17%).

A majority of Indonesian Muslims, according to the surveys, support democracy as the best form of government. However, the Indonesian figure is below the average for the world's democracies (84%) in the 1990s World Value Surveys (Klingemann 1999, 45). It is smaller than the USA (88%), Brazil (78%), Ukraine (75%), Turkey (89%), Japan (88%), South Korea (84%), or South Africa (85%). It is almost the same as the Philippines (72%) and Mexico (71%). It is larger than Russia (51%).

Support for democratic values may be gauged as well from support for the value of liberty, norms of democracy, free press, free market, and competitive elections. In the two surveys, these democratic values, following Gibson et al's study (1992), were gauged through several items. These included: allowing political views different from those of the majority, allowing minority groups to have demonstrations, supporting equality before the law, freedom to join any political organization, protection of mass media by law, allowing citizens to participate freely in economic activity, agreeing or disagreeing that competitive elections do harm to the country and that competition among political

parties in elections will improve how government works. Exact wording for each of these items is in Appendix B. The average proportion of support for the eight items of democratic values is about 71%, meaning that a substantial majority of the people have positive attitudes toward democratic values.

Democracy as a set of attitudes not only refers to support for democratic principles but also to popular evaluation of the way democracy works. This evaluation is especially crucial at the individual level in order to understand how democracy is legitimized in practice. Strong legitimation of democracy at this level is widely argued to be essential for democratic consolidation (cf. Norris 1999; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995).




Figure 7.1. Some Indicators of Support for Democratic Values (%): 1 = democracy is the best system, 2 = democracy is disorder, 3 = democracy is bad for economic development; 4 = disagree that minority should not have different view from the view of majority; 5 = disagree that minority should not be allowed to have demonstrations against majority; 6 = support equality before the law; 7 = free to join any political organization, 8 = free mass media, 9 = free enterprise, 10 = disagree that free elections harmful to national unity, 11 = competitive elections good for government performance).

In the context of the civic culture research program, democratic performance is popular evaluation of the extent to which people are satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (Norris 1999; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995). The masses' satisfaction with democracy in practice is compared with popular support for democratic principles. The gap between the two defines the extent of democratic support. Mishler and Rose (1999, 1995) argue that a better comparison is not between popular evaluation of democratic performance and democratic ideals, but rather between the current democratic regime and the previous non-democratic regime. If a citizen evaluates positively the existing democratic regime against the previous non-democratic regime it indicates that he or she is supportive of democracy.

In this study, several measures were applied to gauge democratic performance: satisfaction with democracy in practice, preference for current democratic government relative to the previously non-democratic New Order and direction of the democratic government (heading in the right or wrong direction).

Figure 7.2 reveals that about 38% of Indonesian citizens feel very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy in general has worked in the country. This figure is smaller than the average proportion in consolidated democracies of Western Europe and North America (56%) in 1995. However, it is above the average proportions of other new democracies in Eastern Europe (34%) and Latin America (29%) in 1996. It is the same as Croatia's (38%) and almost the same as Portugal's (40%) (Klingemann 1999, 50).

A higher score was initially obtained when current democracy was compared with the previously non-democratic regime. In the 2001 survey, a majority of the people (60%) reported that the current democratic government is better than the New Order. Unfortunately, the figure dropped to about 39% in 2002.

One of several possible explanations for this stunning decrease is that most people in 2001 were still euphoric, while in 2002 they had some reason to believe that democracy in practice has not changed much. A comparable but less drastic drop occurred in the masses' sentiment about the direction of the democratic government. In 2001, about 70% of the respondents believed that the democratic government was going in the right direction. In 2002 the figure was about 60%.




Figure 7.2. Some Indicators of Indonesian Citizens' Evaluation of Democratic Performance (%): 1 = very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy has worked; 2 = prefer current democracy to the New Order, 3 = right direction of the democratic government.

There is considerable variation in support for democratic principles and satisfaction with democratic performance. For example, the extent to which people feel satisfied with how democracy works is partly shaped by their evaluations of their personal and the national economic condition (Mishler and Rose 1999; Rose and Mishler 1994).

Democratic satisfaction may be also affected by values or attitudes about the legitimization of democratic practice. In Muslim societies these values may come from a particular understanding of the Islamic political tradition and practices. As previously mentioned, some students of Muslim society claim that democratic culture, in which democratic satisfaction is one component, is alien to the Islamic world.

If this claim is true we expect that a Muslim who more frequently observes religious rituals, who is more active in Islamic civic associations, and who is more oriented towards Islamism, will be more likely to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works. The problem lies not in the comparison of democratic practice with democratic ideals, but rather between democratic practice with Islamic practice. Islamist activists and intellectuals like to compare current democratic practice with the government led by the Prophet Muhammad in Medina. The standard of good governance is the Prophet's Medina.

Reduction of the explanation of the mass public's satisfaction with democratic performance to particular Islamic attitudes and behavior probably provides an insufficient understanding of Indonesian Muslims. As in many democracies, so in Muslim society

civic and political engagement may contribute independently to democratic satisfaction. From the civic culture perspective, the components of democratic culture, relative to Islamic values themselves, may have a more direct impact on democratic satisfaction.

In Chapter 6, I mentioned studies that suggest that civic and political engagement are likely to correlate positively with support for democratic system and satisfaction with democratic performance. More specifically, interest in politics may correlate positively or negatively with democratic satisfaction and with support for the democratic system. If the correlations are positive, then the relationship between citizens and democratic system is congruent. If the correlations are negative, there is no congruence. Citizens may be alienated, engage in protests, and destabilize democracy.

Socio-economic factors may also affect the extent to which Muslim citizens feel satisfied with the way democracy works and with support for the democratic system. Students of democracy commonly believe that socio-economic factors are the strongest predictor of democracy (Lipset 1959). More recent and systematic cross-national analysis confirms this claim, and specifically relates economic factors to democratic stability rather than to democratic emergence (Przeworski et al 2000).

At the individual level, socio-economic development is reflected in household income, middle class status (with knowledge based occupation), white collar employment, professional employment, and membership in the salaried class. These socio-economic factors are expected to relate significantly with democratic consolidation as measured at the individual level by democratic satisfaction and support for democratic values.

Education is believed to be a crucial socio-economic component to explain democratic satisfaction and support for democratic values. Education has a significant relationship with democracy because it is a social institution in which a citizen is socialized to democratic values such as freedom, equality, and tolerance (Putnam 1993; Shin 1999; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996).

In Indonesia, university students and educated activists have dominated pro-democratic movements. In the New Order era, many students and educated citizens were active in pro-democratic movement organizations even though they were constrained in their activities by authoritarian pressure.

Rural-urban cleavage may also impact the two components of democratic political culture in Indonesia. The literature is sparse, because in developed countries the rural-urban cleavage is not very significant. However, in new democracies in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the rural-urban cleavage has been included to explain democracy (Gibson 2001; Miller, Hesli, Reisinger 1994). It is also likely to be important in Indonesia, which is about 60% rural and 40% urban.

Rural-urban cleavage is likely to be associated with level of education, income, and occupation type. These variables will probably be insufficient, however, to describe all the important characteristics of rural-urban cleavage. Durkheim's mechanical solidarity (referring to rural social life) and organic solidarity (referring to urban social life) are more complicated, and cannot be encompassed by the three variables. Especially in the context of democracy, mechanical and organic solidarities are crucial because they describe homogenous versus pluralistic social life. The former is likely not to demand too much from democracy, while the latter is likely to require much more. Non-

democratic polities have more difficulty accommodating peacefully the myriad of pluralistic and antagonistic interests of urban society. In Indonesia, rural citizens are therefore likely to be less supportive of the components of democratic culture.

Demographic factors, especially age and gender, may also impact on democratic political culture. Older people are believed to be more receptive to received ideas, the established social and political order and authoritarian values (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Sullivan et al 1985; Shin 1999). Democratic activists who struggled to overthrow the authoritarian New Order were mostly educated young Indonesians. A negative relationship between older people and democratic support seems probable in the Indonesian case.

Bivariate statistics reveal that satisfaction with the way democracy works correlates positively with support for democratic values among Indonesians (Table 7.1). This confirms the political economy perspective that legitimacy of democracy or support for democratic values should be understood as a response to the performance of a democratic government.⁷⁵ The more satisfied a person is with the way democracy

⁷⁵ In this analysis, satisfaction with democratic performance is a four-point scale constructed by adding the three item scores of democratic satisfaction. The four point scale of satisfaction with democratic performance is recoded to be a two-point scale, i.e. satisfied (1) unsatisfied (0); the item of the comparison between current democratic performance and the New Order is coded 1 if the performance of current democracy is better than that of the New Order, and otherwise 0; the direction of the nation under democracy item is coded 1 if it is in a right direction, and otherwise is 0. The four-point scale indicates that the mass public evaluation of democratic performance is from "not satisfied at all" (0) to "very satisfied" (3). The eleven items of support for democratic values are added to be a five-point scale of support for democratic values, from not supportive at all (1) to very supportive (5). Cranbach alpha of the scale is .73. "Don't know" answer in each item was transformed into "neutral" (3).

works the more likely he or she is to support democratic values (Klingeman 1999, 55). The Indonesian case indicates that the moral and instrumental components of support for democracy are congruent. This may contribute to democratic stability.

I now turn to explore the main concern of this chapter, the relationship between Islam and support for democratic values and satisfaction with democratic performance. Bivariate statistics (Table 7.2) reveal that the claim that Islam is likely to make Muslims dissatisfied with democratic practice and to reject democratic values as they are alien to Islamic tradition is partly persuasive, at least on first examination. The Islamism component of Islam correlates negatively with the two components of democratic culture. The more Islamist a Muslim, the more likely to reject democratic values and to be dissatisfied with democratic performance. As previously discussed, the root of this rejection is their attachment to the Islamist political orientation under which government should be established according to the divine law and the practice in Medina. The Islamists are indeed alienated from democracy, and as such may destabilize Indonesian democracy.

However, Islamism is not identical with Islam as a whole (see Chapter 3). Other components of Islam do not have negative correlations with the two components of democratic culture in Indonesia. Just the opposite. Three forms of Islamic ritual (mandatory rituals, suggested rituals, and Nahdliyin rituals) and three types of Islamic social capital (Islamic civic engagement, NU identity, and Muhammadiyah identity) have, again on first inspection, positive and significant correlations with the two components of democratic culture (Table 7.2).

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------|
| 1 | - | | | | | | | |
| 2 | .28 (.24) | - | | | | | | |
| 3 | .15 (.18) | .09 (.06) | - | | | | | |
| 4 | .09 (.10) | -.12 (.16) | .21 (.20) | - | | | | |
| 5 | .06 (.10) | .04* (.00*) | .15 (.17) | .18 (.25) | - | | | |
| 6 | .21 (.15) | .33 (.31) | .00* (-.03*) | -.06 (-.01*) | .17 (.09) | - | | |
| 7 | -.06 (.10) | .10 (.05) | .02* (.0*) | .03* (.03*) | .03* (.07) | .13 (.06) | - | |
| 8 | .04* (.11) | (-.14) | .03* (.03*) | .11 (.11) | .04 (.04) | (-.26) | (-.01*) | - |
| 9 | .11 (.11) | .21 (.21) | .03* (.03*) | .00* (.00*) | .04 (.04) | .26 (.26) | .07 (.07) | (-.18) |

Table 7.1. Correlations (Pearson's r) of the Components of Democratic Political Culture 2001 (2002): 1 = secular civic engagement; 2 = political engagement, 3 = political efficacy, 4 = trust in political institutions; 5 = democratic satisfaction; 6 = democratic values; 7 = socio-political tolerance; 8 = general political tolerance; 9 = political community. All correlations are significant at .05 or better except with the asteric (*).

These findings may be more apparent than real, however. Both the negative and the positive correlations are probably spurious. Non-religious factors such as political economy, SES, and demographic factors are probably the real causal factors. In addition, other components of democratic culture, such as civic engagement, political engagement, and political trust probably affect the relationship between the components of Islam and the two components of democratic culture.

| | Democratic Values | Democratic Satisfaction | Political Community |
|--|----------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|
| A. Islam | | | |
| Mandatory rituals | .10 (.08) | .04 (-.02*) | .05 |
| Suggested rituals | .04 (.16) | .00* (.08) | .02* |
| Nahdliyin Rituals | -.00*(.09) | .08 (.05) | - |
| Islamic civic engagement | .04 (.11) | .06 (.09) | .07 |
| NU-ID | .00* (.11) | .10 (.11) | .05 |
| Muhammadiyah-ID | .07 (.06) | .08 (.03*) | .05 |
| Islamism | -.10(-.19) | -.02* (-.07) | -.09 |
| B. Demography, SES, and political economy | | | |
| Gender: Male | .12 (.12) | .02 (.07) | .15 |
| Age | -.10 (-.07) | .02* (.05) | -.08 |
| Rural | -.16 (-.13) | .09 (.00*) | -.07 |
| Education | .35 (.35) | -.07 (.07) | .23 |
| Salaried | .21 (.19) | -.03 (.06) | .14 |
| Income | .23 (.20) | .09 (.06) | .12 |
| Political economy | .09 | .33 | .09 |

Table 7.2. Correlations (Pearson's r) Between Islam, Other Factors, and Support for the Democratic System 2002 (2001)

All correlations are significant at .05 or better except with asterisk (*).

All these likely spurious relationships are indicated in the bivariate statistics of the correlations between democratic satisfaction and support for democratic values, on the one hand, and civic engagement, political engagement, trust in political institutions, political economy, SES, and some demographic variables on the other hand (Table 7.1; Table 7.2). As expected, civic engagement and political engagement have positive and significant correlations with support for democratic values. However, political efficacy as a distinct component of civic engagement does not have significant correlations with

democratic values. It does have a significant correlation with satisfaction with democratic performance, however. This pattern also occurs in the relationship between trust in political institutions and democratic satisfaction.

Further, secular civic engagement has a positive correlation with support for democratic values. The more engaged a person is in secular civic activity the more likely he or she is to support democratic values. Civic engagement does not, however, have a significant correlation with democratic performance.

Political economic variables are believed to be the strongest predictors of satisfaction with democratic performance. The happier a person is with his personal pocketbook and with the national economic condition the more likely he or she is to be satisfied with democratic performance. Economic issues also correlate positively and significantly with support for political values.

Multivariate analyses (Table 7.4) indicate that almost all Islamic components have spurious correlations with the two components of democratic culture. In the 2001 data set, the political economic variables are not available. The multivariate analysis without these variables reveals that the relationship between Islamism and democratic satisfaction remains significant and relatively stable regardless of secular civic engagement, political engagement, socio-economic, and demographic factors.

In the 2002 data set, the political economic variable is available. When included into the equation, the relationship between Islamism and democratic satisfaction diminishes. This indicates that Islamism is not independent enough to explain variation in satisfaction with democratic performance. Political economy rather than Islamism itself shapes how an Indonesian Islamist evaluates democratic performance.

A similar pattern also occurs in the association between Islamism and support for democratic values. The negative and significant correlation between Islamism and support for democratic values diminishes when non-religious factors such as political economy, democratic satisfaction, political engagement, and education are included in the equation. It is not Islamism itself that negatively affects the support for democratic values.

Spurious correlations also occur between almost all other components of Islam and democratic satisfaction. Multivariate analysis demonstrates that a Muslim who has a positive evaluation of his or her pocketbook and the national economic condition, who is efficacious, and who trusts in political institutions is likely to be satisfied with democratic performance regardless of his or her intensity in religious rituals, in Islamic civic engagement, and in Muhammadiyah identity. NU identity is the only component of Islam that still has a positive and significant relationship with democratic satisfaction regardless of non-Islamic factors. A Muslim who feels close to NU is likely to be satisfied with democratic performance. However, this “NU effect,” as with the other Islamic components, does not appear in its relationship with support for democratic values.

Factors significant to explain democratic satisfaction are in general not Islam, but political economy, political efficacy, and trust in political institutions. Democratic satisfaction in turn affects support for democratic values. However, political engagement, civic engagement, and education have direct, positive, and significant impacts on support for democratic values regardless of democratic satisfaction.

In sum, what have we found out about the relationship between Islam, democratic performance, and democratic values? First, no Islamic component has a significant association, positive or negative, with democratic satisfaction or with support for democratic values. The claim by Huntington and others that Islam is inimical to democracy has no empirical ground in Indonesia when democracy is defined by support for democratic values and by satisfaction with democratic performance. The counter claim that Islam has its own political values which are compatible with democratic values is also not persuasive in the case of Indonesia. The apparently significant associations, either positive or negative, between Islamic components and the two democratic components, are spurious. Their associations are shaped by political engagement, political economy, and education.

Second, the strongest predictor of satisfaction with democratic performance is political economy, followed by political efficacy and trust in political institutions. The claim that political economy is essential for democratic legitimacy finds empirical support in Indonesia.

Third, education, as expected, is the strongest predictor of support for the democratic system, followed by democratic satisfaction and by some forms of political engagement—interest in politics, partisanship, political information, and political discussion. These findings indicate that the problems of democratic legitimacy for democratic consolidation among Indonesian Muslims do not have any direct association with religion. Socio-economic status, political economy, and political attitudes are more

crucial to support for democratic principles. The direct and independent impact of Islam on democracy is found in its relations not with democracy at the diffuse level but with secular civic engagement and political engagement as discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.

7.2. Islam and political community

Democratic regimes exist only within political communities. In the contemporary world the nation-state is the ubiquitous form of political community. A stable nation-state is therefore a sine qua non of democratic consolidation. The relationship between democratic consolidation and political community or a positive orientation toward the nation-state is succinctly described by Linz and Stepan (1996). They assert that "in a modern polity, free and authoritative elections cannot be held, winners cannot exercise the monopoly of legitimate force, and citizens cannot effectively have their rights protected by the rule of law unless a state exists. ... No state, no democracy" (Linz and Stepan 1996, 14).

The existence of the modern nation-state as a political community is quite recent. It emerged for the first time in human history in 18th century Europe. The idea was exported from the West to Muslim societies, and implemented there from the early twentieth century. Despite its newness, it is the fundamental foundation for contemporary democracies. If the nation-state is unstable, as Linz and Stepan argue, democratic consolidation is unlikely.

There are many factors which may strengthen or weaken a nation-state. One is cultural or attitudinal, acceptance and positive support for a political community based on

particular national sentiments and located in a geographically delimited area. In some societies this support is undoubtedly weak precisely because the idea is new and to some degree alien to local tradition or culture. Kedourie, Huntington and Lewis assert flatly that the idea of the nation-state is alien to Muslims. In Kedourie's words,

Islam made the Muslims one community where all concerns, spiritual and temporal, were attended to and codified in the Divine Law as revealed in the Koran and in the Prophetic Traditions. This community, the jurists taught, constituted the Muslim umma, i.e. a body of people who were the object of the divine plan of salvation. The umma is unlike a Greek polis or a modern nation-state. Its basis is not kinship or occupation of a well-defined national territory. Wherever the umma is, there is a dar al-Islam, the abode of Islam; all the rest is dar al-harb, the abode of war, where infidels rule. Dar al-Islam, therefore, knows no permanent territorial frontier, and whatever comes under Islamic authority becomes part of dar al-Islam. ...The umma, then, is a community dedicated to the service of God according to His commandments, and to spreading the true faith. The religion, therefore, is necessarily inseparable from politics. (1992, 1-2)

Dar al-Islam and *dar al-harb* are imagined territories on the basis of the same religious faith in contrast to nation, ethnicity, and "secular historicity." In the Islamic view, religious solidarity is superior to other social and political solidarities. It is true that nation-state has emerged in Muslim communities in the early twentieth century, but many scholars believe that this emergence of nationalism does not mean the decline of umma solidarity. The umma has at least distinctively colored emerging nationalism in Muslim communities, and even destabilizes embryonic nation-states. Reinhard Bendix states that

Appeals to Islam transcend the boundaries among them and evoke historical memories and powerful feelings that at one level join the intellectuals seeking a 'national identity' with the masses finding emotional release in the only world of

ideas with which they are familiar. At this level, monarchs and military, one-party rulers alike seek legitimacy on the ground that their regimes reflect and promote the underlying solidarity of the Arab people at home and abroad. Such a solidarity may exist only as an ideal, but the appeals to this ideal seek to merge 'the Arab nation' with the Islamic concept of the religious community (umma). In this way, nationalism (and socialism as well) can invoke traditional Muslim sentiments, fostering dreams of empire and desires for a restored Muslim community, buoyed by a sense of history, identity, and solidarity... The concept of umma is echoed in all Arab countries. Its romantic appeal has a politically destabilizing effect in countries already divided along ethnic and religious lines and which are affected as well by a disparity between rich and poor that is embittered by modern economic developments. Even politically stable countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia are threatened in this way... Arab leaders are torn between appeals to the great Islamic umma which they know to be popular and effort to bring about economic change which along with secular political institutions tend to undermine that tradition (1978, 594).

Bendix's assessment of the interaction between Islamic solidarity and nationalism is soft compared to some other scholars writing on this subject. He agrees, however, that Muslims have difficulty reconciling the two sentiments. Islamic solidarity brings a destabilizing effect on the nation-state. According to Huntington, the two sentiments are not likely to be reconciled. Muslims are more loyal to religion and other primary groups such as family and tribe. Huntington depicts these two different structures of loyalty to political community very clearly:

The structure of political loyalty among Arabs and among Muslims generally has been the opposite of that in the modern West. For the latter the nation state has been the apex of political loyalty. Narrower loyalties are subordinate to it and are subsumed into loyalty to the nation state. Groups transcending nation states - linguistic or religious communities, or civilizations - have commanded less intense loyalty and commitment. Along a continuum of narrower to broader entities, Western loyalties thus tend to peak in the middle, the loyalty intensity curve forming in some measure an inverse U. In the Islamic world, the structure of loyalty has been almost exactly the inverse. Islam has had a hollow middle in its hierarchy of loyalties. The two fundamental, original, and persisting structures.... have been the family, the clan, and the tribe, on the one hand, and

the unities of culture, religion, and empire on an ever-larger scale on the other.... Throughout Islam the small group and the great faith, the tribe and the umma, have been the principal foci of loyalty and commitment, and the nation state has been less significant (1997, 174-75).

If Huntington is correct in his assessment of Muslims' loyalty to the nation-state, then Muslims are a serious threat to the very foundation of the modern polity. A nation-state built in a Muslim societies is like a house on sand. It follows that democratic institutions will also be fragile in such a state.

Are Indonesian Muslims loyal not to the nation-state but to an Islamic community? If Huntington and others are correct, I expect to find that Muslim attachment to Indonesia is weak. Hypothetically, the more Islamic a Muslim the more likely to be disloyal to the state.

Attachment to a political community conventionally includes a sense of belonging to or pride in that community (Norris 1999, 11). Some studies, relying on the World Value Survey data, measure support for a political community by two items: sense of pride to be a citizen of the community, and willingness to fight for it (Klingemann 1999, 35).

In addition to these two measures, attachment to the political community in this work also includes a sense of belonging to a national, as opposed to regional or local, political community (see the appendix for detail wording of the measures). Admittedly, these three items do not measure exactly the structure of loyalty to the political community among Muslims as suggested by Huntington. They do not explicitly measure umma solidarity relative to national solidarity. They are nonetheless useful to gauge national sentiment among Muslims.

If support for the political community is low, it implies that Indonesian Muslims are likely to have stronger loyalties to other political communities. In addition, if Huntington and others are correct, I expect to find a negative correlation between Islam and support for Indonesia as a nation-state whose territorial boundaries are relatively fixed. Prior to this analysis, I will lay out the basic findings of the surveys concerning Indonesian Muslims' attachment to Indonesia as a nation-state.

Figure 7.3 displays the proportion of attachment to the national political community according to the three items. A majority of Indonesian Muslims (about six out of ten) feel that they belong to Indonesia, at the national level, rather than to their particular region or local community. The 2002 survey also gauged attachment by national pride and willingness to go to war. Judging from these two measures, a majority of Indonesians support the political community. About 57% feel very proud of being Indonesian citizens, and about 70% reported that they were willing to fight in a war to defend Indonesia.⁷⁶

Despite the existence of separatist movements in Aceh and Papua and many ethnic and religious conflicts in recent years, a majority of Indonesians still support Indonesia as a political community. Is this support more characteristic of Java, where about 60% of the population lives, perhaps reflecting the sentiment of the Javanese ethnic group which is the largest in the country (about 46%)?

⁷⁶ The different percentages of pride and willingness to fight for Indonesia lie in the fact that a significant proportion of those who feel "quite proud" to be an Indonesian citizen are also willing to fight for the nation. The proportion of "quite proud" itself is about 37%.




Figure 7.3. Some Indicators of Support for the Indonesian Political Community 2002 (%):
 1 = feel belong to Indonesia; 2 = very proud to be an Indonesian citizen;
 3 = prepared to go to war to protect Indonesia.

Figure 7.4 displays the strength of attachment to the political community according to island and ethnic group. The conventional wisdom is that attachment to Indonesia as a political community has been weak among the non-Java island population and among non-Javanese ethnic groups. There is no evidence in the survey data that this wisdom is correct. A very large majority of Indonesians (77%), across the archipelago, is strongly attached to Indonesia as a political community.⁷⁷ How does this percentage compare to other democracies?

⁷⁷ In order to be comparable to some existing studies about support for political community such as Klingemann (1999), in this analysis, the items are restricted to only two: pride and willingness to fight. Responses to these, following Klingemann, were recoded: willingness to fight for the nation 1, otherwise 0; very (4) and quite (3) proud of becoming an Indonesia citizen 1, little (2) and not at all (1) 0. These two recoded items were added to constitute a three-point scale of attachment to the political community: 0 = low attachment, 1 = medium attachment, and 2 = high attachment. Because the sample from most of the provinces is small relative to some provinces on Java, the regional concept is defined according to island. Hundreds of non-Javanese ethnic groups are also small relative to the Javanese, and therefore ethnic group is defined into two categories only: Javanese and otherwise.




Figure 7.4. Strength in Attachment to National Political Community According to the Population of Java/Non-Java and Javanese/non-Javanese ethnic groups 2002 (%): 1 = Java's population, 2 = non-Java's population, 3 = Javanese ethnic group, 4 = non-Javanese ethnic group.

Based on the same measures and scaling, the Indonesian figure is above the average for other democracies in the 1990s (about 68%).⁷⁸ It is smaller than Turkey (93%), Sweden (85%), the Philippines (83%), and Peru (86%), and almost the same as the United States (76%) and Finland (78%). However, it is above most of the democracies such as Spain (58%), West Germany (36%), Russia (62%), South Africa (69%), Brazil (64%), and Japan (18%) (Table 7.3).

⁷⁸ The proportion was recalculated from Klingemann (1999).

| <i>Religion/nation</i> | % | <i>Religion/nation</i> | % |
|------------------------|----|------------------------|----|
| <i>Islam</i> | | Japan | 18 |
| Indonesia | 77 | Taiwan | 62 |
| Azerbaijan | 93 | <i>Orthodox</i> | |
| Nigeria | 61 | Georgia | 69 |
| Turkey | 92 | Ukraine | 62 |
| <i>Catholicism</i> | | Russia | 62 |
| Argentina | 63 | <i>Protestantism</i> | |
| Brazil | 64 | Norway | 81 |
| Spain | 58 | Sweden | 85 |
| Philippines | 83 | Switzerland | 60 |
| <i>Confucianism</i> | | USA | 76 |
| China | 84 | West Germany | 36 |

Table 7.3. Strong Support for Political Communities in Several Religions and Nations (%)

Sources: PPIM Survey 2002; Klingemann (1999, 40).

Judged comparatively, support for the political community among Indonesian citizens is strong. If this is a valid measure of support for the political community, Indonesia has certainly fulfilled one of the basic requirements for democratic consolidation. The finding also undermines Huntington's claim that Muslims are likely to be disloyal to the nation-state. Parenthetically, Huntington is also not persuasive regarding several other predominantly Muslim nation-states, including Turkey (92%), Azerbaijan (94%), and Nigeria (61%) (Table 7.3).

Bivariate statistics (Table 7.2) reveal that the relationships between Islamic components and support for political community are mixed. Islamism is likely to have a negative and significant relationship with support for the nation-state. The more Islamist a Muslim, the more likely not to support the nation-state. Other components of Islam

mostly correlate positively and significantly with support for the national political community. Further analysis is required to make sure that these correlations are not spurious.

Multivariate analysis (Table 7.4) diminishes the negativeness and significance of the relationship between Islamism and support for the nation-state. It indicates that other factors such as political economy, political tolerance, political engagement, support for democratic values, socio-economic status and some demographic factors which are included in the equation significantly affect the association.

The likelihood of a negative impact of Islam on the national political community, as previously discussed, is empirically not verified in the case of Indonesia, even if Islam is defined as Islamism. The concept of *dar al-Islam* (Islamic state) and the ideal of the caliphate (*khilafah*) which tend to alienate Muslims from the nation-state as a political community are likely to be overstated. To be sure, these ideas exist and are frequently articulated by Islamist activists in the country, especially by the Hizb ut-Tahrir (Chapter 2), but they are not likely to have a significant impact on the community. Indonesian Islamists are split. One group tends to imagine their Islamist political ideals supra-nationally, while another stays inside the nation. At the mass level, the latter is likely to be more significant than the former.

It is worth noting here that some important Islamist movement organizations such as the Islamic Defenders Front and Laskar Ahlussunah Wal-Jamaah frequently operate implicitly and even explicitly as Indonesian nationals. These groups' involvement in the civil war in Maluku between Muslims and Christians was framed as a defense of national unity against Christian separatists.

The idea of *ukhuwwah wathaniyya* (national solidarity) in addition to *ukhuwwah Islamiyya* (Islamic solidarity) introduced by NU elites is also likely to be a factor that helps to neutralize the tendency for some Muslims to subordinate the nation-state to the umma (Chapter 2). NU's main discourse about religion and nationhood places Islam squarely in the context of the Indonesian nation-state.

Other factors which are likely to shape attitudes toward the nation-state are support for democratic values, political tolerance, political engagement, secular civic engagement, and education (Table 7.2). Support for democratic values strengthens commitment to the national political community. This indicates that the two components of the democratic system are congruent. This congruence is likely to be further strengthened by political engagement. Both political engagement and support for democratic values integrate citizens into the nation-state, as do level of education and economically-based satisfaction with democratic performance.

The only component of political culture which is likely to weaken congruence is political tolerance. The more tolerant a person, the more likely not to support the national political community. This pattern can be explained by the unique position of communism as the focus of tolerance among a majority of Indonesians.

As discussed in Chapter 5, communism has a unique position in the history of Indonesian politics. Most political elites and a majority of the population, as far as we can tell from the surveys, still want communism and the communist party to be outlawed. Political elites, especially in the New Order era, have campaigned vigorously on the threat of communism to national unity. This campaign has probably been effective, influencing the attitudes even of those who claim to support democratic values.

If political tolerance is measured by tolerance toward Christians the pattern of relationship between tolerance and support for the nation-state is different. Bivariate statistics (Table 7.1) indicate that this tolerance has a positive and significant correlation with support for the nation-state even though in the multivariate analysis the strength of the relationship diminishes.

| | Democratic Satisfaction | | Democratic Values | | Political Community |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|---------------------|
| | 2001 | 2002 | 2001 | 2002 | 2002 |
| <i>A. Religion</i> | | | | | |
| Mandatory rituals | - | - | .06* | - | .07* |
| Suggested rituals | .06* | .02 | .08* | -.04 | -.01 |
| Nahdlyin rituals | .06* | .01 | .10** | -.02 | .02 |
| Islamic civic engagement | -.03 | -.03 | .03 | -.03 | -.06 |
| NU ID | .06* | .07* | .04 | .05 | .05 |
| Muhammadiyah ID | - | .04 | -.03 | -.05 | .01 |
| Islamism | -.11** | - | -.13** | -.02 | -.03 |
| <i>B. Non-Religion</i> | | | | | |
| Non-religious civic engagement | .03 | .03 | .10** | .04 | .05 |
| Political engagement | - | - | .17** | .16** | .05 |
| Political efficacy | .13** | .08** | - | .00 | - |
| Political trust | .13** | .15** | - | -.01 | - |
| Democratic satisfaction | - | - | .12** | .15** | .02 |
| Democratic values | - | - | - | - | .14** |
| General tolerance | - | - | - | - | -.08** |
| Tolerance toward Christians | - | - | - | - | .01 |
| Political economy | - | .27** | - | .03 | .07* |
| Education | .07* | .03 | .24** | .19** | .08* |
| Rural | - | .06* | -.04 | -.04 | .04 |
| Age | -.05 | - | -.06* | .00 | -.03 |
| Gender: Male | .03 | - | .07* | .06* | .18** |
| <i>Adjusted R²</i> | .07 | .16 | .18 | .13 | .11 |
| <i>N</i> | 1384 | 1546 | 1384 | 1354 | 1128 |

Table 7.4. Multivariate analysis of support for democratic system (standardized regression coefficients - beta)

** $P \leq .01$, * $P \leq .05$

7.3. Conclusion

Having explored the complex relationship between Islam and three components of the political system, some findings should be stated more clearly and explicitly to conclude this chapter.

First, democracy does not have negative and significant relationships with any of the components of Islam, including Islamism, in the case of Indonesian Muslims. Based on these findings, the claim of Huntington and other scholars that Islam is inimical to democracy is not persuasive.

Second, the opposite claim that Islam has the potential to strengthen democratic values due to some inherently democratic concepts within the Islamic tradition such as *ijtihad*, *ijma*, *ikhtilaf* and *shura* (Chapter 1) has probably been overstated. The components of Islam do not have a direct impact on support for democratic values. New studies are required to reveal whether they have an impact on support for democratic values and what the nature of that impact is.

Third, Huntington and other scholars' claim that the idea of the nation-state is alien to Islam is rejected in the case of Indonesian Muslims. Regardless of their level of religiosity and their Islamic political orientations, a majority of Indonesian Muslims strongly support the nation-state. There is no component of Islam which weakens the Indonesian political community.

Fourth, support for a democratic system, believed to be essential for democratic consolidation, is better explained directly by non-Islamic factors: secular civic engagement, political engagement, trust in political institutions, political economy, and socio-economic status. These factors help to forge congruence between Muslims and the

democratic political system. The role of Islam in democracy-building lies in its significant contribution to secular civic engagement and political engagement (Chapter 4, and Chapter 6).

The evaluation of the relationship between Islam and democracy in this chapter has been restricted to the attitudinal level. A complete account must also include democracy at the behavioral level, that is political participation. In the next chapter, I will explore the hypothesis that Islam is inimical to democracy when democracy is defined as political participation.

CHAPTER 8

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Students of the subject believe that political participation is the core of democracy. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 1) even argue that “Citizen participation is at the heart of democracy. Indeed, democracy is unthinkable without the ability of citizens to participate freely in the governing process” (cf. Kaase and Marsh 1979, 28). If it is true that Islam is inimical to democracy, then Islam will be inimical to political participation.

Huntington (1984, 284) claims that "political participation was originally an alien concept in the Muslim community." If there is political participation in a Muslim community, it is linked to religious affiliation because in Islam there is no distinction between religious community and political society (Huntington 1993, 307). Political participation outside religion is not likely as Islam is believed to encompass and to regulate all behavior of Muslims (cf. Lewis 2002, 100). Huntington observes that

Opposition movements to authoritarian regimes in Southern and Eastern Europe, in Latin America, and in East Asia almost universally espoused Western democratic values and proclaimed their desire to introduce democratic processes into their societies. ... In authoritarian Islamic societies, in contrast, in the 1980s movements explicitly campaigning for democratic politics were relatively weak, and the most powerful opposition tended to come from Islamic fundamentalism. (1993, 308)

If Huntington's claims are correct, I expect to find two patterns of association: first, Islam has a negative and significant impact on political participation; second, political participation among Muslims, if any, is not significantly oriented towards non-Islamic objects. To evaluate these propositions, I will first elaborate the meaning, measures, and dimensions of political participation, and then explore the extent to which Islam affects political participation on the basis of the survey data.

8.1. Political participation: meaning and measures

In classical democratic theory the common people are believed to be interested and to participate in politics. They are knowledgeable about the process of government and about alternative solutions to public issues; they participate in the political process in accordance with its rules and values (Conway 2000). In this theory, political participation is believed to be an instrument to achieve preferred policies (Conway 2000, 3). Kaase and Marsh (1979, 30) argue that political participation is associated with other elements of democratic government such as rationality, control, responsiveness, flexibility, legitimacy, and conflict resolution.

Citizens have particular interests and preferences about who should govern, and about public policy. They participate directly or indirectly to influence decisions regarding public policy made by public officials. Public officials' survival partly depends on their responsiveness to constituent preferences. In this sense, political participation is associated with rationality and responsiveness.

Related to these characteristics, democracy is control of government by citizens. This control to a large extent depends on citizen's political participation. In a democracy,

citizen's preferences vary and often conflict. These characteristics of citizens' preferences make democracy a flexible form of governance, meaning inclusive and open to various demands. Otherwise, democracy cannot work.

Related to the pluralistic nature of preferences is interest conflict among citizens. This conflict can be managed peacefully in a democracy due to the inclusion and mediation of the conflict by democratic institutions such as representation in the legislative body. This representation obviously requires political participation.

This claim of the centrality of the common citizen's political participation in democracy has been challenged by proponents of a revisionist or elitist conception of democracy. While I do not have the space to discuss this criticism in detail, I can highlight some of its more general claims.⁷⁹

The elitist or revisionist theory of democracy—developed among others by Schumpeter (1942), Dahl (1956, 1961), Lipset (1981), and Huntington (1975, 1968)—basically claims that the idea of actual rule by the people in classic liberal theory is not realistic. The elitists argue that democracy is basically the business of political elites. It is a procedure for contestation among elites for important office in governance. Some elitists argue further that mass publics, compared to elites, are unable to perform as democrats in concrete political situations (Prothro and Grigg 1960; McClosky 1964). The elites are the true keepers of the democratic flame.

Because politics is mostly conducted by elites, political participation is not as important as the classical theory of democracy assumes. Lipset (1981) has even claimed

⁷⁹For discussion about the classic liberal theory of democracy and the revisionist or elitist theory that followed, see for example Joseph (1981) and Walker (1966).

that low political participation is positive for democracy. It contributes to democratic stability. Some authors in the 1950s and 1960s made a similar claim that low political participation is an indication of the masses' satisfaction with democratic performance (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee 1954).

Elitist theory has even made a further claim that political participation without economic development and political institutionalization is dangerous to political order and to democracy itself (Huntington 1968). Some students of democracy in the 1970s claimed that democracy was in crisis in America, Western Europe, and Japan (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975). Huntington (1975) believed that this crisis was caused by increasing political participation, by increasing demands of the people on the government, while not increasing simultaneously the government's capacity to respond.

However, a more recent evaluation suggests that the claim that democracy is in crisis is not accurate. While there may be a decline in "conventional political participation" such as voter turnout and political party membership, there is an increase in "unconventional political participation," and this pattern does not indicate a crisis in democracy. Democracy has been strongly supported by the masses and has triumphed everywhere (Pharr and Putnam 2000; Kaase and Newton 1995). People in stable democracies may have become increasingly cynical toward the elites and the performance of government institutions, but cynicism does not mean that they are negative toward democracy as a political system (Kaase and Newton 1995; Norris 1999). They are critical, and this attitude is important to democracy. It is a feature which distinguishes democracy from autocracy.

The revisionists are convincing when they claim that elites are in the final analysis the most important element in public policy-making. This claim does not necessarily undermine the importance of common citizens' participation, however, especially in more recent democracies. The demand for participatory or direct democracy is likely to be growing, the elite cannot ignore this phenomenon, and the student of democracy will miss his subject's core concern if he or she ignores common citizens' political participation.

What is political participation? As noted in the introduction, Verba and Nie (1972) define political participation as "activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take." (cf. Kaase and Marsh 1979; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Conway 2000). All definitions of political participation, according to Brady (1999), include four basic concepts: activities or actions, ordinary citizens, politics, and influence.

"Action" or "activity" in political participation is something that a person does. It is not just thoughts, attitudes, or tendencies (Brady 1999). Feeling close to a political party, or dislike for a government policy, for example, is not an activity, and therefore should not be included in political participation. Voting for a party, signing a petition showing disagreement with a government policy, or protesting against a government decision about an income tax increase are examples of political activity or political participation.

Some students of political participation include political discussion and following political news in the mass media as two other forms of political participation (Conway 2000, 3). In my view, these variables violate the basic definition of political activity and

therefore are not included in this study. Following political news through mass media is a resource of political information, not political action itself. Political discussion is a form of political engagement rather than political activity (see Chapter 6) (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Inglehart 1981).

Political participation is not only action, but action by ordinary citizens, not governmental elites. Action by the government elite is political, but not political participation (Brady 1999). Activity in social associations such as church work, sports clubs and cultural clubs is not political as it is not directed to influence government policies or activities even though it may influence a political action by a person. In addition, political participation is a voluntary act, meaning that the participants are not forced to do it and are not paid for it (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 38-9).

Early studies of political participation in the 1950s and 1960s (Lane 1959; Milbrath, 1965; cf. Kaase and Marsh 1979) attempted to demonstrate that political participation was one-dimensional. A scale of political participation was constructed from a series of items that indicated how much a person participates in politics. Later studies criticized this one-dimensional scale. Verba and Nie (1972), for example, argue that political participation consists of many dimensions. Voting and demonstrations can not be placed on a scale to indicate a continuum of political participation. Demonstration is one form of political participation, and voting is another one.

Kaase and Marsh (1979) suggest that political participation consists of two different forms, conventional and unconventional. The conventional form includes any activity by ordinary citizens to influence political outcomes according to relatively settled procedures or laws, such as voting, running for a particular public office or campaigning.

Unconventional political participation is any activity by ordinary citizens to influence political outcomes “that does not correspond to the norms of law and custom that regulate political participation under a particular regime” (41) such as demonstrations, strikes, or damaging public facilities.

Students of political science do not agree about measures of political participation. What measures political participation, how many items should be included, how many components in political participation should be tolerated, and so on, varies from one scholar to another. Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978, 341-44) measured political participation with twenty items, constituting four components: voting (three items), campaign activity (six items), communal activity (eight items), and contacting officials (two items). Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 51) include not only the four components but also campaign contributions and protests.

Kaase and Marsh’s (1979) measures of political participation or action exclude voter turnout. They include items of political protest (unconventional political participation), meaning not only demonstrations in general but also organizing and signing petitions, blocking traffic, political strikes, political boycotts, occupying public buildings, and damaging public facilities. These measures of political protest are also found in recent studies of political participation such as Parry, Moyser, and Days (1992), Shin (1999), and McDonough, Shin, and Moises (1998).

Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 68-72; cf. Shin 1999) state that there are some benchmarks for political participation measures, i.e. political activity that includes at least voting, campaign work, contacting public officials, and community work. To these components I will add political protests. My measures of political participation are

therefore very similar to Kaase and Marsh (1979), and Perry, Moyser, and Day (1992). The measures, described in Table 8.1,⁸⁰ include conventional and unconventional political activities.

What makes the components of political participation different is the quality of each component, which includes information, pressure on public officials, scope of outcome (collective or particular), conflict intensity (non-conflictual or conflictual), initiative (little or much), and the intensity of cooperation with others (little or much) (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978, 55).

Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978) argue that voting puts a high degree of pressure on candidates seeking election to strategic offices. At the same time, the act of voting itself cannot tell us much about the information that the voters want to convey to the competing parties or candidates. Voting does have a collective outcome. It is also conflictual in the sense that it produces political conflict among voters and among elites. However, it requires little initiative for a person to go to the ballot box, and little cooperation with other people (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). It is no wonder that the percentage of voting among citizens is always high relative to other forms of political participation.

Unlike voting, campaign activity, communal activity, and contacting public officials place relatively less pressure on officials, but convey relatively more

⁸⁰ See appendix B for detailed wordings of the items.

information. They also require relatively more initiative and more cooperation with others (Verba, Nie, and Lim 1978). It is therefore no wonder that the number of people engaged in these forms of political participation is in general lower than voting.

| Components | Items |
|--------------------|---|
| A. Voting | 1.... voted for a political party in the 1999 national election |
| B. Campaign work: | 2. ... convinced other people to vote for a particular political party 3. ... help voluntarily a political party such as disseminating party leaflets, organizing campaign, etc. 4. ... attend party campaign 5. ... wear party attributes on cloth, vehicles, homes, etc. |
| C. Contacting: ... | 6. ... contact local or national public office or officials for a public interest |
| D. Community work: | 7. ... work together with other people in the community to resolve any community problems 8. ... organized community members to resolve any community problems 9. ... attend community meeting to resolve any community problem |
| E. Petition: | 10. Organize petition |
| F. Protesting: | 11. Sign petition 12. Demonstration 13. Boycott 14. Strike 15. Occupied public building 16. Blocked traffic 17. Damaged public facilities |

Table 8.1. Components and items of political activity

I argue, however, that campaign activity, contacting public officials, and communal activity, relative to protest, not only place less pressure on government, but also need less initiative and cooperation with others. Therefore, there are usually fewer acts of protest than of other forms of political activity.

Because democracy is still a rare phenomenon in Indonesian history, students of Indonesian politics have never systematically studied political participation. There are some seminal studies, but they are more restricted to party choice rather than political participation. In addition, they are mostly based on a limited quantity of national aggregate data rather than on individuals, and accordingly cannot explore further the characteristics of political participation among Indonesians (Liddle 1973, 6).

The following description of the characteristics and dimensions of political participation may shed some light on this dark area of Indonesian politics. As will be discussed shortly, the characteristics and dimensions of Indonesian political participation to a great extent mirror the findings of studies of other democracies.

a. Voting

The most common measure of conventional political participation in a democracy is voting. As mentioned earlier, voting places high pressure on government as it determines which candidate or political party will control political offices, or which public policy will be legislated and implemented. Voting determines the survival of political elites and their agendas, and therefore is crucial in democratic systems regardless of how little it tells us about voter preferences.

There have been two elections in Indonesia in which adult citizens freely or voluntarily voted for a particular party, the 1955 and 1999 national elections.⁸¹ Under President Suharto's New Order, a national election was held every five years from 1971 through 1997. However, the elections were commonly judged fictitious in terms of democratic standards (Liddle 1996).⁸²

In the 1955 national election, voter turnout was 86% (Feith 1957). In the 1999 national election it was even better at 92%. In three surveys conducted by the author in 1999, 2001, and in 2002, the proportions of respondents who reported that they voted are 95%, 96%, and 90% respectively.

If voting is an indication of political participation, most Indonesians in the post Suharto era participated in politics as the proportion of those who reported that they voted in the 1999 national election is very large relative to most democracies in the world (see Table 8.2). This finding is probably meaningless in terms of democratic consolidation as almost all consolidated democracies have lower proportions of voter turnout. It is moreover probably not a good measure of political participation in the context of post-Suharto Indonesian democracy, especially if judged instrumentally, that is, its impact on public policy making. This issue is discussed further below.

⁸¹ About the 1955 election, see Feith (1957).

⁸² About New Order elections, see Liddle (1996, 1977), Mallarangeng (1997), and Gaffar (1992).

b. Campaigning

Campaign activity is probably a form of political participation that reflects more accurately than voting the interests of citizens. A person who participates in a campaign, or in any kind of campaign activity, indicates that he or she has a stronger desire to inform or to influence the candidates or parties and other fellow citizens about their political preferences (Verba, Schlozman, Brady 1995).

We do not know for sure how many Indonesians participated in campaign work. In the surveys, campaign work covers several items: attended party campaign events in the 1999 campaign season; distributed party leaflets, wore a party attribute; convinced other people to support one's party.

According to the surveys (Figure 8.1), about 30% of the respondents reported that they very often or quite often attended party campaign events (party public meetings, rallies, etc.) in the campaign season. The same proportion also reported that they wore, or put a party attribute on their house or vehicle. Fewer Indonesians distribute party leaflets, party pictures and the like (about 13%). This proportion is almost the same as that of convincing other people to vote for a particular party (11%). All of these items constitute a single factor in a factor analysis (see Table), which fits the idea that campaign activity is a dimension of political participation (Verba and Nie 1972).

c. Community activity

Community activity is a form of political participation through cooperation with others regarding social and political issues. Students of political participation measure this aspect of political participation variously (see Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Verba,

Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992). In this study, community activity is measured by citizen involvement with other members of a community to meet and act together to resolve particular social and political issues. It is also measured by participation in organizing other members of the community.

According to the surveys, about 60% of the respondents reported that they participated at least once in the last three years in a community meeting or other collective action to resolve community issues or to make an action plan to resolve the issues. About 53% reported that they had very often or quite often participated. In addition, about 31% of the population reported that they had at least once in the last three years participated in organizing community members. This proportion is not bad relative to those of most democracies (Table 8.2).

d. Contacting officials

Political participation can also be measured by citizen contact with government officials or representatives at the local level to talk about anything that is relevant to public policy or to the interest of the community.

About 10% reported that they often or quite often contacted governmental officials or representatives at the local or national level in the last three years to talk about something important to the interest of the community or public policy such as social disturbances, poor public services, school fees, etc. Again, this proportion is not bad relative to those of most democracies (Table 8.2).




Figure 8.1. Forms of political activity (%):
 1 = voting, 2 = party campaign, 3 = distributed party leaflet,
 4 = wore party attribute, 5 = convinced other, 6 = organized community,
 7 = participated in community activity, 8 = community meeting, 9 = contacted officials,
 10 = signed petition, 11 = organized petition, 12 = demonstration, 13 = strikes,
 14 = boycotts, 15 = occupied building, 16 = blocked traffic, 17 = destroyed public facility

e. Petitions

Signing petitions together with fellow citizens to support or reject a particular public policy or public official is another form of political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). According to the surveys, about 10% reported that they

signed a petition at least once in the last three years. Almost the same proportion reported that they also organized a petition. These proportions are relatively small compared to those of most democracies in the world (Table 8.2).




Figure 8.2. Quantity of political activity without voting (%)

f. Protest

Protest is a political activity by ordinary citizens to show disagreement with or reaction against a particular public policy. This activity has various forms and measures.⁸³ In this study, protest includes demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, occupying public buildings, blocking traffic, and damaging public facilities.

A demonstration is a form of political participation to support or reject a particular government policy at the local or national level. According to the surveys, about 7% of Indonesians participated at least once in the last three years in a

⁸³ About form and measures of political protest see Barnes and Kaase (1979) and Parry, Moyser, and Day (1992).

demonstration. This proportion is slightly smaller than that for signing petitions. However, it is not too bad compared to the comparable figure for most democracies in the world (Table 8.2).

Strikes against particular public policies is another form of political protest that is found among the Indonesian population. The percentage is quite small, however (about 4%). This figure is almost the same (about 3%) as that for boycotting a particular public decision or any public good that is perceived to be harmful to the public interest. Still smaller is the percentage that has occupied public buildings (about 2%), blocked traffic (about 1%), or damaged a public facility (public building, traffic light, etc.) (.5%). These numbers are not surprising. In most democracies, these activities are quite rare (Table 8.2).

The number of acts of political participation varies between zero and 17, or between 0 and 16 if voting is excluded (Figure 8.2). The mean of the number of acts is about 4, or about 3 if voting is excluded. This number is quite similar to Parry, Moyser, and Day (1992) in the case of Britain.⁸⁴ Most people participated in voting and in community activity. As in other democracies, the proportions of participation in campaign or party related activity and in protest activity, are low. Factor analysis demonstrates four dimensions of political participation which are close to those of other democracies (Table 8.3).

⁸⁴ Some of the items are on a four-point scale (very often, quite often, rare, and never), and have been recoded into two categories (very often and quite often = 1, rare and never = 0) to construct the number of acts of political participation.

| Activity | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|-------------|----|------|----|----|----|----|-----|
| Nation | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 81 | 24 | 31 | 16 | 01 | 06 | 03 |
| Armenia | 75 | NA | 18 | 28 | 12 | 15 | 01 |
| Australia | 95 | NA | 79 | 18 | 22 | 08 | 02 |
| Austria | 84 | 11 | 48 | 10 | 05 | 01 | 01 |
| Azerbaijan | 86 | NA | 10 | 20 | 02 | 09 | .02 |
| Bangladesh | 65 | NA | 25 | 23 | 19 | 17 | 01 |
| Belarus | 61 | NA | 10 | 20 | 03 | 02 | .04 |
| Bulgaria | 73 | NA | 07 | 11 | 03 | 05 | 02 |
| Belgium | 91 | 13 | 47 | 23 | 09 | 06 | 04 |
| Bosnia H. | 58 | NA | 22 | 09 | 09 | 06 | 01 |
| Brazil | 82 | 20 | 47 | 25 | 06 | 07 | 03 |
| Britain | 75 | 10 | 58 | 14 | 14 | 10 | 02 |
| Canada | 69 | 15 | 77 | 22 | 23 | 07 | 03 |
| Chile | 89 | 24 | 17 | 15 | 02 | 05 | 02 |
| Croatia | 72 | NA | 43 | 07 | 05 | 07 | 01 |
| Denmark | 84 | 34 | 51 | 27 | 11 | 17 | 02 |
| E. Germany | 80 | 19 | 57 | 22 | 11 | 01 | 02 |
| Estonia | 68 | 23 | 14 | 21 | 02 | 03 | 01 |
| France | 68 | 10 | 54 | 33 | 12 | 10 | 08 |
| Finland | 67 | 07 | 39 | 12 | 12 | 05 | 01 |
| Georgia | 69 | NA | 15 | 24 | 07 | 10 | 01 |
| Hungary | 67 | 30 | 18 | 04 | 02 | 03 | .01 |
| Iceland | 86 | 16 | 47 | 24 | 21 | 05 | 01 |
| India | 59 | 14 | 27 | 13 | 18 | 04 | 02 |
| Indonesia | 92 | 09** | 12 | 08 | 03 | 04 | 02 |
| Ireland | 67 | 10 | 42 | 16 | 07 | 04 | 02 |
| Italy | 85 | 20 | 48 | 36 | 11 | 06 | 08 |
| Japan | 57 | 07 | 55 | 10 | 07 | 02 | .04 |
| Latvia | 79 | 19 | 31 | 20 | 08 | 03 | .04 |
| Lithuania | 64 | 33 | 31 | 17 | 05 | 03 | 02 |
| Mexico | 66 | 16 | 30 | 11 | 09 | 06 | 05 |
| Nigeria | NA | 29 | 07 | 17 | 10 | 05 | 06 |
| Netherlands | 76 | 19 | 51 | 25 | 08 | 03 | 03 |

Table 8.2. Some political activities: Indonesia in the world (%): 1 = voter turnout in the 1990s (average percentage); 2 = convince other people (often); 3 = petition (done); 4 = demonstration (done); 5 = boycott (done); 6 = strike (done); 7 = occupy building (done).

*Combination of East Germany and West Germany; **Very often and quite often

Source: Voter turnout from www.idea.int/voter_turnout1.html;

Indonesian data are average proportion of the two PPIM surveys;

and other countries from World Value Survey,

but the UK from Parry, Moyser, and Day (1992, 44),

the US data is from Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 72),

and South Korea data from Shin (1999, 102).

| Activity | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|-------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Nation | | | | | | | |
| N. Ireland | NA | 05 | 60 | 19 | 09 | 10 | 01 |
| Norway | 76 | 14 | 65 | 26 | 18 | 05 | 02 |
| Peru | 66 | NA | 21 | 12 | 03 | 04 | 03 |
| Philippines | 73 | NA | 12 | 08 | 06 | 03 | 02 |
| Poland | 48 | 11 | 20 | 10 | 05 | 04 | 02 |
| Portugal | 65 | 13 | 27 | 21 | 04 | 04 | 02 |
| Russia | 58 | 22 | 11 | 21 | 02 | 02 | 01 |
| S. Africa | 89 | 19 | 19 | 11 | 12 | 05 | 02 |
| S. Korea | 68 | NA | 40 | 14 | 16 | 04 | 02 |
| Slovenia | 80 | 10 | 19 | 09 | 06 | 04 | 01 |
| Spain | 78 | 14 | 22 | 21 | 05 | 05 | 02 |
| Sweden | 85 | 15 | 72 | 30 | 33 | 05 | 01 |
| Switzerland | 44 | NA | 68 | 17 | 11 | 02 | 01 |
| Taiwan | 71 | NA | 13 | 02 | 03 | 01 | 06 |
| Turkey | 85 | 19 | 20 | 09 | 09 | 02 | 01 |
| Ukraine | 73 | NA | 13 | 18 | 04 | 02 | 01 |
| Uruguay | 92 | NA | 36 | 05 | 04 | 11 | 08 |
| USA | 61 | 16 | 75 | 16 | 19 | 04 | 02 |
| Venezuela | 56 | NA | 23 | 10 | 02 | 02 | 03 |
| W. Germany | 80 | 12 | 66 | 26 | 18 | 04 | 02 |

Table 8.2 (continued)

Table 8.2. Some political activities: Indonesia in the world (%): 1 = voter turnout in the 1990s (average percentage); 2 = convince other people (often); 3 = petition (done); 4 = demonstration (done); 5 = boycott (done); 6 = strike (done); 7 = occupy building (done).

*Combination of East Germany and West Germany; **Very often and quite often

Source: Voter turnout from www.idea.int/voter_turnout1.html; Indonesian data are average proportion of the two PPIM surveys; and other countries from World Value Survey, but the UK from Parry, Moyser, and Day (1992, 44), the US data is from Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 72), and South Korea data from Shin (1999, 102).

8.2. Multi-Dimensionality of Political Participation

Most of the items of political participation correlate. The only item that generally does not correlate positively and significantly with other items is voting. This indicates that voting, for Indonesians, is not a reliable measure of political participation. Its

internal validity is also questionable as factor analysis indicates that its factor loading is very low relative to other variables. Further observation and analysis is required to assess the validity of voting relative to other variables as a measure of political participation.⁸⁵

Apart from voting, the political activity items are multi-dimensional. The dimensions generally fit the existing propositions in the literature, especially those of Verba, Nie, and Long (1978) (Table 8.3).⁸⁶ The differences lie in voting and contacting public officials. In the Indonesian case, voting is not reliable, while contacting only consists of a single item, which forms the community activity dimension. In addition, Verba and Nie's measures of political participation do not include political protest and petition items. However, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) include a political protest item, and it constitutes a dimension of political participation.

A closer finding to the Indonesian case is Britain as described by Parry, Moyser, and Day (1992), where political protest was measured more extensively than in Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995). In addition, Parry, Moyser, and Day include two items of petition. However, their petitions do not constitute a dimension, but parts of community activity (1992, 51). In the Indonesian case, petition items constitute a dimension of political participation, which is separated from community activity.

⁸⁵ In many studies of political participation, voting is measured by several items. See for example Verba, Nie, and Long (1978), Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), and Parry, Moyser, and Day (1992).

⁸⁶ Having seen that voting has very low loadings (less than .10) I decided to exclude it from the factor analysis displayed in Table 8.4.

| | 2001 | | | | 2002 | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| <i>A. Party campaigning</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Convinced | .540 | .185 | .018 | .047 | .453 | .049 | .082 | .140 |
| Helped party | .681 | .255 | .063 | .074 | .558 | .081 | .107 | .155 |
| Attended campaign | .602 | .075 | .063 | .048 | .542 | .066 | .078 | .192 |
| Wore party attributes | .607 | .043 | .080 | .092 | .561 | .082 | .050 | .059 |
| Distributed party leaflets | .663 | .076 | .095 | .113 | .607 | .123 | .174 | .070 |
| <i>B. Community work</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Contacted officials | .187 | .360 | .156 | .074 | .260 | .061 | .201 | .220 |
| Community work | .082 | .653 | .025 | .010 | .097 | -.011 | .046 | .674 |
| Organized community | .118 | .590 | .143 | .061 | .186 | .054 | .116 | .553 |
| Community meeting | .111 | .472 | .111 | .041 | .234 | .083 | .106 | .497 |
| <i>C. Petitions</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Signed petitions | .123 | .205 | .750 | .176 | .202 | .123 | .670 | .141 |
| Organized petitions | .133 | .274 | .732 | .170 | .123 | .152 | .694 | .170 |
| <i>D. Protest</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Demonstration | .165 | .075 | .174 | .514 | .196 | .450 | .398 | .022 |
| Boycott | .069 | .061 | .176 | .448 | .114 | .397 | .284 | .022 |
| Strikes | .062 | .020 | .047 | .370 | .130 | .399 | .165 | -.025 |
| Occupied buildings | .059 | .059 | .079 | .465 | .103 | .507 | .150 | .051 |
| Blocked traffic | .011 | .032 | -.092 | .348 | .028 | .562 | -.021 | .060 |
| Damaged public facilities | -.004 | -.018 | -.019 | .275 | -.005 | .552 | -.023 | .048 |

Table 8.3. Dimensionality of political participation (Varimax rotation)
2001 (N = 2012) and 2002 (N = 2321)

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 2001: Cumulative variance: 48.54%. $\chi^2/\text{df}/\text{sig.} = 371.312/74/.000$; 2002: Cumulative variance: 48.99%. $\chi^2/\text{df}/\text{sig.} = 393.260/74/.000$.

The data reveal variation in political participation. What explains this variation? The following section is an attempt to answer this question by focusing primarily on religion, political engagement, socio-economic status (education, employment, social class, and household income) and some demographic variables (gender and age).

8.3. Islam and political participation

I turn now to the central question: the extent to which Islam is inimical to general political participation, that is political activity which is not defined specifically for an Islamic purpose. Bivariate statistics reveal how various Islamic components and dimensions of political participation correlate (Table 8.4).⁸⁷

No single component of Islam has a negative and significant correlation with any dimension of political participation. In fact, almost all Islamic components have positive and significant correlations with almost all dimensions of political participation. Voting is the only dimension of political participation that in general has no significant correlation with the components of Islam. This problem will be discussed below. However, Islam in general does not have a negative and significant correlation with voting.

To be more specific, the sets of suggested and Nahdliyin rituals, networks of Islamic civic engagement, NU identity, Muhammadiyah identity and Islamism all correlate positively and significantly with campaign activity and with community work. Most of these components also have positive and significant correlations with petitioning. However, their correlations with political protest are either inconsistent or insignificant.

⁸⁷ In these analyses voting is a dummy variable (voted = 1, did not vote = 0); the items of campaign activity are added to be a five point scale: never (0) to a lot (4); items of community activity are added to be a five-point scale: from never (0) to a lot (4); petition items are added to be a three-point scale: from “never” (0) to “a lot” (2); protest items are added to be a 7-point scale: from “never” (0) to “a lot” (7). Overall political activity is a 17-point additive scale: from “never” (0) to “a lot” (17). About scaling of the seven components of Islam, see Chapter 3.

These bivariate statistics help us to draw some preliminary conclusions about the correlation between Islam and political participation. First, the correlation is mixed. It depends on what component of Islam and on what dimension of political participation. Second, there is no single component of Islam which correlates negatively and significantly with political participation. Third, Islam, understood and institutionalized as suggested and Nahdliyin rituals, networks of Islamic civic engagement, NU identity, Muhammadiyah identity, and Islamism, has significant and positive correlations with political participation. This finding falsifies the sweeping generalization that participation is alien to the Muslim community because of its unique political culture inimical to democracy.

Huntington's claim that political participation is linked to Islamic objects of political participation is also falsified in the case of Indonesian Muslim society. Muslims participate in political activity regardless of the characteristics of the objects of participation, Islamic or non-Islamic. They attend local community meetings, organize the community to resolve common problems, work together, contact public officials, attend public meetings in campaign season, participate in party rallies, help political parties, organize and sign petitions for public issues, and even participate in demonstrations and other direct political actions. All these political activities correlate positively and significantly with Islam.

A fuller assessment of the relationship requires that other factors—demographic, socio-economic, secular civic engagement and political engagement—believed to have a

significant impact on political participation should be included in the analysis. Before doing so, I need to discuss briefly the relevant theoretical considerations and findings about the association between these factors and political participation.

a. Gender

Verba, Burns, and Schlozman (1997) argue that “women are less politically interested, informed, and efficacious than men and that this gender gap in political engagement has consequences for political participation.” However, gender *per se* does not explain the effect on political participation. They argue that the impact of gender on political participation is not very significant controlling for education and political factors such as interest, efficacy, and partisanship (cf. Burnes, Verba, and Schlozman, 2001). This issue has been discussed in Chapter 4. This chapter will focus on the impact of gender *per se* and other demographic variables, to the extent to which they affect the relationship between Islam and political participation.

b. Age

Age is believed to be a demographic factor that affects political participation. Milbrath (1966, 66) argues that “Political participation rises gradually with age, reaches its peak and levels off at the forties and fifties, and gradually declines above sixty.” Nie, Verba, and Kim (1974) argue that this decline is associated with education. Jennings and Markus (1989, 12) argue that “participation in the more demanding modes declined

following the transition to old age. Those declines were partly offset by increased involvement of the elderly in age-appropriate activities that can have direct political consequences.”

Strate et al (1989) believe that this impact is associated with civic engagement processes in which those who have been more involved in civic activity regardless of their age tend to be more involved as well in political activity. In this chapter I give attention to age as a variable to the extent that it decreases the effect of Islamic factors on political participation.

c. Socio-economy

Education is probably the single most important socio-economic factor in explanations of political participation (Conway 2000, 25; Wolfinger and Rosentone 1980, 9). The higher the level of education, the more likely a person is to participate in politics. There are several ways to explain this relationship (Conway, 2000). Better-educated citizens are likely to follow events in the media and be more aware of the consequences of a public policy which may affect their daily life. They are likely to live in an environment which encourages them to be politically active. They are likely to have more analytic capacity plus the relevant political knowledge and skills, and to be better prepared to discuss these matters with others (cf. Almond and Verba, 1962).

Some studies, however, tend to conclude that education provides a better ground for cynicism. The better-educated know that government cannot work as promised, and therefore they are likely to distrust it. They may think that politics serves elite interests only. In other words, education may encourage citizens to be alienated rather than to feel

efficacious. This view is supported by data on “conventional political participation” in which more educated people tend to distrust political parties and to be absent in voting in post-materialist Western Europe (Inglehart 1997, 152-56; Scarbrough 1995, 151; Topf, 1995, 48-49).⁸⁸ These conflicting views require further observation and assessment, part of which might be provided by the Indonesian case.

The importance of education also lies in the likelihood that modern education has a democratic enlightenment effect, that is, the dissemination of democratic values or principles. Students are more likely to be attentive to the values in which political participation is the core of democracy (see Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996).

In addition to education, occupation and income are believed to affect political participation. The relationship between income and political participation is explained as follows (Conway 2000). Citizens with better income have more time to follow political issues, while the poor give more attention to their immediate needs. Higher-income citizens are likely to live in an environment that encourages them to participate in politics. They are also likely to have better access at their workplace to information related to their occupation or other direct interests, which encourages participation.

Some studies suggest that occupation (employed relative to unemployed) and social class (salaried relative to working class) may affect political participation (Conway 2000; Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992). Unemployed citizens pay more attention to their immediate needs than to political activity (Rosenstone 1982, 33). Salaried workers have

⁸⁸ Inglehart emphasizes the importance of “formative security” rather than education itself for the formation of postmaterialist values. It is parents’ educational level in which children who are attentive to materialist values have already had better education.

more resources (money, time, skill and knowledge) than wage-earners (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Parry, Moyser, and Day (1992, 125-26) found in the case of Britain that salaried workers are the most likely to participate in overall political activity. On the basis of these findings, I simplify social class into two broad categories, i.e. the salaried (managers, clerks, civil servants, professionals) versus others (farmers and industrial laborers, manual self-employed in the informal sector) to explain political participation.

Place of employment is also believed to affect political participation (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Public sector employees, for example, are thought more likely to participate in politics. I argue that the connection of a sector to participation varies by country. In the United States, government workers and farm owners are believed to participate more than some other groups. The former directly experiences the impact of state policy, while the latter is heavily dependent for their livelihood on government tax, export and import policies (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).

In Indonesia, farm ownership is mostly small-scale, and few farmers are wealthy. The farm sector is the largest in terms of number of workers. These workers live mostly in rural areas, have lower levels of education, and are less attentive to farmer organizations which might mobilize them politically (cf. Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992).

d. Civic engagement and political engagement

Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) argue that people participate in politics not just because they have resources but because they are engaged in community affairs, and are therefore available for political mobilization, and also because they are willing to participate.

In thinking about why some people are active while others are not, we find it helpful to invert the usual question and to ask instead why people do not take part in politics. Three answers immediately suggest themselves: because they can't; because they don't want to; or because nobody asked. 'They can't' suggests a paucity of necessary resources - time to take part, money to contribute to campaigns and other political causes, and skills to use time and money effectively. 'They don't want to' focuses attention on the absence of *political engagement* - little interest in politics or little concern with public issues, little or no knowledge about the political process, or other priorities. 'Nobody asked' implies isolation from the networks of recruitment through which citizens are mobilized to politics. (1995, 15-16; italics mine)

This chapter focuses on two factors, networks of recruitment and political engagement. The networks of recruitment have to do with citizen engagement in various social groups. The logic underpinning the relationship between the networks and political participation is that civic engagement opens access to information and communication about public issues and therefore encourages citizens to be involved in politics. In addition, a person involved in a social group is likely to be available for political mobilization by the group. In Perry, Moyser, and Day 's words,

There are at least two ways in which groups can be important to participation. First, membership of groups can provide the individual with information about policies and actions which may affect his or her life. Through interacting with others who have like interests, persons become more aware of their social and political environment. Still more this should be so if a person is a member of a multiplicity of groups. In a sense, one has then an upward relationship with the group, using it as a resource. Secondly, where persons are members of a group, they are available to be mobilized in a downward relationship, by the group and its leaders. The group invite them to act in its own interests. It asks the member to take part in a protest march or to write a letter to a Member of Parliament. (1992, 85)

Perry, Moyser, and Day argue that civic engagement affects political engagement which in turn affects political participation. It is also likely that both civic engagement and political engagement have direct impacts on political participation, while civic engagement and political engagement interact (van Deth 1997, 12). The direct impacts are suggested by Olsen (1972).

Involvement in voluntary, special-interest, *nonpolitical associations* will in time activate individuals politically. There are many reasons why such participation can increase individual political activity: (1) It broadens one's sphere of interests and concerns, so that public affairs and public issues become more salient for him. (2) It brings an individual in contact with many new and diverse people, and the resulting relationships draw him into public affairs and political activity. (3) It increases one's information, trains him in social interaction and leadership skills, and provides other resources needed for effective political action. (1972, 318; italics in original)

What is the theoretical foundation of the relationship between political engagement and political participation? As discussed in Chapter 6, political engagement in this study includes political interest, partisanship, political information, political discussion, and political efficacy.

Willingness to participate is also a relevant variable (Conway 2000, 49). This proposition may be obvious to the point of tautological.⁸⁹ However, it seems plausible to argue that conceptually attitude (willingness) and behavior (participation) are different, and therefore not all people interested in politics necessarily participate (cf. Klingemann 1979, 264; Campbell, Gurin, Miller 1954, 33).

⁸⁹ For further discussion see van Deth (1989).

Partisanship is another component of political engagement believed to be important to political participation. Feeling close to or identification with a political party psychologically links one to political or public issues through the mediation of the party. Political parties establish sentiment and feeling among people about what is right and wrong and about who are “we” and who are “they” in political life. Perry, Moyser, and Day (1993, 190-1) argue that political parties "help to shape enduring outlooks of a wide section of the citizenry." This is a potentially powerful psychological force. Partisanship encourages a person to take part in politics, to support his or her party and to take part in other political actions.

Another component of political attitudes is political efficacy. As discussed in Chapter 6, political efficacy "refers to individuals' sense of personal competence in influencing the political system" (Reef and Knoke 1999, 414). Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954) long ago drew a clear relationship between political efficacy and political participation. Political efficacy is "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact on political process, i.e. that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties. It is the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change."

The other end of the spectrum of political efficacy or optimism is alienation, powerlessness or pessimism. An alienated citizen feels that the political system outside himself or herself is very complicated, not responsive, useless to his or her life. These feeling discourage participation (Parry, Moyser, and Day 1993, 172; Reef and Knoke 1999, 414).

Political information is another component of political engagement. Knowledge about political issues encourages participation as a citizen understands the importance of particular decisions and issues. Unlike the three components of political engagement, political information is cognitive rather than affective, but it is still an engagement, "cognitive engagement" (Zaller 1992, 42-43).

As discussed in Chapter 6, political discussion is talk rather than action, but it is not an attitude. Some studies have placed political discussion under the rubric of political engagement rather than participation. Unlike other components, political discussion indicates a clearer concern with and interest in politics (Norris 2002, 131).

These likely relationships between participant political culture or political engagement and political participation are part of the social economic status (SES) model of political participation in which SES is believed to be the main cause of political participation. Participant political culture is perceived to be the intervening factor that links SES and political participation (Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992; Verba and Nie 1972). However, in their Civic Voluntarism Model of political participation, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 269-71) define resources for political participation not only as SES but more extensively as social, including religious, institutions. As discussed in Chapter 4, religious institutions help their members to learn civic skills and to care about others.

Political participation, it will be recalled, is a multidimensional concept. In the case of Indonesian Muslims it includes voting, campaign work, community activity,

petition, and protest. The following section reveals the extent to which these forms of political participation are simultaneously affected by Islamic components, SES, and political engagement.

By including all these non-Islamic factors in a multivariate analysis, a more accurate conclusion about the relationship between Islam and political participation can be drawn. Prior to doing this, I need to show how the non-Islamic factors correlate with dimensions of political participation.⁹⁰

Bivariate statistics (Table 8.4) reveal that female gender correlates negatively with the four dimensions of political participation. This finding is not surprising, but requires further exploration of the extent to which SES and political engagement affect the correlation. It is likely that SES is the underlying factor. A less educated male, compared to a better educated female, is less likely to participate in politics.

Age correlates significantly with all dimensions of participation. It is also the only variable that does so. The correlation is positive. A positive, and significant, correlation is also found between age and community activity. The older are more likely to be active in community work. However, age has significant, but negative, correlations with campaign activity and with protest. This pattern is plausible as participation in campaigning and in protest activity requires more energy than does voting and community work.

As expected, education has a significant and positive correlation with almost all dimensions of political participation. However, it does not correlate with voting. In

⁹⁰ For coding and scaling for demographic and SES variables, see Chapter 3. For coding and scaling for political secular civic engagement see Chapter 4, and for political engagement, see Chapter 6.

addition to education, other social and economic variables, i.e. rural-urban cleavage (rural residency), occupation (the salaried) and income also do not correlate with voting or even with campaign activity.

The lack of a relationship between most social and economic variables and voting or campaign activity in the Indonesian case is puzzling. I tend to believe that voting is not a valid measure of political participation in contemporary Indonesia. In the factor analysis, the loading is very low. Close analysis of the relationship between Islam and SES on the one hand and voting on the other through the two survey data sets affirms my view that voting is not a valid measure of Indonesian political participation. Of course, it is also possible that the measure is not reliable in the two surveys. Or that the variation in voting is too small, and therefore requires no explanation. However, the lack of significance of SES, especially education, on voting is found in many democracies (Topt, 1995).

Not only SES, but almost all components of political engagement do not correlate significantly with voting (Table 8.4). Only partisanship has a significant, positive, and consistent correlation with voting. Again, this indicates that voting is probably an unreliable or invalid measure of political participation in the surveys. Indonesians do not need a particular psychological precondition such as interest in politics, political efficacy or feeling optimistic about the election or attentiveness to political news to participate in the 1999 election. Nor do they need very much time or money. Instead, almost everybody went to the ballot-box regardless of their SES, religious orientation, or psychological characteristics.

It is also important to describe here what voting means to Indonesians. In the 2002 data set, the principal reason given for voting is civic duty (42%). Further, a significant number of people participated in the 1999 election because they thought that voting is their right as a citizen of a democracy (20%). Another large group stated that they voted because everybody did (7%).

Voting for many appears to be an *expressive* rather than instrumental act.⁹¹ Only about 20% stated that they voted to elect representatives of the people, elect new leaders or improve the condition of the economy, security and order, leadership, reduce corruption, and so on.

About expressive political activity, Schuessler (2000, ix) argues:

many types of participation in collective activities—such as voting in large scale elections and participating in the consumption of mass-produced goods—represent instances in which individuals express and reaffirm, to others and to themselves, who they are... In such instances, the motivation that guides individuals' participation in these activities is one of *expressive attachment*: through their participation, these voters and consumers express who they are, and they *attach* to a collective that they feel is like them. (italics in original)

From this perspective, most Indonesians voted because this kind of participation helps define who they are, whether they are good and responsible citizens or not. Even when they state that voting is their political right, they connect this right to Indonesian citizenship. When they say that voting is a form of democratic activity, they do not relate it to a particular goal such as support for a preferred party or candidate. Instead, they

⁹¹ Some studies indicate that “conventional political behavior” in a particular polity, such as voting, is more ritualistic, symbolic, habitual, or expressive than instrumental. See for example Schuessler (2000), Richardson (1997, 1986), Milsner (1970, 1966). Liddle (1973, 6) implied that Indonesian voting patterns indicated the ritualistic nature of much political participation.

voted in the election because they wished to express that they are democratic, a term which has a positive meaning in the society. They also saw the election as a "fiesta." One respondent exclaimed that "the election is a democratic fiesta every five years, and I enjoy it!"

There is of course an instrumental element to joining the party, going along with the crowd. Failure to vote might have been perceived as dereliction of duty, avoidance of one's duty as a member of the national community. This reaction to social pressure is rational in the sense that it is a consciously-chosen strategy to avoid social punishment. However, it is not rational if "rationality" is perceived as a calculation to achieve the goal of electing a candidate or party which will fight for one's interest in local or national politics. There are rational Indonesian voters in this latter sense, but they are few in number.

Why did campaign activity not correlate with income and the salaried class? I tend to argue that campaign activity in Indonesia is like a festival, too, in which the citizens, regardless of SES, participate to celebrate freedoms so long restricted by the authoritarian regime. In the campaign season, mass media reported party campaigning intensively. Many people, including children and teenagers, enjoyed the party rallies, marches, and public meetings. Many people in both rural and urban areas voluntarily established centers for mass mobilization, especially for the PDI-P, known as party "pos komunikasi" (communication post) or *posko*. Thousands of youth from the lower classes participated in this activity to help their parties.

There is no systematic study of the *posko* and its participants. Journalists and political observers speculate that the *poskos* were established to support the victims of

New Order politics, especially the PDI-P. People showed their solidarity with the party not because of its platform but because it had been treated unjustly by the New Order. Megawati, chairperson of the party, is a daughter of the charismatic former President Sukarno, who was also a victim of New Order politics. Her party's platform is barely distinguishable from many other parties, which also emphasize economic populism or nationalism and secularism on religio-political issues.⁹²

Despite their lack of relationship to voting and campaign activity, social and economic variables (education, social class, occupation, and income) have significant and positive correlations with most dimensions of political activity and with overall political activity (Table 8.5). The educated, the wealthy, and the salaried have more resources (especially analytical skills, time and money) to participate in political activity. This finding verifies the SES model of political participation that has been tested in many democracies (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992).

As discussed above, people participate in politics not only because they have a higher SES but also because they are already participants in civic life and are available for further mobilization, and because they are willing to participate. The data set confirms this assertion for Indonesia. Secular civic engagement and all dimensions of political engagement have significant and positive correlations with almost all

⁹² About the parties' platforms see Kompas (1999) and API (2001).

dimensions of political participation. On average, their correlations are the strongest relative to those of SES and Islamic factors. The SES or civic voluntarism model of political participation is probably an accurate rendition of the Indonesian case.

To what extent does Islam have a direct relationship with political participation? Multivariate analyses (Table 8.5 through 8.9) help with this assessment.⁹³

In Model 1 of campaign activity, most Islamic components still have a direct and positive impact on political activity. Regardless of education and some demographic variables, suggested rituals, Nahdliyin rituals, Muhammadiyah identity, Islamic civic engagement, and Islamism significantly affect campaign activity. However, these direct impacts mostly diminish in Model 2. From that model, we can see that secular civic engagement and political engagement shape the way Islam is linked to campaign activity.

Piety and Islamic civic engagement themselves are not sufficient to explain a Muslim's participation in campaign activity. He or she needs as well socio-economic resources, secular civic engagement, and political engagement. However, Islamism still has a direct impact on campaign activity regardless of the other factors. In Indonesia and other Muslim countries, Islamists are more active in politics than non-Islamists.

⁹³ In addition to the four dimensions of political participation, overall political participation is a dependent variable in this analysis. Therefore, five dependent variables are analyzed here: campaign activity, community activity, petition activity, and protest. See footnote 10 above for information about coding and scaling of the five variables of political participation. In the multivariate analyses, independent variables are selected according to their significance in the bivariate statistics. Each explanation of the dependent variables is based on two models: (1) Islamic components plus socio-economic and demographic factors as the independent variables; (2) Islamic components, socio-economic and demographic factors, plus secular civic engagement, and political engagement (adding interest in politics, partisanship, political information, and political discussion; and political efficacy).

| | Voting | Campaign | Community | Petition | Protest | Overall |
|--------------------------|------------------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Mandatory rituals | -.01* (.00*) | .00* (-.02*) | .02* (.05) | .03* (-.03*) | -.04* (-.03*) | .01* (-.02*) |
| Suggested rituals | .05 (.04*) | 11 (.07) | 26 (.32) | .07 (.07) | .01* (.05) | 20 (22) |
| Nahdliyin rituals | .04* (.00) | .04 (.07) | .16 (.19) | .07 (.07) | .01 (.05) | .09 (.15) |
| NU | .03 (-.02) | 11 (.11) | 16 (12) | .08 (.07) | .02* (.01*) | 16 (.14) |
| Muhammadiyah | .03 (-.01) | 16 (.08) | 16 (.18) | .07 (.08) | .06 (.03*) | .19 (.16) |
| Islamic civic engagement | .07** (.03) | .16 (.13) | .25 (.22) | .11 (.07) | .03* (.01*) | .24 (.19) |
| Islamism | .00 (.02) | .06 (.08) | .07 (-.05) | .03* (.06) | .08 (.04*) | .11 (.06) |
| Male | .03 (-.02) | 17 (.16) | .30 (.29) | .05 (.07) | .04* (.08) | .25 (.26) |
| Age | .13** (.07**) | -12 (.06) | .07 (.14) | .01* (.01*) | -.12 (-.09) | -.08 (.01*) |
| Rural resident | .02 (.02) | .01* (.01*) | .07 (.14) | .01* (.01*) | -.01* (-.04*) | .03* (-.02*) |
| Education | .00 (-.04) | .15 (.05) | .10 (.20) | .07 (.10) | .08 (.11) | .18 (.19) |
| Salaried | .00 (-.04) | -.01* (-.06**) | .04 (.13) | .04 (.03*) | .04 (.02*) | .05 (.06) |
| Income | .01 (-.03) | .03 (.00) | .05 (.14) | .03* (.07) | .02* (.04*) | .06 (.10) |
| Interest | .05 (.02*) | .36 (.28) | .25 (.27) | .22 (.14) | .16 (.11) | .40 (.36) |
| Partisanship | .06 (.07) | .30 (.37) | .18 (.19) | .12 (.10) | .09 (.04) | .30 (.31) |
| Efficacy | .03* (.02*) | .10 (.06) | .16 (.06) | .12 (.08) | .07 (.01) | .17 (.16) |
| Newspaper | .01* (.01) | .13 (.12) | .17 (.23) | .10 (.07) | .10 (.14) | .21 (.24) |
| Discussion | .03* (.00*) | .36 (.29) | .27 (.32) | .20 (.14) | .25 (.14) | .42 (.40) |
| Overall engagement | .05 (.02*) | .42 (.38) | .32 (.38) | .24 (.17) | .21 (.17) | .49 (.48) |
| Secular civic engagement | .05 (.01*) | .25 (.11) | .45 (.41) | .24 (.24) | .16 (.15) | .43 (.40) |

Table 8.4. Correlations of (*r*) Islamic components, demographic variables, socio-economic status, political engagement, and political activities 2002 (2001)
All correlations are significant at .05 or better except with the asterisk (*).

In the 1999 campaign season, many observers were optimistic about the electoral chances of the Islamist parties. This was especially true of PK, which had large crowds at its rallies. In the event, however, the party did not have many constituents, receiving only about 1% of the vote. Probably a majority of PK voters were enthusiastic activists who turned out for the rallies! Clearly more research is needed on the relationship between Islamism and party activism.

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|--------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | 2001 | 2002 | 2001 | 2002 |
| Suggested rituals | .053 | .076** | -.004 | .012 |
| Nahdliyin rituals | .066* | .054* | .035 | .026 |
| NU identity | .044 | .026 | -.027 | .005 |
| Muhammadiyah identity | .085** | .132** | .047 | .068* |
| Islamic civic engagement | .084** | .099** | .051 | .040 |
| Islamism | .129** | .071** | .107** | .063* |
| Education | .057* | .115** | -.087** | -.051 |
| Rural residence | -.039 | .010 | -.019 | .012 |
| Age | -.123** | -.130** | -.061* | -.108** |
| Gender: Male | .197** | .189** | .121** | .125** |
| Secular civic engagement | - | - | .004 | .096** |
| Political engagement | - | - | .459** | .374** |
| Political efficacy | - | - | -.013 | .046 |
| Adjusted R ² | .096 | .121 | .250 | .237 |
| N | 1442 | 1479 | 1242 | 1295 |

Table 8.5. Multivariate analysis of campaign activity (standardized regression coefficients).

** $P < .01$, * $P < .05$

In the two surveys, Islamism did not have a significant relationship with community activity. In Model 1 of community activity, almost all components of Islam

have direct and positive impacts regardless of socio-economic and demographic factors. Model 2 reveals that the impacts are quite stable regardless of variation in secular civic engagement and political engagement.

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|--------------------------|---------|--------|---------|--------|
| | 2001 | 2002 | 2001 | 2002 |
| Suggested rituals | .206** | .169** | .133** | .138** |
| Nahdliyin rituals | .140** | .125** | .072** | .092** |
| NU | -.048 | .009 | -.065 | -.004 |
| Muhammadiyah identity | .085** | .139** | .045 | .079** |
| Islamic civic engagement | .151** | .161** | .112** | .075** |
| Islamism | -.045 | .017 | -.071** | .018 |
| Education | .187** | .094** | .044 | -.000 |
| Rural residence | .051* | .087** | .058* | .079** |
| Age | .046 | .031 | .064** | .049* |
| Gender: Male | .227** | .284** | .183** | .224** |
| Secular civic engagement | - | - | .224** | .311** |
| Political engagement | - | - | .213** | .143** |
| Political efficacy | - | - | .146** | .045 |
| Adjusted R ² | .219 | .235 | .351 | .350 |
| N | 1464 | 1486 | 1247 | 1305 |

Table 8.6. Multivariate analysis of community activity (standardized regression coefficients)
 ** $P < .01$, * $P < .05$

In Model 1 of petition activity, some Islamic components still have direct and positive relationships, especially Muhammadiyah identity, regardless of education and some demographic variables. However, in Model 2, these impacts diminish. Political engagement is the strongest predictor of petition activity. Petition activity which is quite infrequent in the society requires citizens to be engaged in more diverse community

activities, not only Islamic but also secular, and to be engaged in politics. Engagement in religious activity and socio-economic resources are not sufficient to make citizens sign or organize petitions to advance public concerns.

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|--------------------------|---------|--------|---------|--------|
| | 2001 | 2002 | 2001 | 2002 |
| Suggested rituals | .084** | .033 | .029 | -.023 |
| Nahdliyin rituals | .126** | .017 | .086** | -.013 |
| NU identity | .017 | .040 | .003 | .045 |
| Muhammadiyah identity | .089** | .059* | .057* | .002 |
| Islamic civic engagement | .058* | .118** | .007 | .064* |
| Islamism | .098** | .037 | .079** | .030 |
| Education | .155** | .087** | .039 | -.014 |
| Rural residence | .013 | .046 | .006 | .030 |
| Age | .028 | -.001 | -.008 | .013 |
| Gender: Male | .112** | .100** | .084** | .072** |
| Secular civic engagement | - | - | .213** | .146** |
| Political engagement | - | - | .201** | .169** |
| Political efficacy | - | - | .061* | .088** |
| Adjusted R ² | .082 | .048 | .183 | .100 |
| N | 1464 | 1497 | 1257 | 1313 |

Table 8.7. Multivariate analysis of petition activity (standardized regression coefficients).
 ** $P < .01$, * $P < .05$

Almost the same pattern occurs in the relationship between Islam and political protest. Model 1 and Model 2 of protest activity indicate that almost all components of Islam do not have a direct impact on political protest. It requires more socio-economic resources, more secular civic engagement, and more political engagement to participate in protests. However, Islamism does have a direct and positive impact on protest activity regardless of socio-economic resources, secular civic engagement, and political

engagement. The more Islamist a Muslim, the more likely he or she is to be active in protests. This confirms the conventional wisdom that Islamists, relative to non-Islamist Muslims, are more active in protests.

In many Indonesian cities, Islamists are often seen on the streets protesting policies or political decisions which they feel threaten Islam or the Muslim community. As discussed in Chapter 2, Islamist groups actively demonstrated in the streets to force the People's Consultative Assembly to pass a constitutional amendment on Islamic law. They also protest the policies of foreign government, like the United States' invasion of Iraq. On this occasion, the PK organized the largest march, in which as many as a million people participated, in Jakarta.

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|--------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | 2001 | 2002 | 2001 | 2002 |
| Suggested rituals | .060* | .019 | .022 | -.002 |
| Nahdliyin rituals | .050 | .007 | .020 | -.014 |
| NU identity | .012 | .001 | -.009 | -.002 |
| Muhammadiyah identity | .018 | .073** | .005 | .041 |
| Islamic civic engagement | .017 | .039 | -.001 | -.005 |
| Islamism | .068* | .111** | .041 | .110** |
| Education | .099** | .110** | .042 | .027 |
| Rural residence | -.043 | -.003 | -.022 | -.006 |
| Age | -.120** | -.126** | -.109** | -.118** |
| Gender: Male | .134** | .077** | .095** | .052 |
| Secular civic engagement | | - | .114** | .083** |
| Political engagement | | - | .129** | .159** |
| Political efficacy | | - | .008 | .038 |
| Adjusted R ² | .046 | .051 | .069 | .080 |
| N | 1464 | 1492 | 1255 | 1310 |

Table 8.8. Multivariate analysis of protest activity (standardized regression coefficients)
 ** $P < .01$, * $P < .05$

Again, it is not very clear why Islamists are likely to be more active in protests. Of course, Islamism itself is an ideological force which encourages its proponents to take risks. They believe that their protest is part of a religious call. Casualties or even death are positively valued. For Abdul Aziz, an Islamist activist who was involved in several church bombings and the Bali night clubs bombing, death meant martyrdom. Jihad, war to defend Islam, is a religious obligation. Huntington, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, is correct when he states that Islamists are more active protesters.

More broadly, my data show that Islam in general contributes positively to political participation, at least indirectly through Islamic social capital and secular civic engagement. Model 1 of overall political participation, suggested rituals, Nahdlyin rituals, Muhammadiyah identity, Islamic civic engagement, and Islamism have direct and significant impacts on overall political participation regardless of demographic and socio-economic factors. Model 2 indicates that some of the Islamic components—Islamic civic engagement, Muhammadiyah identity, and Islamism—still have direct and positive impacts on overall political participation regardless of secular civic engagement and political engagement. These components of Islam are in fact more independent than education, whose direct impact diminishes when civic engagement and political engagement are included in the equation.

These findings further disconfirms the claim that in Muslim community political participation is an alien concept and, if any political participation it will be linked to religious affiliation. It is true that political participation, as understood today, was an alien concept in Muslim society. Of course, it was also an alien concept not so long ago in Western society. Indonesian Muslims, like people in the West or elsewhere, are not

likely to be tightly determined by their past. They have the capacity to evaluate new institutions and accommodate to them as seems appropriate. Political tradition is important, but it changes, however slowly, and it has certainly changed among Indonesian Muslims.

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|--------------------------|---------|--------|---------|--------|
| | 2001 | 2002 | 2001 | 2002 |
| Suggested rituals | .158** | .124** | .077** | .055* |
| Nahdliyin rituals | .146** | .088** | .074* | .044 |
| NU identity | .007 | .023 | -.043 | .004 |
| Muhammadiyah identity | .100** | .170** | .052* | .087** |
| Islamic civic engagement | .132** | .158** | .075** | .063* |
| Islamism | .088** | .078** | .053* | .074** |
| Education | .176** | .163** | -.009 | -.017 |
| Rural residence | -.012 | -.056* | .007 | -.051* |
| Age | .078** | .089** | -.031 | .062* |
| Gender: Male | .266** | .266** | .185** | .190** |
| Secular civic engagement | - | - | .178** | .239** |
| Political engagement | - | - | .415** | .355** |
| Political efficacy | - | - | .078** | .073** |
| Adjusted R ² | .209 | .266 | .401 | .391 |
| N | 1364 | 1421 | 1195 | 1284 |

Table 8.9. Multivariate analysis of overall political participation (standardized regression coefficients). ** $P < .01$, * $P < .05$.

Indonesian Muslims have participated in politics regardless of the characteristics of the participation object, religious or non-religious. They voted for various political parties, Islamist and secular. They participated in local community political activity, in campaigns, in petitions, and in protests, regardless of religious characteristics. A majority disagree with the view that only Islamist parties be allowed to compete (Chapter 3). They disagree that a woman be denied the chance of becoming a political leader,

which was alien in Muslim political culture. Muslims who perform the mandatory and Nahdliyin rituals, who identify themselves with NU and Muhammadiyah, have no connection to Islamism, a set of ideas rooted in the old tradition.

The question is not whether Islam is inimical to political participation but rather why the correlation is significant and positive in post-Suharto Indonesia. Chapters 3 and 4 have shown that Islamic rituals shape Muslims' engagement in Islamic civic association which in turn contributes to secular civic engagement and political engagement. These two factors affect political participation.

The significant impact of Islamism on political protest suggests the need for further inquiry into the extent to which "Islamist activism" correlates with support for democratic values and political tolerance. This issue will be discussed in the next chapter.

Here, I want to just briefly argue that the positive impact of Islam in general on political participation is very likely due to the fact that the Islamic rituals have a social characteristic which predisposes individual Muslims to be socially engaged. This in turn contributes to non-religious civic engagement and finally to political participation.

The Islamic rituals, especially the suggested (sunnah) rituals such as religious group study (*pengajian* or *majlis taklim*) and collective prayer (*sembahyang berjamaah*) are often conducted with others. Examples are reciting the Qur'an on various occasions, 'Idul Fitri and 'Idul Adha prayers, and *shalat tarawih* during the fasting month of Ramadhan. This religious collective behavior helps participants to communicate to each other about various community or public issues. They are therefore likely to be encouraged to participate more generally in social and political activity.

The Nahdliyin ritual component also has in general a positive impact on overall political participation. It correlates significantly with campaign work, community work, and petitioning. Like the suggested ritual component, it has social content and implications. The *tahlilan*, *khaul*, the seventh day commemoration of a death (*tujuh harian*), visiting shrines, are collectively performed and therefore social. Social and political issues are often discussed and plans for action prepared.

Those who are engaged in Islamic organization at the local or national level are likely to be more informed about social and political issues in general and to be more involved in social and political activities. Religious organizations such as the NU and Muhammadiyah network with political parties, providing access that leads to greater involvement.

All these characteristics of Indonesian Islam constitute a vast web of social and political resources similar to that found in other studies of religion and political participation (Wald 1992). The relationship between Islam and overall political participation can be more clearly explicated through a path analysis in which socio-economic factors, secular civic engagement, and political engagement are included. This pattern is similar to the civic voluntarism model of political participation developed by Verba, Scholzman, and Brady (1995).

Islam as a set of obligatory rituals affects the suggested rituals as discussed in Chapter 3. These suggested rituals affect the Nahdliyin rituals, Islamism, NU identity, Muhammadiyah identity, and the networks of Islamic civic engagement. The Nahdliyin rituals themselves positively and significantly affect NU identity, but negatively and significantly affect Muhammadiyah identity.

Islamism does not have a significant relationship with either NU or Muhammadiyah identity. These two identities affect more strongly than Islamism the network of Islamic civic engagement. Finally, the networks of Islamic civic engagement affect the networks of secular civic engagement, political engagement, and political participation. In addition, the secular civic engagement affects directly political engagement and political participation.

8.4. Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, I will state more explicitly the most important findings. First, Islam defined by mandatory rituals, suggested rituals, Nahdliyin rituals, Islamic civic engagement, NU identity, Muhammadiyah identity and Islamism is not inimical to democracy defined by political participation. There is no negative and significant association between the two. This finding rejects the assertion of Huntington and other scholars that political participation is alien to Islam.

Second, Muslims participate in politics regardless of the object of participation, Islamic or non-Islamic. This finding rejects the claim that Muslims tend to participate in politics if the object of participation is linked to Islam. Third, almost all of the Islamic components have positive and significant correlations with overall political participation. Some of them even have a direct impact on overall political participation regardless of secular civic engagement and political engagement, which have strong relationships with political participation. However, the Islamic impact on political participation is in

general indirect. It is mediated by secular civic engagement and political engagement. This pattern fits the civic voluntarism model of political participation in which religious engagement is defined as a part of civic voluntarism.

Fourth, Islamists appear to be absent from community activity. Instead, they channel their political participation through protest. Does this indicate that they are alienated from the democratic system? Might they be potential destabilizers of a democratic polity? These questions will be explored in the next chapter, where they will be placed within a broader discussion of the relationship between political participation and support for democracy.

CHAPTER 9

THE CONGRUENCE BETWEEN ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY

In order to be consolidated, a democracy requires congruence between citizens and the democratic system. This chapter will demonstrate the extent to which Indonesian Islam is congruent with democracy.

9.1. Congruence between the components of democracy

Each component in a society and polity should reinforce each other. At the more diffuse level of the democratic system, four system components—support for the political community, support for democratic principles, democratic satisfaction, and trust in political institution—are supposed to reinforce each other.

At the societal level, religion should strengthen non-religious components in the society, that is civil society, and civil society in turn should strengthen political engagement. Political engagement encourages political participation, which is expected to strengthen support for the democratic system.

As noted in Chapter 7, political community, democratic principles, and satisfaction with democratic performance significantly correlate in the Indonesian case.

However, trust in political institutions among Indonesian Muslims does not correlate with democratic principles and political community. It does correlate with satisfaction with democratic performance.

Almond and Verba (1963) state that trust in political institutions is crucial to stable democracy. The argument is that trust allows the government to work effectively without unnecessary interruptions and disturbances. As a matter of fact, trust in political institutions is low everywhere in modern democracies (see Chapter 6), but there is no indication that those democracies are in decline because of the low trust (Klingemann and Fuchs 1995).

A challenge to the democratic system as a whole will occur only "if citizens withdraw their support from the state as a whole, or from the core of structural elements" (Fuchs and Klingemann 1995, 434). This core is mainly support for democratic principles. Norris (1999, 270) similarly argues that "there are genuine causes for concern about the issue of public trust in government, nevertheless the evidence ... suggests that the sky is not falling down for democracy."

Norris (1999) believes that distrust in political institutions is associated with a critical citizenry. The number of critical citizens increases when the gap widens between ideal democracy and the performance of political institutions. Norris warns that distrust may produce democratic instability, particularly in new democracies. In stable democracies, public distrust encourages institutional reforms to meet public expectations. In my view, distrust in political institutions is likely to produce democratic instability if distrustful citizens protest in non-conventional ways, as opposed to channeling their views through elections and normal interest group activity. In addition, distrust in

political participation is potentially destabilizing for democracy if it is combined with political engagement and channeled through protest activity. Otherwise, distrust does not matter.

In the case of Indonesia trust in political institutions is not related to political engagement, and especially not to level of political information (Chapter 6). High trust in political institutions is likely to reflect naïve citizens, who trust without appropriate information. They also lack education, as better-educated citizens tend to distrust political institutions (Chapter 6). However, politically engaged citizens support democratic principles and tend to feel satisfied with current democratic performance. In this sense, critical citizens are congruent with the core of democratic system. In other words, political engagement integrates citizens who are critical with political institutions to the system as a whole.

Citizens are also connected to government by civic associations through which they are informed about political or public issues. They are interested in politics, and tend to identify with a political party. Civic associations help citizen to be integrated into the system (Chapter 4).

Islam in Indonesia helps Muslims to be more involved in civic associations, to be engaged in politics, and therefore to be integrated into the system. There is no indication that Islam discourages Muslims from involvement in secular civic associations and secular political engagement. Islam is congruent with these two components of democracy, which integrate Muslims into the system as whole.

Islam helps not only to integrate Muslims into the system at the attitudinal but also the behavioral level. It helps them to be involved in democratic practice, i.e.

political participation (Chapter 8). However, the extent to which political participation affects support for democracy needs further exploration. Does it strengthen or weaken democracy? I argue that political participation without commitment to democracy may produce instability. The two components should reinforce each other to make democracy stable.

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|---|---------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|--------------|---------|--------|
| 2 | .28 (.24) | - | | | | | | |
| 3 | .15 (.18) | .09 (.06) | - | | | | | |
| 4 | .09 (.10) | -.12 (.16) | .21 (.20) | - | | | | |
| 5 | .06 (.10) | .04* (.00*) | .15 (.17) | .18 (.25) | - | | | |
| 6 | .21 (.15) | .33 (.31) | .00* (-.03*) | -.06 (-.01*) | .17 (.09) | - | | |
| 7 | -.06 (.10) | .10 (.05) | .02* (.0*) | .03* (.03*) | .03* (.07) | .13 (.06) | - | |
| 8 | .04* (.11) | (-.14) | .03* (.03*) | .11 (.11) | .04 (.04) | (-.26) | (-.01*) | - |
| 9 | (.11) | (.21) | .03* (.03*) | .00* (.00*) | .04 (.04) | (.26) | (.07) | (-.18) |

Table 9.1. Correlations (Pearson's *r*) of the Components of Democratic Political Culture 2001 (2002).

1 = secular civic engagement; 2 = political engagement, 3 = political efficacy, 4 = trust in political institutions; 5 = democratic satisfaction; 6 = democratic values; 7 = socio-political tolerance; 8 = general political tolerance; 9 = political community.

All correlations are significant at .05 or better except with the asterisk (*).

Bivariate statistics (Table 9.2) reveal how political participation correlates with support for the democratic system. Among Indonesian Muslims, political participation and support for democratic principles reinforce each other. In other words, participation

is congruent with democracy. Political participation is not likely to destabilize democracy at the level of principles. In addition, there is no indication that overall political participation significantly decreases trust in political institution and satisfaction with democratic performance.

However, as mentioned previously, a threat to democratic stability may come from alienated citizens who channel their political participation in political protest. Does this pattern occur among Indonesian Muslims?

| | Trust | Satisfaction | Democratic principles | Political community |
|-----------|------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| Voting | .065** (.002) | .052* (-.003) | .082** (-.023) | .013 |
| Campaign | -.007 (-.034) | .019 (-.034) | .205** (.143**) | .158** |
| Community | .022 (-.001) | .039 (.066*) | .174** (.282**) | .160** |
| Petition | .030 (.029) | .017 (.006) | .092** (.155**) | .050* |
| Protest | .007 (-.036) | -.010 (-.098**) | .071** (.089**) | .042 |
| Overall | .005 (-.025) | .028 (-.001) | .222** (.265**) | .175** |

Table 9.2. Correlations Between Participation and Support for Democratic System 2002 (2001).

** and *Correlation significant at .01 and .05 respectively

9.2. Islam, political alienation, and political protest

A combination of political engagement and political trust may produce four types of citizens: allegiant, alienated, naïve, and apathetic citizens.⁹⁴ Allegiant citizens are politically engaged or efficacious and trust political institutions. This type of citizen is believed to be engaged exclusively in institutionalized political participation such as voting and campaign or party related activity (Seligson 1980, 77). Alienated citizens are politically engaged but have no faith in political institutions. They feel that they are competent but that political institutions do not function as hoped. They are therefore likely to channel their interest or competence through "extra-institutionalized" forms of political participation such as demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, etc. (Gamson 1968, 48; Muller 1977).

The naïve citizen is one who is not politically engaged or efficacious but trusts political institutions. He or she simply trusts political institutions or government without a sense of competence to influence decisions. This citizen is likely not to participate in politics because he or she feels both incompetent and relatively certain that the government knows what is best. Apathetic citizens are not politically engaged or efficacious but at the same time distrust political institutions. They are likely to be absent from politics.

In democratic theory as discussed in Chapter 8, citizen participation is important to inform the elite about popular interests. If political participation is absent then the elite may be constrained (or at least not pressed) in its efforts to make good decisions.

⁹⁴ Seligson (1980) depict a similar typology: allegiant activist, alienated activist, alienated apathetic, and allegiant apathetic.

A large amount of "extra institutionalized" or "mobilized" political participation (Seligson 1980) may also constrain democratic stability (Huntington 1968, 55; Seligson 1980). Huntington argues that political participation or political mobilization without political institutionalization will threaten political stability. If alienated citizens engage in protest activity or mobilized extra-system participation the consequences are negative for democratic stability. For democratic stability, allegiant citizens are the most desirable type. They are more likely to channel their political participation institutionally in ways that strengthen democracy as a whole.

As noted above, the four types of citizen are constructed from various combinations of political efficacy and trust in political institutions. Some studies suggest that particular combinations will reveal the size of the alienated group, in particular the combinations of trust and interest in politics (Kaase, 1979), and of trust and political information (Seligson, 1980). The combinations of political discussion and trust and of partnership and trust may also produce alienated citizens. Political discussion may produce efficacy. Through discussion, one may become more informed about politics or about government performance. He or she then knows more about what the government is supposed to do for the people. This may result in alienated citizens who destabilize democracy if they channel their dissatisfaction or distrust via political protest.

Partisanship helps to integrate citizens into the party system which is a part of the democratic system as a whole. However, partisanship may produce alienated citizens if it is accompanied by distrust in political institutions. This pattern may occur if the governmental institutions do not perform as expected. Partisanship implies a positive

feeling about a particular political party as an aggregator of societal interests. Distrust in other political institutions combined with partisanship, however, may result in alienated citizens.

As discussed in Chapter 6, political efficacy correlates positively with trust in political institutions in Indonesia. But the four elements of political engagement correlate negatively with trust in political institutions. This indicates that the four components of political engagement may produce alienated Indonesian citizens who channel their dissatisfaction or distrust via protest activity rather than conventional political activity, which may in turn destabilize the democratic system.

Table 9.3 through Table 9.7 display the percentages of the four type of citizens according to the five components of political engagement: political efficacy, interest in politics, political information, political discussion, and partisanship. A majority of Indonesian Muslims are apathetic or naïve citizens. Those who are alienated or allegiant are relatively few (about 20%). This evidence suggests that a majority of Indonesians are not yet integrated into political institutions.⁹⁵

As expected, apathetic and naïve Indonesian Muslims are likely to be absent from political activity. Their apathetic and naïve characteristics decrease their political activity. Those who are not informed about politics, are uninterested in political matters,

⁹⁵ For this combination, the five-point scale of trust in political institutions is recoded as trust (more than 3) (1), and distrust (1-3) (0). The four-point scale of political efficacy is recoded as two categories: not efficacious at all and some efficacious to be non-efficacious (0); the four point-point scale of interest in politics is recoded to be a 0-1 scale: very interested and quite interested to be interested (1), and a little interested and not interested at all to be disinterested (0); the four-point scale of political discussion to be a 0-1 scale: very often or quite often (1), rarely or never (0); the five-point scale of political information is recoded to be 0-1 scale: 1 through 3 to be 0, more than 3 to be 1. The four-point scale of partisanship is recoded to be partisan (very close or quite close) (1) and not partisan (a little close or not close at all) (0).

never or rarely discuss politics, do not identify themselves with parties, and are not efficacious, and distrust political institutions, tend not to participate in politics. Similarly, those who are not informed about politics, are uninterested in political matters, never or rarely discuss politics, do not identify themselves with parties, and are not efficacious but nonetheless trust in political institutions, are also absent from political activity.

Conversely, alienated and allegiant citizens tend to be more involved in politics. The data indicate that the alienated and the allegiant do not differ in the forms of political participation through which they channel their political engagement. Both types are more likely to be active not only in protest but also in other forms of political participation: campaign activity, community activity, and petitioning.

The hypothesis that alienated citizens are more likely to engage in protest activity is not verified among Indonesian Muslims. Alienated Indonesian Muslims tend to be active not only in protest but also in other forms of political participation. In addition, their impact on various forms of political participation is not stronger than that of allegiant citizens.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Several tests of the Gamson hypothesis about the relationship between a combination of political efficacy and political trust were undertaken without combining political trust and political efficacy that produce the four types of citizens (Piage, 1970; Muller, 1977; Seligson, 1980). Seligson's four types of activists are not followed up with the analysis of the impact of the four types of activist on forms of political participation. Those tests treat trust and efficacy as two separate factors. Therefore the outcomes are the relationship between political trust and political participation, and political efficacy and political participation, rather than between the four types of citizen and different forms of political participation. If this strategy is followed the outcome is similar to Muller (1977) in which political trust does not while political efficacy does have a significant relationship with political protest. However, this conclusion is quite different from Seligson (1980). She found that political trust has a significant impact on mobilized participation but does not have a significant relationship with institutionalized participation. These different conclusions probably lie in different measures of political trust, political efficacy, and two forms of political participation. Seligson includes community efficacy and efficacy skills into her concept of political efficacy. My political efficacy is restricted to what Seligson calls "subjective competence." If analysis is restricted to this dimension of political efficacy, her political efficacy does not have a significant relationship with overall institutionalized participation.

Allegiant citizens, like alienated citizens, are likely to be more politically active. They produce both conventional and unconventional forms of political activity. Allegiant and alienated Indonesian Muslim citizens do not produce different forms of political participation. This finding suggests that among Indonesian Muslims there is no destabilizing effect as the alienated citizens do not disproportionately channel their dissatisfaction with government into political protest.

| Trust | Yes | No |
|----------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Efficacy | | |
| Yes | Allegiant (13.3%) | Alienated (7.8) |
| No | Naïve (34.4) | Apathetic (44.5) |

Table 9.3. Typology of citizens according to the combination of political efficacy and trust in political institutions (N = 2035)

The problem with Indonesian Muslims is not that they are alienated destabilizers of democracy through unconventional political activity, but rather that they are naïve and apathetic non-participants. A majority of Indonesian citizens are not integrated into the political system. To what extent is Islam responsible for shaping these naïve and apathetic citizens?

Bivariate statistics (Table 9.9) reveal that there is no component of Islam which significantly contributes to the number of apathetic citizens. On the contrary, most

components of Islam have a positive and significant correlation with most characteristics of allegiant citizenry. Islam encourages Muslims to be oriented toward the political system, to contribute to the formation of an allegiant citizenry.

| Trust Information | Yes | No |
|----------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Yes | Allegiant (7.8%) | Alienated (10.3) |
| No | Naïve (40.4) | Apathetic (41.4) |

Table 9.4. Typology of citizens according to the combination of political efficacy and political trust (N = 2035)

| Trust Interest | Yes | No |
|-------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Yes | Allegiant (13.7%) | Alienated (13.3) |
| No | Naïve (35.4) | Apathetic (37.6) |

Table 9.5. Typology of citizens according to the combination of interest in politics and political trust (N = 2035)

| Trust Discussion | Yes | No |
|---------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Yes | Allegiant (7.0%) | Alienated (10.6) |
| No | Naïve (41.2) | Apathetic (41.3) |

Table 9.6. Typology of citizens according to the combination of political efficacy and political trust (N = 2035)

| | | |
|--------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Trust | Yes | No |
| Partisanship | | |
| Yes | Allegiant (11.3%) | Alienated (11.5) |
| No | Naïve (36.2) | Apathetic (40.9) |

Table 9.7. Typology of citizens according to the combination of political efficacy and political trust (N = 2035)

| | protest | Petition | campaign | Community |
|---------------------------|---------|----------|----------|-----------|
| <i>Alienated citizens</i> | | | | |
| Information | .029* | .059 | .092 | .129 |
| Interest | .117 | .108 | .223 | .117 |
| Discussion | .136 | .112 | .236 | .171 |
| Partisanship | .046 | .066 | .209 | .099 |
| Efficacy | .070 | .059 | .057 | .06 |
| <i>Allegiant citizens</i> | | | | |
| Information | .045 | .085 | .074 | .110 |
| Interest | .075 | .166 | .192 | .183 |
| Discussion | .105 | .137 | .219 | .169 |
| Partisanship | .043 | .078 | .157 | .113 |
| Efficacy | .047 | .098 | .095 | .144 |
| <i>Naïve citizens</i> | | | | |
| Information | -.004* | .005* | -.015* | .027* |
| Interest | -.040* | -.078 | -.123 | -.057 |
| Discussion | -.100 | -.117 | -.172 | -.196 |
| Partisanship | -.050 | -.092 | -.165 | -.156 |
| Efficacy | -.043* | -.069 | -.026* | -.105 |

Table 9.8. Correlation (Pearson's r) between citizen type and forms of political participation 2002. All correlations are significant at .05 level or better except with the asterisk (*).

In this context, perhaps some findings about the association between citizen type and political participation and between citizen type and Islam should be stated more clearly. First, there is no indication that alienated Indonesian Muslims are especially

likely to channel their distrust or dissatisfaction with governmental institutions via political protest. Therefore, alienated citizens have little potential to destabilize democracy. Alienated citizens channel their distrust and dissatisfaction via all forms of political participation, conventional and unconventional. This pattern is the same as that of allegiant citizens.

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|--------------------|-------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Apathetic citizen | | | | | | | |
| A | .027 | -.027 | -.137** | -.080** | -.024 | -.044 | -.092** |
| B | .033 | -.079** | -.070** | -.082** | -.065** | -.110** | -.056* |
| C | .025 | -.088** | -.098** | -.078** | -.051 | -.117** | -.049 |
| D | -.002 | -.084** | -.099** | -.048 | -.016 | -.079** | -.008 |
| E | .016 | -.089** | -.111** | -.075** | -.075** | -.125** | -.094** |
| Alienated citizens | | | | | | | |
| A | .002 | .006 | .002 | .027 | .039 | .007 | -.011 |
| B | .003 | .063** | .098** | .013 | .107** | .060** | -.035 |
| C | .004 | .023 | .056** | .013 | .090** | .064** | -.041 |
| D | .030 | .082** | .072** | .023 | .056* | .005 | -.102** |
| E | .006 | .087** | .041 | .071** | .120** | .079** | .027 |
| Allegiant citizens | | | | | | | |
| A | -.038 | .073** | .107** | .103** | -.046 | .097** | .067** |
| B | -.016 | .095** | .069** | .105** | .043 | .088** | .017 |
| C | -.013 | .076** | .041 | .062* | .020 | .044 | .023 |
| D | .011 | .094** | .042 | .022 | .058* | .036 | -.007 |
| E | .015 | .082** | .075** | .106** | .047* | .091** | .026 |

Table 9.9. Correlations (tau-b) between Islamic components and apathetic and allegiant citizens according to the combination of trust and the components of political engagement 2002. 1 = mandatory ritual, 2 = suggested ritual, 3 = Nahdliyin ritual, 4 = NU identity, 5 = Muhammadiyah identity, 6 = Islamic civic engagement, 7 = Islamism. A = efficacy, B = interest in politics, C = political discussion, D = political information, E = partisanship. Coding: apathetic citizen = 1, otherwise = 0; allegiant citizen = 1, otherwise = 0. ** and *correlation is significant at .01 and .05 respectively.

Second, a majority of Indonesian Muslims are apathetic or naïve, characteristics that decrease political participation. Third, Islamic components do not contribute significantly to the presence of apathetic or naïve citizens. Instead, they contribute positively and significantly to the emergence of both allegiant and alienated citizens. The latter are not likely to produce destabilizing protest.

9.3. Islam, political tolerance, and political participation

Another component believed to be a threat to a democratic consolidation is intolerance. As mentioned in Chapter 5, political participation without tolerance will hinder democratic consolidation. Chapter 5 also showed that a majority of Indonesian Muslims are intolerant. They are intolerant toward the least liked group. A substantial proportion is more specifically intolerant toward Christians. In addition, Islamism is the one component of Islam that has a significant relationship with intolerance toward Christians. Islamism also has a positive and significant relationship with protest activity (Chapter 8). Is an "intolerant Islamist," relative to the other three combinations of Muslims, more likely to participate in protest? If the answer is yes, does it destabilize democracy?

When tolerance is defined by tolerance towards the least liked group, Indonesian democrats also tend to be intolerant (Chapter 5). I argue that intolerance will be a greater threat to democratic consolidation if the intolerant are active in politics. Are "intolerant democrats," relative to other subgroups, more willing to participate in politics?

A combination of Islamism and tolerance toward Christians produces four categories of Muslim: intolerant Islamists, non-intolerant Islamists, intolerant non-

Islamists, and non-intolerant non-Islamists.⁹⁷ Table 9.10 displays the proportions of these four categories of Muslims. The proportion of intolerant Islamists is significant even though it is smaller than that of the non-intolerant non-Islamists.

| | Islamist | Non-Islamist |
|----------------|------------------------------------|--|
| Intolerant | Intolerant Islamists (26.2%) | Intolerant non-Islamists (17.7) |
| Non-intolerant | Non-intolerant Islamists (19.9) | Non-intolerant non-Islamists (36.2) |

Table 9.10. Association Between Islamists and Tolerance toward Christians 2002 (N = 1716)

As mentioned above, I argue that Islamism is likely to be a threat to democratic stability if it is accompanied by intolerance, and if this combination produces protest rather than other forms of political participation. According to the survey data, however, there is no a significant association between the intolerant Islamists and political participation. There is no indication that intolerant Islamism increases political participation. More specifically, the intolerant Islamist is not likely to engage in destabilizing political protest. As seen in Table 9.11, tolerance toward Christians does not correlate with political participation. Tolerance or intolerance simply has no effect on political participation among Indonesian Muslims.

⁹⁷ The five-point scale of Islamism was recoded into two categories: 1 to 2.5 = Islamist (1), 2.6 to 5 = non-Islamist (0). The three-point scale is recoded into two categories: intolerant (1) and non-intolerant (0). The latter category is a combination between neutral (2) and tolerant (3). Non-intolerant in this case does not exactly mean tolerant because it includes the neutral category which constitutes a significant proportion (29%).

In addition, when defined as intolerance toward the least liked group, intolerance does not correlate significantly with political protest (Table 9.11). The “elitist theory” of democracy asserts that intolerant citizens are likely to be apathetic (Chapter 5). They tend to be absent from politics. The “mass based theory” of democracy, on the other hand, asserts that intolerant citizens are more than willing to participate in politics if “they are faced with a noxious group trying to exercise its civil liberties” (Chapter 5). Among Indonesian Muslims, these claims can not be verified. Tolerance or intolerance simply does not matter to political participation.

It is worth pointing out that the insignificance of political tolerance for political participation lies partly in the characteristics of political participation used in this study. They are not specific enough to reveal the impact of intolerance on political participation. Marcus et al's conceptualization of political participation to test the hypothesis is “behavioral intention” rather than “general political participation,” either conventional or unconventional, which is “a political act with a specific intention underlying the action, or a reasoned action” (Marcus et al 1995, 188).

In other words, the political participation sensitive to the issue of political tolerance is action for a reason relating to the specific group against which the action is targeted. Behavioral intention is motivated by tolerant or intolerant reasoning. Through this strategy, Marcus et al found that political tolerance does affect behavioral intentions. More specifically, they found that intolerant attitudes shape intolerant behavior which constrains the civil liberties of fellow citizens (cf. Gibson 1993).

| | Intolerant Islamists |
|--------------------|-------------------------|
| Protest | -.013 |
| Petition | -.002 |
| Campaign activity | .054 |
| Community activity | .010 |

Table 9.11. Correlations (tau-b) between Intolerant Islamists and Political Participation 2002

Further study is required to test this finding, and the available data is not specific enough for this purpose. However, I argue that in the case of Indonesian Muslims at the mass level, intolerant citizens do not make a difference in political participation. Intolerance is not translated into behavior. This may indicate that intolerant attitudes are not a real threat to democratic stability as they do not materialize in the form of protest action. However, this is a preliminary conclusion.

| | Socio-political tolerance | General political tolerance |
|-----------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Voting | .023 (-.032) | -.043 |
| Campaign | -.016 (-.020) | -.060* |
| Community | .032 (.055*) | -.005 |
| Petition | -.011 (.008) | .026 |
| Protest | .015 (.008) | .025 |
| Overall | .017 (.009) | -.021 |

Table 9.12. Tolerance and Political Participation 2002 (2001)

4. Conclusion

I will conclude this chapter with an explicit statement of my key findings about the congruence between Indonesian Muslim citizens and the democratic system as a whole.

First, all important components of the democratic system reinforce each other among Indonesian Muslims. At the more diffuse level of the democratic system, democratic principles and support for the political community reinforce each other. At the more specific level, trust in political institutions and satisfaction with democratic performance in general also reinforce each other. Democratic satisfaction and support for democratic principles are also reinforcing. There is a coherent hierarchical relationship at the system level.

Second, political participation, support for democratic principles, and support for the political community positively and significantly correlate. This indicates that political participation and the core of the democratic system are congruent. The forms of political participation strengthen democracy among Indonesian Muslims. At the same time, political participation does not strengthen trust in political institutions and satisfaction with democratic performance, but overall it does not weaken them. Therefore political participation does not matter for political trust and democratic satisfaction.

Third, alienated Indonesian Muslims are not disproportionately active in potentially destabilizing protests. Like the allegiants, the alienated citizens tend to be active in various forms of political participation, both conventional and unconventional.

Fourth, judged by the combination between political engagement and trust in political institution, a majority of Indonesian Muslims are apathetic or naïve. However, Islam is not responsible for these characteristics of citizens. On the contrary, Islam encourages both allegiant and alienated citizens to participate in politics in ways that are congruent with the core of the democratic system.

Fifth, political intolerance does not result in potentially destabilizing political protest. Defined both as tolerance toward Christians and as tolerance toward the least liked group, political tolerance does not matter with regard to political participation. There is no indication that intolerant citizens are more active than the tolerant ones, and therefore no indication that intolerant citizens will destabilize democracy.

Sixth, Islamism at the attitudinal level is intolerant towards Christians. However, intolerant Islamism does not matter to political participation. Intolerant Islamists are not more likely to participate in protests, even though Islamism correlates with protest. Intolerant Islamists are likely to be inactive in politics and therefore not a threat to democratic stability.

Seventh, overall Islam helps to integrate Indonesian Muslims into the political system as a whole through secular civic engagement, political engagement, and political participation. The last three components integrate Indonesian Muslims into the democratic system as a whole. At the individual level, Islam helps to strengthen the democratic system and therefore is likely to contribute to democratic consolidation.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

This work has explored a range of scholarly arguments about the relationship between Islam and democracy. Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis and Ellie Kedourie have written that Islam and democracy are different creatures, walking separate paths. Further, Islam is inimical to democracy. They believe that the stronger Islam is in a society the more unlikely that democracy can also be found there. Because of this antagonistic relationship, democracy is not likely to characterize Muslim societies in general. If it is planted, it will not flourish.

In this study, democracy is understood in two ways: as a complex political culture and as political participation. As a complex political culture, it includes elements of interpersonal trust, networks of civic engagement, tolerance, political engagement, trust in political institutions, satisfaction with democratic performance, support for democratic principles, and support for a modern political community, i.e. nation-state. As political participation, democracy is a set of voluntary political actions—from voting to protest—by ordinary citizens to influence public policy.

Islam is a multidimensional religion. It comprises a complex set of beliefs and membership in a community, including a confession of faith in God and in Muhammad

as the last of His prophets, a set of rituals, Islamic social activity, and Islamic political orientations, within which I have focused on a set of attitudes I have called, following the standard literature, Islamism. The rituals include the mandatory, the suggested, and a special set of Nahdliyin rituals followed by members of Nahdlatul Ulama or NU, Indonesia's largest Muslim organization. Islamic social engagement includes such diverse activities as membership in national Islamic organizations or local Islamic community groups. I label this membership the networks of Islamic civic engagement.

Islamic social identity is understood as a component of social engagement. It comprises self identification with Nahdlatul Ulama and with Muhammadiyah as the two largest Indonesian Muslim organizations. Islamism is a set of specific attitudes about the inseparability of Islam and politics, or Islam and the state, as discussed in Chapter 2. In sum, a Muslim's religiosity or Islamicness can be assessed by examining his or her intensity of faith, performance of various Islamic rituals, degree of Islamic social engagement, and type of political orientation.

In this study the components of Islam and the components of democracy are analyzed to the extent to which they have negative and significant relationships in the case of Muslims in democratic Indonesia, the period after the fall of President Suharto's authoritarian New Order regime in 1998. The likely negative relationships are stated in specific hypotheses in the introduction. In this conclusion, I will state more explicitly whether the hypotheses are verified in the case of Indonesian Muslims.

1. Islam and Social Capital

The first hypothesis is about the relationship between Islam and interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust is believed to be crucial to democratic stability. The absence of stable democracy in Muslim societies is believed to be associated with low interpersonal trust. The hypothesis states *that the more Islamic a Muslim, the more likely to distrust other people in general.*

The case of Indonesian Muslims indicates that this hypothesis is not verified. There is no single component of Islam which has a negative and significant relationship with trust in other people in general.

In the context of Muslim society, trust should be defined as trust in non-Muslims rather than in people in general. Defined this way, Muslim respondents may be more sensitive on the issue of interpersonal trust. The second hypothesis states that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more likely to distrust non-Muslims.* In the case of Indonesian Muslims, this hypothesis is mostly rejected. There is no single component of Islam, except Islamism, which has a negative and significant relationship with trust in non-Muslims. Whether defined as general trust or as trust in non-Muslims, overall Islam has no impact on interpersonal trust. The low interpersonal trust among Indonesian Muslims does not have a significant association with Islam.

Related to interpersonal trust as a component of social capital are the networks of secular civic engagement, believed to be crucial to political participation and democratic consolidation. The absence of democracy in Muslim societies is associated with weak

civil society. Gellner and Lewis, as portrayed in Chapter 4, believe that Islam is responsible for this problem. Therefore the third hypothesis states that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the less likely to be engaged in secular civic community activities.*

This hypothesis is not persuasive in the case of Indonesian Muslims. There is no single component of Islam which has a negative and significant relationship with the networks of secular civic engagement. On the contrary, almost all Islamic components have positive, significant, and consistent relationships with the networks. More specifically, suggested rituals, NU identity, Muhammadiyah identity, and the networks of Islamic civic engagement contribute significantly to the networks of secular civic engagement. Islam strengthens, not weakens, secular civic engagement among Indonesian Muslims.

2. Islam and Socio-Political Tolerance

Tolerance is a component of democratic culture which is believed to be crucial to democratic consolidation. As portrayed in Chapter 5, Huntington in particular argues that Islam and Christianity are by nature intolerant religions. Conflicts between the two are natural. If intolerance is strongly associated with Islam, then one may expect that Muslim religiosity increases intolerance toward Christians. Therefore the fourth hypothesis states that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more unlikely to be tolerant toward Christians.*

In the case of Indonesian Muslims, this hypothesis is partially verified. Islamist responses have a negative, significant, and consistent relationship with tolerance toward Christians. Mandatory and suggested rituals have some negative relationships with

tolerance, but these relationships are inconsistent. Other components of Islam, i.e. Nahdliyin ritual, Islamic civic engagement, NU identity, and Muhammadiyah identity, do not have a significant relationship with intolerance.

It is worth remembering that in the case of Indonesian Muslims, Islamism is not identical with Islam. A substantial proportion, but less than a majority, of Indonesian Muslims are Islamists. Overall, Indonesian Muslims are neutral on the issue of non-Islamism versus Islamism. In addition, Islamism is not identical with Islam among Indonesian Muslim respondents. Its relationship with most other components of Islam is very weak and sometimes non-existent. Therefore, the assertion that in Islam there is no distinction between religion and politics has been overstated.

Some studies suggest that political tolerance is better gauged by tolerance toward the least liked group rather than tolerance toward a specific group such as Christians. Defined in this way, which I label “general political tolerance,” political tolerance is believed to be more sensitive to the question of democratic consolidation. The claim that Islam has a negative relationship with democratic consolidation, therefore, should be assessed by the extent to which Islam has a negative relationship with this general political tolerance. The relevant hypothesis states that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more likely he or she is to be intolerant toward the least liked group.*

In the case of Indonesian Muslims, this hypothesis is not supported. There is no single component of Islam which has a negative and significant relationship with tolerance toward the least liked group. On the contrary, the networks of Islamic civic engagement reveal some significant and positive relationship with this general political tolerance.

3. Islam and Political Engagement

In the civic culture theory of democratic stability political tolerance is understood as a passive component of democratic or civic culture. An active component is political engagement, i.e. a psychological variable which encourages citizens to participate in democratic politics, and to integrate citizens into the democratic system as a whole. This argument was developed in Chapter 6. The claim that Islam has a negative relationship with democracy should be evaluated also in terms of the extent to which it has a negative relationship with political engagement. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis states that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more likely not to be engaged in politics.*

In this study political engagement includes interest in politics, following political news via mass media, political discussion, partisanship, and political efficacy. In the case of Indonesian Muslims, the hypothesis is not verified. There is no single component of Islam which has a negative and significant relationship with any component of overall political engagement. On the contrary, some components of Islam (suggested ritual and Muhammadiyah identity) have a significant, direct, consistent, and positive relationship with political engagement. Nahdliyin ritual, NU identity, and Islamic civic engagement contribute indirectly to political engagement. Their impacts are mediated by secular civic engagement. More specifically, these three components of Islam contribute to feelings of political efficacy. In general, Islam helps to connect Muslims to the democratic system through political engagement.

4. Islam and Trust in Political Institutions

Another passive component of democratic culture is trust in political institutions. Political participation and political engagement without trust in democratic institutions may lead to democratic instability. The claim that Islam is inimical to democracy can partly be evaluated by the extent to which Islam has a negative relationship with trust in political institutions, a part of democratic culture. Political institutions within the democratic system as a whole are relatively modern phenomena, and the claim that democracy as a modern political system is alien to Muslim societies should be reflected in a negative relationship between Islam and this trust. The sixth hypothesis, therefore, states that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more likely not to trust political institutions*.

In the case of Indonesian Muslims, the hypothesis is rejected. There is no single component of Islam which indicates weak trust in political institutions. On the contrary, there are some indications that Islam has a positive and significant relationship with institutional trust. Seen from this angle of democratic stability, there is no indication that Islam may destabilize democratic government. On the contrary, Islam even has a positive contribution as a channel mediating Muslim democratic participation.

5. Islam and Satisfaction with Democratic Performance

Satisfaction with democratic performance is another component of democratic culture which helps democratic consolidation. Democratic satisfaction legitimates democracy, or indicates that democracy is accepted in practice. It strengthens democracy. The claim that Islam has a negative relationship with democracy can be evaluated by the extent to which Islam has a negative relationship with satisfaction with

democratic performance. Pious Muslims are hypothesized to be dissatisfied with democratic performance not because of democratic performance itself but rather due to their orientation toward an alternative, Islamic, political system. They are alienated from democratic institutions and practices because of the gap between the two political systems. Therefore, the seventh hypothesis states that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more likely to be dissatisfied with democratic performance.*

This hypothesis is falsified in the case of Indonesian Muslims. There is no single component of Islam which has a negative and significant relationship with satisfaction with democratic performance. The degree of piety of Indonesian Muslims is unconnected to their evaluation of the government's democratic performance. Pious Muslims therefore do not threaten democratic consolidation.

6. Islam and Support for Democratic Principles

Support for democratic principles is believed to be crucial to democratic consolidation, as discussed in Chapter 7. Students of democracy in the Muslim world who argue that Islam is inimical to democracy mainly base their conclusion on a rather diffuse concept of democracy, i.e. commitment to democratic principles. Therefore, their argument can be evaluated by the extent to which Islam has a negative relationship with democratic principles.

In this study democratic principles are defined as a set of attitudes toward the idea that democracy is the best system of governance, values of liberty and minority rights, equality before the law, free press, free enterprise, political rights, and competitive elections. These values are asserted to be alien to Muslim societies. If democratic

institutions are created in Muslim societies, they are unlikely to be stable or to become consolidated. Muslims are said to be more accustomed to Islamic principles which are inimical to democratic principles. Therefore, the eighth hypothesis states that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more unlikely to support democratic principles*.

In the case of Indonesian Muslims, this hypothesis has no empirical foundation. There is no single component of Islam which has a negative and significant relationship with support for democratic principles. Even Islamist attitudes, which are strongly suspected to have a negative relationship, do not when controlled for respondents' evaluation of their personal and the national economic condition. The apparently negative relationship between the two is spurious. Islamists who are satisfied with their own and the national economic condition do not reject democratic principles.

An opposite argument was introduced in Chapter 1: that Islam has the potential to strengthen democracy due to its particular political values such as *ijtihad* (reasoning), *ijma'* (consensus), *ikhtilaf* (difference), and *shura* (consultation). My data suggest that this argument is probably overstated, as there is no positive or strong relationship between the various dimensions of Islam and democratic principles. Further exploration about Islamic values as held by ordinary Muslims will be required to reveal their direct impact on the support for democratic principles.

7. Islam and Support for the Nation-State

A stable nation-state is necessary for democratic consolidation. No state, no democracy. From a political culture point of view, the stability of the nation-state is shaped by the extent to which citizens support it.

Huntington and Kedourie in particular are concerned with the issue of the relationship between Islam and the nation-state. They argue that the nation-state is a political community that emerged in the course of the development of modern politics in the West. It requires capacity to feel loyalty beyond primordial, especially religious, attachments. This concept of the nation-state is alien to Islam because in Islamic political culture there is no distinction between religion and state. In Islamic culture, the concept of umma (community of Islamic believers)—which has no fixed territory—is far more pervasive than the concept of nation-state. Huntington further argues that the nation-state is antagonistic to the concept of umma: support for the umma decreases support for the nation-state. This implies that a pious Muslim is not likely to support the nation-state. Accordingly, the ninth hypothesis states that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the more likely not to support the nation-state.*

The case of Indonesian Muslims indicates that the hypothesis is not verified. There is no single component of Islam which has a negative and significant relationship with support for the Indonesian nation-state. Regardless of their religiosity and their Islamic political orientations, a majority of Indonesian Muslims strongly support the nation-state. I conclude that the idea of umma is not necessarily antagonistic to the idea of nation-state.

8. Islam and Political Participation

The nine hypotheses and their verifications summarized above are concerned with democracy as a complex of political orientations or attitudes. Understood at this attitudinal level, almost all components of democracy do not have negative and

significant relationships with almost all components of Islam. However, the argument about the negative relationship between Islam and democracy should also be evaluated at the behavioral level of democracy, i.e. political participation.

As stated in the Introduction and elaborated in Chapter 8, political participation is at the heart of democracy. The argument that Islam has a negative relationship with democracy, therefore, should be reflected in Muslims' political participation. Huntington more specifically argues that political participation is an alien concept to Muslims. Because there is no distinction between Islam and politics, political participation, if it exists, in a Muslim community must be linked to Islamic affiliation. Political participation beyond Islamic affiliation and norms is not likely. The tenth hypothesis states that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the less likely to participate in politics unless the specific object of participation is Islamic.*

This study has demonstrated that the hypothesis is not verified in the case of Indonesian Muslims. There is no single component of Islam which has a negative and significant relationship with political participation regardless of the object of participation, religious or non-religious. On the contrary, almost all Islamic components have positive and significant relationships with overall political participation.

Judging from this empirical finding, Islam helps Muslims to be active in democratic politics. The ritual and Islamic social capital components are likely to have participant effects. They connect Muslims to public issues and actions relevant to public interests regardless of the individual issues and interests, religious or non-religious.

9. Islam, Political Engagement, Trust in Political Institutions, and Political Participation

The literature on democracy suggests that the combination of various forms of political engagement and trust in political institutions produces different types of citizen. In this study, we have examined four types of citizens: allegiant, alienated, naïve, and apathetic, as described in Chapter 6 and Chapter 9. In order for a democracy to be consolidated, citizens are expected to be allegiant, i.e. engaged in politics and trustful of political institutions.

Alienated citizens, on the contrary, are believed to be a potential source of democratic instability. They are likely to channel their political activity through extra-institutional, un-institutionalized, or unconventional political activity or protest. Their political behavior may destabilize a democratic system.

The assertion that Islam is inimical to democracy should be evaluated by the extent to which Islam has a negative relationship with allegiant activism and a positive relationship with alienated activism. The eleventh hypothesis states that *the more Islamic a Muslim, the less likely to be an allegiant rather than an alienated, naïve, and apathetic citizen.*

This hypothesis is also not proven. In the case of Indonesian Muslims, the allegiant and the alienated are relatively more active in all forms of political participation—the institutionalized or the un-institutionalized, the conventional or the unconventional—than the naïve and apathetic citizens. Among the allegiant, no component of Islam has a negative relationship with allegiant status. It is also noteworthy that the alienated citizens, like the allegiant, do not exclusively channel their

participation through political protest, but also through voting, campaign work, and community activity. I conclude that there is no indication that alienated activists are dangerous to political stability.

10. Intolerant Islamism and Protest Activity

This study finds that Islamism has a negative and significant relationship with tolerance toward Christians. How important is this intolerant Islamism to democratic stability? Intolerant Islamism may encourage individuals who subscribe to its principles to act in ways that threaten democratic stability. It follows that the extent to which intolerant Islamists, relative to other kinds of Islamists, are likely to be more active in politics is crucial for democratic consolidation. The assertion that Islam has a negative relationship with democracy and democratic consolidation can be evaluated from this angle. The twelfth hypothesis is that *the intolerant Muslim is likely to be active in politics*.

This hypothesis is not empirically supported in the case of Indonesian Muslims. Intolerant Islamism is not related to political participation. There is no indication that intolerant Islamists are more likely to participate in protest, even though Islamism correlates with protest. Intolerant Islamists are likely to be inactive in politics, which implies that they are not a real threat to democratic stability.

11. The Emergence of the Religious Democrat

This study has demonstrated that the proposition that Islam has a negative relationship with democracy is only persuasive if Islam is defined as Islamism and

democracy is defined as tolerance and trust toward Christians. This intolerant and distrustful Islamism is found at the attitudinal level. It becomes a threat to democratic consolidation only when it takes the form of protest activity. Among Indonesian Muslims, however, intolerant and distrustful Islamists tend to be apathetic and therefore probably not a serious threat to democratic consolidation.

Apart from these findings, there is no single component of Islam which has a negative and significant relationship with a single component of democracy. Overall the proposition that Islam has a negative relationship with democracy is falsified in the case of Indonesian Muslims (Table 1).

| | Islam |
|--|-------|
| General Interpersonal trust | 0 |
| Trust in non-Muslims | - |
| Secular civic engagement | +++ |
| Tolerance toward Christians | - |
| Tolerance toward the least liked group | + |
| Political engagement | ++ |
| Trust in political institutions | + |
| Satisfaction with democratic performance | 0 |
| Support for democratic principles | 0 |
| Support for nation-state | + |
| Political participation | ++ |
| Allegiant activist | ++ |
| Intolerant activist | 0 |

Table 10.1. Summary of the relationships between Islam and the components of democracy. 0 = the relationship is not significant; - = there is a component of Islam which has a negative relationship with it; + = positive and significant, but inconsistent relationship; ++ = a significant number of Islamic components have positive, significant, and consistent relationship; +++ = almost all Islamic components have positive, significant, and consistent relationship

What we find instead is at least the beginnings of a contrary picture. That is, there are a significant number of Islamic components which have positive and significant

relationships with a significant number of the components of democracy. Islam helps Indonesian Muslims to participate in politics and to support democracy. Islam helps to forge a congruence between Muslim citizens and the democratic system as a whole, which is believed to be crucial to democratic consolidation.

My findings are based on the observation of Indonesian Muslims at the individual level. Therefore, they are only likely to reflect the case of Muslims in post-Suharto Indonesia, and the connection between Islam and democracy at the individual level. Indonesia is only one of many predominantly Muslim states in the world, albeit the largest. In addition, it may be on the periphery of Islamic civilization. Therefore, the findings may not falsify the main thesis about the negative relationship between Islam and democracy as a majority of predominantly Muslim states remain non-democracies.

In this context, however, it should be pointed out that the inseparability of religion and state has been a powerful issue in Indonesian as well as Middle Eastern politics. It was, according to many analysts, a major factor contributing to the decline and fall of Indonesian democracy in the 1950s. There was, after all, an armed struggle to establish an Indonesian Islamic state when the issue was relatively quiet in other predominantly Muslim states. So it is not entirely persuasive to argue that Indonesia is a peripheral case, where the Islamic state is a less compelling idea for Muslims.

Fortunately, history never sits still. Since the 1950s, Indonesian Islam has changed. The Islamic state issue is now peripheral not because Indonesia is peripheral but because contemporary Indonesian Muslims have a different conception of the relationship between Islam and the state. They have reevaluated and reinterpreted their past in the light of their present needs and interests.

In the early history of the Republic, probably relatively few Indonesians were simultaneously pious Muslims and democrats. To today's Muslims, Islam and democracy are not antithetical. Their Islam is understood and practiced in a such a way that it helps, rather than constrains, them to support and be active in democratic politics. Many Indonesian Muslims are now religious democrats. They are pious in terms of their faith in God, Islamic ritual or worship, and their Islamic social engagement. At the same time they support the democratic system and strengthen it through their civic engagement and political participation.

This phenomenon of religious democrats among Indonesian Muslims probably deviates from the Muslim mainstream. However, several studies indicate that in the Middle East and other predominantly Muslim states, Islam does not have a negative relationship to democracy (Tessler 2002a, 2002b; Norris and Inglehart 2003; Al-Braizat 2002; Rose 2002). The positive impact of Islam on democratic culture, especially secular civic engagement and political engagement, and political participation do not appear in other studies probably because their measures of Islam are different from mine, and their measures of democracy are restricted to support for democratic values. Their use of Islamic rituals, for example, is limited. They do not include the suggested rituals which are in fact crucial to explain political attitudes and behavior in the case of Indonesian Muslims. In addition, they do not deploy the concept of Islamic social capital which is also crucial in this study. Regardless of these difference, their conclusion and mine is the same: that Islam and democracy are not negatively related.

The finding that Islam has a positive and significant relationship with democracy is however like a new-born baby, just arrived on the scene and far from analytical maturity. It calls for further empirical tests with particular attention to the measures of ritual or worship, the core of any religion, and to religion-based civic engagement.

For policy purposes, this study suggests that in addition to socio-economic and political economic factors, Islamic rituals which are performed collectively are an important source of civic engagement which is in turn critical for political engagement, political participation, and support for democracy. Participation in various religious groups at the local community level and above is also a requirement for pluralistic civic engagement and political participation. These religious engagements connect citizens to the democratic system, thereby helping to consolidate democracy. Indonesian Muslims should take pride in the contribution their rituals and participation in religious organizations make to the common political life and look for more ways to strengthen that contribution.

APPENDIX A:
METHODOLOGY

The data used in this study were produced by two mass surveys of the Indonesian population in October 2001 and October 2002. Budget and physical accessibility determined how the samples were drawn.

In the 2001 survey, the population was restricted to fifteen provinces: Jakarta, Banten, Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, Yogyakarta, Jawa Timur, Sumatra Utara, Sumatra Selatan, Sumatra Barat, Lampung, Riau, Jambi, Kalimantan Selatan, Kalimantan Timur, Nusa Tenggara, and Sulawesi Selatan. The population of these provinces is about 87% of the total national population (Biro Pusat Statistik 2000). Because of budget constraints, Papua (formerly called Irian Jaya) was not included. The population of Papua is only about 1% of the national population (BPS 2000). Moreover, it is scattered throughout that vast island and mostly cannot be reached by ground transportation.

The Maluku islands were also excluded. The population is about 1% of the national population. In 2001 local warfare, albeit calmed down considerably from the previous year, still occurred. It was impossible to conduct a survey in the war atmosphere. Sulawesi Tengah, Kalimantan Tengah, Kalimantan Barat, and Aceh were also excluded from the survey for security reasons. Ethnic- and religion-colored wars were ongoing in these provinces.

Sulawesi Utara, Nusa Tenggara Timur, and Bali were excluded because the non-Muslim population is quite significant, if not predominant, in these regions. The intent of this survey was to explore Muslim political attitudes, not those of other religious groups.

Sulawesi Tenggara, Gorontalo, and Bengkulu are remote and the population is very small: about 2% of the national population (BPS 2000). Kepulauan Bangka Belitung is a new province, and in the survey it was part of Sumatra Selatan.

In the 2002 survey, the budget constraint was removed and we were able to draw a sample covering the whole national population.

In both surveys, the population was defined as citizens who are seventeen years of age or older, or who are married. The interviewees were selected from the population according to a multistage random sampling procedure. First, the national population was stratified according to gender proportion, rural-urban residence, and province.

According to the national census data (BPS 2000), the ratio of males to females in the population is 100.6. In the surveys the ratio is rounded to be 100, and therefore the proportion of male and female in the sample is equal.

Rural-urban residence is defined by the national population of rural and urban residence: 52% rural, 48% urban (http://www.bps.go.id/sector/population/Pop_indo.htm). However, the rural-urban proportion varies by province. Therefore the number of rural and urban respondents was selected proportionately in each province based on the primary sampling unit, i.e. *desa* (rural administrative unit) or *kelurahan* (urban administrative unit). The BPS provides a list of *desa* and *kelurahan* in each province. The number of *desa* and *kelurahan* selected as the primary sampling unit was based on the rural-urban population breakdown in each province.

The number of respondents in the two surveys was set according to a calculation of typical sample size in scientific surveys, on the one hand, and budgetary restrictions on the other. For a large population, a sample between 2000 and 2500 is common. To

achieve a figure within that range, first a number in a primary sampling unit was arbitrarily set at eight respondents. In the 2001 survey 276 desa or kelurahan as the primary sampling unit were then randomly selected according to the proportion of population and rural-urban residence from the 15 provinces. The sample size was therefore 2176. In the 2002 survey, based on the same considerations and procedures, 311 desa or kelurahan from all the provinces were selected. Therefore, the sample size was 2488.

How were the eight respondents selected in each desa or kelurahan? Interviewers went to the office of the selected desa or kelurahan, and asked for the list of RT (Rukun Tetangga, neighborhoods, wards, or hamlets) in the desa or kelurahan. If the list was not available, interviewers, assisted by a local official, drew a map of the RT in the desa or kelurahan. Four RTs were then randomly selected from the list.

Two kartu keluarga (household card) were then chosen randomly from the list of households in the selected RT. This list was provided by the RT official. In case the list was not available, the interviewers, helped by the official, drew the map and listed the households in the RT. In each selected household, a member of the household who was seventeen, older, or married chosen using a Kish Grid. The selected person, male or female, was interviewed.

The Principal Investigator, helped by the PPIM, recruited 38 persons and trained them in how to conduct face to face interviews. These persons helped the PI to recruit and train interviewers in the provinces. They became field coordinators. In the 2001

survey, the PI, assisted by the coordinators, recruited and trained 138 interviewers. In 2002 the number of interviewers was 311. The interviewers were mostly university students in the respective provinces.

The field coordinators were responsible for obtaining permission from local administrators and for spot-checking the interviews. The Maluku islands (32 respondents) were not accessible for the interview because of security reasons. The spot-checking was conducted on twenty five percent of the total sample selected randomly. No significant errors were found.

Having cleaned the questionnaires, 2012 (92%) of the 2001 survey and 2321 (93%) of the 2002 survey were judged valid for analysis. The rest were non-responsive and defective questionnaires. The author was directly involved in all stages of the two surveys, from recruiting and training of field coordinators and interviewers, pre-tests, spot checks, cleaning, coding, and data entry.

APPENDIX B:

QUESTIONS USED IN THE SURVEYS

A. Islam:

1. Faith: Do you believe that God exists? (1) yes, absolutely, never doubt about it (2) yes, but sometimes doubt, (3) yes, but frequently doubt, (4) no, never.
2. Rituals: How frequently do you perform the following rituals? Very frequently, quite frequently, rarely, or never?
 - a. Daily five prayers.
 - b. Ramadan fasting.
 - c. Recite Qur'an (mengaji).
 - d. Pray prior to work.
 - e. Collective prayer (salat berjamaah).
 - f. Suggested prayer (salat sunnah).
 - g. Suggested fasting (puasa sunnah).
 - h. Religious class (pengajian) such as majlis taklim or ceramah agama.
 - i. Ask for a prayer from a religious authority (mohon doa dari kiai).
 - j. Participate in ceremony to praise God (ikut tahlilan).
 - k. Have annual commemoration of the death of a family member, parent or grandparent. (melakukan khaul atau slametan untuk mengenang wafatnya anggota keluarga seperti orang tua, nenek/kakek, dll.).
 - l. The seven day commemoration of the death of a family member (tujuh harian bagi anggota keluarga yang meninggal).

Give charity in the form of money or food (sedekah dalam bentuk uang, makanan, dll.)

m. Visit the shrine of a saint or religious authority (berziarah ke kuburan wali atau kiai).

3. Islamic social capital:

- a. Are you an active member, inactive member, or non-member of a religious organization or group at the local community level such as mosque community (jamaah masjid) or mosque youth organization (remaja masjid) .
- b. Are you an active member, inactive member, or non-member, of a religious organization at the national level such as NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, etc.
- c. Do you feel a part of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)? Yes or no?
- d. Do you feel a part of Muhammadiyah? Yes or no?
- e. How close do you feel to NU? Very close, quite close, slightly close, or not close at all?
- f. How close do you feel to Muhammadiyah? Very close, quite close, slightly close, or not close at all?

4. Islamism: To what extent do you agree with the following ideas? Do you strongly agree, agree, no decision, disagree, or strongly disagree?

- a. Islamic governance, i.e. governance based on the Qur'anic and Sunnah teachings under the leadership of Islamic authorities (such as ulama or kiai) is the best for this nation.
- b. The state should enforce the obligation to implement Islamic law (shari'a) for all Muslims.

- c. The amputation of the hand of a thief as prescribed in the Qur'an should be enforced by the government.
- d. General election is supposed to elect candidates who understand and fight for the implementation of Islamic teachings in the polity.
- e. General election should support Islamic party only.
- f. The ideals and practices of Islamic organizations (such as Darul Islam, Negara Islam Indonesia, Front Pembela Islam, Laskar Jihad, etc.) to implement Islamic law (shari`a) in the society and polity should be supported.
- g. Females are not allowed to take distant trips without the accompaniment of a close family member or relative.
- h. The government (police) should engage in surveillance (mengawasi) when Muslims perform the Ramadan fasting.
- i. Generally speaking, males are superior over females.
- j. Like males, females have the right to run for membership in the legislature.
- k. In a family there are two children, son and daughter, while the family socio-economic condition is only able to support one child. In this situation, the son, rather than the daughter, should go to school. Agree or disagree?
- l. Female is better not to be allowed to run for presidential office.
- m. Female is too weak to be a judge in court.
- n. Daughter is supposed to receive half of son's right of inheritance from their parents.

B. Social capital: trust and secular civic engagement:

1. Trust:

- a. Do you think that most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful with other people?
- b. Do you trust that other people will not harm you? Just about always, most of the time, sometimes, rarely, or never?
- c. Do you trust people who belong to another religion that they will not hurt you because of the religious difference? Just about always, most of the time, sometimes, rarely, or never?

2. Networks of secular civic engagement: Civic. Are you an active member, inactive member, or non-member of the following social organizations or associations?

- a. Social organization at local community level such as village council (dewan desa), security council of local community (lembaga kemanan masyarakat desa), community youth organization (karang taruna).
- b. Rotating credit association (arisan) or educational association for family well-being (Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga - PKK).
- c. Red Cross.
- d. Sports club such as soccer club, volley ball club, badminton club.
- e. Art or culture clubs.
- f. Associations of animal lovers such as bird watchers (pencinta burung), fighting cock aficionados (pencinta ayam piaraan).

- g. Association of environmentalists.
- h. Unions such as trade union, farmers union, fishers union.
- i. Cooperative.
- j. Professional association such as teachers association, doctors association, lawyers association.
- k. New movement organization (Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat)
- l. Other association, please specify:

C. Political engagement:

1. Interest in politics: How interested are you in politics or governmental affairs? Very interested, quite interested, a little interested, or not interested at all

2. Partisanship:

a. Is there any political party that you feel close to? Yes or no?

b. If yes, how close do you feel to the party? Very close, quite close, or a little close?

c. How close do you feel to the following parties if this closeness is placed on a ten-point scale from 1 to 10 in which 1 refers to feeling not close at all, and 10 to feeling very close?

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P)?

Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)

Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)

Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)

Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)

Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)

Partai Keadilan (PK)

3. Political discussion: How often do you discuss politics with other people (friends, neighbors, coworkers)? Very often, quite often, rarely, or never?
4. Political information: How frequently do you follow political or governmental news via the following media? Every day, almost every day or between four to six days in a week, between two to three days in a week, once a week or less, once a month or never?
 - a. TV
 - b. Radio
 - c. Newspaper
 - d. Magazine/tabloid
 - e. Internet
5. Political efficacy:
 - a. How much can you or people like you influence the decision making process of the local government here? Very much, rather much, a little, or nothing?
 - b. If you have any concerns about the working of the local government in your community and tell your concerns to the local government, would you say the government will care very much, rather much, a little, or not at all?
 - c. What would you say about the impact of decisions made by the central government in Jakarta on the daily life of people like you? Would they have a lot of impact? Quite a lot, a little, or nothing?

D. Trust in political institutions:

1. How much of the time do you think you can trust the president really to do what is right? Just about always, most of the time, sometimes, rarely, or never?
2. How much of the time do you think you can trust the police to enforce law and order? Just about always, most of the time, sometimes, rarely, or never?
3. How much of the time do you think you can trust the armed forces to protect this country from external invasion? Just about always, most of the time, sometimes, rarely, or never?
4. How much of the time do you think you can trust the court to reach just decisions? Just about always, most of the time, sometimes, rarely, or never?
5. How much of the time do you think you can trust the People's Consultative Assembly to serve the popular interest? Just about always, most of the time, sometimes, rarely, or never?
6. How much of the time do you think you can trust the People's Representative Council to serve the popular interest in legislation, watching government, and so on? Just about always, most of the time, sometimes, rarely, or never?
7. How much of the time do you think you can trust a political party to represent the interest of its constituency? Just about always, most of the time, sometimes, rarely, or never?
8. How much of the time do you think you can trust religious organizations in general (such as NU, Muhammadiyah, church, etc.) that they will not harm you? Just about always, most of the time, sometimes, rarely, or never?

9. How much of the time do you think you can trust religious leaders in general that they will not harm you? Just about always, most of the time, sometimes, rarely, or never?
 10. How much of the time do you think you can trust unions to represent the interests of their constituencies? Just about always, most of the time, sometimes, rarely, or never?
- E. Satisfaction with democratic performance:
1. How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in our country? Very satisfied, quite satisfied, a little satisfied, not satisfied at all, or don't know?
 2. Would you say that our country is moving in the right or wrong direction?
 3. Would you say that in general we are in a better condition under the current democratic government, or were we in a better condition under the New Order of President Suharto?
- F. Support for democratic system and principles: Would you strongly agree, agree, feel neutral, disagree, strongly disagree, or don't know about the following ideas?
1. Democracy, compared to other forms of governance, is the best form of government for a country like ours.
 2. Democracy is a source of political disorder.
 3. Democracy is a source of bad economic development.
 4. Society should not put up with political views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority.
 5. A minority group should not be allowed to have a demonstration against a majority group.

6. Every citizen is equal before the law regardless of his or her political views.
7. Every citizen is allowed to join any political organization.
8. Mass media must be protected by law to preserve it from arbitrary actions of government.
9. Our economy will be better if the government gives more freedom to each citizen to do as he or she wishes.
10. Support for free elections is harmful to national unity.
11. Free and fair contestation between political parties improves the performance of government of this country.

G. Support for the political community:

1. How proud are you to be an Indonesian citizen whose territory spreads from Sabang in Aceh to Merauke in Papua? Very proud, quite proud, a little proud, not proud at all, or don't know.
2. We all hope a war between our country and another country does not happen. However, if a war between our country and another country cannot be avoided, would you participate to go to the battle field to protect our country? Yes, no, or don't know.
3. Where do you mainly feel you belong? To this village or city, to this province or region, to Indonesia as a whole, to Asia, to the world, or don't know?

H. Political participation:

1. Did you vote for a political party to represent you in the Council in the national election in 1999? Yes, No.
2. If "yes," would you tell why you participated in the election?
3. If "no," would you tell why you did not participate?
4. In the election season in 1999, did you ever convince other people to vote for a particular party? Yes, no, don't know.
5. Have you ever voluntarily helped a political party, given any kind of help? Yes, no, no answer.
6. Did you attend party campaigns at least once in the campaign season? Yes, no, don't know.
7. Did you wear any party attribute on your clothing, vehicle, house, etc., in the campaign season? Yes, no, no answer.
8. In the last three years, have you ever contacted a public office or official to talk about public issues such as slow public services, public school fees, community security, and so on? Yes, no, no answer
9. In the last three years, have you ever attended a community meeting to discuss and to make an action plan to resolve various community issues such as security, bad condition of local roads, tensions or conflict between groups in the community? Yes, no, no answer.
10. Have you ever organized a community meeting to resolve any community problem? Yes, no, no answer.

11. Have you participated in a community activity to resolve any community problem in the last three years?
 12. Have you ever signed a petition to support or to protest any decision made by a local or national government in the last three years? Yes, no, no answer.
 13. Have you ever organized a petition in the last three years? Yes, no, no answer.
 14. Have you ever participated in a demonstration to protest any public policy that harms the public interest in the last three years? Yes, no, no answer
 15. Have you ever participated in boycotting any public policy which is perceived to harm the public interest? Yes, no, no answer.
 16. Have you ever participated in a strike to protest against a public policy in the last three years?
 17. Have you ever participated in occupying a public building to protest against any public policy in the last three years? Yes, no, no answer.
 18. Have you ever participated in blocking traffic to protest against any public policy in the last three years? Yes, no, no answer.
 19. Have you ever participated in the last three years in destroying a public facility to protest against any public policy? Yes, no, no answer.
- I. Political economy: I would like to know your view about your own economic condition and the national economic condition this year compared to last year, and also the prospect of next year compared to this year.

1. Is your own economic condition much better, better, about the same, worse, or much worse this year compared to last year? Much better, better, about the same, worse, or much worse.
 2. How about the national economic condition? Is it much better, better, about the same, worse, or much worse this year compared to last year? Much better, better, about the same, worse, or much worse.
 3. How about your personal economic condition next year? Do you think it will be much better, better, about the same, worse, or much worse next year compared to this year? Much better, better, about the same, worse, or much worse.
 4. How about the national economic condition next year? Will it be much better, better, about the same, worse, or much worse compared to this year? Much better, better, about the same, worse, or much worse.
- J. Socio-economy:
1. Residence area: rural or urban.
 2. I would like to know your formal education. Which category of the following represents your formal education? Never went to school, incomplete elementary, complete elementary, incomplete junior high school, complete junior high school, incomplete senior high school, complete senior high school, or some college or higher.
 3. What do you do for a living? Do you work? Yes, no, no answer.
 4. If yes, what is your occupation? Please mention precisely
 5. If not, why do you not work? Retired, housewife, student, still looking for a job, or other (please specifically mention:).

6. If you do not work, how do you support yourself? From pension, husband, parent, other family member or relatives, or other (please specify).
7. If dependent on another person such as a parent, another family member, husband, relative, or other, please mention what is his or her occupation:
8. If you are on a pension, what was your occupation? Please specify
9. I would like to know your gross household income per month. Which of the following categories represent your income? Less than Rp 200,000.00; Rp 200,000.00 - 399,999.00; Rp 400,000 - 599,999.00; Rp 600,000.00 - 799,999.00; Rp 800,000.00- 999,999.00; Rp 1,000,000.00 - Rp 1.199,999.00; Rp 1,200,000.00 - 1.399,999.00; Rp 1,400,000.00 -1.599,999.00; Rp 1,600,000.00 - 1,799,999.00; Rp 1,800,000.00 - 1,999,999.00; Rp 2,000,000.00 or more.

K. Demography

1. Gender: Male or female.
2. Age: in what year were you born?
3. Province of residence: Banten, DKI Jakarta, Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, DKI Yogyakarta, Jawa Timur, Bali, NTB, NTT, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Sumatra Utara, Sumatra Barat, Sumatra Selatan, Lampung, Jambi, Riau, Bengkulu, Kalimantan Selatan, Kalimantan Barat, Kalimantan Tengah, Kalimantan Timur, Sulawesi Selatan, Sulawesi Utara, Sulawesi Tengah, Sulawesi Tenggara, Maluku, Papua.

4. Island of residence: Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, Papua, Bali, Nusa Tenggara
5. To what ethnic group do you originally belong? Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Balinese, etc.? Please state clearly:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdillah, Masykuri. 1999. *Demokrasi Di Persimpangan Makna. Respons Intelektual Muslim Indonesia terhadap Konsep Demokrasi*. Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana.
- Abramson, Paul R. 1983. *Political Attitudes in America*. San Francisco: Freeman.
- , and John H. Aldrich. 1982. "The Decline of Electoral Participation in America." *American Political Science Review*, 76: 502-521.
- Adam, Charles C. 1933. *Islam and Modernism in Egypt: A Study of the Modern Reform Movement Inaugurated by Muhammad `Abduh*. New York: Russell & Russell.
- Afifi, A. A., and Virginia Clark. 1990. *Computer Aided Multivariate Analysis*. New York: Chapman and Hall.
- Al-`Ashmawi, Muhammad Said. 1998. "Shari`a: The Codification of Islamic Law." *Liberal Islam. A Source Book*. Edited by Charles Kurzman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Al-Braizat, Fares. 2002. "Muslims and Democracy: An Empirical Critique of Fukuyama's Culturalist Approach." *International Journal of Sociology*, 43: 269-299.
- Ali-Fauzi, Ihsan. 2002. "The Politics of Salt, not the Politics of Lipstick: Mohammad Hatta on Islam and Nationalism," *Studia Islamika*, 9: 89-120.
- Al-Raziq, `Ali `Abd. 1998. "Message Not Government, Religion Not State." *Liberal Islam. A Source Book*. Edited by Charles Kurzman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Almond, Gabriel A. 1989. "Intellectual History of Civic Culture." *The Civic Culture Revisited*. Edited by Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Anderson, Benedict R. O`G. 1972. "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture." *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*. Edited by Claire Holt. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Anderson, Lisa. 1995. "Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture Approach." *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*. Edited by Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- An_Na 'im, Abdullahi A. 1996. *Toward an Islamic Reformation : Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press.
- Arjomand, Said Amir. 1993. "Shi'ite Jurisprudence and Constitution Making in The Islamic Republic of Iran." *Fundamentalism and the State. Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance*. Edited by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Aziz, Abdul, Imam Tholkhah, and Soetarman. 1989. *Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus.
- Baaklini, Abdo, Guilain Denoeux, and Robert Springborg. 1999. *Legislative Politics in the Arab World*. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner.
- Barnes, Samuel H., et al. 1979. *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Democracies*. Beverly Hill, CA: Sage.
- Barnum, David G. 1982. "Decision Making in a Constitutional Democracy: Policy Formation in the Skokie Free Speech Controversy." *Journal of Politics* 44: 480-508.
- Barry, Brian. 1970. *Sociologist, Economist, and Democracy*. London: Collier Macmillan
- Barton, Greg. 1996. "The Liberal, Progressive Roots of Abdurrahman Wahid's Thought." *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam, and Modernity in Indonesia*. Edited by Greg Barton and Greg Fealy. Clayton: Monash Asia Institute.
- Beatty, Kathleen Murphy, and Oliver Walter. 1984. "Religious Preference and Practice: Reevaluating Their Impact on Political Tolerance." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48/1
- Benda, Harry J. 1982. "Democracy in Indonesia." In *Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate*. Edited by Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project.
- Bendix, Reinhard. 1978. *Kings or People: Power and The Mandate to Rule*. Berkeley: California University Press.
- Berber, Benjamin R. 1984. *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age*.

- Berkley: University of California Press.
- Berelson, Bernard, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1967. *The Social Construction of Reality : A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. New York: Doubleday.
- Billings, Dwight B., and Shaunna L. Scott. 1994. "Religion and Political Legitimacy." *Annual Review of Sociology*, 20: 173-202.
- Binder, Leonard. 1988. *Islamic Liberalism: Critique of Developmental Ideology*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Bourchier, David. 1997. "Totalitarianism and the 'National Personality': Recent Controversy about the Philosophical Basis of the Indonesian State." *Imagining Indonesia: cultural politics and political culture*. edited by Jim Schiller and Barbara Martin-Schiller. Athens, Ohio : Ohio University Center for International Studies.
- . 1994. "The 1950s in New Order Ideology and Politics." *Democracy in Indonesia 19950s and 1990s*. Edited by David Bourchier and John Legge. Clayton: Center for Southesat Asian Studies, Monash University.
- Bowen, John R. 1993. *Muslims through Discourse*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Brady, Henry E. 1999. "Political Participation." *Measures of Political Attitudes*. Edited by John R. Robinson, Phillip R. Shaver, and Lawrence S. Wrightsman. San Diego: Academic Press.
- Burhanudin, Jajat (ed.). 2002. *Ulama Perempuan Indonesia*. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
- Burhanuddin. 2002. "Wawancara Dengan K. H. Abubakar Ba'asyir."
- Burns, Nancy, Scholzman, Key L., Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action. Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
- Bush, Robin. 2002. "Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia: the case of the Nahdlatul Ulama." A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Washington

- Antony Black. 1997. "Christianity and Republicanism: From St. Cyprian to Rousseau." *The American Political Science Review*, 91: 647-656.
- Campbell, Angus., et al. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: John Wiley.
- , Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller. 1954. *The Voter Decides*. Evanston, IL: Row and Peterson Company.
- Citrin, Jack, and Christopher Muste. 1999. "Trust in Government." *Measures of Political Attitudes*. Edited by John P. Robinson, Phillip R. Shaver, and Lawrence S Wrightsman and San Diego: Academic Press.
- Klarke, Harold D., Nitish Dutt, and Allan Kornberg. 1993. "The Political Economy of Attitudes Toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies." *Journal of Politics*, 55: 998-1021.
- Converse, Philip E. 1970. "Attitudes and Nonattitudes: Continuation of a Dialog." *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems*. Edited by Edward Tufte. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- . 1969. "On Time and Political Stability." *Comparative Political Studies*, 2: 139-71.
- Converse, Philip E., and Gregory B. Markus. 1979. "The New CPS Election Study Panel." *The American Political Science Review*, 73: 32-49.
- Conway, M. Margaret. 2000. *Political Participation in the United States*. Washington D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Crook, Richard C., and James Monar. 1998. *Democracy and Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cribb, Robert (ed.). 1990. *The Indonesian Killings of the 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali*. Clayton: Monash University.
- Crouch, Harold. 1988. *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Crozier, Michel, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki. 1975. *The Crisis of Democracy : Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission*. New York: New York University Press.
- Crystal, Jill, and Abdallah al-Shayegi. 1995. "The Pro-Democratic Agenda in Kuwait: Structures and Context." *Political Liberalization and*

- Democratization in the Arab World. Volume II. Edited by Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1997. "Development and Democratic Culture." *Consolidating the Third Wave of Democracy*. Edited by Larry Diamond. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- . 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- . 1961. *Who Governs?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- . 1956. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Davis, J. 1975. "Communism, Conformity, Cohorts, Categories: American Tolerance in 1954 and 1972-1973." *American Journal of Sociology* 81: 491-513.
- Damanik, Ali Said. 2003. *Fenomena Partai Keadilan. Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Penerbit Teraju.
- Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know about Politics and Why it matters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Denny, Frederick M. 1994. *An Introduction to Islam*. New York: McMillan Publishing Company.
- Dhofier, Zamakhsyari. 1982. *Tradisi Pesantren. Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai*. Jakarta: LP3ES.
- Diamond, Larry (ed.). 1997. *Consolidating the third wave democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- . 1996. "Toward Democratic Consolidation." *Global Resurge of democracy*. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- . 1994. *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Duch, Raymond M., and James L. Gibson. 1992. "'Putting Up With' Fascists in Western Europe: A Comparative, Cross-Level Analysis of Political Tolerance." *The Western Political Quarterly* 45: 237-273.
- Edelman, Murray. 1971. *Politics as a Symbolic Action*. Chicago: Marham.
- . 1964. *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

- Effendy, Bahtiar. 1998. *Islam dan Negara. Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktek Politik Islam di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Penerbit Paramadina.
- Eickelman, Dale F., dan James Piscatori. 1996. *Muslim Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Emmerson, Donald K. 1976. *Indonesia's Elite. Political Culture and Cultural Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Enayat, Hamid. 1982. *Modern Islamic Political Thought*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Entelis, John P. 1997. "Introduction." *Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa*. Edited by John P. Entelis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Esposito, John L., dan John O. Voll. 1996. *Islam and Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fananie, Zainuddin, and Atiqa Sabardila. 2001. *Sumber Konflik. Masyarakat Muslim NU-Muhammadiyah. Perspektif Keberterimaan Tahlil*. Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press.
- Feith, Herbert. 1957. *The Indonesian elections of 1955*. Ithaca, N. Y.: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1957
- Fish, M. Steven. 2002. "Islam and Authoritarianism." *World Politics* 55: 4-37.
- Freedom House. 2002. *Freedom in the World*.
- Fuchs, Dieter, Giovanna Guidorossi, and Palle Svensson. 1995. "Support for Democratic System." *Citizens and the State*. Edited by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fuchs, Dieter, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1995. "Citizens and the State. A Relationship Transformed." *Citizens and the State*. Edited by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. "The Primacy of Culture." *Journal of Democracy* 6: 7-14.
- Gaffar, Afan, 1992. *Javanese Voters: A Case Study of Election Under a Hegemonic Party System*. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press.

- Gamson, William A. 1992. *Talking Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1968. *Power and Discontent*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- . 1968. *Islam Observed. Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- . 1962. "The Rotating Credit association: A 'Middle Rung' in Development." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 10. 241-263.
- . 1960. *The Religion of Java*. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press.
- Gellner, Ernst. 1994. Conditions of Liberty. *Civil Society and Its Rivals*. London: Hamish Hamilton.
- . 1990. "Tribalism and the State in the Middle East." *Tribes And the State in the Middle East*. Edited by Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gerges, Fawaz A. 1999. *America and Political Islam : Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gibson, James L. 2001. "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospect for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transitions." *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 51-68.
- . 1998a. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerance." *American Journal of Political Science* 42: 819-850.
- . 1998b. "Putting Up with Fellow Russians: An Analysis of Political Tolerance in the Fledging Russian Democracy." *Political Research Quarterly* 51: 37-68.
- . 1992a. "The Political Consequences of Intolerance: Cultural Conformity and Political Freedom." *The American Political Science Review* 86: 338-356.
- . 1992b. "Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance be 'Leaset-Liked.?'?" *American Journal of Political Science* 36/2.
- . 1989. "The Policy Consequences of Political Intolerance: Political Repression during the Vietnam War Era." *Journal of Politics*, 51: 13-35.

- . 1988. "Political Intolerance and Political Repression during the McCarthy Red Scare." *American Political Science Review*, 8: 511-29.
- Gibson, James L., Duch, Raymond M., and Tedin, K. 1992c. "Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union." *Journal of Politics*, 54: 329-71.
- Gibson, James L., and Raymond M. Duch. 1991. "Elitist Theory and Political Participation in Western Europe." *Political Behavior*, 13: 191-212.
- Gohari, M. J. 2000. *The Taliban. Ascent to Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Grossman, Lawrence K. 1995. *The Electronic Republic: Reshaping Democracy in the Information Age*. New York: Penguin Book.
- Guazzone, Laura (ed.). 1995. *The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World*. Berkshire: Ithaca Press.
- Gunther, Richard, and Anthony Mughan (eds). 2000. *Democracy and the Media. A Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: cambrdidge University Press.
- Haidar, M. Ali. 1994. *Nahdatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia. Pendekatan Fikih dalam Politik*. Jakarta: Penerbit PT. Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
- Halliday, Fred. 1996. *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation : Religion and Politics in the Middle East*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Hefner, Robert W. 2000. *Civil Islam Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 1987. "Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 46: 533-554.
- Higley, John, dan Richard Gunther (eds.). 1992. *Elites and Democratic Consolidation In Latin America and Southern Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hindley, Donald. 1964. *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1952-1963*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1997. *The Clash of Civilizations. Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- . 1993. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

- . 1984. "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly*, 99: 193-218.
- . 1975. "The United States." *The Crisis of Democracy : Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission*. Crozier, Michel, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki. New York: New York University Press.
- . 1968. *Political Order in Changing Society*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hurwitz, Jon, and Jeffery J. Mondak. 2002. "Democratic Principles, Discrimination, and Political Intolerance." *British Journal of Political Science*, 32: 93-118.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1999. "Trust, Well-Being, and Democracy." *Democracy and Trust*. Edited by Mark E. Warren. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 1988. "The Renaissance of Political Culture." *American Political Science Review*, 82: 203-30.
- . 1985. "Aggregate Stability and Individual-Level Change in Mass Belief Systems: The Level of Analysis Paradox." *American Political Science Review* 79: 97-117.
- Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide. Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, Margaret L. 1981. "Political Interest in Western European Women." *Comparative Political Studies*, 14: 299-326.
- Jackson, Karl D. 1980. *Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion. A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jagodzinski, Wolfgang, and Karel Dobbelaere. 1995. "Secularization and Church Religiosity." *The Impact of Values*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jamhari. 2001. "The Meaning Interpreted: The Concept of *Barakah* in *Ziarah*." *Studia Islamika*, 8: 87-128.
- Jenings, M. Kent, and Jan W. van Deth, et al. 1989. *Continuities in Political Action*. New York: Walter DeGruyter.

- Jennings, Kent M., and Gregory B. Markus. 1989. "Political Involvement in the Later Years: A Longitudinal Survey." *The American Journal of Political Science* 32: 302-316.
- , 1989. "Mass participation." *Continuities in Political Action*. Edited by M. Ken Jennings, Jan W. van Deth, et al. New York: Walter de Gruyter
- Joseph, Lawrence B. 1982. "Democratic Revisionism Reconsidered." *American Journal of Political Science*, 25: 160-187.
- Kaase, Max, and Kenneth Newton. 1995. *Beliefs in Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , Alan Marsh. 1979. "Political Action: Theoretical Perspective." *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. Edited by Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase. Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage Publications.
- Kamrava, Meharan. 1998. *Democracy in the Balance. Culture and Society in the Middle East*. New York: Chatam House Publishers.
- Kayam, Umar. 1992. *Mangan Ora Mangan Kumpul*. Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti.
- Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Daerah (1986).
- Kelsay, John. 2002. "Civil Society and Government in Islam." *Islamic Political Ethics. Civil Society, Pluralism, and Conflict*. Edited by Sohail H. Hashmi. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Khalaf-Allah, Muhammad. 1998. "Legislative Authority." *Liberal Islam. A Source Book*. Edited by Charles Kurzman. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Kedourie, Elie. 1994. *Democracy and Arab Political Culture*. Portland: Frank Cass.
- , 1992. *Politics in the Middle East*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Khomeini, Imam Ruhullah. 2000. "The Pillars of an Islamic State." 2000. *Contemporary Debates in Islam : An Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought*. Edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof. New York : St. Martin's Press.
- , 2000. "The Necessity of Islamic Government." *Contemporary Debates in Islam : An Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought*. Edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof. New York : St. Martin's Press.

- Kim, Jae-On, and Charles W. Mueller. 1978. *Introduction to Factor Analysis. What It Is and How To Do It*. Newbury Park: Sage University Paper.
- Kinder, Donald. 1983. "Diversity and Complexity in American Public Opinion." *Political Science: the State of the Discipline*. Edited by Ada W. Finifter. Washington D.C.: American Political Science Association.
- Kinder, Donald and Roderick Kiewiet, 1981. "Sociotropic Politics: The American Case." *British Journal of Political Science*, 2: 129-161.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 1999. "Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis." *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Edited by Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 1979. "The Background of the Ideological Conceptualization." *Political Action: Mass participation in Five Western Democracies*. Edited by Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase, et al. Beverly Hill: Sage.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, and Dieter Fuchs. 1995. *Citizens and the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Koentjaraningrat. 1985. *Javanese Culture*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Kompas. 1999. *Partai-Partai Politik Indonesia. Ideologi, Strtaegi, dan Program*. Jakarta: Kompas Media Nusantara.
- Kramer, Martin (ed.). 1997. *The Islamism Debate*. Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies.
- Kurzman, Charles (ed.). 1998. *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lane, Robert E. 1959. *Political Life: Why and How People get Involved in Politics*. Glencoe, Il: Free Press.
- Layman, Geoffrey C., and Edward G. Carmines. 1997. "Cultural Conflict in American Politics: Religious Traditionalism, Postmaterialism, and U.S. Political Behavior." *Journal of Politics*, 59: 3.
- Leege, David C. and Lyman A. Kellstedt. 1993. *Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

- Leege, David C. 1993. "Religion and Politics in Theoretical Perspective." 1993. *Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics*. Leege, David C. and Lyman A. Kellstedt. New York: M. E. Sharpe.
- Leigh, Barbara. 1991. "Making the Indonesian State: The Role of School Text." *RIMA* 1.
- Lenski, Gerhard. 1961. *The Religious Factor*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
- Lewis, Bernard. 2002. *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 1993. "Islam and Liberal Democracy." *Atlantic Monthly*, 2: 89-98.
- , 1988. *The Political Language of Islam*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- , 1985. *The Jews of Islam*. Princeton. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1995. *Data Analysis*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- , 1986. "Comparative Economic Voting: Britain, France, Germany, Italy," *American Journal of Political Science*, 30: 315-46.
- Liddle, R. William, 2000. "The Story Behind Abdurrahman," *The Jakarta Post*, 9 and 10 February, pp. 4-5
- , 1996. *Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- , *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- , 1970. *Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration: An Indonesian Case Study*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- , and Saiful Mujani. 2000a. "Islam, Kultur Politik, dan Demokratisasi: Sebuah Telaah Komparatif Awal." *Jurnal Demokrasi dan HAM* 1: 133-159
- , and Saiful Mujani. 2000b. "The Triumph of Leadership: Explaining the Indonesian Voter." Paper Presented at the 2000 Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance In Thirty Six Countries*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996a. *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post Communist Europe*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- . 1996b. "Toward Consolidated Democracies." *Journal of Democracy* 7/2.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1994. "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited." *American Sociological Review*, 59: 1-22.
- . 1981. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- . 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review*, 53: 69-105.
- Listhaug, Ola, and Matti Wiberg. 1995. "Confidence in Political and Private Institutions." *Citizens and the State*. Edited by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Locke, John. 1963. *Letter on Toleration*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. 2000. *Idependensi Muhammadiyah di Tengah Pergumulan Pemikiran Islam dan Politik*. Jakarta: Cidesindo.
- . 1985. *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan*. Jakarta: LP3ES.
- Madjid, Nurcholish. 1989. *Islam, Kemoderenan dan Keindonesiaan*. Bandung: Mizan.
- Mahasin, Aswab. 2000. "Membangun Civil Society dari Kancan yang Rentan: Sebuah Pengantar." *Agenda LSM Menyongsong Tahun 2000. Refleksi Pengalaman Dua asawrsa LSM*. Edited by Rustam Ibrahim. Jakarta: Center for the Study of Democracy (CESDA) - LP3ES
- Mallarangeng, Andy A. 1997. "Contextual Analysis on Indonesian Electoral Behavior." A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School, Department of Political Science. Northern Illinois University.
- Marcus, George E., et al. 1995. *With Malice Toward Some. How People Make Civil Liberties Judgment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mardin, Serif. 1995. "Civil Society and Islam." *Civil Society: Theory, History, and Comparison*. Edited by John A. Hall. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Marsh, Alan, and Max Kaase. 1979. "Measuring Political Action." *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. Edited by Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase. Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage Publications.
- Mawdudi, A'bul A'la. 1976. "Political Theory of Islam." *Islam: Its Meaning and Message*. Edited by Kurshid Ahmad. London: Islamic Council of Europe.
- Mernissi, Fatima. 1991. *The Veil and the Male Elite : A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam*. Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Books
- McClosky, Herbert. 1964. "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics." *American Political Science Review*, 58: 361-82.
- McClosky, Herbert., and Zeller, J. 1984. *The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- McDonough, Peter, Samuel H. Barnes and Antonio Lopez Pina. 1986. "The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain." *The American Political Science Review*, 80: 735-760.
- McDonough, Peter, Doh C. Shin, Jose Alvaro Moises. 1998. "Democratization and Participation: Comparing Spain, Brazil, and Korea." *The Journal of Politics*, 60: 919-953.
- McVey, Ruth. 1965. *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press.
- Milbrath, Lester W. 1965. *Political Participation*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Miller, Arthur H., Vicki L. Hesli, William M. Reisinger. 1994. "Reassessing Mass Support for Political and Economic Change in the Former USSR." *The American Political Science Review*, 88: 399-411.
- Miller, Arthur. H., and Listhaug, O. 1990. "Political Parties and Confidence in Government: A Comparison of Norway, Sweden, and United States." *British Journal of Political Science* 20: 357-86.
- Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 1999. "Five Years After the Fall: Trajectories of Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe." *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Edited by Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 1997. "Trust, Distrust, and Skepticism: Popular Evaluation of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies." *Journal of Politics*, 2: 418-451.

- , 1995. "Trajectories of Fear and Hope: Support for Democracy in Post Communist Europe." *Comparative Political Studies*, 28: 553-81.
- Mitchell, Richard. 1964. *The Society of Muslim Brothers*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Moaddel, Mansoor. 2002. "The Study of Islamic Culture and Politics: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 8: 359-86.
- , and Kamran Talattof. 2000. *Contemporary Debates in Islam : An Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought*. New York : St. Martin's Press.
- Monshipouri, Mahmood. 1998. *Islamism, Secularism, and Human Rights in the Middle East*. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner.
- Moussalli, Ahmad S. 2001. *The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
- , 1999. *Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism. The Quest for modernity, Legitimacy, and the Islamic State*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
- Moore Jr., Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Mulkhan, Abdul Munir. 2000. *Islam Murni dalam Masyarakat Petani*. Yogyakarta: Bentang.
- Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1994. "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships." *American Political Science Review*. 88:
- , Jukam, T. O., and Seligson, M. A. 1982. "Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science*, 26: 240-264.
- , and Jukam, T. O. 1977. "On the Meaning of Political Support." *American Political Science Review* 71, 1561-1593.
- , 1977. "The Behavioral Correlates of Political Support." *American Political Science Review* 71: 454-68.
- Mujani, Saiful and R. William Liddle. 2003. "Islamism in Democratic Indonesia: Findings of a New Survey."

- Munhanif, Ali (ed.). 2002. *Perempuan dalam Literatur Islam Klasik*. Jakarta: Pustaka Gramedia Utama.
- Newton, Kenneth. 1999. "Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies." *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Government*. Edited by Pippa Norris. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba, Jae-on Kim. 1974. "Political Participation and the Life Cycle" *Comparative Politics*, 3: 319-340
- Nie, Norman H., Jane Junn, and Kenneth Stehlik-Barry. 1996. *Education and Democratic Citizenship in America*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Noeh, Munawar Fud, and Mastuki HS (eds.). 2002. *Menghidupkan Ruh Pemikiran K. H. Achmad Siddiq*. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
- Noer, Deliar. 1987. *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945-1965*. Jakarta: Grafiti Pers.
- . 1973. *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Norris, Pippa. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix : reinventing political activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (ed). 1999. *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2003. "Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the Clash of Civilizations' Thesis." *Human Values and Social Change. Findings from the Values Surveys*. Edited by Ronald Inglehart. Leiden: Brill.
- Norton, Augustus Richard (ed.). 1995. *Civil Society in the Middle East*. Leiden: Brill.
- Olsen, M. E. 1972. "Social Participation and Voting Turnout: A Multivariate Analysis." *American Sociological Review*, 37: 317-33.
- Parry, Geraint, George Moyser, and Neil Day. 1992. *Political Participation and Democracy in Britain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pateman, Carole. 1971. "Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change." *British Journal of Political Science*, 3: 291-305.

- Pharr, Susan J., and Robert D. Putnam (eds.). *Disaffected democracies : what's troubling the trilateral countries?*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Pipes, Daniel. 1983. *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power*. New York: Basic Books.
- Pranowo, Bambang. 1991. "Creating Islamic Tradition in a Rural Java." PhD dissertation, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia.
- Price, V., and Zaller, J. 1993. "Who Get the News? An Examination of News Reception and Its Implications for Research." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 57: 133-164.
- Price, Daniel E. 1999. *Islamic Political Culture, Democracy, and Human Rights. A Comparative Study*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.
- Prothro, James W., and Charles M. Grigg. 1960. "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement." *Journal of Politics*, 22: 276-94.
- Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Daerah. 1986.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reformisms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Przeworski, Adam et al. 2000. *Democracy and Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling Alone : the Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- . 1993. *Making Democracy Work. Civic Tradition in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D, and Kristin A. Goss. 2002. "Introduction." *Democracies in Flux. The Evaluation of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Putnam, Robert, Susan J. Pharr, and Russell J. Dalton. 2000. "Introduction: What's Troubling the Trilateral Democracies?". *Disaffected democracies : what's troubling the trilateral countries?* Edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Qomar, Mujamil. 2002. NU "Liberal." *Dari Tradisionalisme Ahlussunah ke Universalisme Islam*. Bandung: Penerbit Mizan.
- Rahman, Fazlur. 1979. *Islam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ramadan, Abdul Azim. 1993. "Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Group." *Fundamentalisms and the State*. Edited by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Ramage, Douglas E. 1995. *Politics in Indonesia. Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance*. New York: Routledge.
- Rasjidi, H. M. 1977. *Koreksi Terhadap Drs. Nurcholish Madjid tentang Sekularisasi*. Jakarta: Bulan Bintang.
- Reef, Mary Jo, and David Knoke. 1999. "Political Alienation and Efficacy." *Measures of Political Attitudes*. Edited by John P. Robinson, Phillip R. Shaver, and Lawrence S. Wrightsman. San Diego: Academic Press.
- Richardson, Bradley M. 1997. *Japanese Democracy. Power, Coordination, and Performance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- . 1986. "Japan's Habitual Voters: Partisanship on the Emotional Periphery." *Comparative Political Studies*, 19: 675-93.
- Rose, Richard. 2002. "How Muslims View Democracy: Evidence from Central Asia." *Journal of Democracy* 13: 102-111.
- Rose, Richard and William T. E. Mishler. 1994. "Mass Reaction to Regime Change in Eastern Europe: Polarization or Leaders and Laggards?" *British Journal of Political Science* 24:159-182
- Rosentone, Steven J. 1982. "Economic Adversity and Voting Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 26: 25-46.
- Rosentone, Steven J., and John M. Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*. New York: Macmillan.
- Roy, Olivier. 1994. *The failure of political Islam*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Ruedy, John (ed.). 1994. *Islamism and Secularism in North Africa*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

- Rustow, Dankwart. 1970. "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." *Comparative Politics 2*:
- Samson, Allan A. 1973. "Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesian Islamic Modernism." In *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia*. Edited by R. William Liddle. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Saimima, Iqbal A (ed.). 1988. *Polemik Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam*. Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scarborough, Elinor. 1995. "Materialist-Postmaterialist Value Orientations." *The Impact of Values*. Edited by Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarborough. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. 1997. "Civil Society East and West." *Consolidating the Third Wave of Democracy*. Edited by Larry Diamond. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Schmitt, Herman, and Soren Holmberg. 1995. "Political Parties in Decline?" *Citizen and the State*. Edited by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schroeder, Larry D., David L. Sjoquist, and Paula E. Stephan. 1986. *Understanding Regression Analysis : An Introductory Guide*. Beverly Hills : Sage Publications.
- Schuessler, Alexander A. 2000. *A Logic of Expressive Choice*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Schumpeter, Joseph. 1942. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. 1983. "On the Measurement of Diffuse Support: Some Evidence from Mexico." *Social Indicator Research*, 12: 1-24.
- . 1980. "Trust, Efficacy, and Modes of Political Participation: A Study of Costa Rican Peasant." *British Journal of Political Science*, 10: 75-98.
- Sen, Krishna. 1988. "Filming 'History' under the New Order. Histories and Stories." Edited by Krishna Sen. Clayton: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.

- Sherkat, Darren E., and Christopher G. Ellison. 2001. "Recent Developments and Controversies in the Sociology of Religion." *Annual Review of Sociology*, 25: 363-94.
- Sigmund, Paul E. 1994. "Christian Democracy, Liberation Theology, and Political Culture in Latin America." *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Edited by Larry Diamond. Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner.
- Sjadzali, Munawir. 1988. "Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam." *Polemik Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam*. Edited by Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima. Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1982. "Bringing the State Back In." *Bringing the State Back In*. Edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Soekarno. 1990. *Bung Karno dan Islam : kumpulan pidato tentang Islam, 1953-1966*. Jakarta : Haji Masagung.
- . 1964. *Alqur'an membentuk manusia baru*. Djakarta: Departemen Agama, 1964
- Stouffer, Samuel C. 1955. *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- John M. Strate, et al. 1989. "Life Span Civic Development and Voting Participation." *The American Political Science Review*, 83: 443-464.
- Sujuthi, Mahmud. 2001. *Politik Tarekat. Qadiriyyah wa Naksyabandiyah Jombang*. Yogyakarta: Galang Press.
- Sullivan, John L., et al. 1993. "Why Politicians Are More Tolerant: Selective Recruitment and Socialization among Political Elites in Britain, Israel, New Zealand and United States." *British Journal of Political Science*, 23: 51-76.
- . 1985. *Political Tolerance in Context: Support for Popular Minorities in Israel, New Zealand, and the United States*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press
- Sullivan, John L., James Piereson, and George E. Marcus. 1982. *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1979. "An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases 1950s-1970s." *American Political Science Review*, 73: 233-249.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1996. "Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work." *American Political Science Review*, 90: 389-397.

- Tessler, Mark. 2002a. "Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes toward Democracy in the Arab World: Evidence for the World Values Survey in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 43: 229-249.
- . 2002b. "Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes Toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries." *Comparative Politics*, 34: 337-254.
- . 1999. "Democratic Concern and Islamic Resurgence: Converging Dimensions of the Arab World's Political Agenda." *Democracies and Its Limits. Lessons from Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East*. Edited by Howard Handelman and Mark Tessler. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de. 2000. *Democracy in America*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
- Topf, Richard. 1995. "Electoral Participation." *Citizens and the State*. Edited by Hans Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Turner, Bryan S. 1995. "Islam, Civil Society, and Citizenship." In *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East*. Edited by Nils A. Butenschon, Uri Davis, and Manuel Hassassian. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Uhlin, Anders. 1995. *Democracy and Diffusion. Trnsnational Lesson-Drawing among Indonesia Pro-Democracy Actors*. Lund: Lund Political Studies 87.
- Umar, Nasaruddin. 2002. *Qur'an untuk Prempuan*. Jakarta: Jaringan Islam Liberal dan Teater Utan Kayu.
- UNDP. 2000. *Human Development Report*. www.undp.org
- Van Bruinessen, Martin. 1995. *Kitab Kuning. Pesantren dan Tarekat*. Bandung: Penerbit Mizan.
- Van Der Kroef, Justus M. 1965. *The Communist Party of Indonesia. Its History, Program, and Tactics*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia.
- Van Deth, Jan W. 1997. "Introduction: Social Involvement and Democratic Politics." *Private Groups and Public Life*. Edited by Jan W. van Deth. London: Routledge.
- . 1989. "Interest in Politics." *Continuities in Political Action*. Edited by M. Ken Jennings and Jan W. van Deth et al. New York: Walter de Gruyter

- , 1983. "The Persistence of Materialist and Postmaterialist Value Orientation." *European Journal of Political Research*, 11: 63-79.
- Van Deth, Jan W., and Elinor Scarbrough (eds.). 1995. *The Impact of Values*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Verba, Sidney, Nancy Burns, and Kay Lehman Schlozman. 1997. "Knowing and Caring about Politics: Gender and Political Engagement," *The Journal of Politics* 59: 1051-1072.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality. Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Verba, Sidney, et al. 1995. "Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation." *American Political Science Review*, 89: 271-294.
- Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Verba, Sidney and Norman H. Nie. 1972. *Participation in America*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1984. "Massa Islam dalam Kehidupan Bernegara dan Bangsa." *Prisma*, extra edition: 3-9.
- Wald, Kenneth D. 1992. *Religion and Politics in the United States*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Wald, Kenneth D., and Corwin D. Smidt. 1993. "Measurement Strategies in the Study of Religion and Politics." *Rediscovering the religious factor in American politics*. Edited by David C. Leege et al. Armonk, NY: R. E. Sharpe.
- Wald, Kenneth D., Layman A. Kellstedt, and David C. Leege. 1993. "Church Involvement and Political Behavior." *Rediscovering the religious factor in American politics*. Edited by David C. Leege et al. Armonk, NY: R. E. Sharpe.
- Wald, Kenneth D, and Corwin E. Smidt. 1993. "Measurement Strategies in the Study of Religion and Politics." *Rediscovering Religious Factor in American Politics*. David C. Leege and Layman A Kellstedt. New York: M. E. Sharpe.
- Walker, Jack L. 1966. "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy." *American Political Science Review*, 60: 285-295.
- Warren, Mark E (ed.). 1999. *Democracy and Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Weatherford, Stephen M. 1992. "Measuring Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review*, 86: 149-66.
- . 1984. "Economic 'Stagflation' and Public Support for the Political System." *British Journal of Political Science*, 14: 187-205.
- Waterbury, John. 1996. "Democracy without Democrats?: The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East. *Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*. Edited by Ghassan Salame. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers.
- Weisberg, Herbert. 1992. *Central Tendency and Variability*. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Wildavsky, Aaron. 1987. "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation." *The American Political Science Review* 81: 3-22.
- Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. *Who Votes?*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Wuthnow, Robert. 1999. "Mobilizing Civic Engagement: The Changing Impact of Religious Involvement." *Civic Engagement in American Democracy*. Edited by Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina. Washington D. C.: Brooking Institution Press.
- Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1990. "Political Awareness, Elite Opinion Leadership, and the Mass Survey Response." *Social Cognition*, 8: 125-153.
- Zeller, Richard A., and Edward G. Carmines. 1980. *Measurement in the social sciences : the link between theory and data*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.